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Abstract: 
 
Complicity is a criminal law doctrine that attributes responsibility to those 
who do not physically perpetrate the crime. It is an essential mode of liability 
for core international crimes because it reaches out to senior political and 
military leadership. These persons do not usually engage in direct offending, 
yet in the context of mass atrocities they are often more culpable than foot 
soldiers. The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, hybrid courts and the 
International Criminal Court expressly provide for different forms of 
complicity, and domestic legal systems recognize it in one form or another. 
This is in contrast with alternative modes of liability implied from the 
Statutes to address the situations with multiple accused removed from the 
scene of the crime – (in)direct co-perpetration, extended perpetration and the 
joint criminal enterprise.  
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  1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Complicity is a notoriously difficult legal notion to grasp. K.J.M. Smith wrote 
“[s]urveying complicity’s hazy theoretical landscape, can, depending on the 
commentator’s nerve, temperament, and resilience, induce feelings running 
from hand-rubbing relish to hand-on-the-brow.”1  
Complicity is a doctrine that attributes criminal responsibility to those who do 
not physically perpetrate the crime.
2
 Thus, complicity’s function is to 
construct a link between the accomplice and the criminal act of another 
person. This is not an easy task if one accepts the distinct moral importance of 
the perpetrator’s role.3 Criminal law is premised on the principle of individual 
autonomy that views individuals as rational persons responsible for their own 
acts.
4
 If the perpetrator is the one ultimately responsible for the act, why do 
we need to punish those who merely influence or aid him?  
Smith referred to the difficulties of researching complicity in domestic law. 
Undertaking the same journey in the context of international criminal law 
presents even more challenging obstacles. Consider the following cases: 
 The commander of the Bosnian Serb troops, positioned around Sarajevo 
during the siege of the city, does nothing to prevent the forces under his 
command from targeting - by shelling and sniping - the civilians trapped 
in the city. This situation lasts for twenty-three months. In this period, the 
commander remains passive: sometimes he decreases the level of attacks, 
only to increase them later. The commander’s complicity for ordering 
crimes perpetrated by the troops is established based on his lack of 
reaction to these crimes. There is no the direct evidence that he ordered 
the attacks. The commander is sentenced to life imprisonment;
5
 
 
 The most senior officer in the Yugoslav Army knowingly provides 
logistical and personnel assistance to the Army of the Republika Srpska, 
which is committing crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
6
 He is acquitted 
                                                             
1
 K.J.M. Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity, Clarendon Press 
Oxford, 1991, at 4. 
2
 Kutz defined complicity slightly differently as a concept that renders one person liable for 
the criminal act of another when the accomplice intentionally aids, encourages, or both, the 
direct perpetrator in the commission of act. See C. Kutz, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of 
Complicity Law’, in J. Deigh and D. Dolinko (eds) The Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal 
Law, Oxford University Press, 2011, at 151.  
3
 K.J.M. Smith, at 81. 
4
 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, Clarendon Law Series, 2
nd
 ed, 1995, at 83. 
5
 Prosecutor v. Galić, ICTY Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment, 5 December 2003 (‘Galić 
Trial Judgment’), §§ 741-749. 
6
 Prosecutor v. Perišić, ICTY Case No. 04-81-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 February 2013 
(‘Perišić Appeal Judgment’), §§ 2, 62 and 68. 
  
 
 
 
2 
of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity, including murder, 
persecutions, and attacks on civilians. The rationale for the acquittal is a 
failure to establish that the officer’s assistance is specifically directed at 
supporting the criminal activities, and not just aimed at winning the war;
7
 
 
 The acting president of Liberia and a member of the ECOWAS 
Committee supplies financial aid and other forms of practical assistance 
to warlords in the neighbouring Sierra Leone, where he knows crimes are 
being committed on a large scale.
8
 The accused is convicted of aiding 
and abetting and planning murders, rapes and other acts of violence 
committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war. He is sentenced to 50 
years of imprisonment;
9
 
 
 A pharmacy owner in Rwanda participates in a meeting where the 
demolition of a local church is discussed. Approximately 2000 Tutsi 
men, women and children are known to have taken refuge in this church. 
After the meeting, the businessman gets a bulldozer that is subsequently 
brought to the parish and used to demolish the church, crushing those 
inside.
10
  The businessman is sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment for 
planning genocide and extermination.
11
  
 
These examples demonstrate the complexity of holding an individual 
complicit in crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. International 
criminality breeds an infinite number of factual scenarios; the accused range 
from local businessmen to the former (or acting) heads of state. Because 
international criminal law targets organized, large-scale offending, the 
distance between the accomplice and the harm is usually greater compared 
with the regular domestic law situations. This peculiarity creates much room 
for inferential analysis as to the mental state of the accused and fosters 
creativity in the application of traditional legal doctrines. Different 
interpretations of the same doctrine lead to startlingly different results in each 
particular case – from life sentence to an acquittal.  
 
                                                             
7
 Ibid, §§ 62 and 68. 
8
 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Trial Judgement, 11 May 2012 (‘Taylor Trial 
Judgment’), §§ 6920. 6952, 6956.  
9
 Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-A, Appeal Judgment, 26 September 2013 (‘Taylor Appeal 
Judgment’).  
10 
 Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, ICTR Case No. 02-78-T, Trial Judgement, 1 November 2010 
(‘Kanyarukiga Trial Judgment’), §§ 644-653.  
11  
Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, ICTR Case No. 02-78-A, Appeal Judgment, 8 May 2012 
(‘Kanyarukiga Appeal Judgment’), § 285. 
  
 
 
 
3 
The state of mind of an accomplice in mass atrocities presents another 
difficulty as it differs from the state of mind of a complicit individual in 
ordinary crimes. In the context of domestic law, criminality is a form of 
deviance from the norm. The principal perpetrator chooses to offend with the 
knowledge and understanding that he is defying the rules accepted in his 
society. The accomplice, for his part, takes a culpable decision to assist the 
principal. The responses of the domestic criminal justice system are 
consequently tuned towards ensuring conformity and preventing deviance.
12
  
 
In contrast, participation in international crimes often stems from obedience 
rather than deviance. Political violence creates circumstances whereby 
authority is exercised to induce offending on the part of subordinates and 
creates a culture of impunity. Experiments aimed at testing human capacity to 
resist authority when put under pressure to perform acts going against human 
conscience show that on average less than a half of those tested were able to 
do so.
13
 As a consequence, the will of the principal perpetrator in 
international criminal law is frequently compromised - he becomes part of the 
system that makes it easier for him to offend than to desist. In contrast, the 
accomplice that occupies a senior position in the state or army apparatus may 
have more leeway than the foot soldier to resist authority and make the right 
choices. Thus, international criminal law turns the assumption that the act of 
the principal has distinct moral importance on its head: the accomplice is 
often more culpable than the actual perpetrator.  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain what complicity means within 
international criminal law context and to define the legal requirements of its 
various forms, as well as to delimit complicity from the neighbouring 
concepts, such as co-perpetration and common design.
14
 This thesis uses legal 
tools to tackle complicity. It must be noted, however, that the concept lies at 
the intersection of law, philosophy, human psychology, sociology and 
                                                             
12
 In the words of Hart, criminal law sets up, in its rules, standards of behavior to encourage 
certain types of conduct and discourage others. See H.L.A. Hart and J. Gardner, Punishment 
and Responsibility: Essays on Philosophy of Law, Oxford University Press, 2009, at 6. 
13
 S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority. An Experimental View, Tavistock, 1974. 
14
 This thesis does not address in detail another neighbouring concept - command 
responsibility, also referred to as superior responsibility. This notion shares some common 
features with accomplice liability in that they are both accessory to principal crimes 
committed by primary perpetrators. The key difference that distinguishes command 
responsibility from complicity is the fact that superior is liable not for his part in the 
commission of crimes by his subordinates, but for his own personal failure to adopt measures 
to prevent and punish those acts. The superior is sanctioned for a culpable omission. This 
divergence is so fundamental that it places command responsibility in a category separate 
from all other liability modes. See Prosecutor v. Orić, ICTY Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial 
Judgement, 30 June 2006 (‘Orić Trial Judgment’), § 292; G. Mettraux, The Law of Command 
Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2009, at 39. 
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criminology. Under what circumstances an individual is responsible for the 
act of another person is a serious dilemma that can be approached from 
different angles. 
 
The task of defining complicity is not an easy one - it creates much 
uncertainty. What elements should be included in the various forms of 
complicity? Is it possible to come up with a single formula for complicity that 
would suit the plethora of factual scenarios in international criminal law or is 
this an unattainable goal? Do we need to distinguish between different forms 
of liability at all? And if so, why? The quest for complicity and its 
consequences also inevitably raises questions relating to the general nature of 
international criminal law, its sources, and its punishment rationales. Thus, 
complicity serves an additional function in this thesis: it is used as a test to 
assess the method and purposes of international criminal law.  
Four main points will take shape on the basis of the discussion in the 
subsequent chapters: 
1. Crafting a blanket provision defining complicity does not appear 
feasible in international criminal law. A single formula that would 
magically assist in the attribution of individual criminal responsibility 
to those removed from the crime is akin to a Kafkian castle – an 
unachievable objective.  
 
2. Having said this, it is essential to define most comprehensively the 
constituent elements of the various forms of complicity - the conduct 
requirement and the fault requirement. Thoroughly researched 
doctrine serves as a solid basis for the subsequent evaluation of facts.  
 
3. Complicity in its various manifestations is a useful tool in describing 
the conduct of the accused in the most accurate terms. It has the 
advantage over its alternatives – extended co-perpetration and joint 
criminal enterprise – of being deeply rooted in domestic criminal law 
and, thus, enjoying more acceptance and legitimacy at the national 
and international level. This is so because complicity as a ‘general 
principle of law’ has a solid foundation in the sources of international 
law, while its alternatives do not enjoy the same status. 
 
4. The key to the successful application of different forms of complicity 
is a careful balancing of its different elements on the basis of the facts 
of the case: in instances when the accomplice is in the physical 
proximity to the unfolding atrocities, his culpability may be inferred 
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from the surrounding circumstances, while his contribution to the 
crime needs to be spelled out in detail – mere presence at the scene is 
not sufficient to attract criminal responsibility. In cases when the 
accomplice is removed from the principal perpetrator – in time or in 
space – the emphasis should be on the accomplice’s guilty state of 
mind. The more tenuous the connection between the accomplice and 
the crime, the less an inferential analysis of his mental state is to be 
allowed. In the end, it is the faulty choice to assist another in the 
commission of the crime that makes accessory participation 
punishable.  
 
The following chapters explore complicity from various angles. Chapter I 
discovers the historical origins of complicity in international criminal law – a 
field of law that, from its very inception, has struggled with the attribution of 
individual responsibility for collective wrongdoing. The discussion focuses 
on different mechanisms of addressing the collective dimension of 
international crimes, including complicity. A historical perspective also 
showcases the importance of domestic criminal law in shaping modern 
international criminal law.  
Chapter II investigates how the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) use complicity in their case law. It 
also touches upon the ‘competing’ concepts designed to address crimes with 
multiple accused. This overview reaches the conclusion that there are some 
gaps and inconsistencies in the understanding of complicity by these judicial 
bodies. The problematic aspects include the lack of sufficiently defined 
standard of causation; frequent disconnection between the facts of the case, 
the elements of the substantive crimes and the legal requirements of liability 
modes, and refining complicity by adding to it new elements not rooted in the 
sources of international law. 
Chapter III discusses complicity in the context of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). The Rome Statute of the ICC provides the most comprehensive 
article on individual criminal responsibility in the history of international 
criminal law.15 It seems, however, that the court has until recently neglected 
complicity in favour of the certain forms of commission. The ICC appears to 
have viewed commission as the most appropriate form of responsibility for 
dealing with mass crimes because it corresponds to the higher levels of 
                                                             
15
 Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), of 17 July 
1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (‘Rome Statute’). 
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culpability of the accused. Some arguments against linking culpability of the 
accused to the mode of participation are presented in Chapter III. 
Chapters II and III show the struggle of the ad hoc tribunals - the ICTY and 
the ICTR; the hybrid courts - the SCSL and the ECCC; and the ICC to find a 
mode of participation that accommodates crimes with multiple accused. 
These judicial bodies define to some extent the traditional modes of 
participation through their statutes and jurisprudence. The tendency is to 
extend or adjust traditional participation modes to ‘fit’ international cases.  
The other notable trend in international jurisprudence is a disregard of the 
traditional forms of liability in favour of newly developed concepts that are 
not expressly provided by their respective statutes. This paradox served as an 
inspiration for Chapter IV that includes comparative analysis of complicity in 
various domestic jurisdictions around the world in an attempt to find the roots 
of complicity and to legitimize this concept in an international arena. 
Complicity in one form or another appears to be recognized by all legal 
systems under review. The comparative exercise is instructive for two 
reasons: first, it grounds complicity, in legal terms, as a ‘general principle of 
law’; 16  and, secondly, it helps to reach a deeper understanding of the 
considerations that underlie various forms of complicity. From the overview 
of domestic legal systems it becomes clear that international courts, at times, 
‘cherry picked’ particular features and characterized modes of participation in 
different legal orders in an attempt to create a form of criminal responsibility 
best suited to international criminal law.17 Whether such ‘cherry picking’ is 
appropriate in lieu of the comprehensive analysis of different approaches is a 
relevant question. 
Chapter V contains a comparative analysis of complicity in the law of state 
responsibility and in international criminal law. The limits of complicity in 
both fields are carefully spelled out in this chapter. The findings show strong 
links between the law of state responsibility and international criminal law. It 
appears that both fields of law are complementary in filling the impunity 
gaps, but there are limits to cross-fertilization between the two domains.  
Chapter VI explores the correlation between complicity and punishment. In 
some domestic legal systems, complicity, especially in the form of aiding and 
abetting, results in the mitigation of an accomplice’s sentence compared to 
                                                             
16
 Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute assigns “general principles of law derived from state 
laws of legal systems in the world” the role of a secondary source of law in the ICC. 
Consequently, the survey of domestic legal systems asserts the foundation of complicity as a 
general principle of law. 
17
 For example, ‘indirect co-perpetration’ used by the ICC stems from the German legal 
thought. 
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that of the principal perpetrator. No such rule exists in international criminal 
law. This is not to claim that the form of participation plays no role at 
sentencing at an international level. The mode of liability may or may not – 
depending on the facts of the case - assist in assessing the gravity of the 
offence for sentencing purposes. However, it is the totality of factors - and not 
a single parameter – that is the basis for the final determination of the 
appropriate punishment for the convicted person. 
Finally, the concluding Chapter VII situates complicity in a broader context 
of international criminal law. This chapter looks at the aims of international 
criminal law as well as its limitations. The purpose is to set the direction in 
which the law on individual criminal responsibility should evolve. It appears 
that international criminal law currently struggles with the multitude of 
different aims that it strives to achieve, some of which are conflicting. In the 
absence of a consensus on the dominant goal of international criminal justice, 
defining various legal concepts, complicity included, presents some 
difficulties. It is argued in this chapter that the main role of international 
criminal law is symbolic – it signifies an agreement about the values shared 
by international community as a whole. In line with this general function, 
international criminal law should be conceptualized as an exemplary justice 
mechanism that embraces the notion of fairness to the greatest extent 
possible. Consequently, the ambition should be to apply the principle of fair 
labelling and describe the conduct of the accused in the most precise terms. 
Complicity is an indispensible tool in this process.
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I. The Evolution of Complicity as a Construction for 
Dealing with Collective Criminality 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the evolution of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility for violations of international law. This principle began 
developing at Nuremberg with the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal (‘IMT’) pursuant to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945.1 The 
Nuremberg Charter attached to the London Agreement was one of the first 
international legal instruments targeting persons, as opposed to states.
2
  
Article 6 of the Charter established the jurisdiction of the IMT over persons 
acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, ‘as individuals or as 
members of organizations’. 3  Control Council Law No. 10, passed a few 
months later, provided a framework for the subsequent prosecution of war 
criminals in the occupied Germany.
4
 The Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (‘IMTFE’)5 followed the lead of the Nuremberg 
Charter by focusing on Far Eastern war criminals.
6
 These instruments 
represented a new development in public international law: piercing the veil 
of the state in the sphere of war crimes.
7
  The shift to individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes was easier on paper than in practice, 
and entailed the challenges discussed below. 
Since its inception, international criminal law struggled with the problem of 
attributing responsibility for mass atrocities. The main difficulties are the 
enormity of crimes in question, the collective nature of criminal activity that 
involves many individuals at different levels of state hierarchy and the strong 
organizational element involved in the commission of international crimes.
8
 
                                                             
1
 United Nations, Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals 
of the European Axis (‘London Agreement’), 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.C. 280. 
2  
Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the London Agreement of 8 
August 1945 for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, 82 UNTS 279 (‘Nuremberg Charter’).  
3
 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, emphasis added. 
4 
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and Against Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for 
Germany, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946, Art. II.2. 
5
 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East of 19 January 1946, as 
amended 26 April 1946 (‘Tokyo Charter’). 
6
 Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter.  
7
 Andrew Clapham describes the Nuremberg trials as a paradigm shift, going beyond the 
obligations of states and attaching duties to individuals. See A. Clapham, ‘Issues of 
Complexity, Complicity and Complementarity: from Nuremberg Trials to the Dawn of the 
Next International Criminal Court’, in AT Sands (ed.), From Nuremberg to the Hague: The 
Future of International Criminal Justice, Cambridge University Press, 2003, at 33. 
8
 The former IMTFE judge Röling underlined the complexity of the matter by calling 
international crimes ‘system criminality’. See E. Van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal 
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Right from its conception, the principle of individual criminal responsibility 
for the violations of international law struggled with the complexity of the 
offences in question. The famous pronouncement of the IMT, “[c]rimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities…’,9 
stands in contrast with the constructions developed by this tribunal to capture 
the collective nature of crimes committed by Nazi Germany – conspiracy, 
criminal organization and inference of guilt based on the official position of 
the accused in the apparatus of power. Likewise, the judgment of the IMTFE 
relied heavily on the notion of conspiracy and the group responsibility of 
members of the government for violations of the law of war.
10
  
Complicity as a traditional criminal law concept for attributing criminal 
responsibility to those who do not physically perpetrate the crime is at the 
heart of this tension stemming from the need to declare individual guilt while 
capturing the collective nature of wrongdoing.
11
 The Special Rapporteur of 
the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) assigned with drafting the Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Doudou Thiam, 
insightfully pointed out that in the context of international crimes, the 
“traditional moulds are broken”, and “the classic dichotomy of principal and 
accomplice, which is the simplest schema, is no longer applicable because of 
the plurality of actors.”12  
The purpose of the chapter is to situate complicity in the context of 
international criminal law by providing a historical overview of the doctrine’s 
development. The contours of complicity in international criminal law can 
only be drawn against this historical background. There are two additional 
reasons for looking into the past. First, from the strictly legal perspective, the 
historical analysis provides evidence as to the formation of custom in the 
meaning of Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. Custom is a notoriously ambiguous source of international law when 
                                                                                                                                                              
Responsibility in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, at 20. A. Nollkaemper 
developed the notion of system criminality to include the wide variety of actors. See A. 
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Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
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Am. J. Int'l L. 333 1947, at 221. 
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 US and others v. Araki, Sadao and others, judgment of 12 November 1948, in J. Pritchard 
and S. M. Zaide (eds.) (‘Tokyo Judgment’), at 48,445-6. See N. Boister, “The Application of 
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International Military Tribunal”, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2010, at 425-
447. 
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11 
it comes to defining human rights obligations and international criminal law 
provisions,
13
 and the historical analysis assists in dispelling some of the 
uncertainties associated with the existence or absence of a certain customary 
rule (in this case – complicity). Secondly, the development of complicity 
reveals tensions characteristic of international criminal law in general, 
allowing for deeper insight into this field of law. 
One can identify three main avenues along which complicity historically 
evolved as a concept: the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the subsequent trials 
of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals and domestic 
courts, and, finally, the efforts of the International Law Commission in 
codifying the Nuremberg principles and drafting the Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind.
14
  This chapter will follow the 
chronological development of complicity along these three avenues, while 
focusing on the tensions associated with the concept of complicity that run 
throughout history. The first part of the paper will look into the means of 
addressing collective criminality during the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
proceedings. Part two will explore how accomplice liability evolved at the 
crossroads of domestic and international law in the course of the subsequent 
prosecutions of the former Nazis.
15
 Section three will discover the work of the 
International Law Commission (‘ILC’) in defining complicity for the 
purposes of international criminal law. The fourth part will elaborate on the 
tensions that shaped complicity over time.  
1. Conspiracy vs. Complicity at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
It is important to remember that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters were the 
products of a political compromise between the Allied powers.
16
 A number of 
conflicts, mostly rooted in national variations, characterized the London 
Conference where the Nuremberg Charter was adopted. The US Chief 
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Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert H. Jackson stressed, among other things, the 
ideological dissimilarities between the Soviet and the Western European legal 
traditions and the differences between the common-law adversarial 
proceedings and the continental inquisitorial criminal trial.
17
 The wording of 
the Tokyo Charter was based largely on that of the Nuremberg Charter, with 
some changes necessitated by the different circumstances of the Far East.
18
 
Thus, the Tokyo Charter embraced many of the ambiguities of its Nuremberg 
prototype. The political and legal concessions made at birth of international 
criminal law affects the way we view subsequent proceedings.  
i. Conspiracy as a Method of Dealing with Collective 
Criminality 
The struggle among legal traditions coupled with various extra-legal 
considerations did not stop at the stage of the drafting of the IMT and IMTFE 
Charters. Framing the charges and, in particular, defining the link between the 
accused and the crime, was highly influenced by the Anglo-Saxon concept of 
conspiracy. The first count of the IMT indictment – general conspiracy 
incorporating all actions of the accused deemed to be criminal from the 
formation of the Nazi Party in 1919 to the end of the war in 1945– was the 
solution proposed by Prosecutor Jackson on the basis of the memorandum by 
the US military lawyer Murray Bernays.
19
 The Nuremberg prosecution team 
charged, under count one, conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, as defined in Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter. This Article called for individual criminal responsibility 
for the following acts: 
(a) crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) war crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of the 
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the 
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity; 
(c) crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
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deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation 
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan. 
Continental lawyers at Nuremberg objected to the grand conspiracy charge 
and rejected the idea of conviction without proof of the specific crimes 
perpetrated by the defendant.
20
  As a result of this disagreement, the IMT felt 
compelled to narrow the scope of the charge in two respects. First, it rejected 
the prosecution’s idea of a single conspiracy capturing all the criminal 
conduct of the defendants, and instead held that the evidence establishes the 
existence of many separate plans. The tribunal declined to accept Hitler’s 
‘Mein Kampf ‘as the evidence of a common plan:  
Conspiracy is not defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the 
conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not be too 
far removed from the time of decision and of action. The planning, to be 
criminal, must not rest merely on the declarations of a party program, such as 
are found in the 25 points of the Nazi Party, announced in 1920, or the political 
affirmations expressed in Mein Kampf in later years.
21
  
Secondly, the IMT distinguished between conspiracy to commit acts of 
aggressive war as a substantive crime flowing from Article 6(a) of the 
Nuremberg Charter and conspiracy in the sense of Article 6(c) aimed at 
establishing the responsibility of persons participating in a common plan. The 
IMT proceeded with charges under count one only in relation to the 
substantive crime of conspiracy to wage aggressive war.
 22
 As a result of 
curtailing the conspiracy charge, three of the defendants – von Papen, Schacht 
and Fritsche were acquitted on all four counts of the indictment.
23
 The IMT 
entered convictions for this charge only in relation to seven defendants, who 
were ‘informed and willing participants of German aggression’.24   
One of the greatest opponents of conspiracy at Nuremberg - the French judge 
Donnedieu de Vabres – criticized this legal doctrine as being specific to 
common law and unknown to German and French law.
25
 De Vabres insisted 
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14 
that the last paragraph of Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter adopts the 
French notion of complicity and endorses the principles of ordinary criminal 
law.
26
 He explained that the charge of conspiracy stems from the same social 
necessity to capture the acts of a multitude of individuals that is present in 
both continental and English law. The technical means of addressing this 
legal problem in continental law are, however, different. French law uses the 
notion of complicity or accessory participation in relation to the intended 
crime. The French point of view is subjective in that it captures the moral or 
psychological element connecting separate conducts which aim at the same 
result, namely the commission of the common crime. In contrast, the English 
notion of conspiracy focuses on the external objective indicators of the 
existence of a common plan. De Vabres thought that the French counterpart 
of conspiracy – complicity – is more consistent with modern doctrines that 
insist on the idea of individualized punishment.
27
  
In addition to conspiracy, the IMT used another concept to address the issue 
of collective criminality. The tribunal pronounced certain organizations that 
existed in the Nazi Germany criminal. These organizations were the 
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, SS, Gestapo, the General Staff and High 
Command.
28
 The idea behind this pronouncement was that the declaration by 
the IMT of the criminality of a group would have the definitive authority of 
res judicata in the subsequent prosecutions of members of these 
organizations.
29
 
The wording of Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter was very similar to that of 
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. Article 5 provided for individual criminal 
responsibility for the following acts:  
(a) crimes against peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for 
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) conventional war crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war; 
(c) crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of 
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not 
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15 
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, 
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common 
plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any person in execution of such plan. 
The Tokyo prosecution team, like the Nuremberg prosecutors, opted for the 
all-encompassing count of conspiracy (count one), but also supplemented it 
with a number of subsequent counts, breaking down the grand conspiracy into 
constituent parts. The reason for these extra counts was to secure convictions 
if the umbrella charge failed, as happened at Nuremberg.
30
  
The IMTFE prosecution extended conspiracy over a  period of over eighteen 
years and defined its objective in broad terms of securing “the military, naval, 
political, and economic domination of East Asia and the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans, and for all countries and islands therein and bordering thereon...”31 
However, in contrast with the Nuremberg judgement that rejected the 
existence of grand conspiracy, the first broad count of the Tokyo indictment 
proved to be successful, rendering the subsequent sub-conspiracy counts 
redundant. The majority judgment supported the broad interpretation of 
conspiracy to wage aggressive war – all of the defendants, except general 
Matsui and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, were convicted on count one as 
“leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices” in the conspiracy. 32   The 
IMTFE established, “the conspiracy existed for and its execution occupied a 
period of many years,” and “[a]ll of those who at any time were parties to the 
criminal conspiracy or who at any time with guilty knowledge played a part in 
its execution are guilty of the charge contained in Count I.”33  
The charge of conspiracy to wage an aggressive war stemmed from the 
provision of Article 5(a) of the Charter. The IMTFE interpreted this provision 
to contain five different substantive crimes: planning, preparation, initiation 
and waging aggressive war, and participation in a common plan or conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
34
 Therefore, the tribunal 
treated conspiracy, as well all the other ways of engaging in war listed under 
the same heading, as a separate substantive crime and not as a mode of 
participation. In the view of the IMTFE, the last sentence of Article 5(c) 
related exclusively to sub-paragraph (a), which referred to conspiracy as a 
crime.
35
  Thus, just like the Nuremberg tribunal, the IMFTE rejected the view 
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that the Charter criminalized conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.
 36
   
The IMTFE also found that the charge of conspiracy subsumed the actions of 
the original conspirators or later adherents directed towards planning and 
preparing for its fulfilling. This merger rendered it unnecessary to enter 
convictions for planning and preparing aggressive wars.
 37
 More importantly 
for this discussion, the judgment did not attempt to distinguish the substantive 
crimes and modes of liability in the context of both sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) 
of the Tokyo Charter: conspiracy was treated as a substantive offence, yet its 
function in attributing guilt to all those who took part in the conspiracy 
resembled the notion of the joint criminal enterprise.
38
  
The decision of the IMTFE to adopt the notion of grand conspiracy quickly 
attracted criticism from contemporaries.
39
 One of the main arguments against 
conspiracy was the non-transferability of the concept from domestic to 
international law.
40
  Gordon Ireland noted back in 1950 that conspiracy is 
elastic and its elasticity stems from the authority of the state to administer 
criminal equity based on the need to prevent and suppress crimes.
 41
 The 
safeguard against stretching conspiracy too far is the opt-out provision: the 
participant can withdraw from the agreement by adequate notice without 
entailing responsibility for the overt acts subsequently undertaken.
42
 The 
IMTFE did not develop a similar opt-out provision in relation to the 
defendants, making them collectively responsible for the crimes committed 
during the whole period of the existence of conspiracy, regardless of the time 
when each became part of the agreement and their respective contributions. 
This approach amounted to administering guilt by association. 
Just like the French judge at Nuremberg, the IMTFE French judge – Henri 
Bernard - insisted on the broader use of complicity. His point of view was 
that the Japanese Emperor should have been punished as a principal author of 
the Pacific War and all of the defendants standing trial at Tokyo could only 
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be considered his accomplices.
43
 Judge Pal (India) in his dissent also 
criticized the prominent place that conspiracy occupied in the Tokyo 
indictment and held that “conspiracy by itself is not at all a crime in 
international life.”44 From the substantive point of view, he disagreed with the 
existence of conspiracy, with its alleged criminal purpose for domination of 
the territories and with the fact that the defendants were members of thereof.
45
  
ii. The Sentencing Policy 
The IMT judgment was divided into three distinct parts – the first part 
outlined in detail the factual circumstances of Germany’s aggression against 
several countries. The second part followed the indictment and discussed the 
charges against the defendants, the third and final part of the judgment dealt 
with reasons for declaring the guilt or innocence of the twenty-two accused 
standing trial.
46
 This part did not attempt to ‘label’ the behavior of the 
accused with any legal terms. There is no analysis as to the elements of 
crimes or the necessary legal requirements for the commission of these 
crimes. This part simply discussed the position of the accused in the Nazi 
regime and the specific events in which the accused took part.  
Without distinguishing the modes of liability of the accused, the sentences in 
the judgment reflect to some extent the degree of their participation. For 
example, Reich Marshall Hermann Göring received a death sentence. He is 
described as the most prominent individual in the Nazi regime after Hitler. He 
developed the Gestapo and created the first concentration camps. He 
commanded one of the major attacks on Poland and signed a directive 
concerning the maltreatment of Polish workers in Germany.  Therefore, his 
high position of authority and first hand participation in the atrocities 
committed by Nazi regime justified, in the view of the IMT, imposition of 
ultimate punishment. It is peculiar that the IMT characterized Göring’s 
admissions regarding the use of slave labor as ‘complicity’ in the crime. One 
can infer, however, that the IMT used this term loosely, referring to Göring’s 
association with the crime rather than the mode of participation. Similarly, 
Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was sentenced to death 
because of his significant diplomatic role in activity that ultimately led to the 
attack on Poland and his active assistance in carrying out certain criminal 
policies, particularly those involving extermination of Jews.   
In contrast, the subsequent Minister of Foreign Affairs and Reich Protector of 
Bohemia and Moravia Konstantin von Neurath was only sentenced to fifteen 
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years of imprisonment because his participation in the crimes committed by 
Nazi Germany was mostly limited to attending conferences and negotiations. 
Moreover, he intervened with the Security Police for the release of 
Czechoslovaks detained for protesting against German occupation. Similarly, 
the Supreme Commander of the Navy Karl Dönitz received only ten years of 
imprisonment in recognition of his limited participation in Hitler’s plans. He 
appeared to have known about the concentration camps but his active 
involvement amounted to a single instance of waging unrestricted submarine 
warfare upon all British merchant ships - contrary to the Naval Protocol of 
1936 - whereby Dönitz ordered the murder of survivors of all shipwrecked 
vessels, whether enemy or neutral. 
Despite the fact that the offenders’ role in the commission of crimes was to 
some extent acknowledged in the judgment, the sentencing policy of the IMT 
attracted wide criticism. Some scholars were dissatisfied with the fact that 
IMT imposed the death sentence for crimes against humanity and not for 
planning the aggressive wars.
47
 Others criticized the Nuremberg Tribunal for 
adhering to an excessively high standard of proof in relation to the 
‘conspiracy’ count of the indictment.48  
The Tokyo judgment is over one thousand pages in volume, substantially 
longer than its Nuremberg counterpart (less than two hundred pages). 
Notwithstanding the difference in length, the Tokyo judgment essentially 
followed the same fact-based approach adopted at Nuremberg, explaining at 
extraordinary length the circumstances of Japan’s military domination and 
aggression,
49
 but devoting remarkably little space to the individual 
contribution of each of the accused.
50
 This discrepancy showcased the 
collective-guilt approach adopted by the Tokyo tribunal. 
The sentences rendered by the Tokyo tribunal were harsher than those handed 
down by the IMT: out of twenty-eight senior figures of the Japanese 
government and military standing trial in Tokyo, seven were sentenced to 
death, sixteen – to life imprisonment, two (Shigemitsu and Toco) to the 
imprisonment of seven and twenty years, respectively, two defendants died 
during the trial, while one was declared insane.
51
 These sentences were more 
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homogenous than those issued at Nuremberg, making it even more difficult to 
distinguish between the level of culpability and the nature of the contribution 
of each particular accused. The position occupied by the defendant within the 
government and military apparatus often served as an indication of his 
participation in a common plan.  
For example, the IMTFE convicted and sentenced to life Sadao Araki, 
Japan’s Minister of War between 1931 and 1934, as a ‘prominent leader’ of 
conspiracy to wage aggressive war and “an energetic proponent of the Army 
policy of political domination at home and of military aggression abroad.” 52  
Similarly, General Kenji Dohihara, who had spent eighteen years in China, 
was sentenced to death due to his being “intimately involved in the initiation 
and development of the war of aggression waged against China.” The tribunal 
noted that Dohihara acted in close concert with other military leaders, without 
however naming those individuals.
53
  
In addition to the conspiracy charge, charges related to war crimes attracted a 
number of convictions in Tokyo.
 54
  Shunroko Hata, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the expeditionary forces in China in 1941-1944, was convicted and 
sentenced to life for, inter alia, failing to secure the observance of the laws of 
war (count 55 of the indictment). The IMTFE attributed responsibility to Hata 
solely based on the fact that troops under his command committed atrocities 
in China over a long period of time, and he either knew of these things and 
took no steps to prevent their occurrence, or he was indifferent.
55
 The IMTFE 
thus adhered to a very relaxed mens rea standard.
56
 The duty to prevent war 
crimes was also extended to government officials.
57
 The IMTFE held that the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mamoru Shigemitsu, as a member of the 
government, was responsible for the welfare of prisoners, and it was 
incumbent on him to investigate the situation and press the matter, if 
necessary to the point of resigning, in order to acquit himself of a 
responsibility.
58
 Shigemitsu was sentenced only to seven years of 
imprisonment, which could indicate that the tribunal regarded him less 
culpable than his military counterparts. 
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2. Domestic Law vs. International Law During the 
Subsequent Trials 
Domestic law continued to play an important role in shaping international 
criminal law during the criminal trials of war criminals that followed the 
Nuremberg IMT. These trials relied on the two sets of rules relating to 
criminal responsibility: provisions implementing Control Council Law No. 10 
and national criminal law.
59
 The rules enacted in the British and American 
zones were based on Control Council Law No. 10, while other states, such as 
France and Norway, relied exclusively on their domestic law in trying war 
criminals.
60
 Even those states that relied on Control Council Law No. 10 drew 
heavily on their domestic law in determining the main criminal law concepts.  
i. The British Approach 
The British way of dealing with multiple perpetrators of war crimes was to 
charge them with ‘being concerned in’ committing a specific war crime.61 
This charge stemmed from the traditional English criminal law notion of 
common design.
62
 Framing the charges along the lines of common design 
exposed the ambiguities inherent to English law, which is unclear as to 
whether ‘common design’ is an additional form of accomplice liability 
(beyond aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring), or if it is simply attached 
to each of them, serving as a legal construction of addressing the unexpected 
turn of events.
63
  For example, during the Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Nine 
Others, the British Military Court in Essen faced the task of determining 
whether several members of the German Security Police were concerned in 
the killing of three unarmed members of the Allied air force, who were hiding 
in the house provided by members of the Resistance.  Instead of effectuating 
the arrest, the defendants shot the pilots.
64
 The court convicted four of the 
defendants and acquitted the remainder.
65
 The evidence clearly established 
that the actual shooting was carried out by only one of the defendants, but the 
court convicted three more individuals of the same crime based on their 
actual or constructed presence at the scene of the crime (entering the pilots’ 
house together with the direct perpetrator). All four persons convicted of war 
crimes were sentenced to death. 
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The precise basis for conviction in Schonfeld is unclear.
66
 The Judge 
Advocate made several conflicting observations: first, he held that if the 
object of the visit to the house was initially lawful, i.e. to arrest the pilots, the 
three others were not guilty of the charge of ‘being concerned with the 
killing’ that resulted from one of them starting to shoot. They are innocent so 
long that they did not aid or abet the direct perpetrator. Secondly, if the three 
men aided and abetted the shooter, they would be guilty; and, finally, if the 
rule regarding ‘common design’ were found to be applicable, the others 
present would be guilty of murder whether or not they aided or abetted the 
offence.
67
  
Notwithstanding some contradictions, the most significant finding in 
Schonfeld was that the responsibility of the three defendants present at the 
scene of the crime depended on the guilt of the actual perpetrator, regardless 
of whether the principle of common design applied or whether only the rules 
on aiders and abettors were applicable.
68
 It is noteworthy that the UN War 
Crimes Commission in its report on the case highlighted that British courts 
did not attempt to try the war criminals under English law, but rather used it 
to frame the charges against the accused in the absence the relevant 
international law provisions. The Commission attempted to further 
legitimatize the approach of the British courts by noting, “it would not be 
hard to show that, for instance, the rules of English law regarding complicity 
in crimes, which are frequently quoted in war crime trials before British 
Military Courts, will be "found in substance in the majority" of systems of 
civilized law.” 69  
The term ‘concerned in the killing’ was further clarified in the case of Werner 
Rohde and Eight Others decided by the British Military Court in Wuppertal. 
Judge Advocate in this case held that: 
“[T]o be concerned in a killing it was not necessary that any person should 
actually have been present. […] If two or more men set out on a murder and 
one stood half a mile away from where the actual murder was committed, 
perhaps to keep guard, although he was not actually present when the murder 
was done, if he was taking part with the other man with the knowledge that 
other man was going to put the killing into effect then he was just as guilty as 
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the person who fired the shot or delivered the blow.”
70
  
In this case the court convicted several officials working at the 
Stuthof/Natzweiler camp of killing four captive women prisoners. The roles 
of the accused varied but none was charged with actually killing the women 
concerned: the medical officer at the camp admitted to giving lethal 
injections; the prisoner working in crematorium acknowledged preparing the 
oven for the occasion; while another accused, a functionary at the camp, 
followed the order to bring the harmful drug and overheard the conversations 
relating to the execution of the four women prisoners.
71
 In contrast with 
Schoenfeld, the Rohde tribunal differentiated between the contributions of 
‘those concerned in killing’ at sentencing: the medical officer was sentenced 
to death, while the prisoner who prepared the oven and the functionary who 
delivered the drug were sentenced to five and four years imprisonment 
respectively.
72
   
ii. The US Approach 
The United States military tribunals operating at Nuremberg relied on the 
modes of participation listed in the provision of Article II(2) of the Control 
Council Law No. 10, which reads as follows: 
Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed 
to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a 
principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or 
abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans 
or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or 
group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to 
paragraph 1 (a) if he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) 
position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high 
position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country. 
The critical modes of participation in the US trials were those involving 
secondary liability contained in clauses (b)-(e).
73
 Despite the explicit 
reference to various forms of liability in these clauses, the tribunals never 
systematically distinguished between principals and accessories to a crime, 
primarily due to the adherence of the Control Council Law No. 10 to the 
unitary model of perpetration, which does not distinguish between 
perpetration and complicity
74
  - any participant was “deemed to have 
committed a crime.”  
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The Justice case, brought by the US Military Tribunal against judges and 
officials of the German Ministry of Justice, is a good example of the 
application of the unitary approach to participation.
75
 The tribunal put all the 
crime participants on an equal footing by declaring “the person who 
persuades another to commit murder, the person who furnishes the lethal 
weapon for the purpose of its commission, and the person who pulls the 
trigger are all principals or accessories to the crime."
76
 
The Justice indictment alleged that the accused acting in concert with each 
other and with others, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly were principals in, 
accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected 
with plans and enterprises, involving the commission of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.”77 These acts included, inter alia, the denial of the 
judicial process, the extension of the discriminatory German laws to non-
German territories for the purpose of extermination of Jews and participation 
in the execution of Hitler’s decree Night and Fog, whereby the civilians 
accused of crimes of resistance were spirited away for secret trials.
78
  
The tribunal followed the ‘concerted approach’ of the indictment in laying 
down two essential elements for proving the guilt of the defendant:  first, 
knowledge on the part of the defendant of the offence charged as supported 
by evidence, and second, his connection with the commission of that 
offence.
79
 The nature of this connection to the crime varied on a case-by-case 
basis. The case of the defendant Joel exemplifies the tribunal’s treatment of 
responsibility issues. Joel, in his capacity as a chief prosecutor, was in charge 
of the Night and Fog prosecutions and was tasked with supervising all 
prosecutors in his office.
80
  
The core evidence against Joel consisted of the correspondence, mentioning 
the Night and Fog plan, of which he was either the author or the recipient. 
Thus, it could not be said that the accused was directly responsible for death 
or ill treatment of specific persons.
81
 Nonetheless, his high rank did not 
absolve him of responsibility for the large-scale enterprises carried out by the 
Ministry of Justice where he knew of those schemes.
82
 The question of 
personal knowledge was therefore one of the most critical issues at trial.
83
 
The court established Joel’s complicity “as having aided, abetted, participated 
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in, and having been connected with, the Night and Fog scheme or plan.” 84 He 
was convicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity and membership in a 
criminal organization (SS and SD) and sentenced to ten years of 
imprisonment.
85
  
In the Pohl case, the US tribunal explicitly warned against assuming 
criminality, or even culpable responsibility, based on the official titles of the 
defendants.
86
 The Pohl tribunal also clarified the actus reus required to 
sustain a conviction under Article II(2) of the Control Council Law No. 10 
because solely mens rea -  mere knowledge - was not a sufficient basis for 
conviction. The Pohl case concerned the responsibility for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity of SS officers managing concentration camps 
through the Economic and Administrative Main Office (WVHA) of the SS.
87
 
The tribunal acquitted the chief of the WVHA’s audit department, Vogt, 
based on the lack of any positive action from his side: despite having the 
general knowledge of the existence of concentration camps, he never took 
any positive action that would have established his ‘consent’ in the 
commission of crimes.
 88
 The tribunal clarified that the term ‘being connected 
with” and ‘taking a consenting part in’ a crime in the meaning of Article II(2) 
of the Control Council Law No. 10 means more than having knowledge of it: 
"it means something more than being in the same building or even being in 
the same organization with the principals or accessories. […] There is an 
element of positive conduct implicit in the word "consent.”89 (Ibid.) Thus, 
Vogt’s work could not, in the view of the tribunal, have been considered any 
more criminal than that of the bookkeeper who made up the reports which he 
audited.
90
  
iii. The French Approach 
In dealing with group crime the French courts relied almost exclusively on 
complicity.
91
 In the trial of Gustav Becker, Wilhelm Weber and Eighteen 
Others, the Permanent Military Tribunal at Lyon convicted the former 
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German customs officers in French Savoy for illegal arrest and ill treatment 
of French citizens, which resulted in the death of the three victims later in 
Germany. Two of the accused were convicted as perpetrators, while the 
remaining seventeen individuals were convicted as their accomplices.
92
 The 
court stipulated, “[i]t is a principle of penal law that accomplices are held 
responsible in the same manner as actual perpetrators, and this principle is 
recognized in the field of war crimes as it is in that of common penal law.”93 
In addition to illegal arrest and ill treatment, the court found all of the 
defendants guilty of causing death without intent to inflict it.
94
 The tribunal 
found the accused responsible as they were instrumental to the death inflicted 
on the victims by the German perpetrators regardless of whether the injuries 
sustained in France were the direct cause of the subsequent death of the 
victims in Germany.
95
  
The Permanent Military Tribunal in Strasbourg differentiated between 
different crime participants in Robert Wagner and Six Others.
96
 The case was 
brought against Wagner, who was the head of the civil government in Alsace 
during German occupation, and a number of other high-ranking 
administrative and judicial officials of the region for orchestrating the judicial 
murder of a group of Alsatians in the so-called Ballersdorf trial. The victims 
were intercepted trying to cross the border with Switzerland and were 
subsequently tried and sentenced to death by the Special Court in Strasbourg, 
which operated in violation of the most elementary rules of German law.
97
 All 
of the accused with the exception of Grüner, who was charged with 
premeditated murder, were charged with complicity in the crime.
98
 Hence, the 
tribunal had to establish the relationship of each accused to the crime. The 
court held, inter alia, that Wagner had been an accomplice in the murders that 
followed as a result of the sham trial by virtue of him abusing his power or 
authority and by dictating or ordering the sentence to be awarded by the 
Special Court.
99
 Gädeke was found guilty as an accomplice because he had 
transmitted Wagner's order to pass the sentence of death to the Court.
100
 The 
Permanent Military Tribunal in Strasbourg sentenced all the defendants to 
death, with the exception of one who was acquitted.
101
 Huber was found 
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complicit in the murders on the ground of his bending under pressure from 
Wagner and pronouncing the death sentences in the Ballersdorf trial.
102
  
A few decades later, in 1992, the French courts continued to use complicity in 
connection with international crimes. In Touvier the French courts examined 
the notion of complicity in crimes against humanity.
103
 The case revealed a 
complicated interrelationship between the mode of participation and the 
substantive crime. In 1943 and 1944, Paul Touvier served as a high-ranking 
militia officer in occupied Vichy France. He gave instructions for the 
shooting of seven Jewish prisoners at Rillieux following the announcement of 
the assassination of the Minister of Propaganda of the Vichy government, 
Philppe Henroit, by members of the Resistance. Touvier did not deny being 
implicated in the affair but insisted that his role was limited in that he ceded 
to the inevitable. By ordering the execution of the seven prisoners he 
attempted to limiter more large scale reprisals by the occupying authorities 
following Henroit’s assassination.  
The court held that Touvier indeed had played a limited role in the murder of 
the prisoners, but the instructions he had given in relation to seven prisoners 
constituted sufficient evidence to establish his complicity in murder by 
assistance and instructions.
104
 The problematic aspect was that under French 
law further proceedings in the case of an ordinary murder was barred by the 
statute of limitations. Crimes against humanity were not subject to this rule 
but in order to secure a finding of complicity in crimes against humanity it 
was necessary to show that Touvier acted with specific intent to take part in 
the execution of a common plan by committing inhumane acts in a systematic 
manner in the name of a state that practiced a policy of ideological 
supremacy.
105
 The court of first instance held that the Vichy state could not 
be described as having practiced a policy of ideological supremacy. Hence, it 
could not be established that Touvier had specific intent serving a state 
practicing such policy.
106
 This finding was reversed on appeal on the ground 
that Touvier’s decision to execute the prisoners had been taken with the 
approval of the local Gestapo – an organization declared to be a criminal 
organization by the IMT.
107
 Eventually, Touvier was convicted of complicity 
in crimes against humanity.
108
  
iv. Corporate Complicity 
In addition to government officials, the British and the US Military courts 
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heard also heard cases against private individuals who worked for 
corporations involved in the commission of crime.
109
 The trials of 
industrialists in the aftermath of the Second World War, albeit focusing on 
the individual responsibility of businessmen, were the closest international 
criminal law ever came to corporate complicity in international crimes.
110
  
In the Zyklon B case, the British Military Court in Hamburg examined the 
complicity of German industrialists in the murder of interned allied civilians 
by means of poison gas.
111
 The court convicted the owner of the firm 
supplying the poison gas to concentration camps and the firm’s procurement 
officer, who was described as second-in-command, of war crimes and 
sentenced to death.
112
 The court acknowledged that the case dealt with 
commercial transactions by private individuals. However, “any civilian who 
is an accessory to a violation of the laws and customs of war is himself also 
liable as a war criminal.” 113 The firm’s gassing technician, on the other hand, 
was acquitted. The Judge Advocate emphasized that the technician’s 
knowledge of the purposes for which the gas was supplied was not sufficient 
to establish his guilt because the technician’s subordinate position in the firm 
was such that he could neither influence the transfer of gas to Auschwitz nor 
prevent it.
 114
   
Other trials involving businessmen included Flick,
115
 I.G. Farben,
116
 and 
Krupp Trials;
117
 all heard by the US military tribunals.
118
 In the Krupp trial, 
several officials of the Krupp corporation, including Alfried Krupp, were 
found guilty of having employed, contrary to the provisions of international 
law,  prisoners of war, foreign civilians and concentration camp inmates 
under inhuman conditions in work connected with the conduct of war.
119
 The 
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Krupp tribunal insisted that the laws and customs of war are no less binding 
vis-à-vis private individuals as government officials and military personnel, 
albeit with a difference in the degree of guilt, depending on the 
circumstances. The tribunal held:  
'Officers, directors, or agents of a corporation participating in a violation of 
law in the conduct of the company's business may be held criminally liable 
individually therefor. So, although they are ordinarily not criminally liable for 
corporate acts performed by other officers of agents, and at least where the 
crime charged involves guilty knowledge or criminal intent, it is essential to 
criminal liability on his part that he actually and personally do the acts which 
constitute the offence or that they be done by his direction or permission. He is 
liable where his scienter or authority is established, or where he is the actual 
present and efficient actor.
 120
  
The sentences in Krupp case were rather lenient, possibly reflecting the lesser 
degree of guilt as noted by the tribunal; they ranged from twelve to three 
years of imprisonment.
121
  
3. Defining the Contours of Complicity: International Law 
Commission’s Contribution 
Courts were not the only bodies responsible for the development of 
international criminal law in general, and modes of responsibility in 
particular. By resolution 177 (II) of 21 November 1947, UN the General 
Assembly decided to entrust the International Law Commission with a 
twofold task: first, to formulate the principles of international law recognized 
in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Nuremberg judgment; and 
second, based on those principles, to prepare a draft Code of Offences against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind (‘Draft Code’).122 In fulfilling its mandate, 
the ILC contributed significantly to understanding the scope and the meaning 
of complicity in international criminal law.  
The first part of the mandate – the adoption of the Nuremberg principles – 
was accomplished in 1950.
123
 Principle VII read as follows:  
Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or 
a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under 
international law.
124
 
It is clear from the wording that the Commission regarded complicity as a 
                                                             
120
 Ibid, at 150. 
121
 Ibid, at 70. 
122
 UN Doc. A/RES/177(II). 
123
 Adopted by the International Law Commission at its second session, in 1950, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II. 
124
 Ibid, at 377. Principle VI stipulated that planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, as 
well as participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of these 
acts constitute crimes against peace. 
  
 
 
 
29 
substantive offence. The ILC referred to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter as establishing responsibility for complicity. The 
comment to Principle VII shows however that the Commission failed to 
distinguish responsibility for conspiracy to wage aggressive war as a 
substantive crime and complicity as a mode of responsibility. In this 
comment, the ILC questions the Nuremberg tribunal’s finding that the last 
paragraph of Article 6 of the Charter does not add a new and separate crime 
to those already listed, but establishes the responsibility of persons 
participating in a common plan. The ILC saw a contradiction in this argument 
because the IMT found several defendants guilty of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity for giving orders and not for actually perpetrating the 
crime.
125
 This reasoning reveals a failure to distinguish between the 
substantive crime and the way in which individuals were involved in the 
crime. 
The second part of the ILC’s mandate – preparing the Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind – proved to be more fruitful in 
defining forms of responsibility. The first Draft Code was adopted by the ILC 
in 1954 and contained only a brief account of acts that constitute offences 
against the peace and security of mankind.
126
 This first version of the code 
did not provide any definition of complicity. Article 2 of the code listed acts 
that constituted offences against peace and security of mankind, and 
subheading 13 of this Article listed conspiracy, complicity, direct incitement 
and attempt to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding 
paragraphs of the Article as acts constituting offences against peace and 
security of mankind. Thus, complicity was treated as a substantive offence, 
without further elaboration as to its content.   
Following the adoption of the 1954 Draft Code, active work on the document 
was suspended for several decades and only resumed in the 1980’s. Doudou 
Thiam was appointed as the ILC’s Special Rapporteur charged with preparing 
the document.
127
 Thiam identified the gap in international criminal law in 
attributing responsibility for the crimes committed by a plurality persons.
128
 
He attempted to fill this gap by investigating the notion of complicity in 
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domestic and international law and delimiting its scope.  
Thiam explored domestic law and found that the scope of the concept and its 
content varies from country to country: complicity may include physical acts 
(aiding and abetting, provision of means) and intellectual or moral assistance 
(counsel, instigation, orders). In some countries, those who provide 
intellectual assistance are labelled as ‘indirect perpetrators’, while in others as 
‘originators’.129 Moreover, the boundary between the concepts of perpetrator, 
co-perpetrator and accomplice shifts depending on the legislation in 
question.
130
 Thiam stressed that the matter is further complicated when one 
attempts to assign the actors to one category or another and to determine the 
precise role played by each in the context of international law:  
“Reduced to its simplest terms, complicity [in domestic law] involves two 
actors: the physical perpetrator of the offence (thief, murderer etc.), called the 
principal, and the person who assists the principal (by aiding, abetting, 
provision of means etc.), who is called the accomplice. But this simple schema 
does not reflect the complex reality of the phenomenon of complicity in the 
context of the topic under consideration.”
131
  
When it came to complicity in international law, Thiam acknowledged the 
need for a broad definition of criminal participation corresponding to the 
complexity of international justice. The Special Rapporteur pointed out that 
the concept of criminal participation encompasses not only the traditional 
concept of complicity, but also that of conspiracy (complot), which he dealt 
with in separate sections of his report. He thus drew a clear line between 
complicity and conspiracy.
132
 Finally, Thiam explicitly raised a point as to the 
place of complicity within the draft code, and whether it belonged to the 
section dealing with general principles of law, or whether it should be placed 
in the part on specific offences.
133
 He framed his inquiry as one of 
methodology, but in essence it amounted to establishing the nature of 
complicity as a mode of participation or as substantive crime.  
Based on the work of Special Rapporteur, the ILC adopted a new version of 
the Draft Code in 1991
134
 and a further version in 1996.
135
 The 1991 Draft 
Code provided for the first time a definition of complicity as “aiding, abetting 
or providing the means for the commission of a crime against the peace and 
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security of mankind.” The ILC also clarified that complicity is a form of 
participation and thus belongs in the chapter dealing with the general 
principles of law.
 136
  The final version of the Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind was adopted by the ILC in 1996 
elaborated on the forms of liability even further by providing contains a list of 
the modes of criminal participation accompanied by a detailed description 
attached to each liability type.
137 
Article 2(3) of the 1996 Draft Code holds an 
individual responsible if he or she: 
(a) intentionally commits such a crime;  
(b) orders the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is 
attempted;  
(c) fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a crime in the 
circumstances set out in article 6;  
(d) knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in 
the commission of such a crime, including providing the means for its 
commission;  
(e) directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime 
which in fact occurs;  
(f) directly and publicly incites another individual to commit such a crime 
which in fact occurs;  
(g) attempts to commit such a crime by taking action commencing the 
execution of a crime which does not in fact occur because of circumstances 
independent of his intentions. 
The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind became 
more or less superfluous following the adoption of the Rome Statute, but it 
still serves as evidence of customary international law and has been used by 
the ICTY and ICTR in various judgments.
138
 Additionally, Article 2 of the 
draft Code addressing the modes of responsibility eventually served as a basis 
for the negotiation of the relevant provision of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.
139
  
4. Historical Trends 
The historical account contained in this chapter showed that complicity 
evolved across three main tensions inherent to international criminal law: 
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domestic versus international law, collective wrongdoing versus individual 
criminal responsibility, and substantive crimes versus forms of participation. 
Each of these contradictions helped to shape the definition and the content of 
complicity in international criminal law.  
When it comes to the first contradiction of national and international law, it is 
important to remember that from the very beginning, international criminal 
law was significantly influenced by domestic penal law systems.
140
 The 
drafters of the Nuremberg Charter came from different legal and political 
cultures. The need to compromise shaped not only the language of the 
constituent documents, but also the charges against the accused and the final 
judgements. The US concept of ‘conspiracy’ was the chosen instrument of 
reflecting the collective nature of crimes at both Nuremberg and Tokyo.  
Complicity, as an alternative mechanism for addressing system criminality, 
never arose in the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgements notwithstanding the fact 
that Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and Article 5(c) of the Tokyo 
Charter specifically provided for the liability of accomplices participating in 
the execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the 
aforementioned crimes. However, the separate and dissenting opinions of 
individual judges from different jurisdictions reflected divergent views on the 
issue. These separate voices serve as the best indicators of the complexity of 
the legal landscape of the time. Complicity surfaced in the opinions of the 
French judges, primarily because of the importance of this mode of 
responsibility in France. Judge de Vabres of the IMT insisted that complicity 
would have been a more appropriate form of dealing with group criminality 
because of its wider acceptance in the variety of legal systems and its focus 
on the subjective indicators of individual culpability, rather than external 
evidence of common agreement. 
The subsequent proceedings against former Nazis were conducted under the 
Control Council Law No. 10 and national penal laws of the trying states. 
France, for example, used its domestic criminal law during these 
prosecutions. Thus, it is not surprising that French courts relied almost 
exclusively on the complicity-perpetratorship dichotomy when determining 
the modes of responsibility of the accused. However, prosecutions in the 
British and American zones pursuant to rules based on the Control Council 
Law No. 10 were also highly ‘domesticated’. The British courts used the 
national concept of ‘common design’ to determine whether the accused were 
‘concerned in’ committing the specific war crimes while the courts located in 
the US zone adhered to the common law ‘concerted approach’ to criminal 
participation and focused on the link between the accused and the crime on a 
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case-by-case basis. Finally, the work of the ILC on defining the modes of 
responsibility for the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind was predicated on the exploration of domestic legal systems. 
Special Rapporteur Thiam looked at complicity in various jurisdictions in an 
attempt to define the concept in international law.  
There is one concluding observation in relation to the role of domestic law in 
shaping complicity in international criminal law. It is the frequency with 
which the first war crimes courts referred to the wide domestic acceptance of 
a certain rule in order to secure its international legitimacy.
 
For example, the 
IMT alluded to the “criminal law of most nations” in support of the rule that 
following the unlawful order does not absolve the defendant from 
responsibility.
141
 The UN War Crimes Commission held that British rules 
regarding complicity in crimes are found in substance in the majority of legal 
systems.
142
 This trend shows the historical importance of the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations as a source of international 
criminal law.
143
  
The second tension between individual criminal responsibility and collective 
wrongdoing stems from the need for some ‘medium’ between the crime and 
the offender in international criminal law. This is because very few men 
standing trial for mass crimes directly order or perpetrate certain offences. 
The ILC Special Rapporteur emphasized the difficulty of applying the 
traditional domestic law principal-accomplice dichotomy to international 
offences. He acknowledged that the latter require a broader definition of 
complicity to cover the complexity of the legal context associated with 
international crimes.  
The Tokyo tribunal settled for conspiracy as a tool designed to capture 
collective criminality. Conspiracy declared the agreement to commit mass 
atrocities criminal without the need to prove underlying offences. The 
leadership position was determinative, in the eyes of the IMTFE judges, of 
whether the accused belonged to a conspiracy or was responsible for the 
crimes committed under his supervision. The IMT relied on conspiracy to a 
lesser extent than its Tokyo counterpart. The Nuremberg response to the 
problem of attribution of responsibility for the acts committed by distant 
others was to focus on the factual contribution of the accused to the common 
plan and his official position within the Nazi hierarchy. The IMT therefore 
avoided a legalistic discussion about the modes of participation of each 
accused.  
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The prosecutions of the former Nazis by national authorities in the aftermath 
of the IMT signified a shift from the fact-based approach to criminal 
participation of Nuremberg and Tokyo to a more nuanced and developed 
body of law regarding the ways in which the defendant was involved in a 
crime. These trials were driven, to a large extent, by national law.  Thus, 
many ambiguities characteristic of the domestic legal systems affected the 
way various modes of participation were used. For example, the British court 
in Schonfeld struggled to distinguish participation in the common design and 
aiding and abetting. It referred to the theory of actual or constructive presence 
at the scene of the crime, used by the traditional English law doctrine to 
establish a boundary between the two forms of participation. Notwithstanding 
the reference to this theory in the judgements, the British courts failed to 
consistently apply it in cases like Rohde or Schonfeld and instead settled for a 
half-hearted compromise.  
The US Military Tribunals adopted the unitary model of criminal 
participation thereby  placing all modes of responsibility on an equal footing. 
This does not mean however that the judges paid no attention to the way in 
which the defendants became involved in the crimes. Quite the opposite, the 
US courts developed the fault and conduct requirement of the individual 
criminal responsibility. For example, the Justice case stressed the importance 
of the personal knowledge of the accused, while Pohl guarded against 
assuming criminality solely on the basis of official capacity. The Pohl 
tribunal also highlighted the importance of positive action in establishing a 
defendant’s consent to the commission of the crimes. By focusing on legal 
requirements of responsibility the US tribunals sitting at Nuremberg distanced 
themselves from the approach adopted at Nuremberg and Tokyo.   
The trials of industrialists in the aftermath of the war are yet another example 
of the tension stemming from the complexity of crimes in question. 
Corporations represent the middle ground between the state and the person. 
As demonstrated in the Krupp case, for example, these corporations are 
perfectly capable of committing violations of international law. However, the 
attribution of responsibility for these violations to a particular individual 
within the firm is challenging. Nonetheless, the US and British courts 
undertook this task and acknowledged the responsibility of firms’ officers for 
breaching the laws and customs of war. 
The third tension between complicity as a mode of participation and 
complicity as a substantive crime flows directly from the collective nature of 
the offences in question. The distinction between the wrongdoing and the 
manner in which individuals become involved is not always clear in 
international criminal law. One can trace how judicial reasoning evolved in 
this regard. The first international criminal tribunals hardly referred to the 
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form of liability of each accused, despite their being explicitly mentioned in 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo charters. The Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments, 
did not explicitly distinguish between primary perpetrators and other crime 
participants and instead adopted a rather fact-based approach to attributing 
responsibility.
 144
 Kai Ambos noted, “the Nuremberg approach can be called 
pragmatic rather than dogmatic.”145 One can find two explanations for this 
peculiarity: first, the lack of theoretical framework during the first 
international criminal trials; and secondly, the adoption of an inchoate offence 
of ‘conspiracy’, rather than various forms of complicity, as a method of 
capturing the collective nature of crimes.  
The ILC first codified complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, 
a war crime, or a crime against humanity as a substantive crime under 
international law.
146
 Arguably this was the result of the lack of a distinction 
between the modes of participation and the substantive offences at 
Nuremberg. The ILC’s position regarding complicity changed only with the 
adoption of the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind that recognized that complicity is a mode of participation and 
belongs to the section on general principles of law. The same 1991 Draft 
Code provided the definition of complicity for the first time since the 
beginning of the ILC’s work on the issue in the early 1950’s. This shift, 
leading to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of complicity, was likely 
the result of the scrupulous work on the issue by the ILC’s Special 
Rapporteur in the 1980’s. The other reason for this change of attitude towards 
complicity was the legacy of the post-IMT prosecutions war criminals. These 
trials rejected the fact-based approach of Nuremberg and Tokyo and stressed 
the importance of defining the link between the accused and the crime. The 
final 1996 Draft Code contained a detailed list of the modes of criminal 
participation, paving the road to the relevant provision of the Rome Statute. 
The historical journey in this paper reveals several notable trends related to 
the concept of complicity: the development of the legal requirements for 
complicity while moving away from the fact-based approach of Nuremberg 
and Tokyo; introduction and abandonment of the notion of conspiracy as a 
substantive offence in international criminal law; introduction and 
abandonment of the concept of corporate complicity in war crimes; and, 
finally, the constant struggle to attribute personal guilt for collective 
wrongdoing. This latter trend is arguably the most important in understanding 
the evolution of complicity. While it is never easy to capture personal guilt 
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amid mass atrocities, it is possible. Complicity as a mechanism for dealing 
with collective criminality is deeply rooted in both domestic and international 
criminal law and, notwithstanding the many ambiguities that characterize this 
concept, it still serves the purposes of locating individual criminal 
responsibility. 
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II. Complicity in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
Tribunals and Hybrid Courts 
Introduction 
After some decades of inactivity, international criminal justice was 
reinvigorated with the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 827.
1
 
Its establishment was prompted by another UN-mandated body – the 
Commission of Experts investigating the violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
2
 
The Commission cautiously suggested in its interim report either setting up 
an international tribunal that would combine national jurisdictions under the 
universality principle, akin the IMT, or the establishment of an ad hoc 
tribunal authorized by the Security Council.
3
 The latter option was preferred.
4
 
Roughly one year later, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) came into existence with the mandate to punish those responsible for 
the atrocities committed in the Rwandan genocide and to put an end to such 
crimes.
5
  
Due to the fact that the ICTY and ICTR (the ‘ad hoc tribunals’) were 
established under very different circumstances than their Nuremburg and 
Tokyo predecessors, their creation marked a new era in the development of 
international criminal law. The IMT and IMTFE were the result of a political 
comprise reached by the victorious states. In the aftermath the World War II, 
there was a practical necessity to ‘do something’ about the aggressors. While 
the solution eventually chosen by the Allied Powers was to try them in a court 
of law, other options, including the executions or shows trials, were 
considered.
6
  In contrast, the ad hoc tribunals were not established by the 
winning powers but by the international community and not as a postscript to 
a war but as a mechanism of ceasing the on-going violence and preventing 
further atrocities. These functions were in addition to the traditional goal of a 
criminal justice system of bringing those responsible to justice, itself a 
challenging objective when pursued in the midst of a conflict. The ICTY and 
ICTR therefore represented an enormous aspiration on the part of the 
international community.  
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In contrast with the ad hoc tribunals, introduced during the respective 
conflicts, the hybrid courts combining the features of an international and a 
domestic court, namely the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), were 
established in the aftermath of hostilities.
7
 The SCSL was established shortly 
before the end of the Sierra Leonean civil war,
8
 while the ECCC did not begin 
operations until almost three decades had passed since the end of the bloody 
Khmer Rouge regime.
9
 The ambitions of these two courts are nonetheless 
comparable to those of the ad hoc tribunals – ensuring accountability, 
promoting peace and contributing to national reconciliation.
10
 
The aspirations of the modern international criminal justice had a direct 
bearing on the way law was formulated in the early judgements of the ICTY 
and ICTR, including the doctrines of individual criminal responsibility. The 
desire to simultaneously achieve a plethora objectives and deliberately avoid 
theoretical problems, such as those arising out of the interpretation of the 
sources of international criminal law, frequently led to unsatisfactory 
results.
11
 The last chapter of this thesis provides a critical assessment of the 
purposes of international criminal law and suggests possible trajectories for 
their further refinement. This exercise is an attempt to bring coherence to the 
discipline in general and the law of complicity in particular.  
The present chapter has a different objective in mind. It aims at defining 
complicity, its scope and aims, in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
and hybrid courts. The work of these institutions can be conceptualized as an 
intermediate step in the development of international criminal law linking the 
military tribunals of the post-World War II era and the permanent body of 
international criminal justice – the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’). The 
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‘step’ is however enormous. In the last two decades international criminal law 
has become the symbol of the international community’s efforts to address 
political violence as it has unfolded in different parts of the world.
12
 It is also 
possible to view the existence of the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts as a 
separate vector of the development of international criminal law independent 
from the ICC, given the fact that the circumstances of their creation and the 
aspirations of these institutions are not identical. However, regardless of how 
one perceives them, the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and the ECCC contributed 
immensely to the definition and evolution of the law on individual criminal 
responsibility.  
The first part of the chapter discusses the elements of different forms of 
responsibility in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts. 
The purpose is twofold: first, to define various forms of complicity and to 
separate them from ‘commission’; and, secondly, to analyse some 
problematic and contentious issues pertaining to the law on individual 
criminal responsibility. This section does not comprehensively cover all 
forms of responsibility as defined in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
and hybrid courts but builds on excellent recent works dealing with the 
issue,
13 
selecting those aspects that are crucial for defining and understanding 
complicity in all of its complexity.
14
 The second part of this chapter discusses 
four problems characteristic of international criminal justice that hinder a 
coherent and just application of the concept of complicity. This exercise is 
intended to determine how best to deal with the complicity doctrine in 
international criminal law. When properly defined and employed, different 
forms of complicity allow accurately describing the conduct of the accused 
and attaching responsibility for the particular act thereby avoiding the finding 
of collective guilt that is often produced by newly invented doctrines, such as 
the joint criminal enterprise.  
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1. Forms of Participation in the Statutes of the ad hoc 
Tribunals and Hybrid Courts 
i. Requirements of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
The following provisions the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL (‘Statutes’)15 
and the ECCC Law
16
 deal with matters of individual criminal responsibility.
17
 
Article 7(1) ICTY Statute: 
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided 
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to 
in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for 
the crime. 
 
Article 6(1) ICTR and SCSL: 
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided 
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to 
in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for 
the crime. 
Article 29 of the ECCC Law:
 
 
Any Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or 
committed the crimes referred to in article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this 
law shall be individually responsible for the crime. […] 
The modes of participation are not defined in the Statutes
18
 and the ECCC 
Law. The ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified that the Statute only provides an 
a priori jurisdictional framework ratione personae, and the existence of a 
particular form of liability as well as its legal requirements will be determined 
by customary international law.
19
 This is in contrast with the Rome Statute of 
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the ICC that spells out the modes of participation in greater detail and assigns 
customary international law a secondary role vis-à-vis the provisions of the 
Rome Statute.
20
 
In the absence of a definition in the Statutes and the ECCC Law, it is up to 
the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and the ECCC to spell out the legal requirements for 
each mode of liability. In this process, it is important to distinguish the 
constituent elements of the offence and the legal requirements of the mode of 
responsibility used in conjunction with this offence.
21
 The constituent 
elements of the offence are the objective element or actus reus; and the 
subjective element or mens rea. Cassese defines actus reus as a conduct (an 
act or omission contrary to a rule imposing specific behavior); and mens rea 
as a state of mind (a psychological element required by the legal order for the 
conduct to be blameworthy and consequently punishable).
22
  
There exists a separate set of requirements for each form of individual 
criminal responsibility. Their purpose is to help the judge or the juror decide 
whether individual’s involvement in a crime entails criminal responsibility or 
not. In the literature and the judgments, the terms ‘mens rea’ and ‘actus reus’ 
are often used in relation to both the substantive offences and the mode of 
responsibility.
23
 The goal of this dissertation is to separate the two sets of 
elements. This aim is in line with an important tendency of international 
criminal law to view modes of participation and substantive offences as 
separate issues – a significant trend that has taken some time to evolve.24 The 
terms frequently used in this thesis to refer to the elements of individual 
criminal responsibility (as opposed to the elements of the crime) are the ‘legal 
requirements’, consisting of a ‘conduct requirement’ and a ‘fault 
requirement’.25   
In cases of direct primary participation (i.e. commission), the conduct and 
fault requirement of legal responsibility form ‘mirror’ mens rea and actus 
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reus of the substantive offence: the conduct of the principal fully corresponds 
to the elements of the crime. However, when it comes to more complex forms 
of commission, such as commission through the joint criminal enterprise, as 
well as different forms of complicity, the requirements of liability supplement 
the constituent elements of an offence. It is essential to establish that the 
crime was committed and the way in which the accused was involved in it.  
The first international criminal law judgement since Nuremberg – Tadić – 
pointed out this phenomenon. The Trial Chamber had to determine “whether 
the conduct of the accused […] sufficiently connects the accused to the 
crime.”26 In doing so, the judges drew a distinction between instances when 
the accused directly engaged in the actions alleged and cases when the 
accused did not directly commit some of the offences charged but was present 
at the time of, or otherwise involved in, their commission.
27
 The Tadić Trial 
Chamber consequently established a two-prong test to establish liability for 
‘complicious’ conduct. The first element of the test is “intent, which involves 
awareness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to 
participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding 
and abetting in the commission of a crime.” To satisfy the second part of the 
test, the conduct of the accused must have contributed to the commission of 
an illegal act.
28
  
ii. The Scope of Complicity 
The early Tadić interpretation of ‘complicious conduct’ introduced the 
broader understanding of complicity then subsequently applied by the ad hoc 
tribunals and the hybrid courts. It encompassed all forms of participation 
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mentioned in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.
29
 Such a broad understanding 
of complicity can be explained by the legacy of the IMT and subsequent 
jurisprudence that formed the basis of the first ICTY judgment. As discussed 
in chapter one,
 
pre-1993 case law adopted a rather fact-based unitary 
approach to the modes of responsibility. Thus, little clarity existed in this 
regard at the time when Tadić judgment was drafted.30 In Krnojelac the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber addressed the Tadić approach by clarifying that the term 
‘accomplice’ has different meanings depending on the context and may refer 
to a co-perpetrator or an aider and abettor.
31
 The ECCC Trial Chamber 
delimited ‘aiding and abetting’ from the broader notion of complicity. This 
finding was made despite the French version of Article 29 of the ECCC law 
translating ‘aiding and abetting’ with the word ‘complicité’. Given the fact 
that ‘complicité’ encompasses a broader conduct, a more accurate translation 
would have been ‘aidé et encouragé’.32 The conclusion about the shifting 
scope of complicity is corroborated by the separate declaration of Judge Keith 
to the Genocide Judgment in which he examined various definitions of 
‘complicity’ and came to the conclusion that ‘complicity is often restricted to 
aiding and abetting’.33  
If one views international criminal law as being rooted in domestic criminal 
law,
34
 complicity should be understood as embracing planning, instigating, 
ordering, aiding and abetting. This conclusion follows from the theoretical 
underpinning of complicity as a form of secondary participation, which is 
derivative in nature.
35
 Various domestic law systems recognize different 
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forms of complicity; aiding and abetting and instigating being the most 
common.
36
 The idea is that an accomplice does not directly perpetrate the 
crime but is nonetheless involved in its commission. ‘Committing’, on the 
other hand, signifies principal perpetration, whether directly or indirectly 
through an agent.
37
 Broader and narrower notions of complicity shall be 
contextualized and treated as mere rhetorical tools. Consequently all modes of 
participation listed in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts 
aside from ‘committing’ belong to the sphere of ‘complicity’.38  
Complicity should be distinguished from command responsibility regulated 
by distinct provisions of the Statutes and the ECCC Law. These norms allow 
for holding the superior responsible for the acts of his subordinate “if he knew 
or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or 
had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators.”39 The common 
feature of the accomplice and superior responsibility is that they both entail 
culpable commission by others. Command responsibility cannot be 
characterized as complicity, however.
40
 The key conceptual distinction 
between the two is that the superior bears responsibility for his own culpable 
omission to act in the presence of such duty, while accomplice liability is 
derivative in nature and necessarily stems from the criminal conduct of 
another person.
41
 For this reason, command responsibility has been referred 
to in Orić as responsibility sui generis.42 
The ad hoc and hybrid courts and tribunals defined the legal requirements of 
various forms of liability on a case-by-case basis relying on the existent 
customary international law.
43
 The following subsections summarize their 
findings. Complicity in genocide is treated in a distinct section because it is a 
separate provision in the ICTY and ICTR the Statutes (but not the SCSL 
Statute or the ECCC Law). ‘Committing’ is included in the description of the 
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modes of liability for the purposes of better defining the contours of 
complicity.
44
  
iii. Committing 
The term ‘commit’ in the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and the 
ECCC implies direct commission and participation in the joint criminal 
enterprise.
45
 The Tadić Appeal Chamber held that Article 7(1) of the Statute 
covers “first and foremost the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender 
himself, or the culpable omission of an act that was mandated by a rule of 
criminal law.”46 Despite this statement, only slightly more than a dozen of the 
accused standing trial at the ICTY, less than 20% of all convictions, were 
convicted as direct perpetrators or co-perpetrators. The remainder of 
convictions were founded on participation in the joint criminal enterprise, 
superior responsibility or various forms of complicity.
47
 The SCSL or the 
ECCC produced no convictions for direct perpetration.
48
  
 
The ICTR jurisprudence on commission stands in contrast with that of other 
courts. It issued convictions for committing in a third of the cases it dealt with 
and assigned a less prominent role to the joint criminal enterprise.
49
 This 
trend could be explained by the unique approach to ‘commission’ adopted by 
the ICTR. The Appeals Chamber in Gacumbitsi accepted the extended 
interpretation of this form of liability, holding that “direct and physical 
perpetration” need not be confined to physical killing but can also include 
other acts including “directing” and “playing a leading role in conducting 
and, especially, supervising”. 50  In accordance with this interpretation, the 
ICTR judges held that Sylvestre Gacumbitsi - the highest-ranking local 
administrative official in one of the municipalities in Rwanda – committed 
genocide through being physically present at the scene of the crime and 
personally directing the Tutsi and Hutu refugees to separate in different 
groups. The Chamber found these actions to be “as much an integral part of 
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the genocide as were the killings which it enabled”. 51  The subsequent 
paragraph of the judgment provides reasons for such a broad interpretation of 
commission. That is the belief that other modes of participation - ordering, 
planning or instigating do not, taken alone, fully capture the accused’s 
criminal responsibility.
52
 The appellate judges stated that by being present at 
the scene of the crime, Gacumbitsi did not “merely ‘instigate’ the killings”, 
but rather committed them.
53
  
 
The Appeals Chamber in Seromba adopted the same approach to commission 
by holding that “Athanase Seromba crossed the line separating aiding and 
abetting from committing genocide and became a principal perpetrator in the 
crime itself.”54 The judges noted that Seromba, in his capacity as the local 
priest, exercised influence over the driver who drove a bulldozer into the 
church where 1,500 Tutsi were taking refuge.
55
 The Appeals Chamber 
observed that Seromba’s conduct “was not limited to giving practical 
assistance, encouragement or moral support to the principal perpetrators of 
the crime, which would merely constitute the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting.”56 The recent Munyakazi Appeal judgement confirmed this broad 
interpretation of commission.
57
 
 
Not all of the appellate judges supported this wide reading of commission. 
Judge Liu dissented in Seromba and Munyakazi on three main points: first, he 
noted that the Gacumbitsi interpretation of commission is reserved for 
genocide alone;
58
 secondly, extended commission is somewhat superfluous 
because the joint criminal enterprise is the mode of liability covering 
commission without physical perpetration, thus it must be pleaded instead of 
the commission;
59
 finally, “the expanded notion of commission not only 
embraces acts that technically amount to secondary forms of participation, but 
also extends to conduct that contributes to the commission of crimes of 
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others.” 60  This interpretation resembles co-perpetration or indirect 
perpetration as possible envisaged by the ICC, but not the ICTR Statute.
61
 
 
It is noteworthy that the accused need not hold a position in the army or state 
apparatus to incur individual criminal responsibility under the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals. Alfred Musema, the director of a tea factor, was 
involved in attacks against Tutsi refugees in the area surrounding his factory 
at the time when the Rwandan atrocities occurred. The ICTR Prosecutors 
charged Musema with extermination, rape as a crime against humanity, 
genocide, or, alternatively, complicity in genocide.62  
 
The form of commission that Judge Liu alluded to when he criticized the 
extended form of commission in the ICTR jurisprudence is that of joint 
criminal enterprise. This form of liability is not explicitly mentioned in the 
ICTY, ICTR, SCSL Statutes or the ECCC Law but has frequently been used 
by all of these courts to address situations where multiple accused are 
removed from the scene of the crime. The ICTY in Tadić developed three 
forms of the joint criminal enterprise:
63
 
 
 The first category involves cases where all participants are acting 
pursuant to a common purpose and share the same criminal intent; 
 The second category refers to instances of systemic ill-treatment in 
organized institutions, such as concentration camps; 
 The third category, called the ‘extended form’ of the joint criminal 
enterprise, entails liability of the members of the group for the acts 
which occur as a ‘natural and foreseeable consequence’ of carrying 
out the common purpose.
64
 
The conduct requirement of all three forms of the joint enterprise is the 
following: (i) a common plan involving the commission of a crime; (ii) a 
plurality of persons, and (iii) an individual contribution of the accused to the 
execution of the plan.
65
 The fault requirement differs depending on the type 
of the joint enterprise – intent to perpetrate for the first type, personal 
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knowledge of the system of ill-treatment and the intent to further the system 
for the second type.
66
 The third type of the joint criminal enterprise requires 
the intention to participate and further the criminal activity or the criminal 
purpose of the group and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in 
any event to the commission of a crime by the group. The responsibility for a 
crime other than that agreed upon in the common plan arises only if, under 
the circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might 
be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused 
willingly took that risk.
67
 
Despite the acknowledgment in the jurisprudence that the joint criminal 
enterprise is a form of ‘commission’,68 the legal requirements of the joint 
criminal enterprise are similar to those of certain forms of complicity, namely 
aiding and abetting.
69
 This proximity prompted the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
to distinguish joint criminal enterprise from aiding and abetting. The main 
difference between the two forms of participation is that the aider and abettor 
knowingly commits acts specifically directed at assisting the perpetration of a 
particular crime, while members of the joint criminal enterprise perform acts 
in some way directed to the furtherance of common design with the intent to 
pursue this design.
70
 No proof of common plan is required for aiding and 
abetting.
71
 In addition, the threshold for contribution to the specific crime 
pursuant to aiding and abetting appears to be higher than the contribution to 
the joint criminal enterprise.
72
 
Van Sliedregt has traced the evolution of the application of the joint criminal 
enterprise.
73
 It was initially created as a solution for small-scale enterprises 
and group criminality such as in Tadić and Furundžija, but was later used to 
address the liability of senior political and military leaders in cases such as 
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Krajišnik,74  Popović,75  and Nuon Chea.76  The ICTR Appeals Chamber in 
Rwamakuba expressly refuted the defence’s claim that the doctrine of 
common purpose, as applied in post-World War II cases, was limited to 
crimes with a large degree of specificity: 
The fact that certain prosecutions charged participation in small-scale plans involving 
few victims or in the operation of specific concentration camps does not suggest that 
customary international law forbade punishment for genocide committed through 
plans formulated and executed on a nationwide scale.
77
 
As a result of the application to the large-scale enterprises, the scope of the 
common plan required to hold individuals responsible under this form of 
liability expanded significantly.
78
 For example, the Appeal Chamber in 
Krajišnik ruled that the contribution to the joint criminal enterprise does not 
need to be criminal so long “that it furthers the execution of the common 
objective or purpose involving the commission of crimes.” 79 This feature of 
the judgment is startling. The Appeals Chamber held that Krajišnik’s main 
contribution to the joint criminal enterprise was in setting up and supporting 
the structures of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), an activity not criminal 
in itself but instrumental to the commission of the crimes.
80
  
 
The SCSL Appeals Chamber reasoned along the similar lines. In the AFRC 
case, in addition to the modes of responsibility expressly mentioned in 
Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the SCSL Statute, the prosecution charged the 
accused with participation in the joint criminal enterprise, the objective of 
which was to take any action necessary to gain and exercise political power 
and control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond 
mining areas.
81
 Initially, the Trial Chamber found that the prosecution failed 
to define the criminal objective when determining the responsibility of the 
accused and refused to consider the joint criminal enterprise as a mode of 
participation.
82 
The Appeals Chamber subsequently overturned this particular 
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finding noting, “the criminal purpose underlying the joint criminal enterprise 
can derive not only from its ultimate objective, but also from the means 
contemplated to achieve that objective.” 83  The Appeals Chamber then 
suggested that even though gaining and exercising political power over the 
territory of Sierra Leone may not be a crime itself, the criminal actions taken 
by the AFRC to reach this goal qualify as means to achieve the objective and 
hence themselves constitute a criminal objective.
84
  
 
The concept of the joint criminal enterprise created much debate in academic 
circles and to some extent in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals.
85
 The first 
line of criticism relates to the questionable legal status of the concept under 
the customary international law. In the Milutinović et al. case, the defence of 
Dragoljub Ojdanić raised this point claiming that the Appeals Chamber in 
Tadić misinterpreted the drafters’ intentions by inferring the joint criminal 
enterprise from the Statute – the drafters would have explicitly mentioned this 
form of liability if they intended it to be applicable.
86
 The appellate panel 
Milutinović et al. refuted this argument, holding that it was satisfied with the 
Tadić interpretation of the Statute, which provides, albeit not explicitly, for 
joint criminal enterprise as a form of liability because it has basis in 
customary international law.
87
  
The second major criticism of the joint criminal enterprise is the 
inconsistency between the theoretical concept and its practical application.
88
 
Harmen van der Wilt drew attention to the fact that “the doctrine does not 
entirely dovetail with the gloomy reality of the modern bureaucracies that 
engage in systematic crime.” 89  The conceptual idea of the joint criminal 
enterprise is based on one subjective and one objective element: the 
subjective element is the agreement and the shared intent to pursue a common 
plan that aims at or includes the commission of criminal acts; the objective is 
the accused’s participation in that plan. The emphasis is, however, on the 
subjective element.
90
 In the actual application of the concept, the judges seem 
to have reversed the importance of the objective and subjective elements of 
JCE. While many Chambers set a higher standard for the objective element, 
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requiring, in addition to participation, that the accused played an influential 
part within the JCE, and that he was in a position of authority vis-à-vis the 
direct perpetrators,
91
 they do not examine whether there existed a shared 
intent between the accused person and the direct perpetrator at all.
92
 As 
Verena Haan noted, the ICTY deals with complex cases where numerous 
persons acted at various levels of authority. While there might have existed a 
common agreement to pursue a criminal plan among members of “one level 
of authority”, the persons acting at different levels of authority have most 
likely not been linked to the crime through a common agreement but through 
hierarchical structures, such as military chains of command.
 93
 
 
The third major criticism relates to the scope of application of the joint 
criminal enterprise, and in particular, its extended version. Powles has 
observed that it is hard to see how someone guilty of participating in the third 
category of the joint criminal enterprise, i.e. where the crime falls beyond the 
object of criminal enterprise, can be said to have actually ‘committed’ the 
crime in question, where they do not possess the intention to actually commit 
the crime and may not even be aware of that crime before, during or even 
after the crime has actually been committed.
94
 Danner and Martinez added 
that the prosecution may use this over-expansive form of responsibility in 
cases when there is not sufficient evidence to secure the conviction under a 
different form of responsibility leading to a dangerous over-reliance on 
victim-oriented teleological interpretation that produces a result of ‘guilt by 
association’.95 The authors advocate for an approach that is more sensitive to 
the concern that low-level perpetrators may be charged and convicted of 
large-scale mass crimes, even where they played only a minor role. 
96  
On a conceptual level, it appears that the joint criminal enterprise constitutes 
a somewhat ‘borderline’ case, lying between complicity and the actual 
commission of an offence. On the one hand, the acts of the participants are 
attributed to all members of the group as if each participant has committed 
these acts himself. On the other hand, certain members of the group do not 
directly perpetrate these acts and their liability is derivative. The concept of 
the joint criminal enterprise seems to be borrowed from English law, with the 
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difference that in England the joint enterprise is a creation designed to deal 
for the most part with an unexpected turn of events
97
 whereas in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals it has become an independent, stand-
alone mode of liability. The joint criminal enterprise also seems to resemble 
some features of the national law concepts of co-perpetration and 
conspiracy.
98
 
iv. Planning 
‘Planning’ usually focuses on the responsibility of high-level civil and 
military commanders.
99
 Tokyo and Nuremberg Charters mentioned 
‘planning’ in relation to crimes against peace only. 100  The ICTY, ICTR, 
SCSL Charters and the ECCC Law
101
 include planning along with the other 
forms of complicity applicable to all crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
respective court or tribunal. The Rome Statute does not mention ‘planning’ in 
the forms of participation under Article 25(3).
102
  
‘Planning’ implies “that one or several persons contemplate designing the 
commission of a crime at both the preparation and execution phases”.103 The 
Trial Chamber in Akayesu clarified that in order for a person to incur liability 
under the heading of ‘planning’, the crime that had been planned must have 
been executed.
104
 This clarification distanced planning from the notion of 
conspiracy, which is similar to planning in that it criminalizes preparatory 
steps for the commission of the crime. The difference between the two 
concepts is that conspiracy is an inchoate offence, completed once the 
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preparatory steps are undertaken, while planning is a form of responsibility 
dependent on the commission of the crime towards which it is directed.  
To attract responsibility for planning, the person other than the planner, who 
is considered an actual perpetrator, must be acting in furtherance of a plan.
105
 
Thus, there must be a connection between the plan and the crime, it being 
sufficient that planning was a factor substantially contributing to criminal 
conduct.
106
 In other words, the level of involvement of the accused in the 
planning of the crime must have been sufficiently ‘substantial’.107 The SCSL 
Appeals Chamber gave important practical guidance in assessing whether the 
accused’s acts amount to a substantial contribution to attract liability for 
planning: it has to be done on a case-by-case basis in the light of evidence as 
a whole.
108
 The fault requirement for this mode of responsibility entails the 
intent to plan the commission of a crime or, at a minimum, the awareness of 
the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of 
the acts or omissions planned.
109
 
 
The Dragomir Milošević case illustrates the importance of an individual 
assessment of the mode of liability together with the facts. In this case, the 
Appeals Chamber acquitted the accused of responsibility for planning the 
campaign of sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo because the 
evidence as to whether he orchestrated each and every incident, which he 
allegedly planned, was lacking.
110
 While the conviction for planning failed, 
the appellate judges found the same facts to constitute a sufficient basis to 
support a conviction for ordering.
111
 The Appeals Chamber found that the 
accused personally ordered the deployment and distribution between different 
brigades of air modified bombs, a highly inaccurate weapon with a high 
explosive force. He also ordered the construction of launchers for these 
weapons.
 112
  
 
Planning a crime also serves as an aggravating factor when sentencing the 
actual perpetrator.
113
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v. Instigating 
‘Instigation’ presupposes “urging, encouraging, or prompting” another person 
to commit a crime.
114
 Instigation can take the form of a positive act or an 
omission so long that it can be established that the accused’s conduct had an 
effect on the perpetrator.
115
 It is not necessary that these actions be 
perpetrated in public or take any particular form.
116
 Several Trial and Appeals 
Chambers have held that there must be a causal relationship between the act 
of instigation and the commission of the crime.
117
 This statement is qualified 
by the explanation that the contribution of the accused does not need to be a 
conditio sine qua non for the crime to occur, it is sufficient to show that his or 
her conduct was a contributing factor to the conduct of the other person(s).
118
  
The requirement of a causal relationship between the act of instigation and 
the commission of the crime stands in contrast with the requirements for the 
other forms of complicity – planning, ordering, and aiding and abetting – that 
do not require such causal relationship according to the wording adopted by 
the ad hoc tribunals.
119
 This disparity shows some lack of understanding of 
the appropriate standard of causation for complicity.
120
 It seems that sine qua 
non test is not applicable to complicity because any form of complicity entails 
influencing voluntary conduct of another person. Hence, it cannot be 
reasonably said than an accomplice is a necessary prerequisite for harm 
caused by the primary perpetrator, rather he or she affects the behavior of the 
principal.
121
 Likewise, causation in a strict sense of the word appears to be 
applicable only to the events happening in the physical world and not to the 
actions of others. The causal chain is broken when interrupted by the free 
choice of an individual, even one acting under an accomplice’s influence.122 
Consequently, singling out ‘instigation’ as the only form of complicity 
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requiring a causal relationship to the crime appears unreasonable. Instigation, 
as all other forms of complicity, affects the freely chosen acts by other 
individuals – primary perpetrators. It cannot be said that that an act of an 
instigator (or, equally, aider and abettor, planner or order giver) causes the 
crime to occur in the same way as the primary perpetrator brings about the 
offence in the real world. Causation may be extended to complicity but its 
content must be modified.
123
 
The Orić Trial Chamber seems to have adopted a broad view on the question 
of causation in cases of complicity. It held that the commission of the crime 
may depend on a variety of activities and circumstances and it suffices to 
prove that the conduct of the accused was a substantially contributing 
factor.
124
 The Trial Chamber made a noteworthy distinction between aiding 
and abetting and instigating. Persuasion or a strong encouragement by an 
instigator may contribute to the final determination of the principal 
perpetrator to commit a crime, while further encouragement or moral support 
in cases when the principal has definitely decided to commit a crime “may 
merely, though still, qualify as aiding and abetting.”125 This interpretation of 
the difference between aiding and abetting and instigating, does not however 
seem to find support in international jurisprudence. The Orić Trial Chamber 
further clarified, “not any contributing factor can suffice for instigation, as it 
must be a substantial one, on the other hand, it need not necessarily have 
direct effect, as prompting another to commit a crime can also be procured by 
means of an intermediary.”126  
When it comes to the fault requirement, it is necessary that the accused 
directly intended to provoke the commission of the crime,
127
 or was aware of 
the substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime would be a probable 
consequence of his acts.
128
 The Trial Chamber in Orić clarified that the 
intention has two components: a cognitive element of knowledge and a 
volitional element of acceptance.
129
 The first element is present when the 
accused is aware of the influencing effect of his actions on the principal 
perpetrator and is aware of, and agrees to, the intentional completion of the 
principal crime.
130
 The second volitional element of intent is met when the 
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instigator accepts the occurrence of the crime with the knowledge the 
commission of the crime will more likely than not result from his conduct.
131
 
 
vi. Ordering 
‘Ordering’ entails “a person in a position of authority using that position to 
convince another to commit an offence”.132 Ordering requires a positive act 
from the person in the position of authority.
133
 The very notion of 
‘instructing’ requires a positive action of the person in the position of 
authority.
134
 The authority may be reasonably implied from the 
circumstances.
135
 The issue of the probative value of the inferences was at 
stake in the Galić appeal case in which the Appeals Chamber held that an 
omission cannot constitute an act of ordering per se, but failures to act may 
form circumstantial evidence to prove the mode of liability of ordering.
136
 
Thus, Galić’s responsibility for ordering the shelling and snipping of civilians 
in the occupied Sarajevo was not inferred from the fact that he failed to act 
and his omission constituted an order. Instead, his multiple failures to act in 
response to the attacks over a period of twenty-three months served as 
circumstantial evidence for the mode of liability of ordering.
137
 In contrast, in 
Kalimanzira, the Appeals Chamber answered in the negative the question of 
whether the assistance in providing armed reinforcements substantially 
contributing to the overall attack served as circumstantial proof that the 
accused ordered the attack.
138
 It concluded that, despite the fact that 
Kalimanzira had authority over the attackers, and thus had the possibility to 
order the attack, it was not the only reasonable inference following from the 
surrounding circumstances.
139
  
 
Neither the form of the order (explicit or implicit) nor its legality is a decisive 
factor attracting the liability for ordering a crime.
140
 With regard to the fault 
requirement, the person ordering must have the state of mind as that required 
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for the crime that he or she orders.
141
 In addition, it is necessary that the order 
giver is aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed 
as a consequence of the execution or implementation of the order.
142
 ICTY 
and ICTR case law is not clear on whether responsibility follows from the 
order that was not implemented or instigation that failed.
143
 If one adopts the 
view of complicity as derivative in nature, it seems that the underlying 
offence has to occur or at least be attempted.
144
 
 
‘Ordering’ is the form of complicity that is particularly similar to superior 
responsibility.
145
 The difference between these two forms of responsibility is 
that no formal superior-subordinate relationship is required for a finding of 
“ordering” so long as it is demonstrated that the accused possessed the 
authority to order.
146
 This is in contrast with superior responsibility, which is 
only applicable if the superior has effective control over the persons 
committing underlying violations, in the sense of having the ability to prevent 
and punish these violations.
147
 The Appeals Chamber in Semanza stressed the 
formality of the super-subordinate relationship as the distinguishing factor 
between the two forms of responsibility – all that is required for ‘ordering’ is 
the implied existence of a superior-subordinate relationship.
148
 The 
Gacumbitsi Appeal Chamber further confirmed this statement by holding that 
the superior-subordinate relationship under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute is 
characterized by effective control.
149
 It is peculiar that in the case law of the 
ICTR ‘ordering’ is treated as a mode of participation inferior to ‘committing’. 
The Gacumbitsi Appeal Chamber held: 
“[the accused] did not simply “order” or “plan” genocide from a distance and leave it 
to others to ensure that his orders and plans were carried out […] [r]ather, he was 
present at the crime scene to supervise and direct the massacre, and participated in it 
actively […]”, and this constitutes “committing” genocide.150 
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vii. Aiding and Abetting 
The early judgments of Tadić and Furundžija interpreted ‘aiding and 
abetting’ by relying heavily on the case law produced by the post-Nuremberg 
war crimes trials and the ILC Draft Code.
151
 These interpretations proved to 
be authoritative, with subsequent judgments merely clarifying the elements 
set out by Tadić and Furundžija.152  
An aider or abettor is one who provides “practical assistance, encouragement, 
or moral support” to the principal. 153   These actions must have had a 
substantial effect on the perpetration of a crime.
154
 The Tadić Trial Chamber 
borrowed this element of aiding and abetting from the formulation of the ILC 
Draft Code, which called for criminal responsibility of the individual who 
“knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the 
commission of such a crime […].”155 The ILC Commentary does not define 
‘substantially’, but does provide a hint; assistance of the accomplice must 
facilitate the commission of a crime in some significant way.
156
 Based on 
these considerations, the Tadić Chamber clarified that substantial contribution 
requirement presupposes a contribution that in fact has an effect on the 
commission of the crime.
157
 The Furundžija Chamber further elaborated on 
the effect of assistance, holding that the acts of the accomplice need not “bear 
a causal relationship to, or be a conditio sine qua non for, those of the 
principal.” 158  This finding underlines the derivative nature of aiding and 
abetting: an accomplice can only influence the conduct of the principal 
perpetrator to a certain extent; the final decision to commit or not to commit a 
crime rests with the perpetrator and not with the accomplice.
159
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There is a slight semantic difference between the terms ‘aiding’ and 
‘abetting’. Aiding has been described by international criminal tribunals as 
meaning “giving somebody assistance”, whereas ‘abetting’ stands for 
“facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto”.160 The 
contribution of the aider or abettor may be provided at any stage of a criminal 
process including planning, preparation and execution.
161
  
 
Assistance may occur before, during or after the commission of the crime.
162
 
However, ex post facto aiding and abetting only comes within the scope of 
this provision if there was a prior agreement between the principal and the 
person who subsequently aids and abets at the time of planning, preparation 
and execution of the crime.
163
 Assistance may take the form of either a 
positive act or an omission. Indeed, mere presence at the scene of the crime 
could constitute aiding and abetting where “it is demonstrated to have 
significant encouraging effect on the principal offender”. 164  Aiding or 
abetting may manifest itself in a culpable omission “provided this failure to 
act had a decisive effect on the commission of the crime and that it was 
coupled with the requisite mens rea.” 165  The Blaškić Appeals Chambers 
stressed however that the circumstances of a given case determine whether an 
omission may constitute actus reus of aiding and abetting.
166
 
 
In Furundžija, the position of the accused as a local commander led the 
judges to conclude that he is guilty of aiding and abetting rape by virtue of 
merely being present in the room because his position of authority had an 
encouraging effect.
167
 In the Šljivančanin case, failure of the accused to 
prevent the implementation of the unlawful order satisfied, in the view of the 
Appeals Chamber, all the requirements for a conviction for aiding and 
abetting murder by omission.
168
 The judges in this case held that, regardless 
of the fact that Šljivančanin no longer exercising de jure authority over the 
military police, his duty to protect the prisoners of war required him to order 
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the police not to withdraw from the hospital where the prisoners were kept.
169
 
The Appeals Chamber employed largely inferential analysis suggesting “had 
he ordered the military police not to withdraw, these troops may well have, in 
effect, obeyed his order to remain there.” 170  
 
With regard to the fault requirement, it is not necessary that the accomplices 
share mens rea of the principal perpetrator,
171
 it being sufficient that he or she 
knows of the essential elements of the crime, including the mens rea of the 
actual perpetrator and takes “the conscious decision to act in the knowledge 
that he thereby supports the commission of the crime”.172  Furthermore, it 
must be shown that the aider and abettor “knew (in the sense he was aware) 
that his own acts assisted the commission of the specific crime in question by 
the principal offender”.173 The aider and abettor need not know the precise 
crime that was intended and which in the event was committed – awareness 
that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed is sufficient.
174
  
When it comes to the specific intent crimes, such as genocide and 
persecution, the position is that the aider and abettor does not need to share 
the intent of the principal perpetrator but does need to be aware of it.
175
 Judge 
Shahabuddeen in his partial dissenting opinion in Krstić highlighted the 
difference between the intent of the perpetrator and the intent of the aider and 
abettor in relation to the crime of genocide – the former intends to commit 
genocide, while the latter intends to provide means by which the perpetrator, 
if he wishes, can realize his intent to commit genocide.
176
 
In the view of some Trial and Appeals Chambers, the fact that the aider and 
abettor may not have shared the intent of the principal offender generally 
lessens his or her culpability for sentencing purposes.
177
 However, as 
discussed in more detail in chapter six of this thesis, a number of 
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considerations usually affect the judges’ reasoning at sentencing; the mode of 
participation of the accused being just one of them.
178
 
The last remark in this section is on the novel interpretation of the conduct 
requirement of aiding and abetting as containing the element of the ‘specific 
direction’. This contentious point is currently debated in the jurisprudence of 
international courts.  
The roots of the ‘specific direction’ issue can be found in the early ICTY 
jurisprudence. According to the ILC the contribution of an aider and abettor 
need not only be ‘substantial’, as discussed above, but also ‘direct’.179 The 
ILC Commentary does not explain the exact meaning of ‘direct’ contribution. 
This particular qualifier has caused some confusion in the case law of the ad 
hoc tribunals from their creation. The Tadić Trial Chamber seems to have 
embraced this requirement, treating the accused as culpable where his 
participation “directly and substantially affected the commission of the 
offence.”180 However, in Furundžija the court rejected the term ‘direct’ in 
qualifying the proximity of the assistance and the principal act as misleading 
because “it may imply that assistance needs to be tangible, or to have a causal 
effect on the crime.”181  
The issue of the direction of the contribution by the accused resurfaced in 
early 2013 when the ICTY Appeals Chamber returned to the question in 
Perišić, when it interpreted the actus reus of aiding and abetting as requiring 
that the assistance is specifically directed towards the crimes.
182
 The 
justification for this additional element was the need to address the situations 
where the accused’s individual assistance is remote from the actions of 
principal perpetrators or when such assistance could be used for both lawful 
and unlawful activities.
183
 In such circumstances, the Chamber reasoned, it is 
necessary to establish “a direct link between the aid provided by an accused 
individual and the relevant crimes committed by principal perpetrators.”184  In 
line with this restrictive formulation of accessory liability, the Appeals 
Chamber overturned Perišić’s conviction for aiding and abetting the Army of 
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the Republika Srpska (VRS) in his capacity as Chief of the Yugoslav Army 
General Staff. This is notwithstanding the fact that Perišić, as the most senior 
figure in the Yugoslav Army, knowingly provided logistical and personnel 
assistance to the VRS, which was committing crimes in Sarajevo and 
Srebrenica.
185
  
 
The rationale for the acquittal in Perišić was the Chamber’s reluctance to find 
that the accused’s assistance was specifically directed at supporting the 
criminal activities, and not just geared towards the general war effort.
186
 In 
particular, the VRS was conceptualized as ‘an army fighting a war’ rather 
than an organization whose actions were criminal per se.
187
 The judges, thus, 
concluded that since not all of the VRS activities were criminal in nature, the 
policy of providing assistance to the VRS’s general war effort did not, in 
itself, demonstrate that assistance facilitated by Perišić was specifically 
directed to aid the crimes.
188
 
 
The Perišić appellate panel justified its explicit consideration of the ‘specific 
direction’ issue on two main grounds. First, the judges claimed that they do 
not diverge from, but merely clarify the Tadić formula for aiding and 
abetting, which already contains the contentious element.
189
 In so deciding, 
the Perišić Appeals Chamber had to dismiss preivous prouncement made in 
the Šljivančanin Appeal judgment that “‘specific direction’ is not an essential 
ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting”.190 The Perišić Appeals 
Chamber found feeble arguments to support the dismissal of the Šljivančanin 
definition: it held that in Šljivančanin the reference to the ‘specific direction’ 
was errouneously made in the context of mens rea element of aiding and 
abetting, and not the actus reus where it rightfully belongs. Secondly, the 
Chamber held that the issue was mentioned only in passing, and therefore 
does not amount to ‘careful consderation’ that warrants depature from 
previous case law.
191
  
 
By arguing that the ‘specific direction’ element has been part of the previous 
jurisprudence and the Šljivančanin judgement rejecting it does not alter this 
practice, the Perišić Appeals Chamber avoided the situation whereby it would 
have to furnish “cogent reasons in the interests of justice” for departing from 
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the previous precedents.
192
 The established rule is that the Appeals Chamber 
should follow its previous decisions for the reasons of legal certainty and 
predictability, unless the previous decision has been decided on the basis of a 
wrong legal principle or the judges were ill informed about the applicable 
law.
 193
 
 
The second reason for expressly considering the specific direction in Perišić 
was the alleged lack of treatment of the issue in the jurisprudence of the ad 
hoc tribunals. This pecularity was explained “by the fact that prior 
convictions for aiding and abetting entered or affirmed by the Appeals 
Chamber involved relevant acts geographically or otherwise proximate to, 
and thus not remote from, the crimes of principal perpetrators”.194 This is to 
some extent tenuous because comparable cases have been before the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in the past. For example, in Brđanin, the accused – a 
leading political figure in the Autonomous Region of Krajina and the 
president of the Crisis Staff – was found guilty of aiding and abetting due to 
the decisions he took in his official capacity having a substantial effect on the 
commission of the charged acts. Due to his general leadership role, Brđanin’s 
proximity to the specific crimes is questionable. A discussion about the 
specific direction is does not however appear in this judgment.  
 
The ‘specific direction’ test also appeared in the recent Stanišić and Simatović 
case.
195
 The accused in this case organized and directed a special unit within 
the Serbian state security service, which they knew committed crimes of 
murder, deportation, forcible transfer, and persecution.
196
 The Chamber fell 
short, however, of declaring this unit a criminal organization, despite the fact 
that it operated covertly and was engaged in numerous crimes.
197
 The 
extensive involvement of the accused with the operation of the unit led the 
judges to conclude that their contributions assisted the commission of the 
crimes by the unit members.
198
 However, the fact that the accused were not 
physically present in the field during operations resulted in the finding that 
their assistance may have been directed towards the legitimate military 
objective of establishing and maintaining Serb control and not the criminal 
goals.
199
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64 
The matter was not however closed following Perišić and Stanišić and 
Simatović. Both the SCSL and the ICTY revisited the issue of the specific 
direction as an element of aiding and abetting. First, the SCSL in the Taylor 
Appeal judgment rejected the requirement of specific direction.
200
 The 
Appeals Chamber concluded that the definition of the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting under customary international law is established by the 
substantial effect on the crimes, not the particular manner in which such 
assistance is provided.
201
 The Taylor appellate panel found the requirement 
that the acts of the accused have a substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime establish a sufficient casual link. It therefore saw no reason to depart 
from the settled principles of law and introduce the novel element of the 
specific direction in the definition of actus reus of aiding and abetting
202
 The 
judges further noted that the question of physical proximity between the 
accused and the crimes may be relevant on a case-by-case basis, but it is not a 
legal requirement.
203
 The Taylor Appeals Chamber stressed that the element 
of specific direction discussed in Perišić could be inferred from the Tadić 
Appeal judgment that purported to distinguish aiding and abetting liability 
from the joint criminal enterprise liability rather than establish the elements of 
aiding and abetting under customary international law.
204
 
 
Secondly, the appeal judgement rendered by the ICTY in Šainović et al. in 
early 2014 also reversed the direction of the Perišić Appeals Chamber. 205 
The defence team of Vladimir Lazarević in the Šainović et al. case contested 
his conviction for aiding and abetting deportation and forcible transfer on the 
basis of the lack of determination by the Trial Chamber of whether his alleged 
acts and omissions were specifically directed to assist the commission of 
these crimes.
206
  The majority of the Appeals Chamber disagreed with the 
pronouncement in Perišić that the previous jurisprudence of the ICTY does 
not diverge on the issue of the specific direction.
207
 On the contrary, the 
Šainović et al. judges concluded that there is a clear divergence on the matter 
between the Perišić and the Šljivančanin Appeal judgments.208 The Šainović 
et al. judges solved the legal conundrum by assessing where the law stands on 
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the issue of the specific direction.
209
 Extensive review of the jurisprudence 
the ad hoc tribunals and post Second World War cases begged for the 
conclusion that specific direction is not an element of aiding and abetting 
liability under customary international law or the Statute of the Tribunal.
210
 
The Appeals Chamber also made brief a reference to national law, correctly 
stating that the variations among national jurisdictions do not allow deducing 
a common principle on the issue at hand.
211
   
 
The ‘specific direction’ saga did not end with the rejection of the contentious 
criterion in the Šainović et al. Appeal judgment. The ICTY Office of the 
Prosecution attempted to reverse the acquittal in Perišić by filing a motion 
seeking reconsideration.
212
 The Appeals Chamber denied the request failing 
to find “cogent reasons in the interests of justice” for the reconsideration of a 
final judgment.
213
 It is disappointing that this brief decision does not explain 
or elaborate on what constitutes “cogent reasons in the interests of justice” 
and why this test is not met in present circumstances.   
 
The recent rejection of ‘specific direction’ as an element of aiding and 
abetting liability in Taylor and Šainović et al. is to be applauded for a number 
of reasons. The new enhanced version of aiding and abetting purports to 
bridge the temporal and/or spatial gap between the accomplice and the 
principal perpetrator. This is unnatural for aiding and abetting; the form of 
liability that targets precisely the situations where the accused is removed 
from the scene of the crime. The new standard may lead to gaps in 
responsibility, where culpable assistance with a substantial effect on the crime 
does not attract liability due to a simple lack of physical proximity between 
the crime and the assistance. There are a number of other problems with the 
latest approach. First, it lacks foundation in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals. The requirement of the specific direction, creatively inferred from 
the wording of the Tadić appeal judgment, appears to have been taken out of 
context, and there is case law rejecting ‘specific direction’ as an element of 
aiding and abetting.
214
 The Tadić Appeals Chamber used the ‘specific 
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direction’ criterion for aiding and abetting in order to contrast it with acts in 
some way directed to the furtherance of common design.
215
 Thus, the 
emphasis was not on the physical proximity of the accomplice’s aid to the 
offence in question but on the existence of the crime-specific relationship 
between the aider and abettor and the principal perpetrator. This is in contrast 
to the group-specific situation, characteristic of the joint criminal enterprise.    
 
Secondly, this additional criterion conflates assistance with performing part 
of actus reus of the offence itself and brings aiding and abetting dangerously 
close to commission. The former, in contrast with the latter, need not be the 
direct cause of the crime.
216
 Thirdly, the specific direction requirement is 
superfluous and does not have an independent standing of its own. One can 
view it either as an implied element of substantial contribution, in a sense of 
accomplice’s actions having some impact on the conduct of the principal, 
and, thus, being directed towards the crime; or as part of the accused’s mens 
rea for aiding and abetting, which is knowledge. If the accused knew about 
the crime and still provided assistance, then logically his acts are directed 
towards the offence.
 217
    
Finally, the requirement that the aid is specifically directed towards the crime, 
and not just to the establishing military control or other fighting objective, - 
even in the circumstances when the assistance is provided with the knowledge 
and facilitates the commission of offences - brings to the surface an 
uncomfortable question that goes beyond the legal technicalities of a 
particular liability mode: what are the conditions that turn the ‘general war 
effort’ into a ‘crime’ attracting individual criminal responsibility?  Also, what 
is the standard of behavior that we expect from the senior leadership in the 
context of war?  
 
It remains to be seen whether the recent Šainović et al. Appeal judgment 
concluding that ‘specific direction’ is not an element of aiding and abetting 
liability under customary international law or the ICTY Statute puts an end to 
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a juridical saga.
218
 What is clear at this stage is that the disagreement between 
various Chambers showcased certain degree of ambiguity regarding both the 
scope of complicity and the weight of precedents in international criminal 
law.  
viii. Complicity in Genocide 
Article 4(3)(e) of the ICTY Statute and Article 2(3)(e) of the ICTR Statute 
dealing with the substantive crime of genocide, criminalize, inter alia, 
complicity in genocide. These provisions create an overlap with those articles 
that provide for different forms of complicity as a form of individual criminal 
responsibility.
219
  
Boas summarized three approaches adopted by different Trial Chambers 
when addressing the relationship between the two provisions.
220
 The first 
approach, adopted by the Akayesu Trial Chamber, was to treat aiding and 
abetting genocide and complicity in genocide as having distinct physical and 
mental elements. Aiding and abetting genocide consisted in a failure to act or 
refraining from action, combined with the accused possessing a genocidal 
intent while complicity in genocide required that the accused engage in an 
overt act with the mere knowledge of the actual perpetrator’s intent.221 The 
second approach, adopted in Stakić and Semanza, held that aiding and 
abetting genocide and complicity in genocide are identical.
222
 Finally, the 
most authoritative approach is that of Krstić Appeals Chamber, which held 
that ‘complicity’ and ‘accomplice’ may encompass conduct broader than that 
of aiding and abetting. The court characterized Krstić’s as that of aiding and 
abetting genocide.
223
  The Appeals Chamber did not require an aider and 
abettor to posses a specific intent, mere knowledge of the intent of the 
physical perpetrator sufficed.
 224
 
It appears that the most reasonable way of delineating these two overlapping 
norms is to distinguish them functionally: ‘complicity in genocide’ shall be 
regarded as a substantive offence because it is located in an article dealing 
with the crime of genocide, while various modes of liability in Articles 7 and 
6 of the ICTY/R Statutes serve the different purpose of attaching liability and 
characterising the conduct of the accused. The consequence of the functional 
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approach is to treat the substantive crime provision on complicity in genocide 
as embracing all forms of participation in the actus reus and mens rea of the 
offence itself. The Krstić approach endorses the functional distinction 
between complicity in genocide as a substantive crime and complicity in 
genocide as a mode of responsibility and a crime.  
2. Problems with Building the Coherent Account of 
Complicity 
The above discussion concerned the legal requirements for modes of liability 
in international criminal law. It seems that the judges of the ad hoc tribunals 
and the hybrid courts often resort to predetermined formulas to discuss the 
ways in which the accused are involved in crimes. Different forms of 
complicity are frequently utilized by the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts: a 
table demonstrating the correlation between liability modes and sentencing, 
provided in the Appendix IV of the thesis, shows that situations of instigating, 
ordering, aiding and abetting and planning arise in approximately one third of 
the ICTY cases and approximately two thirds of the ICTR cases. The SCSL 
employed the joint criminal enterprise in one case and various forms of 
complicity as well as superior responsibility in the other cases, while the 
ECCC chose to use all available forms of participation aside from 
‘committing’ in its first judgement. 225  The joint criminal enterprise, 
commission, extended commission and superior responsibility are the 
alternative legal tools used by courts to address international criminality 
sometimes alongside and sometimes instead of complicity. This section 
summarizes four problems preventing coherent application of the liability 
doctrines, in particular complicity, in international criminal law.  
i. Fragmentation 
An overview of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts 
shows that each body applying international criminal law adopts its own 
approach to the modes of participation. The ECCC seems to adhere to the 
unitary model of participation and resembles the Nuremberg prototype. Its 
first judgement listed convictions for every mode of liability available under 
the ECCC Law aside from committing.
226
 The ICTY frequently used the 
concept of the joint criminal enterprise to address collective criminality while 
the ICTR adopted its own notion of commission, namely the extended one. 
Various forms of complicity also frequently make an appearance in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and the hybrid courts but the way in 
which they are applied to the facts are entirely different. The ICTR often 
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employs several modes of responsibility to address the same conduct whereas 
the ICTY and the SCSL are more selective in that they usually prefer a 
particular form of responsibility.
227
 Even within one institution the legal 
standards differ from case to case. The ICTY extended aiding and abetting to 
include liability for omission. It convicted Šljivančanin as an aider and 
abettor for failing to prevent the implementation of an unlawful order in the 
absence of any formal position of authority. It then dramatically restricted 
aiding and abetting liability by introducing the requirement of ‘specific 
direction’ in Perišić and Stanišić and Simatović.  
The recent Taylor and Šainović et al. Appeal judgments, rejecting the specific 
direction requirement as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, 
are the most vivid examples of the fragmentation of international criminal 
law. The rejection of the specific direction requirement in by the SCSL and 
the ICTY is a double-edged sword. On the positive side it upholds the 
appropriate standard of complicity for the purposes of international criminal 
law. The negative side is the lack of coherence and coordination between 
different courts and tribunals applying international criminal law.
228
 The 
discipline is becoming highly fragmented as it is pulled apart by a multitude 
of considerations, many of which are extra-legal. The prosecution’s motion to 
reconsider the final Appeal judgment in Perišić in the light of the recent 
developments and the subsequent decision denying the motion on the grounds 
of the lack of cogent reasons in the interests of justice only added to the 
overall ambiguity about the standards applicable in international criminal law. 
Why do we need coherence in international criminal law? Why not allow 
each international judicial body adopt its own set of rules? The answer to this 
question is threefold. First, differential treatment of offenders across various 
courts and tribunals violates the principle of the equality of punishment. This 
principle is at heart of the retributive rationale adopted as one of the guiding 
principles by international criminal justice.
229
 As Kant framed it, the 
punishment should be commensurate to whatever undeserved evil one inflicts 
on another person.
230
 In modern retributive thinking, the measuring is done 
according to the principle of proportionality – the sentence must be 
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proportionate to the gravity of criminal conduct.
231
 The idea behind this 
principle is that individuals should be treated as rational beings capable of 
making choices, and it is the choice to offend that is punished, not the 
individual himself, consequently punishment must be commensurate to the 
evil inflicted.
232
  In Dworkinian terms, individuals have a right to equal 
concern and respect in the administration of the political institutions that 
govern them.
233
 Acceptance of the differential treatment of offenders in 
international criminal law requires, at minimum, some adjustments to the 
retributive punishment rationale extensively cited as one of the main 
sentencing goals in international criminal law.
234
  
The matter is further complicated if one focuses on a particular legal concept, 
that of complicity. The law of complicity distorts the principle of the equality 
of punishment on a conceptual level, making it ever more important to 
maintain a uniform approach to the matter. Common law position illustrates 
this bias of complicity. Common law translates the principle of the equality of 
punishment for all parties into treating principal perpetrators and accomplices 
alike.
235
 Reconciling this principle with complicity’s derivative nature 
required many changes and refinements in English law, including the 
adoption of the broad notion of presumed causality for complicity.
236
 While 
these modifications allowed for the principle of the equality of punishment in 
English law, the matter is by no means free from controversy. 
Secondly, there is a pragmatic reason militating against fragmentation. The 
judgements in the area of international criminal law are often criticized for 
being too lengthy and requiring significant time and financial input. One way 
to improve the efficiency is to fasciliate a better dialogue between different 
international courts and within each institution. For example, it appears that 
both the Taylor and the Šainović et al. Appeals Chambers undertook 
essentially the same exercise trying to determine whether specific direction as 
an element of aiding and abetting is part of customary international law. It 
seems reasonable, for the purposes of judicial efficiency, to promote cross-
referencing and collaboration across the field with the view of reducing extra 
workload for individual Chambers.  
The final reason for maintaining some level of internal coherence in 
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international criminal law arises from the need to preserve the principle of 
legality. This fundamental principle, sometimes expressed by the maxim 
nullum crimen sine lege or the ‘rule of law’, has both procedural and 
substantive implications.
237
 The specific aspects of the principle of legality 
that are eroded by fragmentation are the principle of maximum certainty in 
defining offences (also termed ‘fair warning’) and the principle of ‘fair 
labelling’, concerned with providing a fair representation of the nature and 
the magnitude of the law breaking.
238
 The reason for maintaining the 
distinctions is again the principle of proportionality – one of the aims of 
criminal law is to provide a proportionate response to offending by accurately 
describing the criminal conduct.
239
  
These principles in domestic law do not exist unchecked but are balanced by 
current pragmatic and political considerations.
240
 Ashworth noted that the 
principle of legal certainty runs counter to the policy of social defence, a 
position that some vagueness in criminal law is beneficial because it allows 
the enforcement authorities and the judiciary to deal flexibly with new 
variations in misconduct without awaiting the legislature.
241
 The principle of 
fair labelling is balanced by the considerations of increasing efficiency in the 
administration of criminal justice – fewer and broader categories of offence 
make it easier to secure convictions and lead to the reduction in spending on 
the court system.
242
  
The examples provided are from the domestic system of criminal justice. 
International criminal law has yet to define its objectives, as well as the 
policy consideration that shape judicial reasoning in an international context. 
How to balance procedural fairness and the completion strategy? How to 
make the mass atrocities ‘fit’ individual indictments? How to maintain 
economic efficiency? How to draw the line between a ‘general war effort’ 
and a war crime?
243
 These are some of the problematic questions with policy 
implications. It is difficult to answer these while international criminal law 
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still searches for its identity and purposes.
244
 Without an understanding of 
what this field of law aspires to achieve, it is difficult to conceptualize how 
the policy considerations counter-balance different aspects of the principle of 
legality in the context of international criminal law. Fragmentation should be 
avoided to the maximum extent possible, pending the resolution of the 
general problems of policy and purposes. Undermining coherence requires 
more justification than what is currently provided.
 
 
ii. Unclear Standard of Causation 
The jurisprudence emanating from the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts 
appears ambiguous when it comes to defining the standard of causation for 
complicity. The fact that some Chambers held that instigation, in contrast 
with aiding and abetting, ordering and planning, requires a causal link 
between an act of instigation and the commission of a crime exemplifies the 
lack of clarity in this sphere.
245
  
The classification by Sanford Kadish of the consequences of human actions is 
helpful in understanding causation in the context of complicity. Kadish 
explained that a person’s actions might result in two outcomes: first, they may 
lead to the subsequent chain of events governed by the laws of nature, as for 
example with setting a house on fire by lighting a match; secondly, the 
consequence of a person’s action may also consist in actions of other people, 
in the situations of instigation, persuasion, etc.
246
 In the first case, 
responsibility follows for the harm that is caused by the freely chosen action, 
while in the second instance, the basis of responsibility is whether help or 
persuasion renders an accomplice accountable for another’s actions and their 
effect.
247
 Kadish wrote:  
“[…] whether I am to be blamed for the other person's action 
would not be assessed by asking whether I caused his action in 
the same sense that his lighting the match caused the fire. 
Rather, my responsibility would be determined by asking 
whether my persuasion or help made me accountable for the 
other person's actions and what they caused.”248 
Causation stricto sensu manifests itself only in the first case, when the events 
happen in the natural world, through its two components: the ‘cause in fact’ 
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requirement and the ‘proximate’ or ‘legal’ cause requirement.249  The first 
requirement refers to causation in the scientific or factual sense and the 
dominant test for the cause in fact is ‘sine qua non’ or ‘but-for’ test, which 
implies that the defendant’s action was a necessary condition for the harm to 
occur.
250
 The second, legal, requirement of causation is evaluative in nature 
and involves determining whether the defendant is culpable of causing certain 
harm based on a number of policy considerations; protected social interests, 
foreseeability, deterrence, directness of the contribution.
251
 The synergy of 
these two requirements allows us to establish causation in the narrow sense of 
the word. The process is not however a clear-cut exercise: the unified view of 
causation conceives causation as a matter of degree – one thing can be more 
of a cause of a certain event than another.
252
 Consequently, even establishing 
causation in the physical world, between the harm and the perpetrator, 
requires some flexibility and an evaluative assessment. 
In the second scenario discussed by Kadish, the causal chain is interrupted by 
others’ freely chosen acts.253 It is therefore not necessary to establish that the 
crime would not have been perpetrated without the accused’s involvement; 
the sine qua non test is not applicable in this situation.
254
 The accomplice is 
only able to influence the conduct of the actual perpetrator, but he cannot be 
said to have caused the crime. This understanding of complicity is in line with 
its derivative nature. The secondary party incurs the liability by virtue of the 
violation of the law by the primary party to which secondary party 
contributed.
255
 Accomplice liability therefore depends on the liability of the 
primary perpetrator.
256
 This is not to suggest that the language of causation is 
inapplicable to complicity. Kadish admitted that complicity and causation are 
cognate issues – “they fix blame for a result characterized by a but-for 
relationship to the actor’s contribution, although complicity allows for a 
weaker version of that relationship”. 257  Furthermore, causation “broadly 
conceived, concerns the relationship between successive phenomena, whether 
they have the character of events or happenings, or of another person’s 
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volitional actions.”258  
The key distinction is that causation in complicity is different from physical 
causation. It is essential that international judges stress and clarify this 
difference. Kutz conceptualized complicity as avoiding individual inquiries 
into causation by treating harm intended (as opposed to harm caused) as the 
basis of criminal responsibility.
259
 For Kutz, the essential shift that complicity 
entails is from objective causation to the subjective intent; from actual harm 
to risk.
260
 Gardner contended, “[…] the difference between principals and 
accomplices is a causal difference, i.e. a difference between two types of 
causal contribution, not a difference between a causal and a non-causal 
contribution.”261 The link between an accomplice and the harm for Gardner 
lies in the subjective sphere of reasoning as to why one engages in criminal 
conduct – justifying one’s wrongs by claiming that they make no impact is 
not cancelling them, but showing one committed them for a sufficient 
reason.
262
  
 
According to K.J.M. Smith, English law adopted the broad notion of causality 
for complicity doctrine as a compromise between the strict theoretical 
demands of causality and the limitations of proof.
263
 Smith maintained that 
the problem stems from the need to distinguish causal roles of the principals 
and accessories on the basis of immediacy and directness of causal 
contribution to actus reus.
264
 The accessory contributes only indirectly by 
influencing the principal. This peculiarity, the distance of an accomplice from 
the actual harm and the practical difficulty of showing causation, prompted 
English courts to adopt the implicit rule of the presumed cause – a theoretical 
adjustment driven by policy demands for a wide-ranging coverage of 
complicity.
265
 This rule embraces the limitations of causation in the context of 
complicity: an accomplice may not be said to have ‘caused’ the principal to 
act in the same way as the principal causes certain crime to occur in the 
physical world through his voluntary act.
266
 This is so because interpersonal 
relations lack predictability; they lack the sequence of cause and effect.
267
 At 
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the same time, if the accomplice’s acts have no effect on the crime, no 
liability follows.
268
 Consequently, the operating basis of complicity, 
according to Smith, is not positively established causal contribution but the 
‘assumed cause’, which is the product of tension between what could feasibly 
be proved and the breadth of conduct that should be covered by complicity 
law pursuant to policy demands.
269
 
 
The theoretical discussion about the nature of causation in the sphere of 
complicity leads to three conclusions pertinent to international criminal law. 
First, all forms of complicity, instigation included, share the same derivative 
basis, thus they may not be distinguished on the basis of present or absent 
causal connection to the crime.
270
 One may safely assume that no causation in 
a strict sense of the word is required for any form of complicity. The standard 
of international criminal law that the relationship between the contribution of 
the accomplice and the crime does not need to be sine qua non is correct. It 
seems however that this test does not belong with complicity at all because it 
deals with events happening in the natural world and cannot be strictly 
applied to the acts of other people in light of the presumption of the freedom 
of choice and individual autonomy.  
 
Secondly, it is possible to construct a wider concept of causation so as to 
include the effect of accomplice’s aid or influence on the voluntary act of the 
primary perpetrator. The artificial nature of the link between accessory’s 
contribution and the crime follows from the distinct moral importance of the 
perpetrator’s role, regardless of the scale of accessory’s contribution.271 The 
process of expanding the ordinary meaning of causation requires further 
elaboration.  
One way to conceptualize causality in the sphere of complicity is to focus on 
the distinction found in the domestic legal systems between unitary and 
differentiated participation. The unitary model presupposes that any 
involvement whatsoever on the part of an actor in any offence establishes his 
connection to the crime, while the differential model requires connecting the 
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liability of accomplices to the conduct of the principal perpetrator.
272
 Thus, 
the unitary model allows for more flexibility when it comes to the causation 
standard – any contribution to the crime establishes the connection. The 
peculiarity of this model is that liability of each crime participant stands on its 
own; in other words, it is not derivative. It seems, however, that the ICTY, 
ICTR, and SCSL recognize the derivative nature of complicity.
273
 The 
ECCC’s conception of the forms of participation in the Duch judgement is 
perhaps a step closer to the unitary model of participation: the ECCC judges 
adopted a factual approach to the evidence. They established the 
responsibility of Kaing Kek Iev, or Duch, for every liability mode available 
under the ECCC Law, aside from ‘committing’ on the basis of his position as 
the head of the extermination centre Toul Sleng (S-21). The ECCC Trial 
Chamber did not elaborate on the specific crimes committed by Duch’s 
subordinates, the prison staff, but focused on the responsibility of Kaing Kek 
Iev himself.
274
 
There is room for constructed causation even within the differential 
participation model. It appears that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
requires that the contribution of the aider and abetter has a substantial effect 
upon the perpetration of the crime.
275
 Likewise, planning or instigation must 
be a factor that contributes substantially to the conduct of another person 
committing the crime.
276
 The terms ‘substantial effect’ or ‘substantial factor’ 
present some conceptual difficulties if one views the will of the principal as 
autonomous. How does one measure the effect of the aid or influence on the 
primary perpetrator if he is an independent moral agent? 
 
One potential solution to this problem is shifting the focus from the actual 
harm caused by the accessory’s actions to the risk that he took by providing 
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assistance or encouragement to the principal. This is in line with the 
proposition by Kutz that the basis for accomplice’s responsibility is not the 
harm caused but the harm intended.
277
 This conceptualization of complicity 
leaves room for the extended form of causation, which may be called the 
‘subjective’ causation: what matters is the internal perception of the risk of 
harm by the accomplice and the actions that he undertakes to further his 
plans. This is a shift from the objective causation required for primary 
perpetration.
278
 It seems reasonable that international judgments should focus 
more on accomplice’s state of mind and his culpable contribution to the 
crime, rather than seek an objective, close cause-effect relationship between 
the accessory and the crime.  This approach does not entail conflating conduct 
and fault requirements of complicity, these should be assessed separately and 
balanced against each other, but rather shifts the emphasis from the end 
result, the crime, to the accomplice, his conduct and his intentions. When 
evaluating culpability of an accomplice, it is also essential to bear in mind the 
specific type of criminality involved in international offending – a criminality 
that stems from obedience rather than deviance.
279
 
 
Thirdly, causation is a matter of degree and not a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question. Even 
the causal link between the primary perpetrator and the harm implies 
attributing relative degrees of significance. The event is usually caused by a 
number of factors and each of them contributes to its occurrence to some 
extent.
280
  When it comes to complicity, the effect of the influence of the 
accomplice on the primary perpetrator is subject to even more relativity. 
Predicting the principal’s behaviour in the absence of the contribution by the 
accomplice is a speculative exercise. Consequently, it is essential to 
undertake a case-by-case assessment of the connection between the 
accomplice and the crime. The Taylor Appeals Chamber correctly held, “the 
causal link between the accused‘s acts and conduct and the commission of the 
crime is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.”281 Domestic law provides for 
similar indications: in Maxwell, the UK House of Lords strongly emphasized 
the desirability of indictments that indicate the true factual nature of the case 
presented against the defendant.
282
 The rationale is that, because all forms of 
behaviour have certain potential to produce an encouraging effect on the 
principal perpetrator, complicity is not determined by literal constructions. Its 
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limits are conceptual and lie elsewhere in causal expectations and the fault 
requirement.
283
 
 
The level of influence on the principal varies from case to case and from one 
form of complicity to another. An instigator who uses threats or lies to induce 
the commission of a crime is closer to ‘causing’ a crime in the actual sense of 
the word than an aider who merely provides the means that could allow 
principal commit an offence if he wished to do so.
284
 It is ever more difficult 
to assess the impact of accessory’s contribution on the primary perpetrator 
and ultimately on the offence in the context of international criminal law due 
to the scale of criminality involved and significant spatial and temporal gap 
between the crime and factors contributing to it. This lack of proximity has to 
be compensated by enhancing the fault requirement or conduct requirement, 
depending on the circumstances of the case.
285
  
The problem of the specific direction partially stems from the lack of the 
well-defined causation standard for complicity.  The justification for the 
introduction of the ‘specific direction’ element in the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting is the need to expressly establish the link between accomplices' 
contribution and the wrongdoing in cases when the accused is removed from 
the offence. The assumption is that the link is implied when the accomplice is 
physically close to the crime.
286
 However, physical proximity is often a false 
friend for establishing this connection – even when an accomplice is present 
at the scene of the crime, he is not directly perpetrating it and his contribution 
to the offence is often inferred from the evidence.
287
 The same conclusion 
follows from the fact that the causal link between the accomplice and the 
crime is constructed: the connection stems from the risk that the secondary 
party envisages and undertakes rather than the actual harm that his actions 
cause. Hence, it is the mental state of the accomplice that grounds his 
relationship to the offence rather than his conduct. If one accepts that distance 
is not dispositive for establishing the effect of accessory’s contribution on the 
offence, then the whole raison d'être for the specific direction fails. It is no 
longer necessary to compensate for the distance by adding additional 
requirements to actus reus of complicity, i.e. that aid is specifically directed 
towards the crime.  
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iii. Disconnection Between Facts, Law and Forms of 
Liability 
In an ideal world the facts of the case, the definition of substantive offences 
and the legal requirements of the liability modes function as a single unit.
288
 
The harmonious collaboration of these three elements leads to the fair 
assessment of conduct of the accused in the particular circumstances of the 
case. Due to high complexity of issues presented in international courts and 
the evolving nature of international criminal law, international judgments are 
usually very voluminous, with the structure reflecting a clear division 
betweent ‘the law’, ‘the facts’ and ‘the sentencing’. This rigidity in the way 
international judgements are constructucted and the autonomous nature of 
each distinct part of the document sometimes leads to the ‘missing links’ 
between the mode of liability and the substantive offence, between the facts 
of the case and the legal definitions, or among all three elements. It follows 
from the description of the liability modes furnished in the previous section 
that the wording that one finds in the case law of international tribunals and 
hybrid courts is frequently mechanical. We observe an engagement with the 
forms of responsibility as the simple application of certain labels. These 
labels are often not linked to the actual facts of the case or to the substantive 
office.  
The missing link between the substantive offence and the mode of 
responsibility is revealed in the lack of a distinction between the legal 
requirements of the liability modes, conduct requirement and fault 
requirement, and the actus reus and mens rea of the substantive crimes.
289
 
Historically, the interplay between the two sets of elements has not been 
straightforward. The IMT and IMTFE did not distinguish them, instead 
opting for a fact-based approach to attributing responsibility. The later case 
law and the work of the ILC show more awareness of the issue, divorcing the 
mode of liability and the substantive offence to which this liability 
attaches.
290
  
The interplay between the offence and the form of responsibility is essential 
in developing a comprehensive theory of individual criminal responsibility in 
international criminal law. Forms of participation and substantive offences 
consist of elements, and, to secure conviction, the prosecution has to prove 
                                                             
288
 This is not to suggest that other factors are not part of the overall assessment. Defenses, 
for instance, also form part of the analysis, but are not discussed in this thesis. Sentencing 
and the aims of punishment – discussed in Chapter VI– also appear to be detached from the 
rest of the discussion – they usually found in a Separate part of the judgment.  
289
 See Section 1.i. supra. 
290
 See Chapter I.4. supra. 
  
 
 
 
80 
both sets of elements.
291
 To further complicate matters, the prosecution must 
also establish the existence of the so-called chapeaux elements or the 
‘general’ or ‘preliminary’ conditions characteristic of the certain type of 
offence (for example, the existence of an armed conflict for war crimes, or the 
widespread or systematic attack for crimes against humanity).
292
 This 
complexity makes it difficult to link different elements in one judgement, 
leading to a situation where the ad hoc tribunals and the hybrid courts treat 
the definition of crimes and the modes of liability for crimes as separate 
questions with the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ECCC discussing the substantive 
crimes and the forms of individual criminal responsibility in different parts of 
the judgments.
293
  
Complicity in genocide – a provision that exists in the ICTY/R Statues as a 
substantive offence – showcases the difficulties encountered by the ad hoc 
tribunals in distinguishing the legal requirements of liability forms and the 
elements of the substantive offence.
294
 The inclusion of ‘complicity in 
genocide’ as a substantive crime in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes is 
problematic in its own right – it creates an overlap between Articles 7 and 6, 
respectively, dealing with various forms of complicity, and Articles 4 and 2, 
respectively, covering the offence of genocide, including ‘complicity in 
genocide’. However, the point to be made here is that until the Krstić Appeal 
judgement that distinguished ‘complicity in genocide’ as a substantive 
offence from aiding and abetting genocide as a combination of the mode of 
liability and the substantive offence, there existed little clarity on the 
matter.
295
 Arguably, the root of the problem – the existence of the two sets of 
requirements in respect of every incident that the prosecution has to prove - is 
still not sufficiently spelled out in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
and the hybrid courts. 
The other frequently missing link is between the facts of the case and the 
legal labels attached to them. This concern is especially pressing with regards 
to complicity, which is a highly fluid legal concept that has no rigid 
definition.
296
 The legal requirements of various forms of complicity - the 
conduct requirement and the fault requirement - provide only the initial 
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framework for the assessment in each individual case. The abstract formulas 
utilized by the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts in respect of various forms 
of complicity seem to allow a flexibility to place more emphasis on the level 
of contribution of the accused or his knowledge of the crime. Furundžija 
provides a good example of balancing the two elements in establishing the 
case of aiding and abetting rape. The accused witnessed the crime happening. 
Presence at the scene of the crime was a ‘strong’ indicator of Furundžija’s 
culpable mental state; this allowed for a ‘weaker’ conduct requirement – his 
contribution was inferred from the position of authority.
297
  
Thus, the two constituent parts of complicity are interconnected – they cannot 
be assessed independently – something that the Perišić Appeals Chamber 
tried to do by stressing that it will only focus on the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting.
298
 A more solid approach in the view of the constructed nature of 
complicity appears to be balancing the fault and the conduct requirement 
based on the facts of the particular case. As Smith put, “complicity’s 
derivative quality must convincingly reside at least in either mens rea or 
actus reus components […] diminution in demands on the mens rea side have 
repercussions for the causal element as part of the actus reus; and vice-
versa.”299  
The need to perceive fault and conduct requirement of complicity as one 
mechanism is relevant for the discussion on specific direction as part of the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting. It seems that making the requirements for 
the conduct element more stringent, without simultaneously lessening the 
fault requirement or getting rid of the requirement that the contribution of the 
accused must be substantial skews the construction of complicity. The Taylor 
Appeal judgment hinted at a more balanced approach to the two elements of 
aiding and abetting by drawing on the example of the US Model Penal Code 
(MPC) that requires ‘purpose’ -instead of a more widely accepted 
‘knowledge’ – as a mental element for aiding and abetting because it allows 
for any contribution to crime to qualify as a conduct element instead of a 
significant or substantial contribution.
300
  
In sum, a harmonious approach to all three elements – facts, description of the 
substantive offences and the modes of liability – is preferred. This is achieved 
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by the different parts of the judgements speaking to each other. The process 
of attribution of responsibility can be made more transparent if the form of 
responsibility is not used as an instrument for reaching a certain result – 
conviction or acquittal – but rather as a lens through which the court assesses 
the circumstances of the case, without any predetermined bias. The legal 
formulas should be attached to the specific facts and an inferential analysis, 
such as that which led to the conviction in the Šljivančanin case, should be 
justified at all times.
301
 
iv. Problem with the Sources  
One of the defence teams in Milutinović et al. raised the question whether the 
Tadić Appeals Chamber was correct in inferring the joint criminal enterprise 
from the ICTY Statute.
302
 This concern exemplifies the problem with sources 
in international criminal law. The first judgements of the ICTY – Tadić and 
Furundžija rely extensively on the post-World War II jurisprudence to 
establish the existence of a customary rule in international criminal law. The 
analysis in the previous chapter shows however that the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo judgments, as well as the subsequent convictions of the Nazi 
perpetrators pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, were highly politicized 
and influenced by domestic law considerations.
303
  International criminal law 
is not incidental but is the product of a combination of factors that need to be 
accounted for.   
Most of the considerations that shaped international criminal justice at the 
time of its conception are extra-legal. Shklar referred to the environment that 
led to setting up the IMT in the following terms: “…a very rare situation in 
which there is no law, no government, no political order, and people have 
committed acts so profoundly shocking that something must be done about 
them.” 304  In spite of this, the early ICTY judgments seem to ignore the 
context in which the precedents they are relying on came into existence. The 
first steps of the ICTY can be characterised by uncritical adherence to the 
post-World War jurisprudence. Boas at al. argue that the most worrying 
characteristic of the Tadić is the methodology used to establish the rules of 
customary international law. International judgements pursuant to Control 
Council Law No. 10 supporting in Tadić the existence of common purpose 
liability do not amount to state practice.
305
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Custom is a very problematic source of international criminal law: tribunals 
often avoid making a distinction between the two constituent elements of the 
custom – opinio juris and state practice. This is understandable because the 
discipline is very peculiar in that the state practice element of the custom 
often points to an undesirable outcome (i.e. a violation).
306
 In addition, the 
field of international criminal law is relatively new and is still evolving, 
making it difficult to assess whether a particular provision has crystalized as a 
custom or not.
307
 
A certain discomfort with the customary nature of the modes of liability in 
international criminal law is discernible in the jurisprudence of both hybrid 
courts. The Co-Investigative judges at the ECCC scrutinized the cases the 
cases that Tadić relied on in support of the three forms of the joint criminal 
enterprise.
308
 The judges found sufficient support in the customary 
international law for the first and second forms of the joint criminal 
enterprise
309
 but not the third, extended, form.
310
 The Trial Chamber 
confirmed these findings a year later and, after having reviewed domestic 
legislation of several states, rejected the proposition that the extended form of 
the joint criminal enterprise finds support in another source of international 
law, namely the general principles of law.
311
 
The SCSL, in the Taylor Appeal judgment showed its unwillingness to 
directly engage with custom. The Taylor Appeals Chamber attempted to 
circumvent the difficulty related to the fragmentation of international criminal 
law by framing the discussion about the specific direction not along the lines 
of shaping the custom but as a rejection of the ICTY precedent that is only 
internally binding.
312
 As Kevin Jon Heller pointed out, this reasoning is 
unconvincing.
313
 International courts and tribunals operating in the field apply 
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the sources of international law – treaty, custom, and the general principles of 
law.
314
 Their statutes do not expressly mention the specific direction 
requirement for complicity. The question is therefore whether it is a custom 
or a general principle. However, the Perišić Appeals Chamber was on equally 
feeble grounds when it entered the discussion in the first place.
315
 
In modern international criminal law, a uniform approach by different courts 
and tribunals to a particular issue may serve as the evidence of a consensus on 
a given topic, and thus permit one to speak of the formation of a customary 
rule. For example, the Taylor and the Šainović et al. Appeals Chambers 
certainly weakened (if not disposed of) the emerging customary rule requiring 
the ‘specific direction’ element as a part of actus reus of complicity, even 
though the Taylor appellate panel was not willing to engage expressly with 
the issue, while the analysis furnished in Šainović et al. is not free from 
controversy when it comes to assessing what consitututes a custom in 
international criminal law: not all of the cases cited in support of the absence 
of the specific direction in customary international law dealt aiding and 
abetting liability.
316
  
Looking at the other source of international law, the general principles of law, 
it seems that the requirement that the aid is directed towards the specific 
offence, in the sense that the ICTY attributed to it in Perišić, also lacks 
support in the majority of domestic legal systems.
317
 In this regard, the 
initiative of the Šainović et al. Appeals Chamber to ‘probe’ this third source 
of international law in order to establish whether domestic law may be of 
assistance in resolving the ‘specific direction’ problem deserves credit.318 The 
Chamber’s substantive conclusion about the lack of the uniform rule in 
respect of this particular aspect of aiding and abetting also appears correct.
319
 
The methodology employed for assessing domestic law is however far from 
clear. The judgment adopted a reductionist approach when grouping the 
countries together, without taking into account the specific features of 
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different legal families and individual legal systems.
320
  The overview of 
national case law is cramped together in three paragraphs and several lengthy 
footnotes.
321
 
Chapter four of this thesis argues in favour of the more extensive use of the 
general principles of law as a source of international criminal law: the 
acceptance of a certain rule in the majority of national legal systems resonates 
with the domestic law origin of international criminal law
322
 and helps to 
increase the perceived legitimacy of international courts; the population of the 
affected states is more likely to view international judgments as legitimate if 
the juridical concepts employed in these judgements correspond to what is 
accepted and understood in a given domestic legal system.
323
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the forms of responsibility that have 
crystalized in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts. The 
special focus was on the contentious issues in the application of various 
responsibility doctrines. Different forms of complicity appear to be 
commonly employed to address the wrongdoing of the accused removed from 
the scene of the crime. Complicity serves as an alternative to the extended 
commission as developed by the ICTR and the joint criminal enterprise, used 
by both international tribunals and hybrid courts. The chapter summarized 
four main challenges of international criminal law that prevent coherent 
deployment of the complicity doctrine: fragmentation, deficiency in 
understanding the appropriate causation standard for complicity, frequent lack 
of cohesion between factual circumstances and the legal labels attached to 
them, and unreliability of some sources utilized by international courts.  
How does one achieve a more harmonious integration of complicity into 
international criminal law? As argued in this chapter, this process is impeded 
by the absence of well-defined goals of international criminal justice. It is 
difficult to shape legal concepts and determine their respective weight 
without answering the question of what international criminal law strives to 
achieve. The lack of clarity about goals leads to a lack of agreement on the 
so-called ‘policy objectives’ of international criminal law, those pragmatic 
considerations counterbalancing legal concepts in the domestic law context. 
The last chapter of this dissertation attempts to define an overarching 
                                                             
320
 For example Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, § 1645. 
321
 Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, § 1643-1646. 
322
 Report of the Committee of French Jurists, § 50(d). For the discussion on limitations of 
international criminal law as a product of two fields – public international law and domestic 
criminal law, see Chapter VII.1 infra. 
323
 M. Damaška, at 350. 
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objective of international criminal law and show how a unifying goal may 
affect the legal definition of complicity.  
In the absence of a consensus on its objectives, it is important that 
international criminal law relies on its domestic law origins when engaging 
with the modes of responsibility. The need to accurately describe the 
behaviour of the accused in the context of national law stems from the notion 
of fairness – the accused has a right to be judged based on his conduct in the 
specific case. In addition, he has the right to be properly informed about the 
charges against him so that he stands a chance of preparing his defence.
324
 It 
appears that similar considerations ought to apply to international criminal 
law. The practical outcome of this approach is careful selection of the most 
appropriate mode of responsibility at the stage of charging and meticulous 
application of the legal requirements of this mode of responsibility to the 
particular case at issue. 
                                                             
324
 W. Jordash and J. Coughlan, ‘The Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the 
Charges: A Potentially Formidable Jurisprudential Legacy,’ in Darcy and Powderly (ed.), 
Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals, Oxford University Press, 2010. 
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III. Complicity and the Hierarchy of the 
Participation Modes at the ICC 
Introduction 
This chapter examines complicity in the context of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute contains the most 
comprehensive description of the liability modes as they have appeared in the 
history of international criminal law. The forms of participation are organized 
in a systematic fashion under the subparagraphs (a) – (d) of Article 25(3). 
Aside from ‘committing’, contained in subparagraph (a) of the article, all 
other liability modes listed in the Rome Statute fit within the notion of 
‘complicity’.1 Notwithstanding the availability of various forms of complicity 
under Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, the ICC, in its early case law, leaned 
towards expanding the notion of ‘commission’ to include a wide array of 
conduct.
2
  
Since its very beginning, the ICC favoured the concepts of direct and indirect 
co-perpetration by means of control over crime in attaching responsibility to 
the accused removed from the scene of the crime.
3
 These constructions were 
inferred from subparagraph (a) of Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, which 
mentions commission of a crime ‘as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person’. The control over crime theory, which has its origins 
in German legal thought, is a form of commission that extends principal 
liability to those persons who do not physically commit the offence but 
nonetheless possess a certain degree of control over its commission.
4
 
Accessories, on the other hand, do not have such control.
5
 The ICC used the 
idea of control over crime to create the form of participation that not only 
                                                             
1
 Commentaries to the 1996 ILC Draft Code that served as a basis for the relevant provision 
of the Rome Statute refer to all modes of participation with the exception of ‘commission’ as 
‘complicity’. Report of the ILC to the General Assembly, Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 
51st Sess., No. 10 U.N. A/51/10 (1996), at 20, § 6. See also W. Schabas, 2006, at 305. Article 
25(3)(e) is a contentious case because it embodies the crime itself, rather than a mode of 
responsibility. Genocide does not need to be committed or attempted to attract responsibility 
under this provision. 
2
 W. Schabas, 2010, at 427-428. 
3 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007 (‘Lubanga Decision’); Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008 (‘Katanga Decision’); Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges, 15 June 2009 (‘Bemba Decision’) 
4  
C. Roxin, Crimes as Part of Organized Power Structures, Goltdammer’s Archiv für 
Strafrecht (1963) 193-207. Reproduced in 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2011, 
191-205.  
5
 G. Fletcher, 1978, at 655. For the detailed description of this theory see Chapter IV. 
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delimits the conduct that warrants criminal liability but also functions as a 
criterion for qualifying the degree of responsibility of the accused.
6
 
The reason for neglecting complicity in favour of the other forms of 
commission in the early case law of the ICC could be explained by the 
structure of Article 25(3) of the Statute and the alleged hierarchy of the 
participation modes that it contains. The ICC, by siding with the German 
legal tradition and inferring direct and indirect co-perpetration from the 
wording of the relevant provision, has acknowledged, in its first 
pronouncements on the matter, that the hierarchy of the modes of 
participation is implicit in Article 25(3).
7
 Consequently, the court felt 
compelled to utilize the ‘stronger’ concept of co-perpetration as opposed to 
the various forms of complicity enshrined in the subsequent paragraphs of 
Article 25(3) with the view of stressing the magnitude of crimes falling 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
8
 Accordingly, the first conviction of the 
ICC was under the doctrine of co-perpetration pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of 
the Statute.
9
 
Recently, the ICC began showing some signs of disillusionment with the 
doctrine of co-perpetration as means of control over crime. The first serious 
benchmark decision questioning this theory - as well as the alleged hierarchy 
of crimes within Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute - was separate opinion of 
Judge Adrian Fulford attached to the Lubanga judgment.
10
 The other 
important development in this regard was the demise of the very case that 
pioneered the notion of indirect co-perpetration at the ICC – Katanga. 
Months after the parties’ closing arguments in this case, the Trial Chamber 
changed the legal characterization of facts relating to Germain Katanga’s 
mode of participation from indirect co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of 
the Statute to complicity in the commission of a crime by a group of persons 
acting with a common purpose under on the basis of Article 25(3)(d) of the 
                                                             
6
 G. Werle and B. Burghardt, ‘Indirect Perpetration: a Perfect Fit for International 
Prosecution of Armchair Killers?’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2011, at 88. 
7
 For references to this hierarchy see Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012 (‘Lubanga 
Judgment’), §§ 996-999; Katanga Confirmation of Charges §§ 469-471; Prosecutor v. 
Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, 16 December 2011 (‘Mbarushimana Decision’), § 279. Cf. Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber II, Judgment pursuant Article 74 of the Statute, 7 
March 2014 (‘Katanga Judgment’), § 1386; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-
01/07, Trial Chamber II, Minority opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert to Judgment Pursuant 
to Article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014 (‘Minority Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert’), 
§ 279. 
8
 E. Van Sliedregt, 2012, at 85. 
9
 Lubanga Judgment, § 976. For more discussion on this judgment see the following section. 
10
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian 
Fulford to the Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012 
(‘Separate Opinion of Judge Fulford’). 
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Statute.
11
 Germain Katanga was recently convicted under this latter form of 
responsibility of murder, attack against the civilian population and the 
destruction of property.
12
  
The same decision that re-characterized Katanga’s liability mode also severed 
the charges against the co-accused in the case
13
 - Mathieu Ngudjolo who was 
subsequently acquitted for the lack of evidence.
14
 Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert submitted a powerful concurring opinion to the judgment of 
acquittal, expressing her views on the interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) of the 
Statute, whereby she criticized ‘indirect co-perpetration’ inferred from this 
provision and argued against the hierarchy of the modes of participation 
under Article 25(3) of the Statute.
15
 The lack of confidence in ‘indirect co-
perpetration’ as a mode of liability also surfaced in the arrest warrants against 
Laurent and Simone Gbagbo – the former President of Côte d’Ivoire and his 
wife. The Pre-Trial Chamber III charged them with indirect co-perpetration in 
crimes but stipulated that the mode of liability “may well need to be revisited 
in due course.”16  
The latest decline of enthusiasm in relation to (in)direct co-perpetration based 
on control over crime could be explained by the loss of faith in the general 
assumption underlying the excessive use of this doctrine. That is the 
assumption that the modes of participation within Article 25(3) are ranked 
according to their degree of blameworthiness; thus the mode of participation 
on top of the list - commission - best reflects the culpability of the offenders 
standing trial for mass crimes within the ICC jurisdiction. It is surprising that 
the recent Katanga judgment retained control of over crime theory as implicit 
in Article 25(3), while rejecting the hierarchy of guilt based on the forms of 
responsibility – the two notions appear closely linked in the ICC 
jurisprudence.
17
  
                                                             
11
 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial 
Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court 
and severing the charges against the accused persons, 21 November 2012 (‘Katanga Severing 
Decision’), § 7. 
12
 Katanga Judgement, § 1691. 
13
 Katanga Severing Decision, § 59. 
14
 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12-4, Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (‘Chui Judgment of Acquittal’), 18 December 
2012, § 503. 
15
 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12-4, Trial Chamber II, 
Concurring opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert to Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, 18 December 2012 (‘Concurring Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert’), § 6. 
16
 Arrest Warrant Laurent Gbagbo, § 11; Arrest Warrant Simone Gbagbo, § 16. 
17 
Katanga Judgement, §§ 1387; 1394. Cf. Minority Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, § 
279. 
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The aim of this chapter is to explore complicity in relation to the competing 
concept of co-perpetration. It questions the assumptions underlying the 
overuse of the latter and paves the way to a more extensive and accurate use 
of the former. Part one of this chapter critically examines the forms of 
participation at the ICC, with the special emphasis on the role of complicity 
in the attribution of liability as opposed to the notion of ‘(in)direct co-
perpetration’. Section two explores the question of the alleged hierarchy of 
liability modes implicit in Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute. This section 
provides arguments against ranking the forms of responsibility in the Rome 
Statute. Some conclusions are drawn in the final part of the chapter.  
1. Modes of Participation at the ICC 
The Rome Statute of the ICC represents the future of the international 
criminal law, as it was drafted after the creation of ICTY and ICTR and 
makes use of their experience when defining different modes of 
participation.
18
 It also takes into account the Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the International Law 
Commission in 1996.
19
 There is general agreement that, at least on the face of 
it, Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute leans towards the differential 
participation model, as opposed to unitary approach.
20
 The division between 
differential and unitary perpetration is inherent to domestic criminal law. The 
core of this distinction is that the unitary model makes the responsibility of a 
party independent from the liability of the principal perpetrator, while the 
differential model implies accessorial dependence of the accomplice on the 
principal act of the perpetrator.
21
 Thus, the premise underlying the differential 
participation model is that liability of an accessory derives from the wrongful 
act of the principal. This model in domestic law usually indicates lesser 
punishment for the accomplices, as they are considered less blameworthy 
than the principals.
22
 Chapter four of the thesis discusses how these two 
models play out in the specific domestic law systems and what is the practical 
significance, if any, of this distinction.  
                                                             
18
 E. Van Sliedregt, 2003, at 65. 
19
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May 
- 26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10. For more discuss on the preparation of the Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, see Chapter I.  
20
 A. Eser, at 788; K. Ambos, ‘The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court 
(Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues,’ 12 International 
Criminal Law Review, 2012, at 144; E. Van Sliedregt 2012, at 71-73, 79. Sliedregt employs 
slightly different terminology. She discusses the ICC’s preference for the ‘normative model’. 
This model implies that the principal is the one most responsible in the sense of having 
decisive influence over the commission of the crime. In essence this normativity falls within 
the ambit of differential participation model as it is based on the idea of the increased 
blameworthiness of the perpetrator.  
21
 A. Eser, at 788. 
22
 See, for example, the German model, discussed in further detail in Chapter IV. 
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Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute provides that a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court if that person:  
(a)     Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with 
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other 
person is criminally responsible;  
(b)     Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime 
which in fact occurs or is attempted;  
(c)     For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, 
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission;  
(d)     In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall 
either:  
(i)     Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; or  
(ii)     Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime;   
(e)     In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to 
commit genocide; 
(f)     Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because 
of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person 
who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the 
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute 
for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily 
gave up the criminal purpose. 
Unlike the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute contains a 
separate provision establishing the general fault requirement for the crimes 
under the ICC jurisdiction - Article 30 of the Rome Statute, which embraces 
two forms of culpability: dolus directus in the first degree - direct intent, - 
and dolus directus in the second degree - awareness that the crime will be the 
almost inevitable outcome of the acts or omissions of the accused.
23
 This 
article shall be read in conjunction with the Article 25(3) setting out the 
modes of responsibility. Article 30 reads as follows:  
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if 
the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.  
                                                             
23
 Katanga Judgement, §§ 774, 775. See also W. Schabas, 2010, at 475. 
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2.  For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: 
(a)    In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b)    In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
 
3. For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed accordingly.  
 
The following subsections elaborate on the forms of participation embodied 
in Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of the Rome Statute. Incitement to commit genocide 
under subparagraph (e) is not discussed because it constitutes an inchoate 
crime rather than a mode of responsibility. This is so because of the 
derivative nature of complicity – the conduct in the form of incitement 
derives its criminality from the crime that is attempted or committed. In this 
case, however, the crime of genocide does not need to be attempted or occur 
in order to bring about responsibility under this subheading.
24
 Criminalizing 
the act of incitement to commit genocide could be explained by the extreme 
gravity of the crime of genocide that calls for additional preventative 
measures. The inclusion of this inchoate offence in the article dealing with 
modes of responsibility is unfortunate as it properly belongs to the section 
dealing with substantive offences.  
Complicity after the fact is also not examined in the following sections as it is 
not covered by Article 25.
25
 The reason for this is the lack of a nexus between 
the act of assistance and the crime necessary according to the derivative 
nature of complicity.
26
 While the Draft Code of Crimes adopted two years 
before the Rome Statute included ex post facto assistance in the category of 
complicity, it stipulated that this assistance would have to be agreed upon 
prior to the perpetration of the crime.
27
 
Another provision that is not discussed at length in this chapter is Article 28 
of the Rome Statute. It contains a distinct form of responsibility, namely that 
                                                             
24
 K. Ambos in O. Triffterer (eds) ‘Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article’, (Second Edition), 2003, at 487. Cf. 
Article 2(3)(f) of the Draft Code of Crimes (1996), which provides for responsibility of the 
individual who “directly and publicly incites another individual to commit such a crime 
which in fact occurs.” Emphasis added. 
25
 W. Schabas, 2010, at 435; K. Ambos, 2003, at 491. 
26
 K. Ambos, 2003, at 491. 
27
 Report of the ILC, 48
th
 session, at 21, § 12. The ICC case law appears to take the same 
approach. In Mbarushimana, the Chamber found that 25(3)(d) liability can include 
contributing to a crime's commission after it has occurred, so long as this contribution had 
been agreed upon by the relevant group acting with a common purpose and the suspect prior 
to the perpetration of the crime. See Mbarushimana Decision, § 287. 
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of commanders and other superiors.
28
 Command responsibility shares some 
characteristics with accomplice liability in that it emphasizes one’s 
relationship or association with others.
29
 The theoretical underpinnings of 
these two forms of liability are entirely different, however: responsibility 
under Article 28 arises from the formal link between the superior and the 
agent and not from the latter’s wrongful conduct as is the case with 
complicity.
30
 The basis for command responsibility is thus superior’s culpable 
failure to act.
31
 
 
i. (a) ‘Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, 
jointly with another or through another person…’ 
Subparagraph (a) of the Rome Statute gives rise to most ICC practice relating 
to criminal participation.
32
 It covers the commission of the crime through 
perpetration, co-perpetration and indirect perpetration, also referred to as 
‘perpetration by means’. Co-perpetration implies a functional division of the 
criminal tasks between the different co-perpetrators, who are usually 
interrelated by the common plan.
33
 Indirect perpetration means that the person 
who commits the crime can be used as an instrument by the indirect 
perpetrator.
34
 Article 25(3)(a) provides for the liability of the indirect 
perpetrator regardless of the mens rea of the person who actually commits the 
offence.
35
 This permits the extension of criminal responsibility of indirect 
                                                             
28
 Text of Article 28 is included in the Appendix I. 
29
 G. Vetter, ‘Command Responisibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International 
Criminal Court’, 25 Yale Journal of International Law 89, 2000, at 98. 
30
 Ibid, at 99. 
31
 G. Vetter, at 100. ‘Command responsibility’ most closerly resembles complicity in the 
form of ‘ordering’ under Article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute. For further comparison of the 
two forms of responsibility see section ii infra. 
32
 Lubanga Judgement; Katanga Decision; Mudacumura Decision; Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, 
ICC-02/05-02/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 
2010 (‘Abu Garda Decision’); Ruto Decision; Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh 
Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 7 
March 2011 (‘Abdallah Banda and Saleh Jerbo Decision’); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-
02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 
March 2009 (‘Al Bashir Arrest Warrant’); Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/12, 
Pre-Trial Chamber III, Warrant of Arrest for Simone Gbagbo, 29 February 2012 (‘Simone 
Gbago Arrest Warrant’); Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of 
Arrest for Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, 27 June 2011 (‘Gaddafi Arrest Warrant’); Prosecutor v. 
Hussein, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/12, Warrant of Arrest for Abdel Raheem 
Muhammad Hussein, 1 March 2012 (‘Hussein Arrest Warrant’). 
33
 K. Ambos, 2003, at 479. 
34
 Ibid. 
35 
The initial Working paper submitted by Canada, Germany, Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom to the Preparatory Committee as part of work on the modes of responsibility 
provided for the commission “through a person who is not criminally responsible”. Working 
paper submitted by Canada, Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom to the 
Preparatory Committee (‘Working Paper’), A/AC.249/1997/WG.2/DAT1, 14 February 1997. 
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perpetrators beyond the cases of innocent agency.
36
 Due to this peculiarity, 
the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers have been actively using the concept of co-
perpetration when confirming charges in the situations with multiple accused 
removed from the scene of the crime.
37
  
The discussion about the correct interpretation of co-perpetration and indirect 
perpetration within Article 25(3)(a) began in Lubanga. The origin of this 
development was the need to identify the criteria for distinguishing principals 
and accessories. The Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber held that the objective 
approach to distinguishing the two categories focuses on the realization of 
one of the objective elements of the crime, thus labelling as (co-)perpetrators 
only those who physically perpetrate the crime.
38
 The subjective approach, on 
the other hand, places the emphasis on the state of mind of the offender – 
those who have the shared intent are considered perpetrators.
39
 The Chamber 
further argued that neither the objective nor the subjective criterion 
distinguishing principals and accessories could be reconciled with Article 
25(3)(a). The former approach unjustly restricts indirect perpetration to those 
performing the actus reus of the offence, while the latter approach is already 
embodied in Article 25(3)(d), thus differentiating it from the co-perpetration 
within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a).
40
 
Consequently, the ICC came up with the third method of ‘control over crime’ 
for distinguishing between principals and accessories, which it said applies in 
‘numerous legal systems’. 41  This approach is based on the work of the 
German criminal law scholar Claus Roxin.
42
  The court argued “[t]he notion 
underpinning this third approach is that principals to a crime are not limited to 
                                                                                                                                                              
This formulation changed to “through another person regardless of whether that person is 
criminally responsible” in the Report of the ICC Preparatory Committee, DOCUMENT 
A/CONF.183/2, 14 April 1998, at 31. 
36
 Katanga Judgment, § 1398. 
37
 Katanga Decision, §§ 480-486, 490, 500-514, 527-539; Lubanga Decision, §§ 328-333; 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-
01/09-01/11-373, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012 (‘Ruto Decision’), §§ 291-292. 
38
 Lubanga Decision, § 328. 
39
 Lubanga Decision, § 329. The Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber attributed the subjective 
approach to the jurisprudence of the ICTY on the joint criminal enterprise or the common 
purpose doctrine. Van Sliedregt, however, points out that neither the ICTY nor ICTR have 
ever used the terminology of subjective/objective approach. See E. Van Sliedregt, 2012, at 
84. 
40
 Lubanga Decision, §§ 333-335. 
41
 Katanga Decision, §§ 502, 504; Thomas Weigend noted that the list of ‘numerous’ 
national jurisdictions that are claimed to be in favor of the concept of perpetration through an 
organization is limited to five (Argentina, Chile, Germany, Peru, Spain), in one of which 
(Argentina) the Supreme Court had overturned a lower court judgment proposing this theory. 
See T. Weigend, ‘Perpetration through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German 
Legal Concept,’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2011, at 105.  
42
 See Chapter IV. 
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those who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also 
include those who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crime, 
control or mastermind its commission by virtue of deciding whether and how 
the offence will be committed.”43 In line with this approach, the principals are 
those who have control over the crime, and, while being aware of this control, 
either (1) physically carry out the crime (direct perpetration), or (2) control 
the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the offence (indirect 
perpetration), or (3) they have, along with others, control over crime by 
reason of the essential tasks being assigned to them (joint or co-
perpetration).
44
 
The long awaited first ICC judgment in Lubanga corroborated the Pre-Trial 
Chambers’ approach. 45  The Chamber followed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
analysis of the scope of co-perpetration based on the control over crime 
theory and held that the prosecution must prove the following elements to 
secure Lubanga’s conviction for the ‘direct co-perpetration’:46   
(i) an agreement or common plan between the accused and at least 
one other co-perpetrator that results in the commission the relevant 
crime in the ordinary course of events;  
(ii) an essential contribution of the accused to the common plan;  
(iii) an intent on part of the accused to commit a crime or his 
awareness that this crime is the consequence of the 
implementation of the plan in the ordinary course of events; 
(iv) awareness that the accused provides an essential contribution to 
the implementation of the common plan; and, finally, 
(v) awareness of the factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict and the link  between these 
circumstances and the conduct of the accused.  
The conclusion on the basis of this list of elements was that Lubanga did 
indeed satisfy the abovementioned criteria to qualify as a direct co-perpetrator 
in the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) for the crimes he has been charged with, 
namely enlisting children under the age of fifteen; conscripting children under 
the age of fifteen; and using children under the age of fifteen to actively 
participate in hostilities.
47
 The Chamber established that the accused and his 
alleged co-perpetrators, including particularly Floribert Kisembo, Chief 
Kahwa and Bosco Ntaganda, worked together and each of them made an 
essential contribution to the common plan that resulted in the enlistment, 
                                                             
43
 Lubanga Decision, § 330. 
44
 Lubanga Decision, § 332. 
45
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber I, Judgment 
pursuant Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012 (“Lubanga Judgment”), § 976. 
46
 Lubanga Judgment, § 1018.  
47
 Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) or 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
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conscription and use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in 
hostilities.
48
 The court treated the second element of co-perpetration - 
essential contribution to the common plan – as an indicator of control over the 
crime or lack thereof. The Chamber clarified that only those “to whom 
essential tasks have been assigned – and who, consequently, have the power 
to frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing their tasks” have 
joint control over the crime.
49
 The threshold for the essential contribution was 
therefore set at the capacity to frustrate the commission of the crime by 
withdrawing the contribution.  
With regard to the mental elements, the Trial Chamber concluded that 
Thomas Lubanga acted with the intent and knowledge necessary to establish 
the charges pursuant to Article 30 of the Rome Statute. He was aware of the 
factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict, and 
the nexus between those circumstances and his own conduct, which resulted 
in the enlistment, conscription and use of children below the age of 15 to 
participate actively in hostilities.
50
 The definition of the mental element in 
Lubanga raises some critical points. The court claimed, “awareness that a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events” involves 
consideration by the participants of the concepts of “possibility” and 
“probability”, which are inherent to the notions of “risk” and “danger”.51 This 
comes dangerously close to accepting dolus eventualis, or inadvertent 
recklessness, as the applicable fault requirement at the ICC.
52
 Dolus 
eventualis, on the other hand, is the lowest form of culpability and appears to 
be beyond what the drafters of the Rome Statute envisaged for the crimes in 
the court’s jurisdiction.53  
Without openly embracing inadvertent recklessness, the Lubanga Trial 
Chamber utilized the evidence more appropriate for this standard, rather than 
dolus directus in the second degree. Among the facts supporting the 
conclusion that Lubanga was aware that his conduct would result in the 
conscription and enlistment of children were the following: the accused’s 
speeches addressed to the population and aimed at recruiting youngsters; the 
use of soldiers below the age of 15 as his bodyguards; and Lunbanga’s close 
contact with Mafuta, “who is said to have played an important role in 
recruiting children and advising the accused on policy.”54 Consequently, the 
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Chamber found that the accused’s participation in a common plan to build an 
army for the purpose of establishing and maintaining political and military 
control over the Ituri region resulted, in the ordinary course of events, in the 
conscription and enlistment of boys and girls under the age of 15, and their 
use to participate actively in hostilities.
55
  All of these facts do not seem to 
support the conclusion that the recruitment of children would have been an 
inevitable outcome in the ordinary course of events, but rather that there was 
a high risk of the crime to occur.
56
  
The notion of control over crime has been finalized in Katanga and took the 
shape of the so-called ‘indirect co-perpetration’. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
upheld the idea of combining co-perpetration and indirect perpetration and 
held:
 
 
There are no legal grounds for limiting the joint commission of the crime solely to 
cases in which the perpetrators execute a portion of the crime by exercising direct 
control over it. Rather, through a combination of individual responsibility for 
committing crimes through other persons together with the mutual attribution among 
the co-perpetrators at the senior level, a mode of liability arises which allows the 
Court to assess the blame worthiness of "senior leaders" adequately.
57
 
Consequently, the Katanga Pre-Trial Chamber created a fancy structure made 
of the subjective and objective elements of indirect co-perpetration by 
combining the features of both doctrines:  
(i) the suspect must be part of a common plan or an agreement with 
one or more persons;  
(ii) the suspect and the other co-perpetrator(s) must carry out essential 
contributions in a coordinated manner which result in the 
fulfilment of the material elements of the crime;  
(iii) the suspect must have control over the organization;  
(iv) the organization must consist of an organized and hierarchal 
apparatus of power;  
(v) the execution of the crimes must be secured by almost automatic 
compliance with the orders issued by the suspect;  
(vi) the suspect must satisfy the subjective elements of the crimes;  
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(vii) the suspect and the other co-perpetrators must be mutually aware 
and accept that implementing the common plan will result in the 
fulfilment of the material elements of the crimes; and  
(viii) the suspect must be aware of the factual circumstances enabling 
him to exercise joint control over the commission of the crime 
through another person(s).
58
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber found that both co-accused in the case - Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo - satisfied the numerous conditions for 
indirect co-perpetration crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 
during the attack on Bogoro village on 24 February 2003 and confirmed the 
charges.
59
  The Chamber found grounds to believe that Katanga and Ngudjolo 
served as de jure and de facto commanders of the forces responsible for the 
attack on Bogoro.
60
  
At the trial stage, however, indirect co-perpetration as a mode of liability 
proved to be unsuccessful in respect to both accused in the Katanga case. 
After the closing arguments of the parties and the participants, the Trial 
Chamber proceeded with severing the charges against Mathieu Ngudjolo
61
 
and subsequently acquitting him.
62
 The judges failed to find sufficient 
evidence that Ngudjolo served as a military commander, despite the important 
role he played in the region due to his high social status.
63
 Furthermore, the 
Chamber did not establish that the accused gave military orders or attempted 
to secure their compliance.
64
 Accordingly, at least two elements of indirect 
perpetration failed, leading to the acquittal of Ngudjolo.
65
  
With respect to Katanga, the Trial Chamber chose to change legal 
characterization of his mode of liability from indirect perpetration on the 
basis of Article 25(3)(a), which failed to provide basis for conviction, to 
complicity in the commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose pursuant to Article 25(3)(d)(ii).
66
 While a detailed 
investigation of the implications of this decision falls outside the scope of 
present analysis, it is sufficient to note that legal re-characterization of the 
liability mode at such a late stage of proceedings divided the Chamber. The 
majority considered legal re-characterization of the mode of responsibility 
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compatible with the rights of the accused because it did not alter, in the view 
of the majority, the narrative of facts described in the Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges.
67
 Judge Van den Wyngaert dissented on this 
point.
68
  
The recent Katanga judgment indeed acquitted Germain Katanga as an 
indirect perpetrator, while convicting him pursuant to Article 25(3)(d)(ii).
69
 In 
this case, the Trial Chamber confirmed the allegations that the accused 
facilitated the supply of weapons used by the local Ngiti militia in an attack 
on the village of Bogoro – a stronghold of the Union of Congolese Patriots 
(UPC). 
70
 The Hema-dominated UPC constituted a legitimate military target, 
but, in addition to the military causalities, a number of civilians died during 
the attack on Bogoro. The Majority regarded the operation in Bogoro as an 
attack against the civilian population.
71
 The argument was that Ngiti militia, 
driven by the ethnic hatred against Hema, regarded the UPC and the Hema 
civilians as one single enemy; hence the attack was primarily directed against 
the civilians.
72
  
Prior to dealing with Katanga’s responsibility under Article 25(3)(d)(ii),73 the 
Trial Chamber clarified the elements of indirect perpetration pursuant to the 
subparagraph (a) of the same article.
74
 In analysing the provision, the Trial 
Chamber unanimously rejected the hierarchy of liability modes inherent in 
Article 25(3).
75
  The judges correctly reasoned that neither the Rome Statute 
nor the Rules of Evidence and Procedure provide for a mitigation of 
punishment for the forms of responsibility other than ‘commission’, and there 
is no reason why an accomplice shall be accorded lesser guilt or receive 
lighter penalty than a perpetrator.
76
 In the light of this welcome development, 
it is regrettable that the Majority decided to retain as a guiding principle for 
distinguishing perpetrators and accessories control over crime theory  – a 
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theory closely linked to the idea of hierarchy.
77
  
The justification for upholding control over crime approach was the need to 
give full effect to Article 25(3), in the light of the distinction between the 
perpetrators and the accomplices inherent in this provision.
78
 The judges 
reiterated already familiar arguments about the inapplicability of the objective 
and subjective approaches for differentiating crime participants.
79
 The 
exercise of giving full effect to Article 25(3) through control over crime 
theory avoided either plain reading of this provision - its language does not 
contain any trace of the theory in question, - or interpreting the article in 
accordance with the rules established in international law.
80
 The judges 
brushed away, unconvincingly, the arguments regarding the theory’s 
recognition in various national legal systems or in the customary international 
law. Examining these sources of law would have likely resulted in the 
dismissal of the theory altogether.
81
 
The Majority thus proceeded to define indirect commission on the basis of 
control over crime theory. The judges concluded that the indirect perpetrator 
exercises within the organization control over crime committed through 
another person.
82
 The organization in question must be a ‘power structure’ 
characterized by the automatic compliance - the link between the superior and 
the actual perpetrators is of little importance, making latter interchangeable.
83
 
The indirect perpetrator must hold real authority within the organization, 
including the power to decide whether or not to execute the crime.
84
 Relying 
on this definition, the Trial Chamber acquitted Germain Katanga of the 
charges as indirect perpetrator upon finding that Ngiti militia lacked 
organization to qualify as a ‘power structure’. In addition to that, the evidence 
was not conclusive as to the exact nature of relationships between the 
commanders and their subordinates.
85
 
ii. (b)     ‘Orders, solicits or induces the commission…’ 
Ordering, soliciting and inducing are different forms of participation, despite 
some overlap among them. Ordering pertains to an individual who is in a 
position of authority and uses his authority to compel another individual to 
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commit a crime.
86
 Thus, ordering implies a superior-subordinate relationship 
between one who orders and the agent. Views have been expressed that 
‘ordering’ belongs to the category of perpetration by means, covered by 
subparagraph (a) of the same article
87
 or responsibility of commanders and 
other superiors under Article 28 of the Rome Statute.
88
 However, it appears 
that ‘ordering’ occupies its own niche among the various forms of complicity 
listed in the Statute. Perpetration through another person is a form of direct 
liability, even when it employs the doctrinal constructions, such as ‘control 
over crime’, used to assign liability to the perpetrator. In contrast, ordering is 
derivative in the sense that it depends on the liability of the actual 
perpetrator.
89
  
‘Ordering’ under subparagraph (b) differs from the liability of superiors 
pursuant to Article 28 because the legal requirements for proving these two 
forms of responsibility differ. In case of ‘plain’ ordering under Article 
25(3)(b), one has to prove only the specific superior-subordinate relationship 
with the perpetrator, but not the offender’s effective control and command 
over the forces required to attract responsibility under Article 28.
90
 The extra 
burden of proving superior’s effective control is compensated by a lower 
threshold for mental element under Article 28. Ordering as a form of 
complicity under Article 25(3)(b) has to comply with the general fault 
requirements set out in Article 30, namely intent and knowledge. In contrast, 
superior responsibility under Article 28 embodies specific fault requirement, 
which is looser than the general one, and includes dolus eventualis.
91
  
In Mudacumura, the ICC provided its early interpretation of ordering, which 
will likely be subject to adjustment in future case law.
92
 The court relied on 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in defining the elements of ordering 
– the Pre-Trial Chamber held that to be responsible under article 25(3)(b) of 
the Statute it must be established that:
93
 
(i) the person is in a position of authority; 
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(ii) the person instructs another person in any form to either:  
a. commit a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted or  
b. perform an act or omission in the execution of which a crime 
is carried out; 
(iii) the order had a direct effect on the commission or attempted 
commission of the crime; and  
(iv) the person is at least aware that the crime will be committed in the 
ordinary course of events as a consequence of the execution or 
implementation of the order. 
Accordingly, the arrest warrant stated that Mudacumura acted in a position of 
authority because he was the top military commander for the relevant 
period.
94
 Mudacumura instructed others to conduct a military campaign 
resulting in the commission of war crimes. For example, he approved of a 
general order to pillage civilian property in order to sustain the military 
efforts.
95
 Mudacumura's orders had a direct effect on the crimes due to his 
position of authority; and, finally, he was (i) was aware of the factual 
circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and (ii) was 
at least aware that by issuing said orders, crimes would be committed in the 
ordinary course of events as a consequence of the execution of his orders.
96
 
There are at least two problems with the Chamber’s interpretation of ordering 
in Mudacumura. First, intent is nowhere to be found in the stipulation of 
elements of ordering and the analysis of Mudacumura’s state of mind. The 
court appears to have abandoned the intent element of Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute, relying solely on the suspect’s awareness of the situation. Moreover, 
his knowledge is inferred from the reports he allegedly received by virtue of 
his position. It is questionable whether such a low standard is acceptable for 
‘ordering’, which, according to Article 30, requires the proof of intent to 
contribute and the knowledge of the consequences. This is in contrast with 
superior responsibility that allows for a lesser fault standard. In the case of 
superior responsibility, inferences could be drawn to some extent from the 
position of the accused. The other problem is that of the exact addressees of 
Mudacumura’s orders. The Pre-Trial Chamber simply stated that he issued 
orders to the ‘others’. However, the derivative nature of ordering requires at 
least some identification of those who were instructed to carry out the 
crimes.
97
 
                                                             
94
 Ibid, § 64. 
95
 Ibid, § 65. 
96
 Ibid, §§ 66 – 67. 
97
 Responsibility is derivative if it is not stand-alone but depends on the responsibility of the 
perpetrator. On the theory of derivative liability see G. Fletcher, 1978, at 581. 
  
 
 
 
103 
Soliciting and inducing in the Rome Statute largely correspond to instigation 
in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.
98
 As with ordering they are covered by the 
general mental element of Article 30.
99
 These two forms of participation 
differ from ordering in that they don’t require a superior-subordinate 
relationship.
100
 Soliciting a crime means commanding, authorizing, urging, 
inciting, requesting, or advising another to commit a crime.
101
 Inducing 
denotes bringing on or about, affecting, causing or influencing an act or 
course of conduct.
102
 Inducing appears to be a broader term, covering 
soliciting, as the latter refers to a more specific conduct.
103
  
Inducing as a mode of liability has been invoked in the Harun case.
104
 The 
court found grounds to believe that Ahmad Harun – a former Minister of 
Interior in the government of Sudan - personally incited militia to attack the 
civilian population on several occasions through delivering speeches and 
promising financial and governmental support to the militia.
 
 These actions 
resulted in looting of the villages 
105
 The Pre-Trial Chamber established the 
fault requirement – intent and knowledge – on the basis of two factors: the 
content of Harun’s speeches, and his position of authority, by virtue of which 
he received regular reports on rebel and counterinsurgent activities.
106
  The 
Chamber held that there are grounds to believe that Harun not only knew 
about the militia’s methods of attacking civilians and pillaged villages, but 
also personally encouraged the commission of such illegal acts.
107
 
iii. (c) ‘[A]ids, abets or otherwise assists in its 
commission…’ 
The conduct requirement under subparagraph (c) significantly expands the 
usual brief reference to aiding and abetting in the Statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals. This provision of the Rome Statute contains a variety of conducts 
under the umbrella term ‘assists’ - aiding, abetting, and providing means for 
the commission of a crime. The qualifier ‘otherwise’ indicates that the list of 
possible forms of assistance presented in this article is not exhaustive. Black’s 
Law Dictionary also treats aiding and abetting as a broad notion that includes 
all assistance rendered by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence 
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actual or constructive.
108
 Article 25(3)(c) does not require the assistance to 
contribute substantially to the commission of a crime. This is surprising 
because the ‘substantial effect’ or ‘substantial contribution’ standard is widely 
accepted by the ICTY and ICTR.
109
 Moreover, the ILC Draft Code of Crimes 
contained even a stricter standard of a ‘direct and substantial’ contribution.110 
Although it is premature at this stage to jump to a final conclusion regarding 
the requirement of substantial contribution in the context of the modes of 
participation enumerated in the Article 25(3)(b)-(c), the scarce case law 
seems to suggest that the ICC has cautiously adopted the ‘substantial 
contribution’ standard of the ad hoc tribunals.111 The Chambers seem to infer 
this level of contribution relative to the essential contribution required under 
subparagraph (a).  
Aiding and abetting is preceded by the words ‘for the purpose of facilitating 
the commission of a crime’. Consequently, the fault requirement of aiding 
and abetting under the Rome Statute is enhanced compared to that of the ad 
hoc tribunals – the accused must both have knowledge of the crime and act 
with the purpose of its facilitation.
112
 This requirement goes beyond the 
general mens rea standard of Article 30 of the Rome Statute because it 
introduces a form of specific intent.
113
 It remains to be seen how the ICC 
interprets this requirement in the case law.  
There is no scholarly agreement as to the place of aiding and abetting in 
Article 25(3). Ambos refers to it as the “weakest form of complicity”, Eser 
contends that aiding and abetting is assistance which falls short of instigation 
under subparagraph (b), but goes beyond other contributions according to 
subparagraph (d); Werle insists that assistance is a mode of participation that 
illustrates secondary responsibility and a rather low degree of individual 
guilt;
114
 while Van Sliedregt argues against categorizing liability and degrees 
of assistance but rather treating them as overlapping.
115
 The latter position 
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best reflects the complex reality of a large-scale criminality.
116
 
iv. (d)     ‘In any other way contributes to the 
commission…’ 
Subparagraph (d) of the Rome Statute introduces a new category of criminal 
participation, namely “contributing to the commission of a crime by a group 
acting with a common purpose”. This provision was modelled on the 1997 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
117
 and 
was inserted in the Rome Statute during the last stage of negotiations.
118
 It 
replaced the earlier draft provisions on planning and conspiracy,
119
 which 
gave rise to divergent views during the negotiations.
120
 Thus, notwithstanding 
the wide acceptance of planning as a form of criminal responsibility in 
international criminal law,
121
 neither planning nor conspiracy were included in 
the Rome Statute, paving the way to the novel category of criminal 
participation - ‘contribution to the commission of a crime’. This form of 
liability merits detailed analysis because it could be replacing (in)direction co-
perpetration, which seems to be falling out of favour at the ICC. The recent 
conviction of Germain Katanga under Article 25(3)(d)(ii) exemplifies this 
trend.  
The ICC practice so far established the following objective and subjective 
elements of the liability under article 25(3)(d) of the Statute: 
122
 
(i) a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is attempted or 
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committed;  
(ii) the commission or attempted commission of such a crime was 
carried out by a group of persons acting with a common purpose;  
(iii) the individual contributed to the crime in any way other than those 
set out in Article 25(3)(a) to (c) of the Statute;
123
 
(iv) the contribution shall be intentional; and 
(v) shall either  
a. be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime; or  
b. in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime. 
The first criterion presupposes that the objective, the subjective and the 
contextual elements of the specific crimes are established.
124
  There is a 
difference between the requirements of the liability modes and the elements 
of crimes, and this particular criterion emphasizes this distinction.  
The second condition relates to the commission of crime by the group. It is 
highly contested. In Katanga, the Trial Chamber used the concept of the joint 
criminal enterprise developed by the ad hoc tribunals in interpreting the 
notion of a group pursuant to Article 25(3)(d).
125
 The judges held that while it 
is not necessary that the group pursues solely criminal aims, it is important 
that the participants of the group are aware that crimes will be committed in 
the ordinary course of events.
 126
  On the basis of these elements, the Majority 
in Katanga proceeded to the conclusion that Ngiti militia was a self-contained 
group acting with the primary purpose of regaining Bogoro through the attack 
on Hema civilians.
127
 The Majority inferred the common purpose from the 
way in which Bogoro was attacked - in the early morning hours when the 
civilians were still sleeping. The assault involved looting and destruction of 
the property and violence against the civilian population.
128
 Judge van den 
Wyngaert dissented on this point, arguing that there was no sufficient 
evidence to establish the existence of the common purpose to attack the Hema 
civilians.
129
 She maintained that it is plausible that the UPC – the legitimate 
military target – was the primary object of the attack. 130  Judge van den 
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Wyngaert questioned the Majority’s assumption that the attack on the UPC 
equals the attack on the entire Hema population for it is one thing to regard 
them as an enemy, but quite another - to deny their right to exist.
131
   
The group requirement was challenged on another two occasions. In 
Muthaura, the prosecution charged one of the accused - Mohammed Ali – 
with responsibility under Article 25(3)(d) for contributing to the commission 
of crimes in Kenya by instructing Kenyan police and ensuring their response 
to post-election violence was ineffective.
132
 The Pre-Trial Chamber held a 
prerequisite for Ali’s criminal responsibility for crimes allegedly committed 
through the Kenyan police, would have been the finding that Kenyan police 
indeed carried out the objective elements of the crimes charged, but since the 
evidence in this regard was insufficient, the crimes could not be attributed to 
Ali.
133
 Likewise in Mbarushimana, the Majority was unable to conclude that 
the armed group in question – the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR) - indeed pursued the policy of attacking the civilian 
population in the Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
134
 This 
conclusion led Majority to believe that the FDLR does not constitute a ‘group 
of persons acting with a common purpose’ as required by Article 25(3)(d).135 
In Mbarushimana, the defence raised another interesting point in respect to 
the group requirement: it argued that 25(3)(d) liability applies only to persons 
outside of the group acting with a common purpose.
136
 The Chamber rejected 
this argument for two main reasons: first, adopting the essential contribution 
test for co-perpetration under subparagraph (a) and excluding from the ambit 
of paragraph (d) responsibility of group members making non-essential 
contribution would unfairly absolve a group of offenders of responsibility; 
and secondly, because of the enhanced mental element for aiding and abetting 
under the Statute – requiring the person to act with the purpose to facilitate 
the crime – Article 25(3)(d) is the only way to hold persons responsible for 
contributions made with knowledge but not necessarily intent. Thus, the court 
concluded that Article 25(3)(d) encompasses contributions from both 
members and non-members of the group.
137
 
The third criterion - the level of contribution to the crime – is far from being 
settled in the jurisprudence of the ICC. In Mbarushimana, the Pre-Trial 
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Chamber felt that criminalizing any contribution to the group crime under 
subparagraph (d) would be inappropriate because:
138
  
Without some threshold level of assistance, every landlord, every grocer, every utility 
provider, every secretary, every janitor or even every taxpayer who does anything 
which contributes to a group committing international crimes could satisfy the 
elements of 25(3)(d) liability for their infinitesimal contribution to the crimes 
committed. 
 
At the same time, the judges referred to Article 25(3)(d) as a ‘residual’ form 
of accessorial liability, which is at the bottom of the value oriented hierarchy 
of participation in a crime.
139
  Thus, “article 25(3)(d)'s contributions "[i]n any 
other way" must be less than that required for liability under article 25(3)(a)-
(c).”140  Keeping in mind these conflicting considerations, the Majority in 
Mbarushimana decided that a contribution to a commission of the crime 
acting with a common purpose must be at least significant. The Chamber 
drew its inspiration, when deciding on the appropriate threshold, from the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals pertaining to the joint criminal 
enterprise.
 141
 The Chamber used the similarity between these two forms of 
liability as a justification for borrowing the JCE’s ‘significant contribution’ 
requirement from the case law of the ICTY and ICTR.
142
 In Katanga, the 
Trial Chamber established a formula for what the ‘significant contribution’ 
implies: it has to either affect the occurrence of the crime or the way in which 
it was committed.
143
 
 
As to the methodology of determining the level of contribution, the judges in 
both Katanga and Mbarushimana rightly stressed that the assessment has to 
be done on a case-by-case basis, taking into account such factors as sustained 
participation after learning about group’s criminality, efforts made to prevent 
criminal activity, and the role of the accused vis-a-vis the crimes.
144
  
 
Factually speaking, the judges concluded that Germain Katanga’s 
contribution to the crimes committed in Bogoro was significant: his role in 
facilitating arms supply to the local Ngiti militia allowed it to gain military 
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advantage over the UPC and carry out the plan to attack the civilian 
population in Bogoro.
145
 The weapons and ammunitions arranged for by 
Katanga ensured the success of the operation in Bogoro.
146
 In contrast, the 
Majority in Mbarushimana held that the accused, whose main responsibility 
was issuing press releases and who held no real authority within the FDLR, 
did not provide any contribution to the FDLR, not even less than 
signficant.
147
 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision declining to confirm charges 
against Mbarushimana has been confirmed on appeal, and, while the Majority 
of the Appeals Chamber saw no need to delve into an academic discussion 
related to the level of contribution required under Article 25(3)(d),
148
 Judge 
Fernández de Gurmendi considered it necessary to address this point in her 
separate opinion.
149
  
 
Judge Fernández de Gurmendi argued that Article 25(3)(d) does not envisage 
the minimum level of contribution to the crime.
150
 She found unconvincing 
both the practice of attaching certain level of contribution to each liability 
mode and the ‘import’ of the ‘significance contribution requirement’ from the 
JCE jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals into Article 25(3)(d).
151
 Judge 
Fernández de Gurmendi correctly argued that the real issue is not the label of 
‘significance’ ascribed to the contribution, but rather the so-called ‘neutral 
contributions’. 152  Unfortunately, the opinion does not elaborate on the 
meaning of this term, but one may suggest that it refers to the contributions 
that could be used for the legitimate military activities and crimes alike.  
 
Indeed, measuring the smallest possible input under Article 25(3)(d) appears 
highly problematic. The impact of the same assistance may vary depending 
on the circumstances of the case – providing the ammunition to the soldiers 
may be a decisive factor in their potential criminality or it may equally have 
no impact at all if they are already in possession of weapons.  The same 
criticism applies to the general idea of quantifying various contributions of 
the accused depending on their respective forms of participation.
153
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As an alternative to measuring the least possible input under Article 25(3)(d), 
Judge Fernández de Gurmendi suggested focusing on the “normative and 
causal” links between the contribution and the crime. 154 The factual situation 
in Katanga whereby the accused facilitated the supply of weapons, which 
could be used for criminal and non-criminal aims alike, prompted Judge van 
den Wyngaert to look for an instrument to assess such ‘generic’ 
contributions.
155
  She proposed utilizing the ‘specific direction requirement’ - 
the element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting in jurisprudence the ad 
hoc tribunals - as such instrument.
156
 These recommendations regarding 
‘neutral’ or ‘generic’ input share in common the emphasis on the link 
between the crime and the assistance, rather than the amount of the 
contribution in question.  
 
It seems that the relationship between the assistance and the offence is an 
important aspect of accomplice liability and needs to be taken into account. 
Using the ‘specific direction’ test is particularly helpful for the purposes of 
Article 25(3)(d) due to the fact that this provision deals with the group that 
could be simultaneously engaged in criminal and non-criminal activities, and 
not just singular perpetrators as is the case with aiding and abetting. However, 
any form of complicity presents a challenge for establishing a straightforward 
connection between the contribution and the offence because it falls outside 
the scope of the law on causation.
157
 The link between the two elements is 
always cursory since it is interrupted by the freely chosen acts of other people 
– the immediate perpetrators. On this point, the Majority in Katanga noted 
that it is not necessary to establish the direct link between the conduct of the 
accomplice and the resulting harm, nor it is required that the assistance is 
proximate to the crime.
158
 
 
How to reinforce the connection between the contribution and the offence if 
the directness of the aid and its distance to the crime are not dispositive? The 
answer could be in enhancing the scrutiny of the accused’s mental state: 
generic assistance becomes culpable when there is knowledge about the crime 
as well as an understanding of the potential effects of the rendered help. Thus, 
the fault element appears to be central in determining the responsibility of 
accomplices.  
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The subjective element for Article 25(3)(d) responsibility consists of 
intentional contribution made either with the aim of furthering criminal 
activity of the group or knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime. Article 25(3)(d) liability represents an exception from the general rule 
on culpability stipulated in Article 30 of the Rome Statute.
159
 Complicity as a 
‘contribution to the group’ also differs from aiding and abetting under 
subparagraph (c) because it allows a lower fault requirement under both sub-
clauses. The terms used in Article 25(3)(d) shall be nonetheless interpreted in 
the light of the general Article 30.
160
  
The Trial Chamber in Katanga defined ‘intentional contribution’ for the 
purposes of both subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Article 25(3)(d) as a conscious 
and deliberate choice to engage in a certain behaviour with the knowledge 
that it contributes to the activities of the group.
161
 The Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Mbarushimana,
  
contended that the ‘intentionality’ of the contribution must 
include an additional element, linking the contribution with the crimes 
alleged.
162
 It appears, however, that this extra requirement is superfluous in 
the light of the two qualifying clauses that do the job of linking the 
contribution to the criminal activity of the group.  
‘Intentional contribution’ should be read together with two specific clauses 
characterizing the attitude towards group activity: the suspect or the accused 
should either aim to further the group’s purpose to commit a crime, or know 
about the intention of the group to commit the specific crimes. Judge van den 
Wyngaert noted the distinction between subparagraph (i), which requires 
more general understanding of the group’s purpose by referring to ‘a crime’, 
and a more specific knowledge under subparagraph (ii) referring to the ‘the 
crime’.163 The Majority in Katanga also correctly focused on the specificity 
of the knowledge of the accused for the purposes of Article 25(3)(d)(ii): 
knowing about the general criminal intent of the group was not deemed 
sufficient since the accused must be aware of the specific crimes the group 
intends to commit, and that they will occur in the ordinary course of events.
164
  
The Majority in Katanga regrettably transferred the conflated vision of 
military and criminal activities of Ngiti militia into its analysis of the 
accused’s mental state. Katanga’s intent to contribute to the attack on Bogoro 
was established on the basis of his own testimony, despite the fact that the 
accused was referring to the attack on the UPC - a legitimate military 
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target.
165
 The Chamber further held that Katanga knew that the ammunition 
he supplied would be used during the attack. He was also aware that the 
methods of warfare generally implemented in the region included atrocities 
against the civilians. Finally, Germain Katanga knew that the UPC was a 
Hema militia and he shared a strong anti-Hema sentiment.
166
 Judge van den 
Wyngaert fairly raised concerns about the way Germain Katanga’s mental 
state was evaluated. She stressed that there was no evidence showing that 
Katanga’s contributions were specifically directed to the crimes and not just 
reconquering Bogoro, or that he shared anti-Hema ideology.
167
 The factual 
analysis of Katanga’s mental state - similarly to the assessment of Lubanga’s 
fault - appears to be close to the standard of dolus eventualis, which is 
rejected by the ICC doctrinally. 
The Lubanga Trial Chamber referred to Article 25(3)(d) as a “residual form of 
accessory liability, which makes it possible to criminalize those contributions 
that cannot be characterized as ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding, abetting 
or assisting.” 168  This early interpretation of Article 25(3)(d) created some 
expectations that Article 25(3)(d) would play a minor role in the jurisprudence 
of the ICC.
169
 It seems, however, that mounting discontent over (in)direct co-
perpetration, pushed the court towards this residual form of liability. This was 
because in essence Articles 25(3)(a) and 25(3)(d) address the same type of 
situation – that of multiple offenders involved in the crime.170 It has been 
established that the term ‘common plan’ under both provisions is functionally 
identical and must include an element of ‘criminality’.171 So far, the ICC has 
drawn a line between the two provisions based solely on the level of 
contribution necessary to attract liability with Article 25(3)(a) embodying a 
higher threshold than Article 25(3)(d).
172
 If one rejects the premise that the 
level of contribution is dispositive in determining whether responsibility is 
principal or accessory, and that Article 25(3)(d) is a ‘lesser’ form of 
responsibility, one may come to the conclusion that contributing to the 
commission of a crime by a group is a suitable form of responsibility in many 
instances. 
2. Hierarchy of the Participation Modes? 
Will the recent rejection of the hierarchy of participation modes by the Trial 
                                                             
165
 Ibid, §1682. 
166
 Ibid, §§ 1685, 1688, 1689, emphasis added. 
167
 Minority Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, §§ 291, 304. 
168
 Lubanga Decision, § 337. See also Katanga Decision, § 483, ‘degrading’ responsibility in 
Article 25(3)(d) on the basis of its accessory nature.  
169
 See for example W. Schabas, Commentary, at 436. 
170
 Katanga Severing Decision. 
171
 Mbarushimana Decision, § 271. 
172
 Lubanga Judgement, § 996. 
  
 
 
 
113 
Chamber in Katanga hold in a long run? The answer to this question is far 
from clear and largerly depends on whether the assumptions underlying the 
ranking – control over crime theory and rigorous quantification of the 
contributions made by different crime participants - will continue to prevail. 
There is no scholarly agreement as to whether the modes of participation are 
arranged in the hierarchical order within the Rome Statute. Olasolo, for 
example, views complicity as unsatisfactory in attributing liability to the 
senior figures within international law context because it does not reflect the 
same level of guilt as primary perpetration and provides, in his opinion, for 
more lenient sentences to those who are most responsible.
173
 Likewise, Ambos 
argues that the correct view of Article 25(3) is that there is hierarchy, with 
contributions of the perpetrator being greater than that of the accessory.
174
 Van 
Sliedregt, on the other hand, sees no reason why indirect perpetrations under 
Article 25(3)(a) deserve more severe punishment than instigators under 
subparagraph (b).  She argues that the fact that Article 25(3)(a) provides for 
three forms of principal liability does not ‘reduce’ the other modes of liability 
or make them inappropriate for the senior level officials.
 175
 Schabas explains 
that some legal systems distinguish between the principal perpetrators who 
carry out the crimes and accessories or accomplices responsible as secondary 
parties for directing or organizing the principals. He clarifies, however, that 
there is nothing secondary about them.
176
  
The ICC raised the question of hierarchy on several occasions in its previous 
case law. The Katanga Pre-Trial Chamber implicitly confirmed the existence 
of the hierarchy of the modes of participation.
 177
 This is evident from the 
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to dismiss the alternative charge of 
accessorial liability for ‘ordering’ the commission of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity pursuant to Article 25(3)(b) as ‘moot’ upon finding 
sufficient grounds to believe the accused are responsible as principals 
pursuant to Article 25(3)(a).
178
 The Trial Chamber’s subsequently changed its 
characterization of Katanga’s liability mode from ‘indirect co-perpetration’ 
pursuant to subparagraph (a) to ‘contribution to the commission of a crime by 
a group’ on the basis of subparagraph (d). In the Chamber’s view this change 
was not prejudicial to the rights of the accused, inter alia, because the 
elements of participation in a crime within the meaning of Article 25(3)(d) 
are an integral part of the material elements characterizing the commission 
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of a crime within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a).
179
 This logic follows from 
the assumption that principal liability ‘subsumes’ accomplice liability.180 
In Mbarushimana, the judges referred to Gerhard Werle’s argument that the 
modes of liability listed in article 25(3) of the Statute are arranged in 
accordance with a value-oriented hierarchy of participation in a crime under 
international law.
181
 Most importantly, the Lubanga judgment established a 
hierarchy between the perpetrator referred to in paragraph (a) and accessories 
mentioned in paragraphs (b) – (d).182 The Chamber found that article 25(3)(a) 
refers to the principal liability of someone committing a crime, as opposed to 
the secondary liability, dependent on the act of the perpetrator, enshrined in 
Article 25(3)(b) and (c).
183
 With regard to Article 25(3)(d), the judges 
highlighted the greater level of contribution required for the ‘commission’ in 
a sense of Article 25(3)(a) and responsibility under Article 25(3)(d).
184
 
According to the majority reasoning, the level of contribution of the (co)-
perpetrator has to be essential to properly express the blameworthiness of 
those persons who are most responsible for the most serious crimes of 
international concern.
185
  
Recently, the ICC witnessed some strong dissents on the question of the 
alleged hierarchy of the modes of responsibility. The latest example is the 
position taken by the Katanga Trial Chamber rejecting the ‘hierarchy of guilt’ 
implicit in Article 25(3), but maintaining that the distinction between 
principals and accomplices needs to be guided by the control over crime 
theory.
186
 Judge Fulford in his separate opinion attached to the Lubanga 
judgment criticized on a number of grounds the Majority’s approach to modes 
of liability.
187
 He disagreed with the majority in Lubanga that there is a need 
to establish a hierarchy between the modes of participation in the Rome 
Statute and also opposed the view that these modes of participation are 
mutually exclusive.
188
 Judge Van den Wyngaert also refuted the hierarchy of 
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the modes of participation in her concurring opinion to the judgment of 
acquittal of Mathieu Ngudjolo.
189
 She failed to see a difference in 
blameworthiness between the accessory liability, such as aiding and abetting 
or ordering, and the principal liability for commission.
190
 Her main argument 
was that guilt of the accused depends on the factual circumstances of the case 
rather than on abstract categories.
191
 
The question regarding the existence of the hierarchy of the modes of 
participations is crucial to the development of the ICC case law on modes of 
responsibility. Acceptance of the hierarchy leads to the conclusion that 
principal perpetration is more blameworthy than complicity. This in turn puts 
pressure on the court to employ the modes of participation in subparagraph 
(a) to emphasize the gravity of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. However, 
the traditional understanding of commission in criminal law is not ideal in 
capturing the wrongdoing of the offender who is removed from the actual 
crime both in time and space. The ICC’s reading of the control over crime 
theory into Article 25(3)(a) therefore artificially expanded the forms of 
commission under the Statutes to cover the widest variety of conduct.  
If one removes the assumption that the modes of responsibility are arranged 
in a hierarchical order and reflect different degrees of blameworthiness, then 
control over crime theory does not seem to be functionally necessary for the 
ICC. The court can simply apply the various forms of complicity, provided in 
the remainder of the article, to address the situations of the accused removed 
from the scene of the crime. It is thus disappointing that the Trial Chamber in 
Katanga chose to hold on to control over crime theory, while rejecting the 
idea that the forms of participation are arranged in the order of seriousness.  
There are three arguments against the hierarchy of the forms of participation 
within the ICC framework. First, control over crime theory underlying the 
hierarchy has no support in the Rome Statute and, even if it had, it is not the 
basis for reading a hierarchy of the liability modes into the Statute. Secondly, 
it is true that Article 25(3) represents a move towards the differential 
participation model.
192
 The forms of responsibility are distinguished in 
different subparagraphs of the article. This does not mean however that they 
are ranked in a particular order. Finally, the level of the accused’s 
contribution is not the criterion for drawing the line between different modes 
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of participation.  
i. ‘Control over Crime’ is not a Basis for Hierarchy  
According to Article 21(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, the court shall apply, in 
the first place, the Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. Thus, it is important to determine whether the Statute supports 
Roxin’s control over crime theory and a hierarchy of the participation modes. 
In answering this question, one has to keep in mind Articles 31-32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that provides guidance on treaty 
interpretation. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention sets the general rule that 
treaty interpretation involves the assessment of three elements - the text, 
context and object and purpose of the treaty. These elements should be read 
together as one rule. There is no priority of one element over another.
193 
Subsequent practice, mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 31, is an additional 
element to be considered when interpreting a treaty.
194
   Article 32 outlines 
supplementary means of interpretation - preparatory work (travaux 
preparatoire) and the circumstances of the treaty conclusion – to be utilized 
only if the meaning is not clear after the application of Article 31.
195 
 
Article 25(3)(a) does not mention the control over crime theory, but rather 
contains the traditional forms of criminal responsibility – perpetration, co-
perpetration and perpetration by means.
196
 The only peculiarity is the 
possibility of holding a person accountable as an indirect perpetrator even in 
cases when the agent, through whom the crime is committed, is criminally 
responsible. This is in contrast with the majority of domestic legal systems 
that call the act ‘perpetration’ only if the agent is innocent, hence an 
‘instrument’ in the hands of the perpetrator. Control over crime doctrine 
provides for the same feature – the physical perpetrator may or may not be 
criminally responsible – this similarity alone does not, however, 
automatically imply that the provision of the Rome Statute on perpetration 
shall be in read in the light of Roxin’s theory.  
To that effect, Judge Fulford argued in his separate opinion that the German-
based control over crime theory is not necessary to establish criminal 
responsibility for co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, 
hence the five-prong test requiring, inter alia, an essential contribution on 
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behalf of the accused, is superfluous.
197
 The object and purpose of the Rome 
Statute embodied in its preamble - putting an end to impunity - does not 
justify overextension of the liability.
198
 The Katanga justification for 
retaining control over crime theory for the purposes of giving effect to the 
distinction between perpetrators and accomplices already implicit in Article 
25(3) does not seem very convincing.
199
 The fault and conduct requirement 
for each form of responsibility seem to be sufficiently defined in the Rome 
Statute. 
Article 25(3) also does not suggest, based on the plain or contextual reading 
of the provision, that the modes participation are arranged in a hierarchical 
order. Distinguishing the forms of responsibility in line with the differential 
participation model does not imply a particular ranking. Judges Fulford and 
Van den Wyngaert both contended that the plain reading of Article 25(3) does 
not suggest that ‘commission’ under Article 25(3)(a) is more serious than 
‘ordering, soliciting and inducing’ under paragraph (b) of the same article, or 
that criminality of accessories (Article 25(3)(c)) is greater than those who 
participate within a group (Article 25(3)(d)).
200
  
Travaux preparatoire demonstrate the compromise reached by the experts 
from different countries, each holding positions based on their domestic 
laws.
201
 Neither the Working Paper, nor the Report of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court indicate 
any preference towards the German control over crime model or the intention 
of the parties to rank the modes of participation are arranged in the order of 
blameworthiness.
202
 The general structure of the corresponding Article of the 
ILC’s Code of Crimes serves as the starting point.203 The initial Working 
Paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee in 1997 contained modes of 
responsibility largely resembling those in Article 2(3) of the ILC Code of 
Crimes. The changes to the initial draft followed debates on criminal 
responsibility of legal entities, mens rea for aiding and abetting and the 
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definition of group crime (current subparagraph (d) of Article 25(3)).
204
 
Control over crime theory or the hierarchy of the liability modes do not 
surface in the debates that shaped the article on individual criminal 
responsibility. 
Customary law at the ICC does not play as prominent role as in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals.
205
 The court has referred, however, to 
an international custom when interpreting the notion of ‘common purpose’ 
contained in Article 25(3)(d). The Trial Chamber in Katanga found it 
reasonable to rely on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals pertaining to 
the joint criminal enterprise.
206
 Thus, it is worth mentioning that control over 
crime theory cannot be said to have materialized as a custom. The theory is 
supported only by the Stakić trial judgment of the ICTY and the Eichmann 
judgment of the Jerusalem court.
207
 Arguably, these authorities alone do not 
establish the existence of a customary rule. Nor can it be said that control 
over crime theory is recognized by the majority of legal systems to constitute 
a third source of international law – a general principle of law.208  Judge 
Fulford ‘blamed’ Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute for the court’s reliance 
on a German concept in Lubanga.
209
 This provision permits drawing upon 
general principles of law derived from national legal systems. However, it 
does not appear from the reading of Lubanga judgment that the Trial 
Chamber justified its choice of the German control over crime theory by the 
fact that it derives from the general principles of law under Article 21(1)(c). 
Instead, the court interpreted the Rome Statute so as to infer the most suitable 
mode of responsibility.
210
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The final issue is that of the connection between control over crime theory 
and the hierarchy of the participation modes. The ICC has tied the liability 
under Article 25(3)(a) to the increased level of contribution, and that, in turn 
to the increased degree of blameworthiness. However, the original control 
over crime theory does not appear to imply a higher degree of guilt for the 
indirect perpetrator. The focus is not on the level of contribution of the 
accused but on the power to exercise control in the hierarchical system.
211
 
Roxin admitted that accessory’s or the instigator’s behaviour need not be less 
reprehensible than that of the perpetrator; rather their lack of power to control 
can be one of the factors at sentencing.
212
 The Trial Chamber in Katanga 
appears to have returned the classical reading of control over crime theory: 
unlike its predecessors, the Majority in Katanga refused to link the theory 
with a higher degree of guilt.
213
 
ii. Modes of Responsibility – Distinguished but not Ranked 
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute represents a move towards the differential 
participation model that distinguishes different modes of liability, but not 
necessarily ranks them. Sentencing is the main reason for grading forms of 
responsibility at the national level. For example, the legislation of Finland, 
Estonia, Germany and Indonesia provide for sentencing discounts for the 
accessories as opposed to the perpetrators.
214
 The Rome Statute does not 
contain similar sentencing provision. Article 78 of the Statute only directs the 
court to take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person.
215
 Thus, the liability label is 
not dispositive in determining the level of culpability of the offender. The 
factual circumstances of the case play a more important role at sentencing.
216
 
Moreover, there is nothing in the Rome Statute or travaux preparatoire that 
suggests that modes of liability are arranged in a particular order. Judge 
Fulford contended that the outcome of the finding that the modes of 
participation are not arranged in the hierarchical order is that a rigorous 
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distinction between principals and accessories is not justified.
217
 There are 
reasons, however, to distinguish modes of participation, also at the 
international level.  
The need to separate modes of liability stems from three different fields 
informing international criminal law – domestic criminal law, transitional 
justice and human rights law.
218
 From the domestic law perspective, the 
distinction between differential and unitary perpetration models plays a role. 
Both models honour the principle of individual culpability, whereby a person 
is punished only for his own conduct. However, the two systems arrive at the 
same result in different ways. Differential participation presupposes the 
derivative nature of accomplice liability in that it depends on the wrongful act 
of the principal perpetrator.
219
  The underlying rationale behind this approach 
is that there is one offence and many crime participants – each having a 
different role. In the unitary perpetrator model, on the other hand, the 
responsibility of a party to the crime is less, if at all, dependent on the 
responsibility of the principal. Plurality of persons implies a plurality of 
offences in the context of this model because the liability of each party stands 
on its own.
 220
  
The difference between the two systems is manifested in different pleading 
techniques and a different standard of causation. In the unitary participation 
model, any involvement whatsoever on the part of an actor in any offence 
establishes his connection to the crime,
221
 while the differential model requires 
connecting the liability of accomplices to the conduct of the principal 
perpetrator. It appears that the Rome Statute has adopted the differential 
participation model and the dynamics of this model shall inform the 
interpretation of Article 25(3) of the Statute. In line with the derivative nature 
of liability inherent in this model, the link between the accomplice and the 
principal perpetrator needs to be spelled out in greater detail.   
The human rights aspect of international criminal law requires the role of the 
offender to be defined in precise terms.
222
 This follows from the right of the 
                                                             
217
 Separate Opinion of Judge Fulford, §  9. 
218
 For the discussion on framing international criminal law see A. M. Danner and J. S. 
Martinez. 
219
 A. Eser, at 782. 
220
 A. Eser, at 788; E. Van Sliedregt, 2003, at 61. 
221
 U. Sieber, Participation in Crime: Criminal Liability of Leaders of Criminal Groups and 
Networks, A Comparative Analysis, Expert Opinion by the Max Planck Institute for Foreign 
and International Criminal Law as Commissioned by the ICTY, Freiburg, 2006, at 13. See 
also Chapter IV.I.iii infra. 
222
 F. Megret, Prospects for "Constitutional" Human Rights Scrutiny of Substantive 
International Criminal Law by the ICC, with Special Emphasis on the General Part (paper 
presented at Washington University School of Law, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, 
  
 
 
 
121 
accused to be properly informed about the nature of charges against him or 
her. This right, recognized as a fundamental human right in the major human 
rights instruments, is part of the broader notion of ‘fairness’ in criminal 
proceedings.
223
 The European Court for Human Rights held, “in criminal 
matters the provision of full, detailed information concerning the charges 
against a defendant is an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the 
proceedings are fair.” 224  In Pélissier and Sassi, the European Court for 
Human Rights looked specifically at the issue of changing the legal 
characterization of facts. The French court of appeal had convicted the 
claimants of aiding and abetting criminal bankruptcy as opposed to the 
commission of criminal bankruptcy, charged in the indictment. The court 
found a violation of Article 6(3)(a) of the Convention based on the 
consideration that “aiding and abetting did not constitute an element intrinsic 
to the initial accusation known to the applicants from the beginning of the 
proceedings.”225 The European Court for Human Rights acknowledged that 
the elements of aiding and abetting are different from those of the 
perpetration. Thus, the accused could have used different defence strategies if 
they knew they were being tried for aiding and abetting as opposed to 
principal perpetration.
226
 The reason for the existence of the rule to be 
properly informed about the charges stems from the notion of the equality of 
arms that is essential to the rights of the defence and underlies the concept of 
fairness.
227
 True equality of arms can only be achieved if the accused is 
properly informed about the charges and is able to defend him or her-self 
accordingly.   
Finally, the transitional justice aspect of distinguishing between different 
modes of liability manifests itself in the need to avoid assigning collective 
guilt. International criminal trials are extremely complex - they involve 
multiple accused; the crime scenes are often spread out in time and space; and 
the evidence linking the accused to the particular offence is often insufficient 
or missing. The offences are grave and usually involve numerous victims 
seeking justice. It may seem tempting to circumvent the principles of 
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individual criminal responsibility. However, assigning guilt by association is a 
dangerous tendency. Addressing past atrocities and criminal law guarantees 
for the accused are not two competing considerations in international criminal 
law but go together hand in hand. This is so because international criminal 
trials are evaluated by subsequent generations based on their adherence to the 
strict legal principles.
228
 The Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals are good 
examples of how international proceedings can be a labelled ‘victors justice’ 
because of jurisprudential shortcomings.
229
 The whole purpose of international 
criminal trials may be defeated if the principles of criminal law are not 
observed. Thus, honouring the principle of individual criminal responsibility 
is key to maintaining the perceived legitimacy of international and hybrid 
courts and tribunals.  
iii. The Level of Contribution is not the Criterion for 
Differentiating Modes of Responsibility  
The third and final argument against the hierarchy of the modes of 
participation has to do with the ‘anchor’ that the ICC chose to delineate 
different liability modes. Responsibility of the accused is measured by the 
amount of his or her contribution to the crime. Thus, there is a ladder of 
participation modes based on the level of contribution. The court requires an 
essential contribution by the accused to the common plan, in the sense of the 
ability to frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing the tasks, 
under subparagraph (a);
230
 a substantial contribution to the commission of a 
crime for aiding and abetting under subparagraph (c);
231
 and a significant 
contribution to the commission of a crime by a group under subparagraph (d) 
of Article 25(3) of the Statute.
232
 The Lubanga Trial Chamber reinforced the 
hierarchy based on the level of contribution by calling the latter provision a 
‘residual’ form of liability, which makes it possible to criminalize those 
contributions that cannot be characterized as ordering, soliciting, inducing, 
aiding, abetting or assisting.
233
 The Pre-Trial Chamber in Mbarushimana 
adopted the same approach: it felt compelled on the basis of the hierarchy of 
participation modes to measure the magnitude of the accused’s 
contribution.
234
  An exercise proved to be challenging and was duly criticized 
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by Judge Fernández de Gurmendi.
235
 
However, there is a flaw in the reasoning based on the connection between 
the form of liability and the level of contribution because it is impossible to 
measure the precise degree to which the accused contributed to the crime in 
abstract terms. This is particularly true in respect of an ‘essential’, or conditio 
sine qua non, contribution that is a requirement for co-perpetration. This 
requirement goes against the distinction between nature and will, which 
Kadish accurately pointed out.
236
 In the physical world the events inevitably 
follow one another, but in the world of voluntary human action the outcome 
is the result of a freely chosen expressions of will.
237
 This distinction 
underlies the conception of responsibility in criminal law because it employs 
the doctrine of causation, for the realm of nature, and complicity, for the 
realm of will.
238
 Causation translates into the events happening in the physical 
world, while complicity results in another person’s voluntary action.239 The 
reason for this distinction is that every person is presumed to have a free will, 
and it cannot be said that another person caused him or her to act. The 
principal freely chose to commit a crime.  
For example, it can be fairly said that the burglar caused the burglary by 
breaking into the house and appropriating the valuables. However, his 
accomplice, who provided the truck to transport the stolen goods with the 
knowledge of the crime being committed, cannot be said to have caused the 
burglary. His responsibility lies in the wrongful choice to assist the principal. 
Another example involving co-perpetrators would be two men simultaneously 
delivering blows to a third person. Both co-perpetrators cause grave bodily 
harm to the other person. This event is happening in the physical world. Thus, 
causation applies to cases that do not involve an intermediary between the 
crime and the offender – these are the classical cases of perpetration, co-
perpetration and perpetration by means. The latter form of perpetration is 
somewhat an exception to the general causation rule because there is an 
intermediary between the crime and the principal. This intermediary, 
however, is innocent in a classical form of indirect perpetration. Thus, he 
lacks free will and becomes an instrument, in the physical sense of the word, 
in the hands of the primary perpetrator. 
In case of ICC-developed doctrines of indirect or direct co-perpetration, the 
agents committing crimes are usually criminally responsible. Therefore, it 
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cannot be said that they are instruments in the hands of others - they retain 
their free will to choose the course of action. Thus, the contribution of a co-
perpetrator to the crime cannot be conditio sine qua non if other persons who 
are criminally responsible carry out the crime. They possess free will and can 
choose not to carry out the elements of the crime. An essential contribution 
presupposes that the co-perpetrator caused, through his or her contribution, 
the crime to occur. This is impossible however if one treats individuals as 
sovereigns of their own acts. For example, the mayor of the city who publicly 
delivered hate speeches urging one ethnic group to take up arms against 
another ethnic group cannot be said to have caused the members of the 
former group to commit acts of persecution or genocide, but rather influenced 
their behaviour through incitement.
240
  
Some quantification of contribution to the crime is nonetheless possible, or 
else even a marginal input would render a person criminally responsible, 
bringing about the unjust result of punishing only the guilty state of mind 
rather than the state of mind and the conduct.
241
 However, it seems more 
appropriate to talk about establishing the nature of accomplice’s assistance 
and its relevance to the crime rather than simply measuring it in the numerical 
terms. Two more factors from the realm of culpability have to be placed in 
the background of any consideration of accomplice’s input: his intent to 
contribute and the level of specificity of his knowledge about the crimes.  
The facts of a particular case usually permit an evaluation as to whether the 
contribution had some effect on the commission of the crime. This appears to 
be a reasonable approach. The Mbarushimana Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
Katanga Trial Chambers took a step in the this direction by noting that 
determination as to which contributions are significant requires a case-by-
case assessment in the proper context.
242
 It seems, however, that the ICC is 
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still in search of the right formula for evaluating the effect of accomplice’s 
assistance on the crime. The Mbarushimana Chamber could not refrain from 
providing some indicators regarding what amounts to significant 
contributions. These included the role played by the suspect vis-à-vis the 
seriousness and scope of the crimes committed or the sustained nature of the 
participation after acquiring knowledge of the criminality of the group's 
common purpose.
243
 These indicators are useful in assessing the input of the 
suspect or accused, but can just as well be used to determine the contribution 
that is ‘essential’ and ‘substantial’, and not necessarily ‘significant’.  
Consequently, the level of contribution has to be at a certain level in order to 
attract any liability, but it cannot serve as an instrument for grading modes of 
liability and establishing a hierarchy. In particular, the essential contribution 
requirement is not the correct criterion to delimit indirect (co)-perpetration 
from complicity.
244
 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the main forms of responsibility accepted by the ICC.  
The Rome Statute, albeit, the most detailed contemporary statement of the 
modes of responsibility in international criminal law, still calls for some 
further interpretation. The ICC initially adopted the German-based doctrine of 
co-perpetration by means of control over crime as a default mode of 
responsibility dealing with collective criminality. It appears however that the 
fascination with the newly developed control over crime theory premised on 
the hierarchy of participation modes is fading away. The application of this 
form of liability creates conceptual and practical difficulties. There is no 
support for this doctrine in the Rome Statute, customary international law or 
the general principles of law. The doctrine operates on the basis of numerous 
highly theoretical criteria that are often difficult to apply to the facts.  
Moreover, the particular requirement of ‘essential’ contribution of co-
perpetrator to the crime committed by someone who is criminally responsible 
himself is at odds with the principle of free will.  Contribution sine qua non 
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presupposes that the acts of the perpetrator directly cause the crime to occur. 
However, if the crime is committed by the intermediary, who possesses the 
ability to act voluntarily, it cannot be said that the principal perpetrator caused 
the crime. Rather, he influenced the agent, who, in turn, caused the result in 
the physical world. The better approach to contributions would be to assess 
them in the context of the case, without attempting to quantify the 
contributions and construct a ranking of responsibility modes based on this 
quantification. 
Until recently, the ICC has used different forms of complicity - embodied in 
Article 25(3)(b)-(d) - scarcely and with reluctance. The explanation for this 
could be the alleged hierarchy of the modes of participation implicit in the 
Rome Statute.  This assumption in turn created a pressure on the court to 
utilize the ‘stronger’ mode of participation – commission under Article 
25(3)(a) – to reflect the gravity of the crimes in the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
The attitudes are slowly changing with the second conviction rendered by the 
court under Article 25(3)(d). Indeed, the supposition that the modes of 
participations are ranked is questionable because it is not supported by the 
Rome Statute or travaux preparatoire. The hierarchy does not follow from 
the original German control over crime doctrine or the sentencing provisions 
in the Statute, which do not distinguish between different liability modes for 
sentencing purposes. Thus, the form of liability – principal or accomplice – is 
not the deciding factor in assessing the degree of offender’s blameworthiness. 
Rather, it is the combination of case-specific aspects that render the accused 
more or less culpable.  
The main conclusion of the above discussion is that co-perpetration must not 
be used to the detriment of other forms of liability enshrined in the Rome 
Statute. Different forms of complicity do not amount to a ‘lesser’ form of 
responsibility because the forms of participation are not ranked in the Rome 
Statute. Complicity can serve an important role in addressing the issue of 
collective criminality because it is designed specifically to deal with cases 
involving multiple accused. The key challenge seems to be not the choice of 
the liability mode in abstracto, but rather faithfully assessing the facts of the 
case against the legal requirements of the chosen form of criminal 
participation.  
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IV. Origins of Complicity: Domestic Law Intake 
Introduction 
Examining the jurisprudence and the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, hybrid 
courts and the ICC shows how international bodies employ complicity in 
their reasoning. However, this assessment is insufficient to understand 
complicity in its entirety, which is a concept deeply rooted in domestic 
criminal law.
1
 It is thus worth going deeper to the level of national legal 
systems to understand complicity, a concept which exists in one form or 
another in countries with both common and civil law traditions.
2
  
This chapter uses a comparative inquiry to examine complicity at a domestic 
level. The first section of the chapter shows the relevance of this study to 
international criminal law. It links the comparative method to the notion of 
the ‘of law recognized by civilized nations’, a source of international law. 
The same part discusses the particulars of the methodology used in this 
chapter. The next section examines the concept of complicity in domestic 
jurisdictions. This part strives to strike a balance between exploring 
complicity in depth and providing an overview of the range of legal systems. 
Appendix III to the thesis shall be read in conjunction with this chapter. It 
provides a schematic overview of complicity in 31 jurisdictions. The 
penultimate section of the chapter adduces some general principles associated 
with complicity resulting from the study of domestic law and evaluates their 
relevance at an international level.  This section provides an interdisciplinary 
perspective on complicity including the limitations of transplanting the 
concept from national law into the international field. The chapter ends with 
some intermediate conclusions. 
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1. Comparative Method in International Criminal Law 
i. General Principles of Law as a Source of Law and 
Inspiration 
Comparative studies of domestic legal systems assist in the discovery of one 
of the sources of international law, namely the ‘general principles of law’. 
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists 
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as one of the 
sources of international law.
3
  The expression ‘general principles of law’ has 
been attributed different meanings in the context of public international law.
4
 
Some academics consider that the expression refers primarily to general 
principles of international law and only subsidiarily to the principles 
embedded in the municipal law.
5
 Others, when speaking of ‘general 
principles of law’, choose to refer to legal principles recognized in national 
law.
6
 A third group, which includes Lauterpracht and Kelsen, almost denies 
the status of the ‘general principles of law’ as an independent source of law. 
Lauterpracht writes:  
 Experience has shown that the main function of ‘general principles of 
law’ has been that of a safety-valve to be kept in reserve, rather than a 
source of law of frequent application. As a rule, the two primary 
sources of law enumerated in Article 38 – treaty and custom – have 
provided a sufficient basis for decision.
7
 
Equally, there does not seem to be an agreement on how many countries need 
to recognize a certain principle in foro domestico in order for it to qualify as a 
source of international law.
8
 Hans Kelsen posed this question as early as 
1950,
9
 but the answer is not entirely straightforward even today. In the 
Baumgarten case, the UN Human Rights Committee satisfied itself with the 
“recognition of the general principle by the community of nations” standard 
when determining whether killings and attempted killings of those crossing 
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the DDR’s border were criminal offences in the 1980’s.10  In Van Hoof’s 
view, two conditions need to be satisfied in order for a principle to be 
considered a source of law: first, the principle needs to be accepted by all 
states in foro domestico, and secondly, there needs to exist the court-situation 
or situation of a third party decision, which calls for the application of this 
source of law.
11
 
Unlike public international law, international criminal law provides some 
guidance as to the hierarchy of sources of law. Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome 
Statute assigns “general principles of law derived from state laws of legal 
systems in the world” the role of a secondary source of law in the ICC. The 
Rome Statute is, thus, more specific than the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice on the content and the role of the ‘general principles of 
international law’: the role of the ‘general principles of law’ under Article 
21(1)(c) is to be a subsidiary source of law when a gap exists in international 
law. It is essential that the ‘general principle’ is representative of the variety 
of nations; hence there is no call for a direct transposition of a certain concept 
from a single domestic legal system to international law. At the same time, 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals does not require universal 
acceptance of the rule by all the states when abstracting legal rules from 
national systems.
12
  
The Lubanga judgement of the ICC proves two issues that are crucially 
important for this discussion: (i) the modes of responsibility in international 
criminal law require more interpretation based on a solid methodology; (ii) 
there is a gap in understanding of the role and purpose of the ‘general 
principles of law’ in defining the modes of responsibility at an international 
level.
13
  While the Majority of the Lubanga Trial Chamber denied resorting to 
domestic law in the context of international proceedings, they introduced, 
through the back door, the German domestic law concept of ‘control over 
crime’. 14  Simultaneously, while Judge Fulford in his separate opinion 
criticized the Chamber’s decision to use the German theory, he believed the 
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Chamber took this decision based on the ‘general principles of law’ under 
Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute.
 15
 
The ICC and the international criminal tribunals have been somewhat 
reluctant, in decisions and judgments, to resort to principles derived from the 
multitude of domestic legal systems, preferring instead to adopt a narrower 
perspective found in a single or few domestic legal systems.
16
 However, there 
are several instances, in which the general principles of law have assisted 
judges in finding the appropriate legal standard.
17
 In Erdemović, for example, 
Judges McDonald and Vohrah determined that duress is not a complete 
defence to charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes by surveying 
30 national legal systems including civil law systems.
18
 Similarly, the Trial 
Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia analysed 
several national legal orders in order to resolve the continuing debate between 
the prosecution and the defence relating to the extended form of the joint 
criminal enterprise.
19
 After having surveyed several national legal systems, 
the Trial Chamber concluded that this form of liability cannot be considered 
to have been a general principle of law between 1975 and 1979.
20
  
The approach developed in this thesis is that domestic law or, rather the 
results collected from examining several national legal systems, inform the 
‘general principles of law’. The question arises whether and to what extent 
domestic law also assists in the interpretation of the ‘orthodox sources’ of 
international law enshrined in Articles 38(1)(a) and 38(1)(b) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, namely treaty and custom.
21
  Arguably, one 
can best conceptualize the ‘general principles of law’ as an independent 
source of law and a framework for interpretation of the principles that already 
exist (often vaguely) in the two other sources of international law, namely 
custom and treaty.  
It appears that domestic laws may be used to interpret these two sources of 
law. However, they cannot be the sole ‘informant’ of the treaty provision or 
the rule of customary law. Treaties, being classical examples of written 
international law, should in theory regulate the matters they address with 
sufficient clarity, thus eliminating the need to consult other sources. In many 
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instances however, treaty provisions require further elaboration and 
clarification.
22
 This is so because they are always a product of diplomatic 
negotiations.
23
 This in turn implies compromises, deliberate gaps and 
omissions, as well reservations by some parties. A legitimate question that 
stems from this inconsistency was posed by Jennings: how can such a  
‘package deal’ be reconciled with the progressive development of law?24  
The use of domestic laws to inform and clarify treaty provisions can be one 
answer to this question. This is especially true in respect of international 
criminal law, which, unlike other branches of public international law, is 
ultimately based on national criminal law with some international flavour to 
it. Consequently, national legislation fills in gaps in the statutes of 
international criminal courts and tribunals.
25
 In particular, the ‘general part’ 
of international criminal law, including rules on punishment and the 
attribution of liability, benefits from the study of the underlying concepts in 
domestic legal systems.
26
 Complicity as a concept belongs to the general part 
of criminal law as it denotes one of the forms of participation and forms the 
basis for the attribution of individual criminal responsibility. These concepts 
need to be developed in international criminal law. Ambos argues that, 
despite the fact that the concept of individual criminal responsibility for 
violations of humanitarian and human rights norms is universally recognized, 
the elements of this responsibility are not sufficiently discussed in the 
literature.
27
 
When it comes to the custom, it appears that courts on some occasions use the 
results of comparative analysis to support the existence of rules of customary 
law.
28
 However, custom, arguably, is a problematic source of law, especially 
when it comes to human rights obligations or provisions of international 
criminal law.
29
 The difficulty arises on several levels: first, it is difficult to 
identify a custom based on the past behaviour of the state because a uniform 
approach to an issue is rare and states often engage in behaviour negating the 
proposed rule.
30
 Secondly, the courts often do not make a distinction between 
two constitutive elements of custom – state practice and opinio juris. 31 
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Finally, Kelsen also highlighted the self-fulfilling prophecy nature of a 
custom: it can hardly constitute ‘evidence’ of state practice because it is in 
itself a qualified practice of the states.
32
  In light of these problems, Bruno 
Simma and Phil Alston, when discussing the nature of some human rights 
obligations, suggested looking elsewhere to explain universally their 
universally binding nature. Instead of updating the concept of custom, they 
proposed to resort to another source of law, namely the general principles of 
law’.33 
There is some evidence in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals that 
domestic criminal law also serves to prove the existence of a customary 
rule.
34
 It is important, however, to maintain a distinction between the two 
sources of law: custom represents “a general practice among States accepted 
by them as law” and general principles of law have recognition in the 
municipal law of states.
35
  Both custom and general principles of law rely on 
the element of recognition of a certain rule. However, the emphasis is 
different: custom centres around the recognition of a legal character of a 
certain rule through state practice, while the general principles of law rely on 
the existence of a certain principle domestically. 
36
 
From the perspective of international criminal law, there exists confusion 
surrounding the concept of customary international law in the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals.
37
  The two traditional elements of custom – state 
practice and opinio juris - take different forms and encompass different value 
in the context of international criminal law. Larissa van den Herik argued that 
the tendency to place extra emphasis on the opinio juris component of custom 
inherent to international law in general is further complicated by the fact that 
the ad hoc tribunals tend to be selective in the cases they use to support 
custom, which in turn may lead to a biased outcome.
38
 This trend is due to the 
specific nature of human rights and international criminal law; state practice 
takes a ‘backseat’ because it frequently supports the ‘violation of the rule’ 
rather than state compliance with it. As with the ‘general principles of law’ 
the evidentiary standard required for the existence of custom differs 
according to the situation.
39
 
It follows that domestic law serves an interpretative function in relation to 
custom and treaty. This is in addition to being a source of international law 
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through the concept of the ‘general principles of law’. One can highlight two 
further beneficial aspects of exploring domestic laws for the purposes of 
international criminal law. First, comparative investigation can serve as a tool 
for discovering ‘best practices’ around the world and incorporating them in 
international criminal law.
40
 Secondly, the study of domestic practices is a 
crucial step in the cross-fertilization of domestic and international criminal 
law with the prospect of developing uniform approaches.  
The interplay between the two fields of law no longer works as a one-way 
street. international lawyers borrow concepts from national legal systems and 
there is striking recent trend evolving of international criminal law enriching 
and altering state penal systems. For example, in the Hamdan case, the US 
Court of Appeal overturned Hamdan’s conviction for material support of 
terrorism because it was not an international law crime at the time Hamdan 
engaged in the relevant conduct.
41
 This is in contrast with, for example aiding 
and abetting terrorism.
42
 In arriving at this conclusion, the court looked into 
the sources of international law – custom and treaty law provisions, including 
the Rome Statute of the ICC.
43
 This cross-fertilization is especially relevant in 
the context of the complementarity principle at the ICC, whereby national 
jurisdictions have primacy over the ICC, subject to their inaction, 
unwillingness or inability.
44
 Thus, the ICC has a clear interest in enhancing 
the national criminal systems. There are initiatives promoting this exchange.
45
 
The implementation of the Rome Statute into the domestic legislation of the 
countries that are parties to the statute is one example of this trend.
 
 
ii. Critique of the Comparative Method  
There are different levels of criticism against using the results of comparative 
studies of domestic penal legislation in international criminal law. On a more 
general level, De Cruz raised concerns about the transferability of national 
law concepts into international law decisions. He stressed that the 
comparative method does not replace judicial functions but rather facilitates, 
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informs and clarifies them.
46
  De Cruz advocated for the cautious use of the 
results of comparative studies in international law. This chapter underscores 
and embraces De Cruz’s concern: direct transposition of the concepts from 
national law into international criminal law or downright analogies do not 
serve the purpose of uncovering the scope of complicity, nor do they provide 
space for accommodating the specific features of international criminal law. 
At the same time, this caution shall not serve as a barrier to the exploration of 
the national law. 
When it comes to international criminal law specifically, Tallgren argued 
against drawing an analogy between international criminal justice and 
national law in light of the particular circumstances of criminality involved in 
the former.
47
 She pointed towards an extraordinarily complex relationship 
between war, crime and criminology, and the interests protected by 
international criminal law differ from the interests protected by state criminal 
law.
48
 In response to this general concern about the incomparability of 
domestic and international criminal law, one may argue that indeed these 
fields of law deal with crimes committed on different scales and under 
different circumstances. However, the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility unites both fields of law.  
Finally, Dubber questioned the value of a comparative method in relation to 
complicity specifically. He suggested, after having studied in some detail the 
concept of complicity in German and American law, that national legal 
systems should serve as no more than a mere signpost for the development of 
the concept of accomplice liability in international criminal law. This has to 
do with the need to strike a balance between a broader view of accomplice 
liability urged by the enormity of the crimes involved and a more narrow 
view of complicity based on considerations of the principle of legality.
49
 It is 
hard to argue against the view that national law concepts should not be 
directly transported into the sphere of international criminal law.
50
 Brownlie 
noted on this point that it would be incorrect to assume that tribunals 
mechanically borrow from national law, instead they use elements of legal 
reasoning.
51
 Nonetheless, international criminal law needs to refine its theory 
of individual criminal responsibility. One way of doing this is by exploring 
national legislation of different countries to discover the divergence or 
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conformity of domestic legal systems in the field of criminal participation.
52
 
This exercise leads to one adducing certain principles of law that can assist in 
the formulation of international principles of individual criminal 
responsibility.  
The following section considers the approach to analysing complicity adopted 
in this chapter. 
iii. Methodology 
The literature devoted to comparative law places great significance on 
methodology.
53
 This is particularly relevant for the purposes of adducing 
certain principles to be later used as a source of international law.  Thus, it is 
essential to justify the perspective of the comparative study, the scope of the 
study and the choice of legal systems. This chapter relies on several key 
considerations in this regard. 
First, the true meaning of complicity and its function in various domestic 
legal systems is at heart of this research. Zweigert and Koetz suggest that the 
basic working hypothesis of all comparative studies is that of functionality, 
meaning that incomparable notions cannot be contrasted.
54
 One way to verify 
the role of a particular legal concept is to establish the ‘common core’ – the 
highest common factor of an area of substantive law.
55
 This chapter focuses 
on finding this common core for complicity by, first describing the types of 
participants in the crime that can be found in different national legal systems 
and, then by separating one mode of participation from the other. The study 
goes beyond the linguistic distinction between principals and accomplices
56
 
and tries to establish the consequences of holding someone accomplice to the 
crime, as opposed to finding him or her to be the perpetrator. 
The second essential consideration of the present study is the range of 
countries to be examined. In this respect it is important to note that the results 
of the study will form the basis of the notion of complicity as a ‘general 
principle of law’. Consequently, it is vital to ensure wide representation of 
countries in terms of numbers and geographical coverage. It is tempting to 
explore as many jurisdictions as possible. However, this is not practically 
feasible. Moreover, as explained below, many legal systems resemble each 
other – this reduces the number of domestic legal orders under scrutiny. 
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Fabian Raimondo provided some practical guidance in adducing ‘general 
principles of law’. He divided this process into two parts, namely a ‘vertical 
move’ and a ‘horizontal move’. The ‘vertical move’ distils an underlying 
legal principle from the variety of national legal systems, while the horizontal 
move corroborates its acceptance by the generality of states.
57
 An example of 
the ‘horizontal move’ is the study by Judges McDonald and Vohrah of the 
national law on duress in 30 jurisdictions in support of their separate opinion 
in Erdemović.58  The present report on complicity is similar to Erdemović in 
that it examines briefly (in a table format) the concept in 31 jurisdictions. 
However, it is also supplemented and reinforced by the in-depth analysis of a 
select number of legal systems in line with Raimondo’s ‘vertical move’.59  
Another notable methodological issue is the choice of legal systems to be 
compared.
60
 On a more general level, Zweigert and Koetz suggest choosing 
representatives of the major parent legal systems as a rule of thumb: English 
and American law of the Anglo-Saxon family, French and Italian law as 
examples of the Romanistic family, Germany and Switzerland of the 
Germanic system, and, finally, Denmark and Sweden to showcase the Nordic 
system.
61
 René David holds a similar view, although he grouped major legal 
families slightly differently: the Romano-Germanic family, the common law 
family and the family of socialist law. He made it clear, however, that there 
are other systems situated outside of these three traditions or sharing only a 
part of their concepts and practices.
62
 Raimondo noted that only exploring 
systems that represent the legal families might lead to a certain bias. He 
proposed utilizing a test based on equitable geographic distribution to ‘even 
out’ the legal systems under consideration. 63  Regardless of the general 
cataloguing, there is agreement among academics that the suitability of any 
classification depends on the subject matter of the research and the 
perspective (regional or world-wide).
64 
When it comes to criminal law, Fletcher’s analytical structures of thinking 
about criminal offence are useful for the purposes of a comparative exercise. 
Fletcher identified bipartite, tripartite, and quadripartite systems.
65
 The 
common law countries, as well as France and Francophone countries, adhere 
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to the bipartite mode. This system distinguishes between actus reus and mens 
rea. Smith and Hogan held actus reus to be made up of conduct (which 
includes acts or omissions) and sometimes its consequences, as well as the 
circumstances in which the conduct took place.
66
 An example of the 
‘circumstances’ would be the lack of the consent of the rape victim.67 For the 
crime to attract criminal liability, actus reus must be committed with the 
requisite state of mind. The term ‘mens rea’ denotes the state of mind, intent 
or recklessness required by the specific crime. The Rome Statute adopted the 
bipartite system in that it distinguishes between ‘material elements’ and 
‘intent or knowledge’.68  
The quadripartite system is a framework developed in the communist 
literature on criminal liability.
69
 It features the following categories: the 
subject of the offence, the object of the offence, the subjective side of 
liability, and the objective side of liability. The subjective and objective sides 
are similar to mens rea and actus reus. The subject of the offence is the 
person liable for violating the criminal norm, and the object - is the social 
harm caused by the offence.
70
 This system is unlikely to persist at an 
international level because of the general demise of the Soviet legal family in 
the post-communist period.
71
  
Finally, the tripartite system denotes the German way of thinking about the 
offence. This approach surfaces in the German- and Spanish-speaking 
countries, as well as in the Far East (for example, Japan).
72
 Conduct only 
attracts criminal liability if it satisfies the definition of the offence, is 
wrongful and blameworthy.
73
 The three elements incorporate the notions of 
justification and excuses that exist as separate categories in the bipartite and 
quadripartite systems.  Killing a human being in self-defence satisfies the 
definition of the offence but is not wrongful because it is justified; stealing 
under duress is wrongful but not blameworthy because it is excused.
74
 
When one moves to the specific level of criminal participation, there is an 
additional consideration for selecting the case studies. Some jurisdictions, 
such as Italy and Austria, adhere to the ‘unitary perpetrator model’, while the 
majority of other states recognize ‘the differential participation model’.75 The 
‘unitary perpetrator model’, also referred to as the model of ‘individual 
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agency’, characterizes every person who contributes to the carrying out of a 
crime in whatever way as the author of the offence, without distinguishing, at 
least at the statutory level, between direct perpetrators and accomplices.
76
  
The ‘differential participation model’ sets perpetratorship apart from mere 
participation. The underlying rationale behind this model is that causal 
contributions to the commission of the offence vary in terms of weight and 
closeness.
77
 Thus, it would be unfair to treat all persons involved in the same 
way.
78
 There are two implications of the ‘differentiated participation model’. 
First, this approach creates the possibility for sanctioning perpetrators and 
accessories in a different way by allowing more lenient punishment for 
accomplices or by excluding the liability of accomplices for less serious 
crimes.
79
  This does not mean however that every country following this 
model provides for such a distinction at the level of legislation. Second, this 
model connects the principal and the accessory in that the liability of the latter 
depends on the principal act and is consequently ‘derivative’ or ‘accessorial’ 
in nature. This is in contrast with the ‘unitary model’, in which each causal 
contributor to the crime is separately accountable for his own actions.
80
 The 
unitary model adheres to a looser standard of causality in that any 
contribution that has effect on the crime is sufficient to establish the link 
between the individual and the offence. 
Based on the above discussion this chapter strives to strike an uneasy balance 
between being comprehensive, in line with the ‘vertical move’ and 
representative as in the ‘horizontal move’. There is an in-depth analysis of the 
samples of various parent legal families: Germany of the Germanic legal 
system; France and Italy that showcase the Romanistic family; Russia for 
Soviet law; the United States and England as the examples of the common 
law; finally, India and China belong to the category of mixed or ‘other’ legal 
systems in the world. These countries also neatly reflect different ways of 
thinking about the criminal offence as discussed by Fletcher.  Finally, Italy 
represents the ‘unitary perpetrator model’, while all other countries are the 
adherents of the ‘differential participation model’.  
Appendix III to the thesis is a table containing a survey of the modes of 
participation in 31 legal systems around the world.  It supplements the in-
depth analysis of various legal systems discussed in the following section.
81
 
The table in Appendix III covers a wide geographical area and corresponds to 
Raimondo’s ‘horizontal move’ in that it verifies the existence of common 
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trends across jurisdictions.  The table systemizes crime participants for each 
country and reflects any sentencing considerations that attach to finding 
someone complicit in a crime as opposed to having directly perpetrated it. 
The table refers, at times, to conspiracy - a distinct offence somewhat similar 
to complicity – in order to mark the borders of complicity.  
2. Complicity in Domestic Law 
i. General Remarks on the Attribution of Liability 
Prior to discussing different national legal systems, it is necessary to take one 
last brief detour to establish the difference between the attribution of 
responsibility and wrongdoing.
82
 Fletcher drew this distinction, pointing out 
that the question of wrongdoing is dealt with under the set of primary legal 
norms, prohibiting or requiring particular acts, while the question of 
attribution, “is resolved under an entirely distinct set of norms, which are 
directed not to the class of potential violators, but to judges and jurors, 
charged with the task of assessing whether individuals are liable for their 
wrongful acts.”83  
There exists a tension between the normative theory of attribution, which 
views the process of attribution as a judgment about whether the accused can 
be fairly held accountable for his wrongful act and the descriptive theory, 
which implies that there is some single feature of all criminal conduct that 
serves to link the actor to the wrongful act thus justifying liability.
84
 Fletcher 
noted that countries with an Anglo-American tradition have sought to 
suppress the normative aspect of accountability and pack the problems of 
attribution into the concept of responsibility by focusing on the status and 
capacity of the actor, while the German tradition has favoured the normative 
approach to attribution.
85
 Causation in the pattern of harmful consequences 
caused by ones own behaviour or by the acts of others lies at heart of the 
German normative theory of attribution.
86
 
Complicity is a field of attribution that falls outside the standard of causation 
in the narrow sense of this term.
87
 At first glance, it may seem illogical to 
infer the accomplice’s culpability based on the actions of the principal when 
it is presumed that the principal’s actions are fully voluntary, and the 
accomplice may not be said to have caused these actions.
88
 Kadish explained 
this phenomenon by the derivative (or indirect) nature of accomplice liability. 
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He argued that an accomplice is culpable not because he caused certain 
events (as would be the case with the primary perpetrator) and not because he 
caused the perpetrator to commit a crime, but because the accomplice is to be 
blamed for the conduct of another person.
89
  
The sections below illustrate the place of complicity in the context of 
particular legal systems.  
ii. Complicity in Germany 
The German Penal Code retained its conceptual structure, despite having been 
regularly amended since its initial adoption in 1871.
90
 German criminal law 
relies heavily on the doctrine. It is based on the application of logic and well-
developed methods of interpretation. German law is deductive in nature in 
that it favours coherence and overarching principles to the greatest extent. 
This is in contrast with the inductive common law approach that relies 
primarily on the facts of the particular case.
91
 The deductive approach 
informs the German Penal Code – an instrument that attaches conceptual 
importance to differentiating among different actors involved in the 
commission of the crime. 
The following crime participants can be identified based on the provisions of 
the German Penal Code: 
 A primary perpetrator (unmittelbarer Täter) is an actor who commits 
the criminal act himself; 
92
  
 A co-perpetrator (Mittäter) is a person who commits the offence 
jointly with others;
93
  
 An indirect perpetrator (mittelbarer Täter) is a principal who commits 
the offence through another (as per the German definition); 
94
 
 An instigator (Anstifter) is “any person who intentionally induces 
another to intentionally commit an unlawful act;”.95 
 A facilitator (Gehilfe) is “any person who intentionally assists another 
in the intentional commission of an unlawful act.”96  
In German law the offences have to be committed with intent unless 
otherwise provided for by law.
97
 There are three forms of intent: 1. dolus 
                                                             
89
 Ibid, at 332. On the nature of derivative liability see also G. Fletcher, 1978, at 583. 
90
 M. Dubber and K. Heller, ‘Introduction,’ The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law, M. 
Dubber and K. Heller (ed.), Stanford Law Books, 2011, at 6. 
91
 M. Bohlander, The German Criminal Code: A Modern English Translation, Hart 
Publishing, 2008, at 1-2.  
92
 Article 25(1) German Penal Code. 
93
 Article 25(2). 
94
 Article 25(1) German Penal Code. 
95
 Article 26 German Penal Code. 
96
 Article 27(1) German Penal Code. 
  
 
 
 
141 
directus or direct intent; 2. dolus directus of the second degree; and 3. dolus 
eventualis (or ‘advertent recklessness’ in common law).98 Direct intent refers 
to the carrying out of the acts and omissions by the offender with the 
knowledge that these actions will bring about the material elements of the 
crime and the desire or purposeful will (intent) for this to happen.
99
  Dolus 
directus of the second degree means awareness that the crime will be the 
almost inevitable outcome of the acts or omissions of the accused – the actual 
will is not necessary.
100
 Dolus eventualis consists of the knowledge of the risk 
or likelihood that the effect will occur and the will to bring it about - at least 
in the form of the acceptance.  
Modern German criminal law relies heavily on the doctrine of Tatherrschaft 
in determining the line that separates principals from accessories. 
Tatherrschaft could be translated as ‘control over crime’ or, as Fletcher put it, 
‘hegemony over the act’.101 Accessory is defined negatively as someone who 
does not have control over the execution of the crime.
102
  An influential 
German criminal law scholar Claus Roxin devised this doctrine in 1960’s as a 
compromise between two competing liability theories – the objective theory 
and the subjective theory, both of which have fallen out of favour with 
German legal scholars.
103
 
The objective theory holds only those who have partially or entirely 
committed the offence, described in the special part of the penal code, as 
perpetrators. All others are instigators and aiders.
104
 The subjective theory, on 
the other hand, distinguishes between perpetration and mere participation 
based on the internal cognitive processes of the individual, such as will, 
motives and intentions. There is a division within the subjective theory 
between those who consider that the factor distinguishing perpetration and 
participation is individual will and those who stress the importance of acting 
in one’s own interest or someone else’s interest.105  
Since the end of the 19
th
 century, German courts have consistently taken the 
subjective approach. The great majority of German academics criticized the 
courts’ subjective approach due to its lack of rational criteria in distinguishing 
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between perpetrators and accessories.
106
 The case of Stashynsky, decided by 
the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH) in 1962,
107
 
demonstrates the weakness of the subjective approach. Stashynsky was a 
KGB agent who in 1957 committed two murders of exiled Soviet dissidents, 
on the direct orders of the head of the KGB. In 1961, he fled to West Berlin, 
where he was apprehended and tried for murder. The court sentenced 
Stashynsky to eight years imprisonment for merely aiding the head of the 
KGB, who was perceived as the real principal. This ruling of the court was 
widely criticized for being too lenient. This outcome was a consequence of 
the court’s result-oriented approach.108 Roxin’s theory of a perpetrator who 
‘dominates’ the execution of the criminal offence - in cases when a person 
does the relevant act himself, jointly with others, or uses another person as his 
tool – supplied the BGH with a much longed-for ingredient of objectivity. 
The legislature welcomed this approach by incorporating it in Article 25 of 
the German Penal Code, in the late 1960’s.109 
The other case to inspire Roxin to develop his theory of crimes as part of 
organized structures was the Eichmann case, decided by the district court of 
Jerusalem in the early 1960’s.110 According to Roxin, it is in fact the structure 
of an apparatus that continues to operate - unconcerned with the loss of any 
particular individual - that distinguishes the behaviour of those behind the 
scenes from instigation and turns it into perpetration.111 The Jerusalem court 
first established Eichmann’s responsibility as an accomplice to the general 
crime of the ‘Final Solution’.112 However, the court did not content itself with 
finding the traditional liability mode in respect of Eichmann’s deeds. It held 
that the specific nature of crimes involved warrants specific approach to 
responsibility:113 
 
In such an enormous and complicated crime as the one we are now considering, 
wherein many people participated at various levels and in various modes of 
activity - the planners, the organizers and those executing the acts, according to 
their various ranks - there is not much point in using the ordinary concepts of 
counselling and soliciting to commit a crime. For these crimes were committed en 
masse, not only in regard to the number of the victims, but also in regard to the 
numbers of those who perpetrated the crime, and the extent to which any one of the 
many criminals were close to, or remote from, the actual killer of the victim, means 
nothing as far as the measure of his responsibility is concerned. On the contrary, in 
general, the degree of responsibility increases as we draw further away from the 
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man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands and reach the higher ranks 
of command, the "counsellors" in the language of our Law. 
Thus, Eichmann was treated not just as a mere implementer but also, with 
regard to his subordinates, as the one giving orders. 114  This complex 
interrelationship between the participants in the crime inspired Roxin’s theory 
of perpetration through an organized power structure.  
The doctrine of Tatherrschaft serves to differentiate between co-perpetrators 
and accomplices. As long as the participant is willing to influence the actual 
mode of commission and offers a contribution that has an impact on how the 
common agreement is shaped or enforced, he will be classified as a co-
perpetrator.
115
 The common plan is the foundation of the cooperation of the 
participants. Each of them must perceive his actions as furthering those of 
others and theirs as furthering his.
116
 The court infers the intent from the 
objective participation in the execution of the crime and the interest of the 
individual members of the venture in its outcome.
117
  
The effect of establishing the existence of co-perpetration is the attribution of 
the offences committed by each co-perpetrator to all other perpetrators in this 
joint venture.
118
 The mutual attribution has limits, however. The rule is that if 
one of the participants lacks a certain quality necessary for the particular 
offence or lacks the necessary mens rea,
119
 he cannot be a joint principal of 
that offence. In this respect, the BGH has held that co-perpetrators will be 
liable for any acts that “lie within a range of typical offences that one can 
expect to be committed given the circumstances of the case, namely if these 
(acts) will reach the aim of the other co-perpetrator to a similar extent, e.g. if 
one steals goods instead of money, if the goods can easily be sold.”120 The 
deviation of a joint principal from a common plan cannot be attributed to the 
other participants.
121
 The BGH refused to infer intent in the form of dolus 
eventualis in the cases when crimes committed by the co-perpetrator were 
outside the agreed plan. For example, A and B decide to rob a bank, and B 
carries a gun without telling A. A and B have to run from the police and B 
shoots a policeman C, who dies. In this case, A will not be liable for 
murder.
122
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German law recognizes two types of secondary participation: instigating and 
facilitating, which both have to be intentional (at a minimum in the form of 
dolus eventualis)
123
 and dependent on an unlawful act committed by the 
principal. The instigator has to cause another to commit an unlawful act.
124
 
The causal link is established based on whether the instigator’s acts 
significantly increase the likelihood of the principal committing the 
offence.
125
 With regard to the aider, the standard linking the act of the aider 
and the offence is lower. The German courts are of the view that it is 
sufficient that the aider furthers the actions of the principal.
126
 There is a 
limited dependence of the accessory liability on the principal offence: the 
principal need not be criminally liable for the act. It is sufficient that the act is 
unlawful.
127
 This peculiarity makes the line between indirect perpetration and 
accessory liability murky. The determination of the appropriate liability mode 
depends on the degree of control that the instigator or aider exercise over the 
actions of the principal. 
128
  
Finally, German law recognizes some kind of criminal conspiracy: “a person 
who declares his willingness or who accepts the offer of another or who 
agrees with another to commit or abet the commission of a felony shall be 
liable under the same terms.” 129  Withdrawal from the plan or an earnest 
attempt to prevent the completion of the crime suffices to exempt such a 
participant from liability.
130
 
iii. Complicity in France 
French criminal law, unlike civil law, is not strongly influenced by Roman 
law. Its structure has developed from medieval roots in royal law.
131
 The first 
French Penal Code was adopted in 1791. It borrowed heavily from the ideas 
of Enlightenment, and in particular, the ideas of Cesare Beccaria.
132
 The 
second Penal Code came into existence in 1810 and was commonly referred 
to as the ‘Napoleonic Code’. In 1992, France adopted its third Penal Code 
after unsuccessful attempts to reform the Napoleonic Code.
133
 French 
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criminal law relies heavily on three basic principles: the principle of legality 
requiring codification of conduct that is subject to criminal law; the 
requirement of a ‘material’ criminal act, as opposed to a mere intention; and 
the ‘mental responsibility’ of the actor - the law does not punish individuals 
lacking mental capacity.
134
 
The French Penal Code recognizes only two participants in crime: perpetrator 
(auteur) and accomplice (complice). The perpetrator commits the prohibited 
act. The accomplice either (1) facilitates its preparation or commission by aid 
and assistance, or (2) incites the commission of an offence by means of a gift, 
promise, threat, order, or an abuse of authority or powers, or gives the 
directions to commit it.
135
 In French law, the instigator is an accomplice, and 
he does not occupy a separate place in the system of crime participants.
136
  
Criminal liability of accomplices presupposes that the underlying act is 
objectively punishable. French authors refer to this phenomenon as ‘borrowed 
criminality’ (emprunt de criminalité). This means that the accomplice’s 
actions derive their criminality from the existence of the principle offence.
137
 
For example, in Schieb and Benamar, Schieb tried to procure Benamar to 
murder Schieb’s wife. Schieb paid Benamar sums of money and supplied him 
with a gun. Benamar took the money and the gun, but then told a friend who 
informed the police. Benamar claimed he never intended to kill Schieb’s wife. 
The court acquitted both defendants of attempted murder, finding that Schieb 
cannot be an accomplice since there was no attempt.
138
 Under French law, 
incitement is addressed to a specific person with the view of inducing him to 
execute a particular offence; and the advice is followed by an effect. 
Consequently, Schieb was not held liable for incitement where Benamar had 
not committed any acts in furtherance of the offence.
139
 Complicity exists, on 
the other hand, in cases when the perpetrator cannot be punished because he 
is insane or minor. However it does not exist when there is a legitimate reason 
why the perpetrator did not commit an offence, why, in other words, the 
perpetrator’s conduct is excused by law.140  
In principle, the act of complicity must be positive and intentional and occur 
at the time of the offence. However, Bell noted that the courts do not follow 
the strict approach when it comes labelling certain act as a ‘positive act’ or 
determining the time when complicity occurred.
141
 For example, in Coutant 
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the court found that the failure of a company’s board member to report 
fraudulent actions of the chairman amounts to active collusion and renders the 
board member complicit.
142
 
The mens rea of complicity under French consists of the knowledge of the 
intended crime and the intention to assist (meaning there cannot be aiding and 
abetting negligent offences). In Paemelabre, the court failed to infer 
complicity in the unlawful slaughter of animals solely based on the fact that a 
man drove a truck containing pigs to a place where they were slaughtered and 
afterwards removed the dead animals’ carcasses.143  
The performance of the actus reus of the offence is the line that divides co-
perpetrators and accomplices under French law. The co-perpetrators perform 
the actions, which constitute an offence, while the accomplices carry out 
ancillary acts with the view of assisting the offence.
144
 This distinction does 
not however lead to differentiated punishment. The accomplice is punished as 
a primary actor.
145
 
Complicity in French law allows the attaching of responsibility in the 
situations where a group of people is involved in the commission of the 
offence but where it is not possible to identify the primary offender. Under 
this scenario, it is possible to convict all as accomplices to the most serious 
offence committed by the member of the group without identifying the exact 
perpetrator.
146
  
Complicity under the French Penal Code is a liability mode and not an 
offence. French law is also equipped with specific substantive offences 
tackling participation by several accused. These offences are called collective 
offences (infractions collectives), and they involve a plurality of persons.
147
 
Examples of such offences are ‘plotting to execute an attack’ (complot) or 
‘criminal association’ (association de malfaiteurs) established with a view to 
the preparation for the crime. In both cases, the steps need to be taken in 
furtherance of the agreement.
148
 The concept of the association de malfaiteurs 
served as the inspiration in devising the concept of criminal organizations at 
Nuremberg.
149
 French law as recently amended penalizes ‘participation in a 
group formed or an understanding reached for the perpetration of one of the 
felonies specified in Articles 211-1, 212-1 and 212-2 (genocide, crimes 
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against humanity and war crimes), when evidenced by one or more overt 
acts.
150
  
iv. Complicity in England 
Despite efforts at codification the criminal law of England still relies heavily 
on the common law and judicial decisions, especially when it comes to the 
general part of criminal law.
151
  
The principle of individual autonomy underlies the concept of complicity as a 
form of responsibility in English law. Ashworth clarifies that at the heart of 
the principle of autonomy lies the idea for respect of individuals as rational, 
choosing persons
152
 who are “sovereigns of their own actions”. 153 
Consequently, the decision to support another in the commission of the crime 
and the realization of this decision in the form of assisting is culpable and 
deserves a criminal sanction.
154
 This is in line with the derivative view of 
complicity adopted in English law.
155
 It may seem that complicity casts its net 
too wide by not requiring that the act of the accomplice caused the principal 
to act. Ashworth however points out that the loose conduct requirements of 
complicity are narrowed by more stringent fault requirements: a small act of 
assistance may suffice but only if done with intent to assist or encourage the 
commission of the principal’s crime.156 
English law recognizes two types of parties to a crime: principals and 
accomplices.
157
 The principal under English law is someone whose act is the 
most immediate cause of the actus reus.
158
 English law allows the holding of 
two or more persons as co-principals (co-perpetrators) if each of them 
satisfies some part of the conduct element of substantive crime, and if each of 
them has the necessary mental element.
159
 If two persons attack the third 
person, and the combined effect of their blows kills the victim, they are both 
guilty of murder as co-perpetrators because they both caused the actus 
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reus.
160
 Indirect perpetration manifests itself in English law in the doctrine of 
‘innocent agency’. An innocent agent brings about the actus reus without 
being a participant in the crime due to infancy or insanity.  The indirect 
perpetrator will be the one whose act is the most immediate cause of the 
innocent agent’s act.161 
Unlike civil law, the common law does not maintain a distinction between 
different types of accessories.
162
 The accomplice in English law (sometimes 
called ‘an accessory’ or a secondary party) is anyone who aids, abets, 
counsels or procures a principal.
163
 Accomplices in English law are punished 
as a principal offender in accordance with the principle of equal 
punishment.
164
 
‘Procuring’ implies bringing about an offence, such as by deceiving another 
so that the other commits an offence.
165
 This is the only term of the four that 
implies some form of causal relationship between the act of procurement and 
the execution of the offence.
166
 The remaining three categories do not require 
such a causal connection.
167
 The word ‘counsels’ presupposes that the 
accused is responsible if he persuades the principal to commit an offence, not 
by threats or bribes, but by pointing to the advantages of the proposed course 
of action or by giving advice to the principal offender.
168
 Abetting involves 
some encouragement of the principal to commit the offence.
169
 There must be 
some connection between abetting or counselling and the execution of the 
crime, but it does not have to be causal in a sense of being conditio sine qua 
non for the crime.
170
  
Abetting and counselling may require a meeting of minds of secondary party 
and principal. In contrast, aiding does not seem to require either causal link or 
the agreement with the primary perpetrator. Aiding implies intentionally 
providing means and opportunity for the principal to act.
171
 Encouragement, 
which is distinct from providing an opportunity, may also amount to ‘aiding’. 
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For example, the presence of the accused at the time when the offence is 
committed may have an encouraging effect on the principal.
172
 Unlike 
abetting or counselling, assistance may be unwanted and unexpected.
173
  
Complicity requires proof of intention, not purpose; and dolus eventualis (or 
‘adverted recklessness’) may be sufficient. 174  The test of specificity of 
accessorial knowledge is whether the offence committed was within the 
contemplated range of offences, if not, then was it of the same type as any of 
those offences contemplated.
175
 
The distinction between the co-principals and accessories is often a subtle 
one.
176
 Presumably it is based on the causality principle and common 
agreement. If the offender causes the actus reus of the offence and was in 
agreement with the other co-principals, he is deemed to be a perpetrator. If 
the acts of the accused amount to simply assisting or encouraging the 
commission of the crime, he is the secondary party.
177
 
From the perspective of English law, Ashworth notes that most complicity 
cases involve some kind of agreement. However, historically it is unclear 
whether common purpose, or joint enterprise, amounts to an additional form 
of complicity liability (beyond aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring), or 
if it is simply attached to each of them. The English courts tend to use the 
doctrine to address the question of unexpected turn of events.
178
 The courts, 
relying on the Chan Wing-Siu case, 
179
 seem to hold the member of the joint 
enterprise responsible if the jury is satisfied that the defendant contemplated 
that there was a real possibility that one member of the joint enterprise might 
go beyond the agreement. Marianne Giles argued that the basis of liability for 
secondary participation, developed in Chan Wing-Siu, is premised on a 
defendant's realisation of the risk that the principal will act with the required 
mens rea, and his acceptance of that risk. Giles suggests that such liability 
follows from the ‘principle of implied authorization’.180 Consequently, the 
basis of liability is subjective foresight of a significant possibility of the 
conduct. This approach appears to be consistent with extended joint criminal 
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enterprise in international criminal law, which emphasizes the risk-taking 
behaviour on behalf of the accused. 
It worth noting however that English law has changed on this point.
181
 The 
test used to be a stricter objective test of foreseeability with a strong element 
of prior agreement or ‘authorization.’182 This was discussed, for example, in 
Anderson and Morris (1966), where it was decided that “[i]f one of the 
adventurers goes beyond what has been tacitly agreed as part of the common 
enterprise, his co-adventurer is not liable for the consequences of that 
unauthorized act (and) it is for the jury in every case to decide what was done 
in part of a joint enterprise, or went beyond it and was in fact an act 
unauthorized by that joint enterprise.”183  The doctrine applied by English 
courts before Chan Wing-Siu therefore established liability only for crimes 
that were expressly ‘authorized’ by the joint enterprise. This form of liability 
resembles the first form of the joint criminal enterprise rather than the 
extended form. 
v. Complicity in United States 
The US criminal law originally started as the  ‘common law’ of England as 
adopted by the American colonies in the eighteenth century but has evolved 
continuously since.
184
 First the courts and, later, the legislature developed 
criminal law on the state and federal levels. Nowadays almost every state has 
a criminal code as a primary source of law, while the courts merely interpret 
it.
185
 A large portion of the states introduced or reformed their criminal codes 
on the basis of the 1962 Model Penal Code, promulgated by the American 
Law Institute as a part of the major criminal law revision (MPC).
186
 
The Model Penal Code defines each crime participant: 
 A direct perpetrator who personally engages in the proscribed 
conduct; 
187
 
 An indirect perpetrator who causes an innocent or irresponsible person 
to engage in the proscribed conduct;
 188
 
 An accomplice who, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of the offence,  
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o Solicits such other person to commit it; 189 
o Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning 
or committing it;
 190
 
o Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, 
fails to make proper effort so to do.
191
 
The MPC draws a fundamental distinction between someone who commits an 
offence ‘by his own conduct’ and someone whose criminal liability derives 
from “the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable.”192 
Consequently, the perpetrator satisfies the objective conduct requirement 
through his own conduct or the conduct of an innocent agent, while the 
accomplice satisfies the objective element of an offence through the 
perpetrator’s conduct by facilitating it via solicitation, aiding or failing in a 
legal duty to prevent the commission of the offence.  
From the wording of the Model Penal Code it follows that mere knowledge of 
the crime is not sufficient to satisfy the fault requirement for complicity; it is 
essential that they intend to participate in it.
193
  This is not to say that the US 
courts never applied a lower standard to establish fault. In Backun v. United 
States,
194
 the court upheld the seller’s conviction for complicity in the 
interstate transportation of the stolen merchandise based on his mere 
knowledge that the goods are stolen and the buyer will go to the other state to 
sell them. The judge in this case did not require that the seller “had a stake in 
the outcome of the case” or specifically desired the buyer to leave the state. A 
different approach was adopted in United States v. Peoni.
195
 The court held 
that the complicity doctrine requires the defendant to “in some sort associate 
himself with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he wishes 
to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.”196 The Model 
Penal Code upheld the higher standard of the Peoni case, which is now 
widely accepted as the predominant test for the accomplices’ guilty state of 
mind in the United States.
197
  
 
The conduct requirement for complicity under the Model Penal Code is less 
stringent than the fault requirement. The accomplice’s assistance need not be 
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necessary for the successful completion of the offence, nor need it be 
substantial, the least degree of assistance sufficing.
198
 Moral encouragement 
qualifies as assistance.
199
 The accomplice can be prosecuted even though the 
direct perpetrator has not been prosecuted or convicted, provided the fact of 
commission of the offence is proven.
200
 Recent case law has summarized the 
requirements for complicity as a two prong test: “first, there must be evidence 
that the person intended to aid or promote the underlying offence, and second, 
there must be evidence that the person actively participated in the crime by 
soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid the principal.”201  
 
All crime participants - accomplices included - are treated as principals for 
punishment purposes under the Section 2 of Title 18 of the United States 
Code.
202
 Consequently, the distinction between crime participants has no 
impact on the sentence.
203
 This is so because the centrepiece of the US system 
of criminal participation is the principle of individual culpability. According 
to Dubber, the MPC drafters - that laid the basis for the criminal codes of 
most states - embraced the peno-correctional vision of criminal law that 
prioritized deterrent punishments over the proportionate ones. The individual 
assessment of culpability, i.e. dangerousness of the offender, was central to 
this approach. Accordingly, what mattered for punishment purposes is the 
abnormal dangerousness of an individual rather than the way in which he or 
she was involved in the offence.
204
 The approach whereby accomplices and 
principals are punished alike is consistent with the traditional common law, 
although rooted in a different rationale.
205
 The case law confirms that the 
accomplice is subject to the same punishment as the principal.
206
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In contrast with complicity, which is not a distinct crime but a means way of 
committing an offence,
207
 conspiracy exists in both English and American 
law as a distinct offence, consummated upon entering into the agreement to 
commit criminal acts. Conspiracy also generates a standard for holding each 
conspirator complicitous in the crimes of fellow conspirators but unlike 
complicity, which is a category of accessorial liability, conspiracy functions 
as a test of what it means to be a co-perpetrator.
208
 Conspiracy typically 
requires an agreement between two or more conspirators that at least one of 
them will commit a substantive offence.
209
 Modern American codes have 
adopted a unilateral conspiracy requirement, which permits the conspiracy 
liability as long as the person agrees with another person, without regard for 
whether the other person is returning the agreement. An overt act performed 
in furtherance of the agreement is typically also required to maintain the 
conviction.
210
  
In Pinkerton v. United States, the US Supreme Court held that each member 
of a conspiracy can be liable for substantive offences carried out by co-
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, even when there is no evidence 
of their direct involvement in – or even knowledge of such offences - 
provided they were “reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural 
consequence of the unlawful agreement.”211  The practical outcome of the 
Pinkerton rule is that conspiratorial complicity destroys the distinction 
between accomplices and perpetrators since the effect of finding membership 
in the conspiracy is making the defendant a co-perpetrator of substantive 
offences committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
212
  
The form of liability developed in Pinkerton strongly resembles the extended 
form of the joint criminal enterprise as defined in Tadić.213 The Pinkerton 
case has been widely criticized both in the US and abroad.
214
 The rule has 
never been incorporated in the MPC.
215
  
vi. Complicity in Italy 
The Italian Penal Code of 1930 extends liability to all participants of the 
criminal offence.
216
 This is in line with the unitary approach to participation 
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in crime discussed above.
217
 The idea is that each form of participation is 
autonomous and depends on the respective role of each participant. The 
responsibility is distinguished on the basis of the facts of the case; the 
difference between the perpetrator and the accomplice is predetermined by 
objective characteristics of the case.
218
  
Article 110 of the Penal Code reads as follows: “When more than one person 
participates in the same offence, each of them shall be subject to the 
punishment prescribed, except as provided in the following articles.” The all-
encompassing term ‘participation’ (concorso di persone) expresses the notion 
that any involvement whatsoever on the part of an actor in any offence 
establishes his connection to the crime.
219
 Participation, as envisaged by 
Article 110 embraces all the acts of the co-participants. Thus, the acts of each 
co-participant are their own acts, which are attributed to all the others. The 
latter statement is true only if two conditions are met:  
 An objective condition: there must be a causal link between 
the acts and the criminal result; and 
 A subjective condition: each participant must be aware of the 
final purpose of all the actions; in other words, each participant 
must deliberately and consciously give his or her contribution 
– material or intellectual – to the commission of the crime (that 
is sought by everyone).
220
  
Thus, for a person to qualify as a party to crime in Italy it is sufficient that the 
person willingly contributes to the commission of the offence with the general 
knowledge about the factual situation, and his input constitutes necessary 
support for carrying out the crime.
221
 The contribution need not be conditio 
sine qua non for carrying out the crime.
222
 
The adoption of the unitary approach to criminal participation does not 
preclude doctrine and judgments from discussing the ways in which the 
persons become involved in crimes. The contribution may take different 
forms. Doctrine distinguishes between (co-) perpetrators (autore or coautori) 
and accomplices (complice).
223
 The difference between the two lies in the fact 
that co-perpetrators take the decision to carry out the offence, while 
accomplices aim at the realization of the decision taken by others.  The 
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accomplice’s willingness to carry out an offence manifests itself in instigating 
(sollecitare) co-perpetrators to make a decision to commit a crime or in 
facilitating the commission of the offence.
224
 Nonetheless, regardless of the 
form of the contribution, the judge is still required to establish the causal link 
between the contribution and the offence. The judge must identify the specific 
way in which the contribution manifested itself.
225
 
As discussed above, the Italian system is based on a ‘monist’ or unitary 
theory of crime, rejecting at the level of attribution of responsibility different 
degrees of participation, primary and secondary parties, accomplices, etc. 
This implies that the end result is caused by the combination of the actions of 
various actors and is imputable to each of co-participants who have 
contributed to the crime.  In principle, the equal treatment of the crime 
participants leads to their equal punishment. Nonetheless, Italian penal law 
found some way to adjust the sentences based on the mode of participation 
using the provisions on the mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
226
  For 
example, Article 112 Italian Penal Code allows an increase in penalty if the 
number of offenders contributing to the crime is more than five or for those 
who exercised authority, direction and supervision that led others to commit 
the crime. Similarly, Article 114 Italian Penal Code provides for the decrease 
in a sentence in cases of minimal contribution to the commission of the 
offence.  
As a general rule, Italian penal law does not penalize the agreement and 
incitement to commit a criminal offence if it is never committed.
227
 
Conspiracies to commit certain crimes constitute an exception to this rule and 
are punishable as such.
228
 
vii. Complicity in Russia 
The new Russian Penal Code was adopted in 1996 and entered into force on 1 
January 1997.
229
 It is the fourth Penal Code in the history of Russia following 
the Penal Codes of 1922, 1926 and 1960. The new Penal Code represents a 
progressive legislative development and is aimed at abandoning the 
ideological overtones that characterised the Penal Codes of the Soviet era. 
The 1996 Penal Code does however retain the quadripartite approach to 
offence featuring the four categories - the subject of the offence, the object of 
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the offence, the subjective side of liability, and the objective side of liability - 
typical of Communist legal theory.
230
 
The Penal Code recognizes the following types of crime participants:
231
 
 A perpetrator 
o A primary perpetrator ‘directly or ‘at first hand’ commits the criminal 
act; 
o A co-perpetrator ‘directly’ or ‘at first hand’ participates in the 
commission of the offence together with other perpetrators;  
o An indirect perpetrator is “the person who committed the offence by 
using other persons, not subject to criminal responsibility due to their 
age, insanity or other factors;” 232 
 An organizer is someone who “organized the crime or directed its 
execution, as well as the person who created an organized group or 
criminal organization, or supervised them;”233 
 An instigator is “a person who induced another to commit a crime through 
persuasion, bribery, threat or any other means; ”234 
 An aider is “a person who assisted in the commission of the offence by 
supplying counsel, directions, information or the means for the 
commission”.235 
The Penal Code labels all modes of participation listed above as ‘complicity’. 
However, a more accurate translation of this umbrella term would be ‘co-
participation’ (souchastije).  The commentaries to the Penal Code discuss the 
‘subjective’ and the ‘objective’ features of co-participation.236 The objective 
side of co-participation implies that two or more persons take part in the 
commission of the offence and their acts are complementary of each other 
and cause a certain effect to occur. The subjective side of co-participation is 
intent in the form of dolus directus (direct intent) or dolus eventualis (indirect 
intent). The co-participants need to be ‘subjects’ of the offence, namely sane 
individuals who have reached the age of maturity.
237
  There exist two forms 
of co-participation –simple co-participation involves co-perpetration, while 
                                                             
230
 See Section 1.iii supra. 
231
 Article 33 Russian Penal Code. 
232
 Article 33(2) Russian Penal Code. 
233
 Article 33(4) Russian Penal Code. 
234
 Article 33(4) Russian Penal Code. 
235
 Article 33(5) Russian Penal Code. 
236
 Commentary on Article 32 Russian Penal Code in Kommentarii k Ugolovnomu Kodeksu 
Rossii, Chekalin (ed) (2006); Kommentarii k Ugolovnomu Kodeksu Rossii, Gromov (ed) 
(2007). 
237
 Ibid. 
  
 
 
 
157 
complex co-participation implies different roles assigned to different 
actors.
238
 
The core difference between perpetratorship and other modes of criminal 
involvement lies in that the (co-)perpetrator (soispolnitel) always performs 
the objective side of the offence or a part thereof, whereas none of the other 
crime participants perform the objective side of the offence.
239
 This line is not 
always clear-cut, especially in the complex crimes. For example, in the case 
of D. the Supreme Court had to qualify the contribution of D. to the theft. D. 
– on the basis on the prior agreement - brought other crime participants to the 
flat, broke the door of the flat and, later, disposed of the stolen goods. The 
Court decided that the role of D. in the theft is significant enough to render 
him a co-perpetrator and not a mere aider. 
240
 
In addition to aiding and instigating – the traditional modes of accessorial 
liability found in many legal systems around the world – Russian law 
recognizes an additional form of participation in crime, namely, ‘organizing’. 
The commentary to the Penal Code considers organizing the most dangerous 
form of co-participation in crime because the organizer is usually the leader 
who coordinates all other participants and represents the ‘soul of the 
group’.241 Organizers are sometimes wrongly convicted as perpetrators, as in 
the case of N. and T. In this case, the two accused agreed to murder N.’s wife 
and hired M. for that. The accused - N. and T. - brought the victim to the 
forest, where M. strangled her. N. and T. were first convicted as co-
perpetrators but the Supreme court later ruled that N. and T. are organizers 
and not perpetrators as they did not perform the objective side, or actus reus, 
of the offence.
242
 
Instigating is somewhat similar activity to organizing a crime. The difference 
between the two lies in that an instigator induces the offender-to-be to 
commit a crime, while the organizer ‘works’ with the actual perpetrators.243 
An instigator always aims at convincing a person to commit a specific crime 
(not any crime) and there is always a causal link between the acts of the 
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instigator and the crime committed. The law requires the same causal link 
between the aider’s acts and the result.244 
Instigators and organizers are considered more dangerous than aiders; hence 
the latter category is usually punished less severely.
245
 However, there is no 
explicit provision in the Penal Code reducing the penalty for aiders. The 
principle is that each participant is punished in accordance with the level of 
his contribution, taking into account the intensity of his criminal activities 
that were aimed at achieving a common criminal result.
246
 
Russian law is similar to German law in that it punishes conspiracy only in 
the form of an agreement to commit a felony (and not in relation to minor 
offences). The commission of an offence with a prior agreement is also an 
aggravating factor at sentencing.
247
 Under Russian law, the co-perpetrators 
are not liable for the so-called ‘excess of the perpetrator’, when the principal 
commits crimes not intended by other members.
248
  
viii. Complicity in India 
Macaulay’s Indian Penal Code of 1860 draws its inspiration from three 
sources: English criminal law, the French Penal Code, and Edward 
Livingston’s Benthamite draft Louisiana Penal Code. 249  The Indian Penal 
Code draws a crucial distinction between a person committing an offence and 
a person who ‘abets the doing of a thing’.  The entire Chapter V of the Indian 
Penal Code is devoted to abetment. The Indian Penal Code provides for three 
types of abettors:
250
 
 An instigator- a person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful 
concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, 
voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing 
to be done; 
 A conspirator – a person who engages with one or more other person 
or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or 
illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy; 
 An aider – a person who, either prior to or at the time of the 
commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the 
commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof. 
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Indian law treats abetment as an offence in its own right that in principle is 
not dependent on the person actually committing an offence.
251
 While this 
holds true for the cases of abetment by instigation and abetment by 
conspiracy, the courts have held that aiding requires that the act aided was 
committed.
252
 
The actus reus of abetment by instigation amounts to provoking, inciting, 
urging on or bringing about by persuasion the commission of the crime. It is 
essential that the instigation relates to a specific act. The fact that the husband 
had mistreated his wife, who later committed a suicide, is not enough to 
constitute an abetment of suicide.
 253
 There must be proof of direct or indirect 
acts of incitement leading to the commission of a particular offence.
254
 The 
actus reus of abetment by conspiracy entails two parts – engaging in the 
conspiracy and an illegal act or omission following from such conspiracy. 
Abetting by aiding involves facilitating the commission of the offence. Mere 
presence near the scene of the crime is not sufficient to attract liability of the 
aider.
255
 
With regard to the mens rea, the abettor must have intended that the actual 
perpetrator carry out the conduct abetted, and must have known that such 
conduct amounted to a crime.
256
 ‘Intention’ in these circumstances seems to 
be interpreted broadly to incorporate knowledge - the Commentary on the 
Indian Penal Code provides that there is no abetment without knowledge or 
intention.
257
 The mere giving of aid without knowing that the offence is being 
committed does not amount to intentional aiding.
258
 For example, it is 
essential to prove that the accused knew that the actual murderer intended to 
commit the murder – mere presence of a person while another is committing 
the offence is not sufficient.
259
 What is clear is that mere negligence on the 
part a person who facilitated the commission of an offence by another is not 
abetment.
260
 The law does not require that the actual perpetrator has the 
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requisite intent or state of mind for the offence. The direct perpetrator can be 
innocent.
261
 
The distinction between abettors and principals does not affect the 
punishment – both those who are deemed to have committed the offence and 
those who abetted are punished for the offence actually committed.
262
 
Abettors are liable for the result, namely for the effect that occurred as an 
outcome of the abetment regardless of the abettor’s intention provided he was 
aware of the likelihood of causing the result by his actions.
263
 By the same 
token, the abettor is liable for the act done, even if it is different from what he 
intended, provided that the act done was a probable consequence of the 
abetment.
264
 In this regard, the Indian Penal Code uses the example of the 
child who is instigated to put poison in the food of one person but 
accidentally gives the poison to another person. The instigator is nevertheless 
liable.
265
  
ix. Complicity in China 
Criminal law has always been an important branch of law in the Chinese legal 
system.
266
 Historically, criminal law was dominant in China because it was 
used as the instrument of the ruling class.
267
 Nonetheless, except for several 
discrete regulations, there had never been a penal code in China before the 
commencement of the legal reconstruction following the death of Mao 
Zedong. The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) was 
adopted 1979 and was one of the first laws enacted as a part of the legal 
reconstruction.
268
 
Chinese criminal law resembles Soviet law and adopts the quadripartite 
framework of thinking about the offence.
269
 The subject is the person who is 
capable of bearing criminal responsibility; the subjective aspect is that crimes 
must be committed intentionally, unless otherwise provided by law; the 
objective aspect includes an act of an offence, a harmful consequence and 
causation between them; finally, the object amounts to the social values 
violated by the offence.
270
  
                                                             
261
 Explanation 3 to Article 108 Indian Penal Code. 
262
 Section 109 Indian Penal Code. 
263
 Section 113 Indian Penal Code. 
264
 Section 111 Indian Penal Code. 
265
 Ibid. 
266
 J. Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and 
Development, Kluwer Law International, 1999, at 167. 
267
 W. Chenguang and Z. Xianchu, Introduction to Chinese Law, Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 
1997, at 107. 
268
 Ibid, at 108. 
269
 See Section 1.iii supra. 
270
 W. Chenguang and Z. Xianchu, at 110 -114. 
  
 
 
 
161 
Article 25 of the Criminal Law of the PRC stipulates: “[a] joint crime is an 
intentional crime committed by two or more persons jointly.” The following 
categories of actors can take part in the joint crime: 
 A principal offender is one who organizes and leads a criminal group 
in conducting criminal activities or plays a principal role in a joint 
crime. He is responsible for all the crimes he participated in, 
organized, or directed; 
271
 
 An accomplice is one who plays a secondary or supplementary role in 
a joint crime;
272
 
 Someone who is compelled or induced to participate; 273 
 An instigator.274 
Knowledge of the circumstances of the offence is a mandatory prerequisite to 
attract liability of any of the joint participants. If knowledge cannot be 
proved, the offender is not liable.
275
 The provisions describing crime 
participants include indications on the punishment appropriate for this form 
of participation demonstrating the importance Chinese law places on 
distinguishing different types of offenders for sentencing purposes. The 
Criminal Law of the PRC prescribes that accomplices and persons coerced 
into participating shall either receive a more lenient sentence, in contrast with 
that received by the principal offender, or be totally exempt from the 
punishment.
276
 Instigators are punished in accordance with the role they 
played in the commission of the crime. An accomplice’s sentence is mitigated 
when the crime has not been carried out. In cases of instigation of underage 
persons, the sentence is more severe.
277
 
The case of Dai Jun and Others demonstrates the disparity in sentences given 
to the perpetrators and the accomplice. In Dai Jun and Others the three 
defendants robbed a tourist. The first defendant, recognized by the court as an 
accomplice, kept watch, while the other two, labelled as joint perpetrators, 
injured the tourist with one defendant using a stone and the other a knife. The 
accomplice received three years of imprisonment, while the other two 
defendants received fifteen years of imprisonment and the death penalty 
respectively.
278
 
The Criminal Law of the PRC provides for a variety of criminal enterprise, 
namely the criminal gang, which it defines as “a more or less permanent 
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crime organization composed of three or more persons for the purpose of 
jointly committing crimes”. 279  The criminal gang does not amount to 
conspiracy as it does not constitute a separate offence but it does provide for a 
form of liability similar to that of joint perpetration.
280
 The leader of the gang 
bears criminal responsibility for all crimes committed by the gang. 
3. Lessons Learned from Comparative Studies 
i. Trends in Domestic Legal Systems: In search of a 
Common Dimension 
The analysis of complicity in domestic jurisdictions resulted in a fully-
fledged study of all modes of participation recognized by the respective 
domestic legislation.
281
 This is so because it is difficult to separate complicity 
from other modes of participation. Semantic peculiarities also frequently 
impede a clear understanding of the term ‘complicity’ until it is in placed in 
the appropriate context. Fletcher’s view of complicity as falling outside the 
standard of causation has been adopted as the starting point of the study. Both 
Fletcher and Kadish emphasize the derivative, or indirect, nature of 
accomplice liability, falling outside the standard of causation.
282
 Following 
the analysis of various jurisdictions, it appears reasonable to suggest that most 
jurisdictions adopt a broader view of causation in respect of complicity.  
The reason for going beyond the paradigm traditionally associated with 
complicity is that in many jurisdictions the difference between perpetrators 
and accomplices is often not set in stone. It shifts depending on the level of 
the offender’s contribution, the type of crime and the general approach to 
criminal involvement adopted in the respective jurisdiction. At times, the 
actions of accomplices have a direct effect on the crime. Following the 
analysis of various national legal orders, it cannot be said that only those 
offenders whose acts do not have a causal connection to the crime are 
accomplices. Complicity is multidimensional. In many instances, there is 
some causal connection, especially in cases of incitement or leadership. For 
example, in German law, an instigator’s acts have to increase the likelihood 
of the commission of the offence. ‘Procuring’ under English law implies a 
causal relationship between the act of procurement and the execution of the 
offence. Italian law provides that there must be some causal link between the 
acts of any crime participant and the criminal result.  
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the distinction between perpetrators 
and accomplices fluctuates depending on many factors. In search of a general 
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theory of complicity, this chapter attempted to find some common approaches 
to the differentiation of crime participants. German law separates perpetrators 
from accomplices based on the semi-objective doctrine of ‘control over the 
crime’.  Under Russian and French law and the US Model Penal Code, a 
perpetrator always performs the objective side of the offence or a part thereof, 
while all other crime participants do not. English law places most weight on 
causality – the principal is the one who causes the crime to occur. The Italian 
doctrine holds as co-perpetrators those, who take the decision to carry out the 
crime, and as the accomplices those, who aim at the realization of the 
decision taken by others. Norway does not endorse the difference between the 
attribution of liability and the particular crime.
283
 Modes of participation form 
part of the description of the substantive offences in the Norwegian Penal 
Code. Indian law treats ‘abetment’ as an offence in its own right, which in 
principle is not dependent on the person actually committing an offence. 
Such a divergence of approaches to criminal participation requires 
distinguishing the constituent elements of the offence and the constituent 
elements of the mode of liability used in conjunction with this offence. In 
cases when the offence is committed solely by the primary perpetrator (the 
principal), it is not necessary to examine his mode of liability separately 
because his conduct fully satisfies the actus reus for the defined crime and he 
acted with the requisite mens rea.  In Norway, it would be sufficient to stop at 
this point also with regard to other modes of participation because the mode 
of liability is already enshrined in the description of the substantive offence. 
However, in all other jurisdictions, when discussing various forms of 
complicity one needs to distinguish the actus reus and mens rea of the 
substantive crime committed by the principal and the way in which the 
accomplice was involved in this act. Consequently, there exists a separate set 
of requirements for the various forms of complicity  
Thus, one should not be guided purely by the accepted terms and their 
translations in search of the boundary distinguishing complicity from its 
counterparts. Linguistics has its limitations, and often the term that is 
translated from different languages as ‘complicity’ would refer to different 
types of conduct in the respective jurisdictions. For example, the translation 
of the Penal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina refers to joint perpetrators as 
‘accomplices’. By the same token, Indonesian law places instigator 
(‘provoker’) in the category of principals. Consequently, it is necessary to 
understand the anatomy of each form of criminal involvement accepted in the 
respective jurisdiction, the constituent elements of this mode of participation, 
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the general principles of attribution of liability and the mechanisms whereby 
criminal responsibility attaches to substantive crime. 
Despite the disparities evident from the comparison of national orders, there 
exist elements of criminal participation that are common to most legal 
systems: 
 All of the legal systems reviewed in this study acknowledge 
complicity in one form or another; 
 
 The functional value of complicity can be reduced to the common 
formula: complicity determines the circumstances when one party 
(accessory) by virtue of prior simultaneous activity or association is 
held criminally responsible for another’s (the perpetrator’s) wrongful 
behaviour;284 
 
 Criminal liability of accomplices presupposes that the underlying act 
is objectively punishable. This does not imply that the primary 
perpetrator has to be punished by law as he may be exempt from 
criminal liability due to infancy or insanity, or his actions may be 
excused;
285
 
 
 Most legal systems provide for different types of accomplices, even if 
it is not specially mentioned in their criminal law. Italy, for example, 
adheres to the ‘unitary perpetrator’ model, but the doctrine still 
distinguishes between those who take the decision to commit an 
offence and those who help in the realization of this offence through 
facilitation or instigation, which happen to be the most common types 
of complicity; 
 
 In addition to ‘instigator’ and ‘facilitator’ (or ‘aider’) some legal 
systems have additional types of accomplices. Russian, Georgian and 
Italian law recognize an ‘organizer’ as a menacing figure leading the 
group. India, Bangladesh and UAE place ‘conspirators’ in the 
category of accomplices. China, on the other hand, introduced 
‘someone coerced to participate’ – usually a less culpable offender, 
compared to all the other crime participants. Polish law punishes those 
who ordered the execution of the crime or directed it. However, these 
two participants are placed in the ‘perpetrator’ category; 
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 16 out of 31 reviewed jurisdictions provide for sentencing discounts 
for some types of accomplices. Typically, the law stipulates that only 
minor contributions qualify for a more lenient sentence. For example, 
the legislation of Latin American countries provides for a sentencing 
discount only for those accomplices whose aid was not indispensable 
for the commission of the crime.
286
 It is noteworthy that only Chinese 
law envisages a discretionary sentencing reduction for instigators. 
Other jurisdictions regard instigation as extremely dangerous.
287
 Some 
accomplices are treated even more severely than the perpetrators. For 
example, Italian law provides for the increase in punishment for those 
who ‘lead others to cooperate’. 
 
 The most influential factor in determining the sentence of accomplices 
across jurisdictions appears to be the principle of individual 
culpability.
288
 Many penal codes provide for the punishment of each 
crime participant according to his guilt or for the result he intended, 
regardless of the outcome;
289
 
 
 Most legal systems covered in this study envisage legal solutions for 
cases with multiple accused. Penalizing group participation as 
substantive crime of conspiracy is one response of the legislature to 
organized criminality. For example, Albanian law punishes the 
creation and participation in a criminal organization, terrorist 
organization, armed gang, or structured criminal group. Other 
responses to mass crimes include mutual attribution of acts of the 
accused under the doctrine of co-perpetration (Germany), punishing 
the person who ‘masterminded’ the offence as principal (Japan), 
holding individuals accountable as organizers (Russia), attributing all 
crimes committed by the criminal gang to the leader of this gang 
(China), increasing the severity of punishment for leaders (Italy).  
ii. Applicability of the Findings to International Criminal 
Law  
The summary of the general trends in the previous sub-section shows that, 
despite the visible disparity of the legal systems in setting the boundary 
between complicity and perpetration, common grounds as well as a common 
functional core of complicity can be identified.
290
 The summary also shows 
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that there exists more than one solution offered by different legal systems for 
crimes committed by several accused or by an accused that did not physically 
perform the actus reus of the offence.  
International criminal courts and tribunals frequently prefer ‘custom-made’ 
forms of responsibility in addressing collective criminality. The ad hoc 
tribunals employ the doctrine of the joint criminal enterprise, adapted 
primarily from the English law, while the ICC reinvented the German law 
theory of ‘(in)direct co-perpetration’.291 It is remarkable that in international 
law both theories have been extended beyond what they were originally 
intended to mean in their original domestic jurisdictions. The joint criminal 
enterprise in English law and the theory co-perpetration based on ‘control 
over crime’ in German law are both limited to cases where crimes have been 
envisaged by co-participants.
292
 International criminal law, arguably, takes a 
step further and extends liability, pursuant to these specifically crafted 
doctrines, to cases where the crimes were committed outside of the scope of 
the agreement as its consequence.
293
 
This chapter argues that as an alternative to inventing new modes of 
participation to accommodate international criminality, it is also advisable to 
look at the traditional forms of criminal responsibility accepted in the 
majority of legal orders. Looking at a range of domestic legal systems could 
assist in refining and improving the part of international criminal law that 
deals with criminal participation. Reliance on the variety of legal orders, as 
opposed to just one, is valuable for two main reasons – legitimacy and 
accuracy. First, grounding the doctrine of criminal participation in “general 
principles of law derived from state laws of legal systems in the world” 
increases the perceived legitimacy of international criminal law, especially in 
countries outside the Western Hemisphere. For example, there are currently 
121 state parties to the Rome Statute. This fact alone supports a comparative 
inquiry into different domestic legal systems as it allows adducing principles 
representative of the legal systems from the various regions of the world. 
Through this exercise legal doctrine becomes a reliable source of 
international law pursuant to Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute. Second, 
the synergy of legal systems allows one to identify the best solutions for a 
variety of complex legal and factual situations arising from international 
criminality.  
Thus, there is no need to rush into adopting a concept devised by the domestic 
law of one single country. Perhaps it is wiser to learn what various legal 
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systems have to offer, identify some common trends, and utilize the 
mechanisms that best address the nature of international wrongdoing.  
Comparing different jurisdictions is already a reasonable exercise in itself 
because it gives a perspective and a deeper understanding of the rationales 
behind the doctrine of criminal participation.  
There are some concerns associated with using the comparative method with 
the prospect of developing international law in general, and international 
criminal law in particular.
294
 One of the main sources of unease is the 
impossibility of directly transplanting domestic concepts into international 
law. This is a valid concern. However, there is no problem in general in 
relying on the principles enshrined in a multitude of legal orders, provided the 
methodology is rigorously defined and the limitations of international 
criminal law are accounted for.
295
 Despite the unique nature of international 
criminality,
296
 the principle of individual criminal responsibility guides the 
process of attribution of responsibility in both domestic and international 
criminal law. This principle also embodies the phenomenon of organized 
criminality and multi-party crimes at the level of domestic law, which offers 
many solutions addressing group participation in the crimes and varying 
degrees of indirect participation.  
Complicity as a traditional mode of liability, once defined and delineated 
from the neighbouring concepts can be an indispensable tool in dealing with 
the accused removed from the scene of the crime. There is a general concern 
in international criminal law that holding someone accomplice to a certain 
crime, as opposed to primary perpetrator does not reflect the inherent gravity 
of the crimes committed by the accused.
297
 However, as has been shown in 
the comparative sections of this chapter, domestic law does not often treat 
accomplices as less culpable parties to the crime. If an accomplice receives 
mitigation in punishment, this is usually due to his minimal contribution to 
the crime rather than the label attached to his behaviour. Instigators and 
organizers are treated at least as severely as the principals. Thus, labelling 
certain conduct as ‘complicity’ does not automatically imply a lesser degree 
of responsibility.  
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One of the major strengths of complicity in comparison with the other forms 
of responsibility designed to address international criminality is that it offers a 
more nuanced approach to criminal participation: under one heading – 
‘complicity’ – there exist several sub-modes of participation. The other strong 
point of complicity is its firm grounding in academic literature and domestic 
legal philosophy, both of which are useful interpretative tools in the complex 
factual situations that characterize international criminal law. 
Conclusion 
Complicity is a traditional form of criminal liability. Each legal system 
reviewed in this chapter defines complicity in one way or another and 
attaches certain consequences to its application. Complicity comprises of 
different subcategories, including aiding and instigating. In cases with several 
accused are removed from the scene of the crime – a typical international 
criminal law scenario – it can be difficult to distinguish complicity from co-
perpetration.  However, the main problem is not the distinction itself, but 
rather providing a comprehensive definition of both modes of responsibility. 
It is argued in this chapter that complicity, once properly defined, is an 
excellent tool for international criminal law.  It is also argued that the 
definition of complicity, as well as of all other forms of criminal 
participation, shall preferably rely on principles derived from a range of legal 
systems. This is essential for two reasons. First, any legal concept developed 
methodologically with the view of the ‘general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations’ has a more solid foundation as a source of international 
law than a concept borrowed from just one single legal system. Second, 
exploring the variety of legal systems allows discovering the best solutions 
for the complex factual and legal situations that undeniably mark 
international criminal law.
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V. Complicity in International Criminal Law and 
Law of State Responsibility: Comparative Analysis 
 
Introduction 
There is an emerging trend among academics and practitioners to view 
international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in their complexity, implying a multiplicity of actors at different 
levels, including states, organizations, corporations and separate individuals.1 
The responsibility of one actor does not exclude the responsibility of another 
but rather complements it.2 Nollkaemper, for example, employed the term 
‘system criminality’,3 which he described as the allocation of responsibility 
for international crimes to ‘the level of the system, in its various 
manifestations, rather than to the individual level’.4 This view challenges the 
traditional paradigm established by the Nuremberg Tribunal, whereby ‘crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities’.5 
Similarly, during the negotiations of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the International Law 
Commission in 1996,6 some countries expressed the hope that in the future 
the provisions of the Draft Code would apply to all perpetrators, not just 
individuals, because, in their view, the difference between treating individuals 
and states is merely procedural.7 
One possible consequence of this complex approach to the allocation of 
responsibility is that certain criminal law concepts, such as complicity, are 
applied to various actors, including states and individuals. 
‘Complicity’ has many meanings depending on the context in which one uses 
it. From the theoretical perspective, Kutz described ‘the domain of 
complicity’ as “cultural and legal practices, surrounding relations of an agent 
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to a harm that are mediated by other agents”.8 The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines ‘complicity’ as ‘the fact or condition of being involved with others in 
an activity that is unlawful or morally wrong’.9  
The law of state responsibility and international criminal law share the legal 
concept of ‘complicity’. Previous chapters discussed in some detail the 
components of complicity in international criminal law 10  and domestic 
criminal law. 11  The ambition of this chapter is to define the legal 
requirements of complicity in the law of state responsibility and contrast them 
with those of international criminal law. While, a more detailed discussion 
will follow in the following sections, it is sufficient to note at this point that 
the legal requirements used for holding states and individuals complicit in a 
crime are very similar. In the memorandum submitted to the UK Parliament's 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (‘UK Parliament’s Committee’), Professor 
Sands suggests using the international criminal law test to determine UK’s 
alleged complicity in torture.12  
The main objective of the analysis in this chapter is to determine whether the 
level of approximation of the content of complicity in the two legal fields – 
international criminal law and law of state responsibility - has reached the 
point where complicity as a legal term can be used interchangeably across the 
two disciplines. In other words, the chapter aims at establishing the 
limitations (if any) of comparing individual complicity to state complicity.  
The analysis is based on four legal cases, two of which deal with state 
complicity (judgments delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and the UK domestic courts) and two with individual complicity in the 
context of international criminal law.13 The judgments selected focus on the 
same substantive crimes – genocide and torture. This approach eliminates the 
divergence in substantive crimes and allows a comparison between state and 
individual complicity in the same type of offence. Such a method leads to a 
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deeper understanding of complicity in the context of the two disciplines and 
illustrates the interplay between primary (substantive) and secondary 
(framework) rules of international law. 
This chapter builds on the analysis of complicity and its legal requirements in 
international criminal law provided in Chapters II and III. The first part of 
this chapter provides an analogous description of complicity in law of state 
responsibility. Section two focuses on state complicity in genocide and 
torture. The focal point of the discussion in this chapter is two judgements 
from the sphere of state responsibility - Genocide and Binyam Mohamed. 
These judgements are contrasted with two international criminal law 
judgements and deal with similar crimes – Furundžija and Akayesu. Section 
three explores the similarities and differences of complicity in the of law state 
responsibility and in international criminal law. Conclusions as to the 
applicability of the concept to both fields of law are drawn in the final section 
of this chapter. 
1. Complicity in Law of State Responsibility 
i. Historical Perspective 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and subsequent prosecutions of former Nazis 
provided abundant opportunity to shape the principles of individual criminal 
responsibility in international law. 14  The Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters 
were unquestionably international instruments resulting from political 
compromise. However, they embodied basic domestic criminal law principles 
with which the drafters, coming from different jurisdictions and political 
systems, were nonetheless familiar. 15  Prosecuting individuals for crimes, 
albeit international crimes, was nothing new to the community of lawyers and 
the IMT and IMTFE applied these principles during the proceedings. The 
main difference with domestic prosecutions was the scale of offences and the 
complexity of interrelationship between various actors.16 Further trials of war 
criminals in the aftermath of the IMT and IMTFE also relied on domestic 
criminal law to a large extent. Mechanisms for dealing with the collective 
aspect of crimes including complicity and conspiracy were therefore 
borrowed from national law and modified to suit international proceedings. 
On the other hand, state responsibility did not develop along the same lines.17 
As it was impossible to rely on domestic law, the rules for attributing 
                                                             
14
 See Chapter I for the detailed discussion. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 This is the case notwithstanding the comments by the ILC that “the question of the 
criminal responsibility of States as well as that of individuals acting on behalf of the State 
[…] may be considered in conjunction with the codification of the principles of the Nurnberg 
Charter and judgment.” Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification 
  
 
 
 
172 
responsibility to the state had to be created de novo. Beginning soon after 
World War II, the International Law Commission worked on a draft of 
Articles on State Responsibility for several decades.18 Complicity of states 
was not part of the initial discussion by the ILC.19 However, by 1978 it held 
that complicity in the sense “of participation in the internationally wrongful 
act of another by providing 'aid or assistance'” had gained acceptance in 
international law, and by 1996, the Law Commission considered the rule of 
“refraining from assisting wrongdoing states” as a well-established practice.20 
In 2007, the ICJ confirmed the customary nature of this norm.
21
 
Historical divergence in the development of state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility can be explained by the conceptual 
difference between these two forms of responsibility: state responsibility is 
governed by a separate set of secondary rules, which establish the 
consequences of the violation of primary rules located elsewhere - in 
international treaties or customary international law.22 Aust highlighted the 
conceptual difficulty with such a distinction, especially when it comes to 
complicity.
23
 The distance between primary and secondary rules in the law of 
state responsibility generates uncertainty as to whether international law 
includes the rule against complicity or whether it is merely a secondary rule 
contained in the Articles on State Responsibility.
24
 In contrast, individual 
criminal responsibility is governed by a narrower set of norms, namely 
substantive and procedural criminal law.25 
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ii. Legal Requirements of Complicity 
The International Law Commission adopted Articles on State Responsibility 
in 2001. 26   They contain at least one provision dealing with complicity. 
Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility provides:
 27
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible 
for doing so if:  
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of 
the internationally wrongful act; and  
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by 
that State. 
The ILC Commentary to Articles on State Responsibility discusses in full 
detail the two explicit and one implicit condition for state responsibility for 
aiding and assisting.28  The first explicit requirement is knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.29 The ILC Commentary is 
not however entirely clear on the necessary fault requirement: on some 
occasions it mentions aid and assistance provided to another state with the 
view to facilitating the commission of an internationally wrongful act; on 
another occasion the ILC speaks of the state organ intending, by aid and 
assistance, to facilitate the commission of a wrongful act;
30
 while on a third 
occasion it discusses the state being held responsible for assisting in human 
rights violations if it was aware of and intended to facilitate these acts.31 
The second explicit condition is that the assisting state itself must be bound 
by the obligation. This criterion loses its relevance in relation to serious 
breaches of peremptory, or jus cogens norms, which are binding on all 
states.32 Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility deal 
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 Report of the ILC on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, Official Records of the General 
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with this type of obligation. Article 40 describes the breach as serious “if it 
involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the 
obligation.”  Article 41 provides that the states shall co-operate to bring to an 
end any serious breach, as well as not recognize nor render any aid or 
assistance in maintaining the situation created by this breach. It is not clear 
from Article 41 whether knowledge or intent is required to hold a state 
responsible for assisting in the breach of peremptory norm.33  
The previous draft of the Articles on State Responsibility contained Article 
19, which drew a distinction between international crimes and international 
delicts in the context of the law of state responsibility. 34  Violations of 
peremptory norms are qualified as crimes. This distinction prompted an 
extensive debate as to the meaning of state crime and the consequences 
attached to its commission. 35  However, the contentious nature of this 
provision prompted the ILC to change its approach and to substitute Article 
19 with Articles 40 and 41, which do not mention the word ‘crime’.36  
One of the main controversies surrounding the notion of state crime was the 
difficulty of punishing a state.37 The ILC envisaged that the commission of an 
international crime should vest other states with some remedial rights, 
without specifying the exact scope of these rights and the mechanisms for 
their enforcement.38 Consequently, the debate around sanctioning the state 
turned away from the general preventative side of the concept and focused on 
the technicalities of defining precise remedies. 39  This, in turn, led to the 
deletion of Article 19 in favour of Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility.  
An opinion that has received some scholarly support simply leaves aside the 
label ‘criminal’ and holds that, for practical purposes, Article 40 ‘serious 
                                                                                                                                                              
academic debate. Verdross provided the following definition: “they do not exist to satisfy the 
needs of the individual states but the higher interest of the whole international community.”  
A. Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law,’ 60 American Journal 
of International Law 57, 1966, at 58. 
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 See K. Nahapetian. 
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 Text of Draft Articles Provisionally adopted by the Commission on First Reading, Report 
of the ILC to the General Assembly, Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,Suat No. 
10 U.N. A/51/10 (1996), at 60. 
35
 See e.g. A. Pellet, ‘Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!’ 10  European Journal 
of International Law, 1999, at 425 et esq. 
36
 M. Shaw, at 807 - 808; A. Nollkaemper in A. Nollkaemper and H.V.D. Wilt, 2009, at 19. 
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 N.H.B. Jorgensen, at 184. 
38
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removal of limitations on restitution and satisfaction. The mechanisms of the implementation 
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Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,Suat No. 10 U.N. A/51/10 (1996), at 71-72. 
See also N.H.B. Jorgensen, at 180. 
39
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breach responsibility’ is equivalent to the international criminal responsibility 
of states.40 The important aspect is not the labelling, but rather the enactment 
of a proper enforcement mechanism currently lacking in the law of state 
responsibility. Zimmermann and Teichmann argued in favour of introducing 
punitive damages and an obligation to alter one’s domestic legal system as 
new, effective remedies in the context of state crimes.41 
The final condition of state responsibility for aiding and assisting is not 
expressly mentioned in Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility but 
is discussed in the ILC Commentary. The aid and assistance must contribute 
significantly to the commission of internationally wrongful conduct.
42
  The 
contribution need not however be essential to the performance of the act.43 
When the ILC covers the possible ways in which the state may assist human 
rights violations it speaks of the ‘material aid’.44   
The ILC Commentary also expressly distinguishes aiding and assisting as 
recorded in Article 16 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility from co-
perpetratorship (regulated by articles on the attribution of the Articles on 
State Responsibility) and the substantive rules prohibiting aid or assistance 
contained in different international instruments.45 
Aside from the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, ‘complicity in genocide’ 
is explicitly outlawed by Article 3(e) of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (‘Genocide Convention’).  
Article 4(1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 (‘Torture Convention’) calls on 
the state parties to criminalize, inter alia, “an act by any person which 
constitutes complicity or participation in torture.” Both provisions are 
discussed in more detail in the section discussing the case law.  
Other international instruments dealing with human rights and humanitarian 
law such the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 or 
the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War of 1949 do not 
explicitly mention ‘complicity’. There is an emerging view among some 
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scholars46 that states can, nonetheless, be complicit in the failure to comply 
with the positive obligation to respect and ensure rights contained in these 
instruments.47 Cerone, for example, argued for a wider understanding of state 
complicity, which, in his view, can manifest itself in three ways: first, as a 
state responsibility for the violation of negative obligations on the basis of 
attributing the conduct of the organs of one state to another state; second, as a 
derivative state responsibility for the violation of negative obligations within 
the meaning of Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility; and third, as 
responsibility for the failure to respect positive obligations contained in 
primary rules.48 It remains to be seen whether this approach will be adopted 
in the future. In the meantime, both cases on state responsibility discussed in 
this article reject this broad view of state complicity. 
2. Comparative Analysis of Complicity in International 
Criminal Law and Law of State Responsibility 
i. Complicity in Genocide 
a) The Akayesu Case 
Jean-Paul Akayesu, a father of five, served as a teacher in the Rwandan 
municipality of Taba. He was a well-respected leader of his local commune 
and held the position of mayor for some time in 1993 and 1994, overseeing 
the local economy, police and law in the village. After the commencement of 
the Rwandan genocide, Akayesu actively urged the population to kill Tutsis. 
As mayor he must have known about the atrocities taking part in his 
municipality but nevertheless failed to punish the perpetrators. Moreover, he 
was present when sexual violence was committed against Tutsi women, 
encouraging by his presence further perpetration of crimes.
49
  
The Akayesu judgment is one of the most significant judgments rendered by 
the international tribunals as it contains the world’s first conviction for the 
crime of genocide.
50
 It is noteworthy that while the Prosecution charged 
Akayesu, inter alia, with both genocide and complicity in genocide,
51
 the 
Trial Chamber disagreed with the Prosecutor’s decision to charge both modes 
of participation, stating that an individual cannot be at the same time the 
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principle perpetrator of a particular crime and the accomplice thereto.
52
 The 
Chamber reasoned that the accomplice can be tried even if the principle 
perpetrator has not been identified.
53
 Consequently, the Trial Chamber 
analysed whether the actions of Akayesu were merely a manifestation of an 
accomplice liability, or whether they constituted an actual commission.
54
 The 
court drew the distinction between complicity in genocide pursuant to Article 
2(3)(e) of the Statute
 
 and aiding and abetting genocide in accordance with 
Article 6(1) of the Statute.
55
  
The Trial Chamber established that for the purposes of the substantive 
provision on complicity in genocide (Article 2(3)(e) of the Statute, which 
prohibits genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to commit 
genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide),
56
 
‘complicity’ is to be defined as per Rwandan Penal Code, and includes 
procuring means, aiding and abetting and instigation. Most importantly, for 
this crime an accomplice to genocide need not necessarily possess the dolus 
specialis of genocide, namely the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. It is sufficient that 
the accused knew of the genocidal plan and participated in its execution.
57
 
Aiding and abetting, covered under Article 6(1) of the Statute is, in the view 
of the Trial Chamber, similar to the material elements of complicity in 
genocide. However, by virtue of being linked to the substantive crimes listed 
in Articles 2-4 of the Statute, aiding and abetting genocide requires the person 
to have acted with specific genocidal intent.
58
 
The Trial Chamber held that Akayesu’s acts constitute factual elements of the 
crime of genocide. He incurred individual criminal liability for ‘having 
ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the preparation or 
execution of the killing of and causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the Tutsi group.’59 Such an extensive participation in genocidal 
acts led the Chamber to conclude that Akayesu possessed specific genocidal 
intent and was thus responsible for genocide and not merely for complicity in 
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 Akayesu Trial Judgment, §§ 468, 532 as discussed by K. Kittichaisaree (2002), at 237. 
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 Akayesu Trial Judgment, § 531. 
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genocide.
60
 The Trial Chamber sentenced Akayesu to life imprisonment for 
genocide.
61
   
b) The Genocide Case 
In 2007 the ICJ ruled on Bosnia’s claim that Serbia had committed genocide 
during various events that occurred in Bosnia between 1991 and 1995. Bosnia 
maintained that the pattern of atrocities committed against the non-Serbian 
population over a long period of time demonstrated that Serbia possessed the 
specific intent within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. The court 
rejected this all-encompassing approach by stipulating that specific intent can 
only be shown by reference to particular circumstances.62 Consequently, the 
ICJ established that members of the VRS (army of the Republika Srpska)63 
committed genocide only in and around Srebrenica starting from about 13 
July 1995.
64
 In its finding the ICJ referred extensively to the ICTY 
jurisprudence on genocide.
65
 
The ICJ reviewed the different ways in which Serbia could be held 
accountable for the atrocities committed by the VRS in Srebrenica. In 
particular, the court examined three issues: first, whether the acts of genocide 
were committed by persons or organs whose conduct is attributable to Serbia; 
second, whether the acts enumerated in Article 3 of the Genocide Convention 
other than genocide itself (for example, complicity in genocide) were 
committed by persons or organs whose conduct is attributable to Serbia; and 
finally whether Serbia complied with its obligation as they derived from 
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention to prevent and punish genocide.66 
With regard to the first question, the ICJ held that actions of the VRS cannot 
be attributed to Serbia on the basis that neither the Republika Srpska, nor the 
VRS were de jure organs of the FRY nor did they have the status of an organ 
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of that state under its internal law.67  Similarly, the ICJ rejected Bosnia’s 
argument that the conduct of the VRS is attributable to Serbia based on 
Article 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility as a conduct directed or 
controlled by the state.68 In resolving this issue, the ICJ refused to apply the 
test of ‘overall control’ introduced by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić 
and instead applied a stricter test of ‘effective control’ developed by the ICJ 
in the Nicaragua case.69 The ICJ explained that while it attached great weight 
to the ICTY’s finding relating to the events that happened during the conflict, 
it could not use the ICTY’s legal test of ‘overall control’ because it was 
developed for a purpose not related to the attribution of state responsibility 
for acts committed by paramilitary units.70 
In relation to the second question, namely responsibility for various acts 
enumerated in Article 3 of the Genocide Convention, the court rather quickly 
ruled out all possible forms of committing genocide apart from ‘complicity in 
genocide’.71 The ICJ then made several important pronouncements relating to 
state complicity in general and complicity in genocide in particular.  
Firstly, the ICJ held that ‘complicity’ needs to be distinguished from the acts 
of perpetrators acting on the instructions of or under the direction or effective 
control of Serbia. If such conduct is proved, it is directly attributable to the 
state without using the concept of complicity.72 Secondly, the court clarified 
that for the purposes of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, ‘complicity’ 
entails ‘the provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission of the 
crime’. 73  Thirdly, the ICJ held that although there is no notion of 
‘complicity’ in the terminology of the law of international responsibility, it is 
similar to the notion of ‘aid and assistance’ that constitutes the customary rule 
found in the law of state responsibility and embodied in Article 16 of the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility.74 Consequently, the ICJ found it appropriate 
to examine Serbia’s potential accomplice liability in genocide through the 
prism of Article 16 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.75 Fourthly, the 
court refused to answer the question of whether the accomplice needs to share 
the specific intent of the principle perpetrator, but affirmed that it is essential 
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that the person or an organ furnishing ‘aid and assistance’ to the principle 
perpetrator needs, at the very least, to be aware of such intent.76  
This latter point was the sole basis for failing to hold Serbia responsible for 
complicity in genocide. The ICJ held that it was not satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that Serbia supplied resources to the perpetrators of the 
genocide with the clear awareness of their genocidal intent - the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a human group, as such. In other words, the court 
did not find conclusive evidence that the Belgrade authorities were aware that 
their aid and assistance would be used to commit genocide, especially where 
the decision to commit genocide had been taken shortly before the act was 
actually carried out.77 Judges Keith and Bennouna disagreed with the court on 
this point, stating in their separate declarations that Serbia must have known 
about the specific intent of the VRS and provided it with aid and assistance 
with that knowledge.78  
Finally, two implicit points emerge from the ICJ’s discussion relating to 
complicity: the state can potentially be an accomplice to the genocide 
committed by certain entities (and not the other state) and complicity in 
genocide is possible even when the genocide as a principle wrong has not 
been attributed to any state.  
With regard to the third question relating to Serbia’s potential failure to 
comply with its positive obligation under Article 1 of the Genocide 
Convention to prevent and punish genocide, the ICJ held that Serbia had 
indeed violated its obligation in this respect.79 While a detailed analysis of 
this finding is not required for the purposes of this chapter it is worth noting 
that the ICJ did not award any compensation to Bosnia as result of finding 
this breach.80 
ii. Complicity in Torture 
a) The Furundžija Case 
Anto Furundžija served as a local commander of the Croatian Defence special 
unit in one of the municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At one point 
during the conflict the accused subjected a Bosnian Muslim woman to 
interrogation in the nude in front of forty soldiers. After this interrogation the 
woman was taken to another room where she was raped in the presence of the 
accused, who did nothing to stop the sexual violence.  
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The Prosecution charged Furundžija with one instance of rape and torture 
without specifying the mode of liability, thus leaving the question to the Trial 
Chamber.
81
 This lack of clarity regarding the nature of the participation of the 
accused prompted the Trial Chamber to examine the difference between 
participating in the joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting a crime, 
using torture and rape as examples for its analysis. Based on a review of the 
post-Second World War jurisprudence, the Trial Chamber concluded that the 
actus reus for aiding and abetting consists of practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime, whereas the mens rea required is the knowledge 
that these acts assist the commission of the offence.
 82
 In contrast to aiding 
and abetting, the notion of common design presupposes the actus reus 
consisting of participation in a joint criminal enterprise and that the required 
mens rea is intent to participate.
83
  
When applying these principles to the case, the Chamber concluded that to be 
guilty of torture as a co-perpetrator, the accused must have participated in an 
integral way in the torture and with the intent to obtain a confession or to 
punish and humiliate the victim.
84
 In contrast, to be guilty as aider and 
abettor, the accused must assist in some way and this assistance must have a 
substantial effect on the torture. The accused must also have the knowledge 
that torture is taking place.
85
 Following this line of argument, the Chamber 
noted that aiding and abetting torture may only occur in very limited 
instances.
86
 
Based on these considerations the Trial Chamber concluded that the 
interrogation of a Bosnian woman was an integral part of torture. The accused 
was therefore guilty of torture as a co-perpetrator.
87
 At the same time, the 
accused was only found guilty of aiding and abetting rape. He himself did not 
commit the act but by virtue of being present at the scene of the crime and 
holding the position of authority, he encouraged the sexual violence.
88
  
The Trial Chamber noted that varying degrees of participation may be a 
matter to consider at sentencing thereby implying that aiding and abetting 
may attract a more lenient sentence.
89
 Consequently, the Trial Chamber 
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sentenced Anto Furundžija to ten years of imprisonment for torture and eight 
years of imprisonment for aiding and abetting rape, with both sentences to be 
served concurrently.
90
 The Chamber did not explicitly discuss the effect of 
the mode of participation on sentencing. It did however make clear that, as he 
is as responsible for the crime as the person actually inflicting pain, the 
accused’s role in torture as a fellow perpetrator is an aggravating factor.91 
Given that both torture and rape are equally reprehensible crimes, the slightly 
more lenient sentence for aiding and abetting rape confirms the relative 
weight the Trial Chamber assigned to the mode of the accused’s participation 
in the crimes. 
b) The Binyam Mohamed Case 
In 2009 the UK Parliament’s Committee issued a report relating to the 
allegations that UK security services had been complicit in the torture of UK 
nationals held in Pakistan and elsewhere.92 The case of Binyam Mohamed 
was one of the alleged ‘torture cases’ reviewed by the UK Parliament’s 
Committee.  
Binyam Mohamed was a UK resident of Ethiopian nationality arrested in 
2002 in Pakistan under the US extraordinary rendition program on suspicion 
of alleged links with Al-Qaeda.  He was detained and questioned in Pakistan, 
Morocco, Afghanistan and, finally, in Guantanamo, where he was held for 
more than four years until his release in 2009.93  
While detained in Guantanamo, Mohamed brought a claim in a UK court 
seeking the disclosure of evidence held by the UK government and 
intelligence services confirming that he was subjected to torture in 2002-
2004. Mohamed needed this information to render his confessions 
inadmissible in proceedings before the US military commission in relation to 
charges of terrorist activity. On 21 August 2008 the Divisional Court of the 
Queen’s Bench Division granted his claim and ordered the release of 
evidence subject to redactions (if any) requested by the Foreign Secretary.94  
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Consequently, at the Foreign Secretary’s request seven paragraphs of the 
Binyam Mohamed Judgment, summarizing the US reports sent to the UK 
authorities regarding Mohamed’s mistreatment while he was held in Pakistan, 
were redacted. Both Mohamed and the media representatives who joined the 
proceedings questioned whether these redactions were justifiable on appeal. 
In the meantime the documents sought by Mohamed were made available to 
him in the US proceedings meaning the only question before the Court of 
Appeal was whether to restore the seven paragraphs initially redacted from 
the Binyam Mohamed judgment. In February 2010 the Court of Appeal 
ordered the redacted paragraphs to be restored.95 The court held that where 
the judgment is concerned with such a ‘fundamental and topical issue as the 
mistreatment of detainees’ and involvement of the UK Government in this 
mistreatment, public interest overrides other considerations.96 
Neither of the two judgements described above relate directly to the question 
of UK complicity in torture.  The Binyam Mohamed judgment does however 
make several points that are important for understanding the scope of the 
concept in the law of state responsibility.  
In Binyam Mohamed, the court granted disclosure on the basis of a test 
developed in the earlier case of Norwich Pharmacal.97 One of the questions 
that the court had to answer in order to apply the Norwich Pharmacal 
principles was whether there was a wrongdoing and whether the UK 
Government had facilitated such wrongdoing through the security service or 
its agents being involved in, or participating in the alleged wrongdoing.98  
The court established that in May 2002 the UK security services received 
reports containing information relating to Mohamed’s mistreatment in 
Pakistan by the US authorities. The court then ruled that the UK Government 
facilitated the interrogation of Mohamed in the knowledge of the reports, 
which contained information relating to his detention and treatment in the 
circumstances where Mohamed’s detention incommunicado was unlawful 
under the law of Pakistan.99 Consequently, the Binyam Mohamed judgment 
concluded that by seeking to interview Mohamed in such circumstances “the 
relationship of the UK Government to the US authorities in connection with 
BM was far beyond that of a bystander or witness to the alleged 
wrongdoing.”100  
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Another important issue discussed in Binyam Mohamed judgment is 
Mohamed’s argument that the UK breached its obligation of disclosure 
flowing from the particular status of the prohibition on torture in international 
law as a rule of jus cogens binding on states erga omnes. 101  Without 
questioning the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture, the court 
rejected Mohamed’s argument, stating that at that time there existed no rule 
of customary international law obliging the UK to make a disclosure to 
Mohamed.102 
In arriving at this conclusion the court examined Article 41 of the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility imposing on all states a two-fold obligation 
resulting from the breach of obligations under peremptory norms of 
international law: a positive obligation to co-operate to bring an end to the 
breach, and a negative duty not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the 
situation created by a breach of a peremptory norm. With regard to the former 
obligation, the court referred to Professor Crawford’s commentary on Article 
41, where he stated that it is an open question whether international law at 
present prescribes a positive duty of co-operation.103 The court also noted that 
currently there is no authority that purports to provide a comprehensive 
statement of the legal consequences flowing from the jus cogens status of the 
primary rule.104  
The UK Parliament’s Committee elaborated on the notion of state complicity, 
using the Binyam Mohamed case as one of the instances of the UK’s alleged 
complicity in torture. The Committee was confronted with the question 
whether certain conduct by the UK Government, such as asking foreign 
intelligence known to use torture to detain and question an individual, 
constitutes complicity in torture. In order to answer this question the 
Committee had to define what constitutes ‘complicity in torture’. 
Consequently the Committee members drew a distinction between 
‘complicity in torture’ for the purposes of individual criminal responsibility 
and state responsibility. The former required proof of three elements in 
accordance with Furundžija: (1) knowledge that torture is taking place, (2) a 
direct contribution by way of assistance that (3) has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime; while the latter, based on the interpretations 
provided by the UN Committee Against Torture, meant ‘simply one State 
giving assistance to another State in the commission of torture, or acquiescing 
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in such torture, in the knowledge, including constructive knowledge, of the 
circumstances of the torture which is or has been taking place.’105  
The UK Parliament’s Committee concluded, relying on the opinion of 
Professor Sands, that a narrower meaning of complicity is likely to be 
adopted in the context of individual criminal responsibility, whereas 
determination of state responsibility calls for a wider definition of 
complicity.106 The Committee made such a conclusion on the basis of Sand’s 
explanation that ‘complicity’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the 
Torture Convention has a broader meaning than ‘aiding and abetting’ within 
the meaning of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. Despite this difference in the 
scope of complicity for the purposes of two different legal instruments, Sands 
advised the UK Parliament’s Committee to use the three-prong test developed 
by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundžija in order to determine whether UK 
incurs liability for complicity in torture.107 Based on these considerations, the 
Committee concluded that the Government’s turning a blind eye, 
systematically receiving or relying on the information originating from the 
country known to torture “might well cross the line into complicity”.108 
In the Ahmed & Anor v R case, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
had an opportunity to test this ‘wider’ understanding of complicity in the law 
state responsibility. 109  The two appellants were convicted of terrorism 
offences. One of the appellants, Rangzieb Ahmed, claimed that the 
prosecution against him should have been stayed on the basis of, inter alia, 
the UK’s alleged complicity in torture.110 The appellant claimed that he was 
held in captivity and tortured in Pakistan before being brought to the UK to 
stand trial. During his time in Pakistan, the UK intelligence officers 
interviewed Rangzieb on at least one occasion. Rangzieb’s argument was that 
complicity is demonstrated where State A has any settled practice of 
information- or intelligence-sharing with State B which is known or believed 
to use torture. Furthermore, according to the argument wherever such 
complicity by settled practice is demonstrated and information has been 
shared in respect of a man prosecuted in England who has been interrogated 
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in State B under conditions involving torture, there is a sufficient connection 
between the complicity and the trial to justify staying the prosecution.111  
On the face of it, this position appears to be consistent with the broader view 
of complicity advanced by the UK Parliamentary Committee. However, the 
court rejected the appellant’s claim. It drew the line between the use of 
materials obtained under torture by the executive and the courts. The court 
regarded the use of materials obtained under torture by the executive as 
permissible with a view to the policy objective of protecting citizens. In 
contrast, the use of such materials by courts should not be allowed. Despite 
this rule, court proceedings involving a prosecution must only be stayed if 
there is a connection between the alleged wrongdoing and the trial. In the 
case at issue it was not demonstrated that the torture impacted upon the 
trial.112  Moreover, the court rejected the extended view of complicity as 
‘aspirational’.113 It held:  
On ordinary principles of English law, if A aids or abets (ie assists) B to commit 
torture, or if he counsels or procures (ie encourages or arranges) torture by B, 
then A is no doubt guilty, as is B. But simply to receive information from B 
which is needed for the safety of A's citizens but which is known or suspected to 
be the product of torture would not, without more, amount in English law to 
either of these forms of secondary participation.114  
 
3. Treatment of Complicity in Two Areas of Law: Common 
Trends and Divergences 
There is a connection between the law of state responsibility and international 
criminal law. As has been discussed above, the two fields complement each 
other. Article 58 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility reassures us that 
“these articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual 
responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of the 
State.” Similarly, Furundžija confirms that under current international 
humanitarian law, individual criminal liability may be supplemented by state 
responsibility.115   
Complicity is a concept utilized by the law of state responsibility and 
international criminal law in a very similar manner.  Complicity in both areas 
of law has both broader and narrower meanings.  Complicity in international 
criminal law can encompass all modes of direct criminal participation apart 
from commission, while at the same time it can be equated solely with aiding 
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and abetting.116 Similarly, complicity in law of state responsibility can be 
understood merely as one state aiding and assisting another state to commit 
an internationally wrongful act within the meaning of Article 16 of the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility, or it can also entail the state’s failure to 
respect positive obligations under the jus cogens primary rules of 
international law. In the latter case, the procedural threshold set by Article 16 
for holding the state responsible may arguably be circumvented.  However, in 
Binyam Mohamed, the court refused to recognize as binding the positive 
obligation to disclosure flowing from the prohibition of torture and refused to 
acknowledge complicity on the part of the UK in torture on this basis.117  
It is evident from the case law analysis that complicity as a form of 
participation in both the law of state responsibility and international criminal 
law is intimately linked to the substantive rules defining the prohibited 
conduct. The scope of complicity is pre-defined by the nature of conduct it is 
attached to. The Trial Chamber in Furundžija was able to establish that the 
accused perpetrated torture, and not merely aided and abetted the one, only 
after having reviewed the elements of torture and the accused’s role in 
relation to these elements. Similarly, Sand’s Memorandum discusses 
complicity in torture from the perspective of the Torture Convention (primary 
rules) and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility (secondary rules). Both 
the Genocide and the Akayesu cases focus on the notion of genocidal intent, 
or dolus specialis, in their reasoning relating to complicity.  
On a more general note, the cases discussed in this chapter show that the law 
of state responsibility and international criminal law use complicity in the 
context of identical crimes – torture and genocide. Clearly, the present study 
is limited in scope and the cases reviewed here have been specifically 
selected to contrast state and individual complicity in torture and genocide. 
However, the similar subject matter of the cases examined in this study is not 
entirely accidental as complicity is particularly prevalent in relation to these 
particular offences. 
Similar principles relating to complicity seem to emerge in both fields of law. 
Firstly, in the law of state responsibility and international criminal law it is 
possible to hold an individual and a state complicit in crime even without a 
conviction of the principal perpetrator. The Furundžija, Genocide and Binyam 
Mohamed cases fall under this principle and Akayesu explicitly discusses it. 
Secondly, both fields of law draw a dividing line between perpetration and 
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complicity. Furundžija clearly demonstrates the difference between 
perpetrating the crime as a part of the joint criminal enterprise and aiding and 
abetting the crime. Similarly, the ILC Commentary and the Genocide 
Judgment explicitly mention the distinction between the two modes of 
participation. 
Finally, the legal requirements of complicity in the law of state responsibility 
and international criminal law are very similar. The fault requirement of 
complicity for the purposes of both state responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility seems to be at least knowledge that the acts assist in 
the commission of the specific crime. However, the mental element is better 
defined in international criminal law. The ad hoc tribunals require at least 
‘knowledge’,118 while the ICC has adopted a higher threshold; aiding and 
abetting must occur “for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a 
crime.” 119  
The law of state responsibility offers limited insight on the issue of the fault 
element. Article 16 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility incorporates 
the requirement of ‘knowledge’ in the definition of aiding and assisting, the 
ILC Commentary mentions both knowledge and intent, and the Genocide 
Judgment, regrettably, falls short of discussing whether intent shared with the 
principle perpetrator is required to hold a state complicit in genocide. Such a 
finding would have dealt with the discrepancies in the ILC Commentary, but 
could have been highly controversial because without the conviction of the 
primary perpetrator it seems very difficult, if not impossible, to establish the 
‘shared intent’ of the accomplice. In Binyam Mohamed the UK Parliament’s 
Committee suggested, relying on the international criminal law standards, that 
knowledge is sufficient to hold a state complicit in torture.  
The conduct requirement of complicity is also comparable to some extent in 
the law of state responsibility and international criminal law. The Trial 
Chamber held in Furundžija that actus reus of complicity (in a narrow sense) 
consists of the assistance having a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime. The Rome Statute omits the requirement of substantial contribution but 
it appears that the ICC Chambers have slowly acknowledged that assistance 
must meet a certain threshold. 120   Both the Genocide and the Binyam 
Mohamed describe complicity as a certain conduct that ‘facilitates’ the 
commission of the wrongdoing.  In addition, the ILC Commentaries require 
that in the context of state complicity the aid and assistance must contribute 
significantly to the commission of internationally wrongful conduct. Thus, the 
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impact of assistance has to reach a certain level in order to attract 
responsibility of both states and individuals.  
Despite the close connection between complicity in law of state responsibility 
and international criminal law, the present study revealed a number of 
important differences between complicity of states and complicity of 
individuals. These distinctions showcase the limits of the cross-disciplinary 
comparison furnished in this chapter.
121
 
One of the main differences between complicity in the law of state 
responsibility and international criminal law is that complicity of individuals, 
as opposed to state complicity, implies more or less clear consequences. The 
mode of participation is one of the factors that affect sentencing in 
international criminal law.122 State complicity, in contrast, has no specific 
implications attached to it. The question arises whether state complicity 
entails less severe or simply different countermeasures than those taken 
against the state primarily responsible for an internationally wrongful act.  
One would assume that the general rules regarding the consequences of 
finding a state responsible for breach of an internationally wrongful act would 
be applicable to complicit states.
123
 Using these provisions in conjunction 
with state complicity presents some difficulty, however. The main source of 
the problem is that these consequences have been modelled on the bilateral 
relationship between one wrongdoing state and one injured state.
124
 
Complicity obscures the matters by introducing an additional legal 
relationship.
125
 Matters are further complicated by the fact that responsibility 
for aiding and assisting does not require the complicit state to have committed 
a wrongful act, but that it associates itself with the wrongful conduct of 
another state.
126
 
This distinction between the two fields lies in the fact that international 
criminal law in general has developed mechanisms for enforcing the 
individual criminal responsibility as opposed to the law of state 
responsibility, which still lacks such mechanisms, particularly when dealing 
with responsibility of states for grave breaches of peremptory norms. The 
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absence of clear guidelines on enforcing the responsibility of states for failure 
to respect positive obligations of jus cogens nature was one of the reasons for 
the ILC’s rejection of the notion of ‘state crimes.’ The same reason prompted 
the court in Binyam Mohamed to deny UK responsibility for violating the 
Torture Convention. Similarly, the ICJ did not grant Bosnia compensation 
following the finding that Serbia violated the Genocide Convention by failing 
to prevent genocide.  
Another important distinction between state and individual complicity is that 
the link between complicity and substantive rules is more evident in the area 
of individual criminal responsibility.  International criminal law usually 
provides for one comprehensive legal instrument- the relevant statute – that 
contains both the general rules on attribution of responsibility and the specific 
provisions relating to crimes. In contrast, the law of state responsibility 
defines complicity as a mode of participation in the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility, while the rules outlining prohibited conduct are found 
elsewhere in various international treaties. It is true that the Genocide and the 
Torture Conventions explicitly mention ‘complicity’. However, in the context 
of these instruments ‘complicity’ is treated more as a substantive crime itself 
rather than a mode of participation. This peculiarity prompted the judges in 
the Genocide case to turn to the ILC Articles on State Responsibility for the 
proper definition of ‘complicity’. The UK Parliament’s Committee in Binyam 
Mohamed drew inspiration from the definitions provided by international 
criminal law.  
Yet another difference between complicity in law of state responsibility and 
international criminal law resides in the definition of legal requirements of 
complicity. As discussed above, it is well established in the case law of 
international criminal tribunals that ‘knowledge’ is sufficient to hold an 
individual responsible for aiding and abetting the crime if other criteria are 
met.127 The ICC has a higher threshold for the fault requirement – acting with 
a purpose of facilitating the commission of the crime.
128
 The situation is much 
less clear in the law of state responsibility. The ILC Commentaries mention 
both knowledge and intent as a requirement for aiding and assisting. 
Similarly, the ICJ has adopted a very careful approach to the fault 
requirement in the context of state complicity. It did not rule on whether 
shared intent is necessary for complicity in genocide and it fell short of even 
establishing Serbia’s awareness of the genocide about to be committed. This 
caution can be explained by the general difficulty of ruling on the fault of a 
collective entity such as the state. The legal dilemma lies in the fact that fault 
is established in relation to state agents who are nonetheless acting in their 
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official capacity. They are implementing state policy in an unlawful manner. 
The ensuring separation of their individual responsibility as moral agents as a 
result of their unlawful actions from the responsibility of a state brings about 
certain level of discomfort.129 
Consequently, in contrast with the UK Parliament’s Committee conclusions, 
it appears that complicity for the purposes of law of state responsibility has a 
narrower scope than complicity for the purposes of international criminal law. 
The threshold for holding a state responsible for complicity is higher than the 
threshold established for complicity in the context of individual criminal 
responsibility. Of course, this could be partially explained by the lack of 
relevant cases in the field of law of state responsibility but the general 
principles of complicity developed by both disciplines are nonetheless 
sufficiently clear to point in the direction of a higher threshold for state 
complicity.  
At first it may seem counter-intuitive that it is more difficult to hold a state 
guilty as an accomplice rather than an individual. A rich jurisprudence 
relating to individual criminal responsibility clearly dominates the remarkably 
few cases dealing with state complicity. International criminal law has 
developed the concept of complicity to a much greater extent than the law of 
state responsibility. However, this does not imply that the standards accepted 
for states are more relaxed than the standards for the individuals. The case of 
Ahmed & Anor v R supports this contention. The Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales, in contrast with the conclusions of the UK Parliament’s 
Committee, rejected the wider notion of state complicity.  
One can furnish a number of explanations as to why there is a higher 
threshold for state complicity. One reason could be the tension that is still 
present in the law of state responsibility between the traditional state-centred 
approach that implies primarily bilateral relations between states and the 
community oriented approach that is currently on the rise.
130
 In this respect, 
Aust referred to the prominent international lawyer Roberto Ago, who in 
1939 stated that it was exactly this bilateral structure of international law 
which made it impossible to think of state responsibility for complicity.
131
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From a strictly legal point of view, criminal law, from the moment of its 
conception, was aimed at individuals rather than collective entities.
132
 
Consequently, applying certain criminal law principles to the state poses 
challenges. For example, the Genocide judgment demonstrated the difficulty 
of defining the fault requirement for the state.
133
 Another challenge is the 
question of punishment and its enforcement. Domestic criminal law usually 
provides for a developed criminal justice system encompassing various types 
of punishment backed up by the state enforcement mechanism. International 
criminal law is similar to domestic criminal law in that it empowers courts 
and tribunals to hand down sentences, enforced through state cooperation. 
Therefore, finding an individual accomplice to a crime brings about a very 
tangible outcome. No equivalent exists at the level of state responsibility.   
On a more general level, the reluctance to accept a stricter standard of state 
criminality, and in particular state complicity, can be caused by the need to 
protect states from the stigmatization that inevitably follows from a finding of 
criminal responsibility. Arguably, the consequences of holding an individual 
complicit in international crimes are less severe than the same finding in 
relation to a state. This is so because the nationals incur their punishment 
individually, while criminally responsible states have to bear the 
consequences as a collective entity. The criminal responsibility of a state, 
including criminal complicity, opens the door to severe reputational 
implications, as well as many legal actions, including individual claims for 
damages originating in foreign countries. These effects could in turn 
undermine the very essence of statehood – sovereignty, which holds that a 
state is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to governmental, 
executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign state.134  
In this respect, a parallel can be drawn with corporate complicity, and the 
caution that the state courts exercise in holding corporations complicit in 
human rights violations in another state. The recent case law of the US 
Supreme Court appears to uphold the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of the US Statutes.135 For example, in Kiobel, the US Supreme 
Court rejected the claim that Alien Torts Statute covered conduct occurring in 
a foreign sovereign’s territory, even if the corporation is present in the US. 
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The court insisted that for the presumption against extraterritoriality to be set 
aside the claims must “touch and concern the territory of the United States 
[…] with sufficient force.” 136 The reasons for this conservative approach to 
corporate complicity are similar to the concerns related to state complicity – 
the reluctance to jeopardize another state’s sovereignty. 
Conclusion 
International crimes are very complex in nature and involve a variety of 
actors, including states and individuals. It is very important to address the 
question of responsibility for mass atrocities at each level of perpetration. 
This is possible because state and individual responsibility are not mutually 
exclusive and complement each other. In general, individual criminal 
responsibility and state responsibility are mutually enriching and share many 
concepts. Consequently, some theories from one field of law travel to another 
field of law. Complicity is one example of such a shared notion. However, 
care needs be applied when comparing responsibility of a state and 
responsibility of an individual. It has been demonstrated in this chapter, using 
the example of complicity, that there are limits to such a comparison.  
It is due to the specific features of the law of state responsibility and 
international criminal law that the threshold for state complicity is higher than 
the threshold for individual complicity. At present the threshold for state 
complicity arguably remains at this high level in order to preserve the 
integrity of ‘complicity’ as a concept in both areas of law. The system of state 
responsibility at the moment lacks proper enforcement mechanisms when it 
comes to certain types of violations. It also lacks proper articulation of some 
criminal law concepts, such as the fault of a state.  Complicity of individuals 
in the commission of international crimes is far more developed than 
complicity of states. Following the Nuremberg trials, the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility, including complicity, has gained wide 
international acceptance and support. The same cannot be said about state 
complicity. 
Consequently, direct transposition of the concept of complicity from one area 
of law to another is not the most desirable approach. It is arguably more 
efficient to furnish proper analysis and articulation of this principle separately 
in the context of each discipline, relying on the realities of the particular area. 
The case law of the international criminal tribunals relating to individual 
complicity is a useful tool in developing the notion of state complicity, but it 
can only serve as a reference point and not as a substitute. The Furundžija 
case illustrates this point. The Furundžija Trial Chamber found the accused 
guilty of perpetrating torture (and not merely aiding and abetting the crime) 
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solely on the basis of the accused being behind the purpose of torture, namely 
obtaining the information through interrogation. By directly applying the 
same test to Binyam Mohamed case, one may come to the conclusion that the 
UK was not merely complicit in torture but rather perpetrated it because it 
appears from the facts of the case that UK’s purpose was precisely that of 
obtaining the information from Mohamed. However, such a conclusion would 
arguably be too controversial and far-reaching.  
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VI. The Correlation between Complicity and 
Sentencing 
Introduction 
The question of responsibility is closely intertwined with the question of 
punishment. It is difficult to perceive actions as criminal if they are not 
subject to punishment.
1
 In the dialogue between the offender and the 
community, punishment is an instrument of communication to the wrongdoer 
of public reprobation.
2
 The pain that the punishment inflicts, or the ‘hard 
treatment elements of punishment’, ensures that the offender does not ignore 
the message that society is trying to deliver to him or her.
3
  
This dialogue between the offender and the community becomes even more 
intense at an international level: the outrageous nature of international crimes 
and the amount of suffering sustained by the victims enhance public desire to 
subject the offender to legal censure.  Therefore, sentences handed down by 
the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, ECCC and SCSL have a huge impact on the accused, 
the victims and the society.
4
 The punishment becomes the measure of 
responsibility of the convicted person and it is usually widely publicized and 
discussed. Paradoxically, international criminal law lacks proper guidance on 
sentencing.
5
  There are no appropriate tools to help ‘translate’ the totality of 
criminal conduct of the accused into a numerical value. Therefore, it comes as 
no surprise that some legal commentators highlight the difficulty of 
predicting the length of the sentences to be handed down by the international 
courts.
6
   
Complicity as a mode of participation is an important indicator determining 
the degree of culpability of the accused during sanctioning in national law. As 
discussed in some detail in chapter four, most domestic legal systems 
distinguish between primary and secondary perpetrators for sentencing 
purposes. Mitigation of the sentence is one practical outcome of finding 
someone complicit in crime, as opposed to rendering him or her the primary 
perpetrator. National legal orders are quite explicit in this respect and can be 
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roughly divided into two camps: those that recognise more lenient sentences 
for accessories and those that treat all crime participants alike.
7
 Common law 
countries, as well as France, punish principals and accomplices alike at the 
legislative level. However, analysis of jurisprudence and doctrine reveals a 
more nuanced approach in individual cases. Other national legal systems, 
such as Germany, Spain or Russia, are more explicit in distinguishing 
between complicity and primary participation and their statutes stipulate that 
accomplices should receive more lenient sentences than primary 
perpetrators.
8
 The justification for a sentencing discount for an accessory is 
that his or her act is less wrongful, their state of mind is less culpable, or they 
lack the requisite hegemony over act.
9
 These explanations however raise 
questions even in the domestic law context. For example, should the 
accessory still receive a sentencing discount if his or her motive was worse 
than that of the primary perpetrator?
10
 
As international law targets senior leadership figures, often far removed from 
the scene of the crime, it presents even greater difficulty with respect to 
punishing accomplices. In many instances, the conduct of these individuals 
fits the legal definition of complicity. Can one safely assume that their 
culpability is less, simply because they were did not directly perpetrate the 
crime? The statutes of ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ECCC and ICC do not answer 
this question or explain the consequences attached to the distinct modes of 
liability they contain.
11
  The matter is further complicated by the introduction 
in international criminal law of various concepts constituting ‘borderline’ 
cases that lie between complicity and the actual commission of an offence. 
Joint criminal enterprise and co-perpetration often denote a level of 
involvement that, while not exactly amounting to perpetration, does not 
belong under the heading of complicity either.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the impact of complicity on 
sentences in international criminal law.  This is done in two ways. First, there 
is an in-depth analysis of the sentencing considerations contained in several 
judgements that are thought to be representative of sentencing decision-
making process at an international level. This is intended to elucidate the 
factors affecting the final outcome. Secondly, the table contained in Appendix 
IV reflects the correlation between the modes of participation and sentencing 
at the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC and SCSL in a more schematic way. The table 
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 G. Fletcher,1978, at 637; H. Olasolo in R. Haveman and O. Olusanya (eds), at 54. 
8
 A. Cassese, 2008, at 188. 
9
 G. Fletcher, 1978, at 654-656. 
10
 G. Fletcher, 1978, at 651. 
11
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197 
lists all persons convicted by the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts, the 
crimes that they were convicted of, their mode of liability and their respective 
sentences. The aim of this table is to show that the ‘final number’ largely 
depends on the type of crime charged and the scope of the indictment. 
Moreover, many convictions rely on several forms of participation and not 
just one.  
This chapter seeks to demonstrate three main points. First, that the processes 
of attributing responsibility and the imposition of a sentence are two distinct 
processes and should continue to be treated as such, especially in the context 
of international criminal law. This is in line with HLA Hart’s separation of 
conviction and punishment, which will be discussed in the section dealing 
with judicial discretion.
12
  
Secondly, the mode of liability under which the accused is convicted bears 
more weight at the stage of the attribution of responsibility than at the 
punishment stage. Empirical research of the sentencing practice in 
international criminal law supports this conclusion and shows that complicity 
by no means warrants a lesser sentence in international criminal law. Rather, 
it has some impact on the sentence along with other considerations.
13
 This is 
so because of the peculiar nature of international criminal law that targets 
primarily senior perpetrators who are not present at the scene of the crime.  
Thus, it is the totality of factors that judges take into consideration, and not 
one particular aspect.
14
 Consequently, in contrast with domestic law, the 
mode of participation does not speak so much to the gravity of the offence.  
Finally, in the absence of the sentencing regime in international criminal law, 
judicial discretion in determination of penalties is essential. The judges’ 
freedom to decide on the appropriate penalty after having taken into 
consideration the totality of factors, including the mode of participation of the 
accused, is one of the peculiarities of contemporary international criminal 
law. This is not necessarily a negative feature. However, it is important to 
establish a ‘cap’ on the exercise of this discretion by international judges. The 
most obvious way to do this is to define and rank the aims of punishment in 
international criminal law and to elaborate on a scale of crimes according to 
their gravity.  
The first part of this chapter outlines few sentencing principles contained in 
the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. The same section explores 
the effect of the forms of participation, in particular complicity, on 
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H.L.A. Hart and J. Gardner, at 185. 
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 Appendix IV. For the quantitative study of the ICTY sentencing practice see also B. Hola, 
A. Smeulers and C. Bijleveld, ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical Analisys of 
ICTY Sentencing Practice,’ 22 Leiden Journal of International Law, March 2009, at 79-97. 
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sentencing. This is done by looking at selected judgements emanating from 
the ad hoc tribunals, the hybrid courts and the ICC. The second part discusses 
punishment goals in international criminal law – any discussion on sentencing 
is incomplete without an elaboration of these goals. This section attempts to 
link the traditional justification for punishment utilized by domestic legal 
systems with the reality of international criminal law. In addition to that, the 
section strives to find a place for the mode of participation within the 
framework of each sentencing goal. The final third part of the chapter 
examines judicial discretion at sentencing. This section draws a distinction 
between the two stages of criminal trial – the stage leading to conviction, 
which places much emphasis on the mode of responsibility of the accused 
person, and the sentencing stage that focuses on the totality of factors in 
determining the punishment. Some conclusions are provided in the final part 
of this chapter. 
1. The Correlation between Complicity and Sentencing 
i. Statutory Sentencing Principles 
Before turning to the impact of complicity on punishment in the case law, it is 
important to identify some sentencing principles developed by the 
international criminal tribunals and the ICC. The Statutes of the ICC, ICTY, 
ICTR, and SCSL and the ECCC constituent documents provide minimum 
guidance on this aspect, allowing for wide judicial discretion.
15
 One can 
summarize a few general principles common to all of the abovementioned 
courts:
16
 
1. International criminal tribunals cannot impose the death penalty; 
2. There is a limited dialogue with the national criminal justice systems: 
The ICTY, ICTR and SCSL may have a recourse to the general 
practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the respective 
state, while the ICC may refer to national sentencing provisions in the 
complementarity analysis; 
3. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into 
account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person, as well as mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances. 
The first principle limits the Trial Chambers’ discretion to imposing custodial 
sentences only, supplemented by the option of ordering the forfeiture of 
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 A. Cassese, 2008, at 51. 
16
 See Articles 24 ICTY Statute, 22 ICTR Statute, Article 78 Rome Statute, Article 19 SCSL 
Statute, Articles 38-39 of the ECCC Law, Article 10 of the ECCC Agreement, Rule 101 
ICTY, ISTR and SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 98(5) of the ECCC Internal 
Rules, and Rule 145 ICC Rules of Evidence and Procedure, attached in the Appendix I. 
  
 
 
 
199 
unlawfully acquired assets. In relation to the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL,
17
 this 
excludes other types of punishment such as the death penalty, fines or 
community service.
18
  The Rome Statute provides for an option of a fine, in 
addition to the imprisonment.
19
 With regard to the length of imprisonment, 
neither ICTY nor ICTR Statutes prohibit life imprisonment,
20
 while the Rome 
Statute sets the maximum term at 30 years, allowing in exceptional cases for 
life imprisonment if justified by the extreme gravity of crimes and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person.
21
 The SCSL Statute 
requires that the imprisonment be for a limited number of years.
22
 
The second principle - the recourse to domestic sentencing practice at the 
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL– received some acclaim.23 However, it is generally 
not considered to be mandatory.
24
 The Appeals Chamber in Tadić noted 
“while the law and practice of the former Yugoslavia shall be taken into 
account by the Trial Chambers for the purposes of sentencing, […] a Trial 
Chamber’s discretion in imposing sentence is not bound by any maximum 
term of imprisonment applied in a national system.”25 National law plays a 
greater role when it comes to the enforcement of sentences of the convicted 
persons.
26
 The Rome Statute, on the other hand, does not suggest that the ICC 
should consider the scale of penalties of the relevant states.
27
  
Finally, the third principle, namely the factors to be considered at sentencing, 
received a detailed, albeit somewhat mechanical, explanation in the case law 
of international tribunals. The first part of the determination, the ‘gravity of 
offence’ has been referred to as “the litmus test for the appropriate sentence.” 
                                                             
17
 The ECCC regime differs from that of the SCSL, ICTY ICTR and the ICC in that “[t]he 
ECCC Agreement, the ECCC Law and the Internal Rules are otherwise silent as regards the 
principles and factors to be considered at sentencing. In particular, they do not indicate 
whether sentencing before the ECCC is governed by international or Cambodian legal rules, 
or some combination of each.” See Duch Judgment, § 575. The ECCC Supreme Court 
Chamber established the prevalence of international law over national sentencing provisions 
by holding that  “in accordance with the principle of lex specialis, the ECCC Law shall 
govern the range of penalty in proceedings before the ECCC.” Prosecutor v KAING Guek 
Eav alias Duch, ECCC, Case 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgment, 3 February 2012 
(‘Duch Appeal Judgment’), § 348. 
18
 G. Mettraux, 2005, at 343. 
19
 Article 77 (2) (a) Rome Statute. 
20
 Articles 23(1) ICTR Statute and 24(1) ICTY Statute. 
21
 Article 77 (1) Rome Statute. 
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 Article 19 (1) SCSL Statute. 
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murder, genocide and crimes against humanity. See Judgement, Muhimana (ICTR 95-1B-T), 
Trial Chamber, 28 April 2005, § 592. 
24
 A. Cassese, 2008, at 51- 52. 
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 Tadić Third Sentencing Judgment, § 21. 
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28
 Despite its apparent importance, this notion is not sufficiently clear in the 
jurisprudence of the tribunals,
29
 especially in the absence of a formal 
hierarchy of the offences in the statutes of the courts and tribunals.
30
  The 
courts describe ‘gravity of offence’ in a number of generic terms: the ICTR, 
for example, stated that in assessing the gravity of offences for which the 
accused has been found guilty, the Chamber takes into account the particular 
circumstances of the case as well as the nature and degree of his participation 
in the crimes.
31
  
The ICTY Appeals Chamber adopted a similar approach to understanding the 
gravity of the crime. It held in Krnojelac  “the starting point in any 
consideration of the appropriate sentence is the gravity of the conduct of the 
accused in the case in question” and clarified that the determination of this 
issue requires analysis “of the particular circumstances of the case, as well as 
of the form and degree of the participation of the accused in the crime.”32 In 
the RUF Sentencing Judgment, the SCSL has been more explicit in holding 
that the following factors need to be taken into account when assessing 
the seriousness of the offences for sentencing purposes: the scale and brutality 
of the offences, the role played by accused in their commission, the degree of 
suffering inflicted on victims as well as the number of victims.
33
  
The ICC, in the Lubanga sentencing decision, held that the ‘gravity of the 
crime’ is one of the principal factors to be considered in the determination of 
sentence. It should be in proportion to the crime and reflect the culpability of 
the convicted person.
34
 It is peculiar that the court inferred the requirement of 
proportionality from Article 81(2)(a) of the Rome Statute that provides for the 
possibility to appeal the sentence if it is disproportionate to the crime. 
Proportionality also played a major role in the jurisprudence of the other 
international courts: the ICTR Trial Chamber in Akayesu held that “sentence 
must reflect the predominant standard of proportionality between the gravity 
of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”35 The SCSL 
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 Akayesu Appeal Judgment, § 413. 
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 R. D. Sloane, at 722; M. B. Harmon and F. Gaynor, at 696-698; R. Cryer et al, at 498. 
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 R. Cryer et al, at 498. 
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in RUF also pointed out that sentences should be individual and proportionate 
to the severity of conduct of the offender.
36
 
In addition to the gravity of the offence, the judges consider mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances. Instruments of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL do not 
include the list of such circumstances, deliberately leaving them to the 
discretion of the judges.
37
 Examples of the aggravating factors include the 
role of the accused in the commission of crimes, that is his position of 
leadership, his discriminatory intent and the length of time during which the 
offence continued.
38
 The ICC’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure contain a 
non-exhaustive list of mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered at 
sentencing, such as the extent of the damage caused, the degree of 
participation of the convicted person, abuse of power and official capacity 
and others.
39
 
The example of the aggravating factor newly introduced in international 
criminal law is the ‘extraterritoriality of the acts of the convicted person’ in 
the Taylor case. The judges felt compelled to account for the fact that Taylor 
caused damage and suffering on the people of the neighbouring country and 
not simply his own.
40
 This freshly discovered aggravating factor reinforces 
two key points. First, the sentencing practice at an international level is still 
evolving. Second, individualization of sentences in international criminal law 
requires that the judges enjoy freedom in the imposition of sentences for the 
purposes of reflecting the unique set of facts surrounding each case. This 
stands in contrast with the majority of domestic criminal cases that are 
usually easier to place in a certain category.   
The three sentencing principles discussed above provide little guidance on the 
punishment of convicted persons.
41
 While there exist some 
fundamental sentencing rules, such as the exclusion of the death penalty, the 
specific length of incarceration is determined by relying on the generic 
notions, such as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of 
the accused. The judges thus enjoy broad discretion in crafting the content of 
these broad terms on a case-by-case basis. The next section demonstrates how 
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 RUF Sentencing Judgment. § 18. 
37
 RUF Sentencing Judgment, § 25; Prosecutor v. Obrenović, ICTY Case No. IT-02-60/2, 
Sentencing Judgement, 10 December 2003, § 91; Blaskić Appeal Judgement, § 685. 
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judges approach one of the ‘ingredients’ of sentencing considerations – the 
form of participation of the convicted person, which is a constituent element 
of ‘gravity of offence’. It appears to play only a limited role in sanctioning. 
ii. Case Law 
In the absence of the rigid statutory guidance, there are a number of factors 
that international criminal judges take into account at sentencing and it is 
difficult to single out one aspect that is dispositive.  Where does complicity fit 
in the equation? The mode of participation of the convicted person appears to 
be one of those factors. The SCSL in RUF noted that the mode of liability 
under which the accused is convicted may serve as an indication of his role in 
the crime, and  “aiding and abetting as a mode of liability generally warrants 
a lesser sentence than that imposed for a more direct form of participation”42 
Many ICTY and ICTR Chambers made similar pronouncements to that 
effect.
43
 For example the Šljivančanin Appeals Chamber acknowledged the 
practice of treating aiding and abetting as a lower form of responsibility 
attracting a lesser sentence. However, it held that it is the gravity of the 
underlying crimes that remains an important consideration in assessing the 
totality of the criminal conduct.
44
 The Appeals Chamber in Taylor took a 
different approach. It held that  “there is no hierarchy or distinction for 
sentencing purposes between forms of criminal participation.”45 
In practice, the form of participation of the accused bears a relative value.
46
 
The table on the impact of the liability mode on sentencing at the ICTY, 
ICTR, SCSL, ICC and the ECCC contained in Appendix IV shows that a 
combination of factors affects the length of the sentence of the accused. First, 
it is clear from the table that the ICTY has on average a more lenient 
sentencing policy that the ICTR, while the ICTR is in turn more lenient than 
the SCSL. Secondly, the types of crime as well as the number of criminal acts 
underlying the conviction play an important role at sentencing. Genocide 
usually attracts heavier penalties; the more crimes that the individual is found 
responsible for, the longer is his sentence.
47
 Finally, on the basis of the 
cumulative sentencing principle, internationally convicted persons frequently 
receive a single sentence for different criminal acts and different modes of 
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 RUF Sentencing Judgment, §§ 19-21. 
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participation that attach to these acts. This peculiarity makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to distil the exact impact of complicity on the ‘final figure’. 
The empirical research of the ICTY sentencing dynamics conducted by Hola, 
Smeulers and Bijleveld pointed to interesting conclusions. It showed that the 
final average sentence for perpetrators, 17.3 years of imprisonment, is very 
close in value to the final average sentence for aiders and order-givers – 16.2 
and 16.8 years of imprisonment, respectively. Moreover, the other types of 
accomplices receive an even more severe punishment than the actual 
perpetrators – 18.5 years is the average sentence for planners, and 20.7 – for 
instigators.
48
  On the other hand, members of a joint criminal enterprise 
receive a lenient average sentence of 14.6 years of imprisonment. This is 
despite the fact that participation in the joint criminal enterprise counts as a 
primary mode of responsibility.
 49
  
Therefore, one can conclude that it is the combination of factors that 
predetermines the final sentence, and the mode of responsibility plays only a 
limited role. In this respect, it is also instructive to look at several cases across 
the tribunals with the prospect of establishing how complicity, or the mode of 
participation in general, fits into the pattern of judicial thinking at sentencing. 
This exercise has the benefit of including the factual component in the 
discussion on sentencing that is missing from the statistical overview 
provided in the Appendix IV.  
Tadić, the first international criminal law trial in the modern era, provides a 
compelling example of the limited significance of complicity and the 
importance of the other factors at sentencing. Duško Tadić was a member of 
the Serbian Democratic Party in the town of Kosarić. He was convicted of 
various acts of violence against the non-Serb population in this district, 
including aiding and abetting prisoner beatings and killing two Muslim police 
officers.
 50
 Tadić’s initial sentence of twenty years of imprisonment was 
largely motivated by the fact that the accused could not be considered to have 
played a significant leadership or organizational role in the events that 
occurred in Prijedor.
51
  
Tadić’s sentence has been revisited twice after that: once by the Trial 
Chamber after the Appeal Judgment came out,
52
 and again by the Appeals 
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 B. Hola, A. Smeulers and C. Bijleveld, at 91. 
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 Vasiljević Appeal Judgment, § 95; Tadić Appeal Judgement, § 188; Krnojelac Appeal 
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Chamber itself.
53
 Upon the first review, the Trial Chamber increased Tadić’s 
sentence to twenty five years imprisonment following the finding that Tadić 
was responsible for the killing of five men pursuant to the notion of ‘common 
design’ of the joint criminal enterprise, as opposed to aiding and abetting 
these crimes.
54
 Tadić appealed both the initial sentencing judgment and the 
subsequent one, on the basis that the gravity of the offence and his culpability 
were not sufficiently reflected in the sentence. The Appeals Chamber agreed 
with the accused that the sentence of twenty-five years failed to reflect the 
relative insignificance of his role in the broader context of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia. The Appeals Chamber reduced Tadić’s sentence to 
twenty years, holding that while the conduct of which the accused stood 
convicted was heinous, his level in the command structure of the whole ethnic 
cleaning campaign was relatively low.
55
  
In contrast with Tadić, Aleksovski was found guilty of aiding and abetting 
and not guilty of membership in the joint criminal enterprise. The ICTY held 
that Aleksovski’s presence during the maltreatment of hundreds of non-Croat 
prisoners in Bosnia in his capacity as commander of the prison represented a 
tacit encouragement of the crimes.
56
 This maltreatment qualified as outrages 
upon personal dignity as violations of the laws and customs of war.
57
 The 
Trial Chamber sentenced Aleksovski to two and a half years imprisonment 
based on the consideration that his direct participation in the commission of 
the acts of violence was relatively limited.
58
 The Prosecution appealed, 
arguing that the sentence of two and a half years custody failed to achieve the 
two main purposes of sentencing in international criminal law, it being 
disproportionate to the magnitude of the offence
59
 and lacking a sufficient 
deterrent effect.
60
  
The Appeals Chamber was not especially influenced by the deterrence 
rationale and used the test developed by previous tribunals in order to assess 
whether the gravity of the offence was given due consideration. It discussed 
whether the circumstances of the case as well as the form and degree of 
participation of the accused in the crime justify such a lenient sentence.
61
 It 
concluded that while the accused may have had a secondary role in the 
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commission of crimes in prison, the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient 
weight to the gravity of his conduct because Aleksovski was a commander 
and as such the person in authority who had the power to prevent crimes in 
the prison. The Appeals Chamber therefore increased the sentence of the 
accused to seven years of imprisonment.
62
 
Aleksovski is one of the infrequent instances when the Appeals Chamber felt 
compelled to increase the sentence of the accused.
63
 It appears that when 
initially delivering a lenient sentence of two and half years, the Trial Chamber 
was guided by recognition of Aleksovski’s peripheral position in the 
commission of the crimes and the fact that he was not perpetrating them but 
merely aiding and abetting. The mode of liability of the accused was therefore 
central in the Trial Chamber’s reasoning. The Appeals Chamber re-
established that a number of factors must be evaluated in order to determine 
the gravity of the crime, not only the degree of the participation of the 
accused but also his role in the context of the conflict and circumstances of 
the case. 
The Vasiljevic case is a rare example of when a sentencing discount was 
based almost exclusively on the mode of participation of the convicted 
person. Mitar Vasiljevic was a member of Serbian paramilitary unit operating 
in Eastern Bosnia.
64
 The Trial Chamber established that around 7 June 1992 
the accused, together with several other paramilitaries, forcibly transported 
seven Bosnian Muslim civilians to the eastern bank of the Drina River, where 
five of the victims were executed while two men managed to escape.
65
 Prior 
to transporting the civilians to the execution site, Vasiljevic held them at 
gunpoint in the nearby hotel. The Trial Chamber convicted Vasiljevic as a co-
perpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise. To incur liability as a member of 
the joint criminal enterprise, the accused must share a criminal intent with the 
principal offender.
66
 The Trial Chamber in Vasiljevic inferred intent from the 
acts of the accused, holding that ‘the only reasonable inference available on 
the evidence is that the accused, by his actions, intended that the seven 
Muslim men be killed, whether or not he actually carried out any of those 
                                                             
62
 Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, §§ 183, 184 and 191 as discussed by K. Khan and R. Dixon, 
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killings himself.’ 67  The Trial Chamber convicted Vasiljevic of murder in 
respect of five men and inhumane acts in respect of two survivors.
68
 
Vasiljevic was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment.
69
 
The Appeals Chamber, on the other hand, held that it has not been established 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused shared a criminal intent to kill.
70
  
However, the Appeals Chamber recognized that the accused knew that his 
actions would assist the killings because he guarded the victims prior to the 
shootings, walked them to the place of the executions, and was present at the 
time when the killings took place. His actions had significant effect on the 
commission of the crime. Based on these considerations, the Appeals 
Chamber reversed the finding that Vasiljevic was a co-perpetrator in the joint 
criminal enterprise and found him guilty of aiding and abetting murder and 
inhumane acts.
71
 The new finding in relation to Vasiljevic’s form of liability 
prompted the Appeals Chamber to adjust his sentence.
72
 The Chamber 
reversed the sentence from twenty to fifteen years imprisonment based on the 
view that aiding and abetting generally warrants a lesser sentence than is 
appropriate for responsibility as a co-perpetrator.
73
 Such a sentence, in the 
view of the Appeals Chamber, reflected the inherent gravity of the criminal 
conduct of the accused, the form and the degree of his participation, and the 
circumstances of the case.
74
   
The ICTR judges also chose between primary and secondary participation on 
a number of occasions. For example, in the Akayesu case the trial bench 
analysed whether the actions of the local teacher in the Taba municipality of 
Rwanda were merely a manifestation of an accomplice liability, or whether 
they constituted an actual commission.
75
 The judges held that Jean-Paul 
Akayesu incurred individual criminal liability for “having ordered, 
committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the preparation or execution of 
the killing of and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
Tutsi group.”76  Such an extensive participation in genocidal acts led the 
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Chamber to conclude that Akayesu was responsible for genocide and not 
merely for complicity in genocide.
77
  
The Trial Chamber sentenced Akayesu to life imprisonment for genocide and 
incitement to commit genocide, fifteen years of imprisonment for rape and 
fifteen years of imprisonment for murder.
 78
  In arriving at such a conclusion, 
the judges assessed his personal role in the crimes committed in Taba. In 
particular, the tribunal noted Akayesu’s position of authority in the local 
municipality and his duty to protect the population whose confidence he had 
betrayed.
79
 The Trial Chamber pointed out that Akayesu’s relatively low 
ranking in the government of Rwanda could serve as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing, whereas his deliberate choice to participate in killings and rapes 
of Tutsi population through orders and tacit encouragement constituted a 
powerful aggravating factor, one which clearly outweighed the mitigating 
one.  
At the sentencing stage, the tribunal placed the magnitude of the crime at the 
centre of its considerations. Life imprisonment for genocide stands in contrast 
to the fifteen years of imprisonment for all other crimes committed by 
Akayesu, including murder and rape.
80
 Despite the fact that the judges went 
to some length in specifying the mode of participation of the accused, this 
consideration seems to have occupied a rather peripheral role at sentencing, 
with the gravity of the crime of genocide taking centre stage.  
The SCSL sentencing judgment in Taylor exemplifies sentencing practice for 
complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is not particularly 
lengthy and builds on the past jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and the 
SCSL. From the beginning the Trial Chamber acknowledged that in the case 
law of the ad hoc tribunals aiding and abetting attracts a lesser sentence than 
that to be imposed for primary forms of participation. Despite recognising 
this, the Chamber highlighted that the unique circumstances of the case are 
the dominant factor in its sentencing considerations.
81
 Charles Taylor’s 
factual contribution to the crimes committed in Sierra Leone appeared to be 
significant. The Chamber found that the RUF/AFRC heavily and 
frequently relied on the material aid supplied and facilitated by the convicted 
person, who also provided other forms of practical assistance that 
substantially contributed to the commission of the crimes while fully aware of 
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the essential elements of these crimes.
82
 The ‘label’ of secondary participation 
did not alleviate the gravity of Charles Taylor’s acts in the eyes of the Trial 
Chamber. 
Two main aggravating factors appeared to attract the most weight for penalty 
purposes: Taylor’s presidency and the extraterritoriality of his acts. The court 
placed him “in a class of his own” when deciding upon the penalty, while 
stressing that, as president of Liberia and a member of ECOWAS committee, 
Charles Taylor held a position of public trust with inherent authority that he 
abused.
83
 The fact that Taylor intervened in the affairs of another state by 
supporting the violence in the neighbouring Sierra Leone and not in his 
own country, thus violating the principle of customary international law, 
further aggravated his sentence.
84
 Consequently, it was Charles Taylor’s 
leadership position as the former president of Liberia as well as the 
extraterritorial nature of his crimes and not the means of his involvement in 
the crimes that played the key role at sentencing and resulted in him receiving 
a lengthy sentence of fifty years of imprisonment.
85
  
The Taylor Appeals judgement upheld Charles Taylor’s conviction and 50-
year sentence for aiding and abetting and planning murders, rapes and other 
acts of violence committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war.
86
 However, 
the appellate panel disagreed with the Trial Chamber that aiding and abetting 
generally warrants a lesser sentence than that imposed for primary 
participation.
87
 The judges held that it is unwise to assess the gravity of 
participation modes in abstract as it precludes the individualized assessment 
of cases.
88
 Instead, the better approach is to evaluate the totality of factors: 
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber holds that the totality principle 
exhaustively describes the criteria for determining an appropriate sentence that is in 
accordance with the Statute and Rules, and further holds that under the Statute, Rules 
and customary international law, there is no hierarchy or distinction for sentencing 
purposes between forms of criminal participation. The Appeals Chamber concludes 
that the Trial Chamber erred in law by holding that aiding and abetting liability 
generally warrants a lesser sentence than other forms of criminal participation.
89
 
The RUF case closely resembles Taylor both factually and legally. In this 
case, the SCSL convicted three high profile members of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) - Sesay, Kallon and Gbao - of war crimes and crimes 
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against humanity, stemming from their participation in a single joint criminal 
enterprise with a broadly defined common criminal purpose to take power 
and control of Sierra Leone through committing crimes such as terrorism, 
rape, enslavement, murder, attacks on UN personnel, forced marriages and 
recruitment of child soldiers.
90
 The Chamber held that Sesay and Kallon 
contributed significantly to the furtherance of the common purpose in the 
knowledge that their actions were part of the widespread and systematic 
attack against the civilian population. In contrast, the bench largely inferred 
Gbao’s participation and contribution to the joint criminal enterprise from his 
“important role and oversight functions”.91 This resulted in the conviction of 
Gbao pursuant to the basic form of joint criminal enterprise for crimes that he 
did not intend to commit. 
Both the Trial and Appeals Chambers held that so long as the accused had 
agreed to the common criminal purpose, he is responsible for all the natural 
and foreseeable consequences flowing from the execution of that 
purpose, however remote they might have been from the defendant’s own 
intentions.
92
 This finding represented an unjustified extension of the joint 
criminal enterprise concept through abandoning the ‘intent’ requirement for 
mens rea. Ultimately, Gbao’s sentence of twenty-five years 
of imprisonment, as opposed to fifty-two and forty years for the co-accused, 
reflects his lower level of participation in the joint criminal enterprise. The 
Trial Chamber found Gbao’s involvement in the overall scheme to be more 
limited than that of his co-defendants, thus decreasing his degree of 
culpability for sentencing purposes.
93
 In particular, the Chamber noted that 
Gbao was a functionary of the RUF whose chief contribution to the joint 
criminal enterprise was ideological inspiration and enslavement of civilians.
94
 
If one compares Charles Taylor’s role with the role of the accused in the other 
SCSL cases, such as the RUF case, Taylor’s overall contribution to the crimes 
in Sierra Leone appears more comparable to the contributions of Sesay and 
Kallon, who received a punishment of fifty-two and forty years of 
imprisonment respectively, rather than that of Gbao, whose knowledge and 
intent were largely inferred. 
The ICC has yet to define the role of complicity at sentencing. The only 
available sentencing judgement in Lubanga provides, however, some 
important insights on the modes of participation. It reinforces the point that it 
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is the totality of factors that shape the punishment of the accused. Thomas 
Lubanga was convicted as a direct co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) 
of the Rome Statute for his role in the implementation of the common plan to 
build an army for the purpose of establishing and maintaining political and 
military control over the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
that resulted in the enlistment, conscription and use of children below the age 
of fifteen to participate actively in hostilities.
95
  Following a defence request, 
the Lubanga Trial Chamber held a separate sentencing hearing and delivered 
a separate sentencing decision, assessing the factors relevant to the sentence 
of the accused.
96
  Thomas Lubanga was sentenced separately for conscripting, 
enlisting and using children under the age of fifteen to participate in the 
hostilities (thirteen, twelve and fourteen years, respectively).
97
  His joint 
sentence amounted to 14 years’ imprisonment. 98 
Lubanga’s relatively low sentence reflects several considerations by the Trial 
Chamber.  One the one hand, the judges acknowledged that the crimes of 
conscripting, enlisting and using children are very serious, especially with the 
view of the vulnerability of the victims.
99
  In the context of the discussion on 
the gravity of offences, the panel stressed that the sentence should be 
proportionate to the crime,
100
 reinforcing the retributive rationale at 
sentencing.
 
The Chamber rejected as disproportionate the approach suggested 
by the prosecution to set the "baseline" or starting point for all sentences at 
approximately 80% from the statutory maximum of 30 years of 
imprisonment.
101
  On the other hand, the Trial Chamber did not find any 
aggravating factors in the case at issue, while Lubanga’s continuous 
cooperation despite multiple failures of the prosecution was considered a 
mitigating factor.
102
 Moreover, when discussing the degree of participation of 
the convicted person, the judges attributed particular importance to the fact 
that the Chamber did not find that Thomas Lubanga meant to conscript and 
enlist boys and girls under the age of fifteen into the army and use them to 
participate actively in hostilities, but that instead he was aware that, in the 
ordinary course of events, this would occur.
103
 Therefore, Lubanga was found 
to possess indirect intent in the meaning of Article 30 of the Rome Statute.
104
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Thus, without discussing the mode of participation as such, the Trial Chamber 
acknowledged that the fault requirement is an important factor in the 
determination of sentences.  
What follows from Tadić, Aleksovski, Akayesu, RUF, Lubanga and Taylor is 
that the mode of liability has limited impact on the sentences of the convicted 
persons. There are a number of factors affecting the judicial determination of 
penalties. In Tadić, the finding that Dusko Tadić is not a mere aider and 
abettor but a perpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise led to a slight increase 
in his sentence. However, the Appeals Chamber felt compelled to reduce 
this sentence and return to the original length of imprisonment, placing 
most significance on the fact that Tadić was a low-level perpetrator, and not 
on his membership in the joint criminal enterprise. In Akayesu, the gravity of 
the crime of genocide occupied a central role at sentencing. The ICC 
convicted Thomas Lubanga as a direct co-perpetrator, yet he received a 
relatively lenient punishment of fourteen years of imprisonment due to his 
lesser mental state (indirect intent), the absence of aggravating factors, and 
his cooperation with the court as a mitigating factor. 
The cases discussed in this section also demonstrate that the relationship 
between the mode of participation and the severity of punishment is not 
straightforward. Complicity does not necessarily warrant a lesser sentence. 
Charles Taylor received a harsh penalty of fifty years of imprisonment for 
aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is a 
plausible approach: an adequate sentence in international criminal law does 
not hinge on the abstract label attached to the conduct of the convicted 
person, but stems from the overall assessment of the various factors on a 
case-by-case basis – something that can only be performed if enough 
flexibility is afforded to the judges. However, judicial discretion may have a 
downside when judges resolve problems associated with the attribution 
of liability at the stage of sentencing. The latter seems to be the case in RUF, 
where the Trial Chamber struggled to convict the accused Gbao of some the 
crimes charged under the heading of the joint criminal enterprise – a mode of 
liability that requires proof of intent. As a result, the Chamber compensated 
for the tenuous connection between Gbao and some of the crimes in 
the indictment by imposing a more lenient sentence. 
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2. Sentencing Objectives at Crossroads: Domestic and 
International Law 
i. Sentencing Objectives in International Criminal Law 
It follows from the cases discussed in the previous section that complicity, as 
opposed to primary perpetration, has some impact on the sentence of the 
accused, yet it is hard to measure this impact due to a number of other factors 
that affect judicial decision-making. Punishment objectives or goals help to 
systemize these considerations. They may determine the length and the form 
of punishment imposed upon the offender as well as the weight of the liability 
form at sentencing. Despite the importance of articulating sentencing 
rationales, the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL Statutes do not specify the aims of 
sentencing.
105
  The Rome Statute also fails to take a stance on the issue, aside 
from stating in the preamble: “Determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes.”106 The first sentencing judgement of the ICC in Lubanga embraces 
this statement but does not elaborate further on sentencing aims, preferring to 
focus on the specific sentencing principles instead.
 107
   
Upon examination the case law of international tribunals appears to point 
towards retribution and deterrence as the primary aims of punishment.
108
 
As early as 1996, the Erdemović Trial Chamber of the ICTY adopted 
“retribution, or ‘just deserts’, as legitimate grounds for pronouncing a 
sentence for crimes against humanity, the punishment having to be 
proportional to the gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.” 
109
 The Erdemović Chamber also acknowledged the limited value of 
deterrence at sentencing by reiterating that general prevention is ‘intimately 
related’ to the reprobative function of legal punishment.110 The Tadić Appeals 
Chamber confirmed that deterrence must not be accorded undue prominence 
in the overall assessment of the sentences to be imposed on the convicted 
persons.
111
 Finally, Erdemović mentioned the rehabilitative function of 
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punishment, which in the context of international criminal law, should be 
subordinate to the other two rationales.
112
 
Since Erdemović case law of the tribunals has not elaborated significantly on 
sentencing goals.
113
   The rehabilitation rationale does not seem to be 
accepted as relevant at the level of international criminal law, despite 
occasional passing references.
114
 The general discussions relating to the 
gravity offence reinforce the principle of retribution in international criminal 
law. The judgments, however, do not provide any further guidance on how 
retribution as a punishment aim ‘works’ within the ambit of international 
criminal law, nor do they explain the consequences of holding retribution and 
deterrence as the main sentencing goals. 
When it comes to deterrence, the courts have been even less explicit. The 
2004 appeal judgement in Kordić and Čerkez made an unsuccessful attempt 
to define retribution and deterrence for the purposes of international criminal 
law.
115
  Citing the Supreme Court of Canada, it held that retribution should be 
seen as  
“an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate 
punishment which properly reflects the […] culpability of the offender, 
having regard to the international risk-taking of the offender, the 
consequential harm caused by the offender, and the normative 
character of the offender’s conduct. Furthermore, unlike vengeance, 
retribution incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution requires the 
imposition of a just and appropriate punishment […]”116 
There is a misquotation in the above passage – the original paragraph referred 
to the ‘intentional’ and not ‘international’ risk-taking of the offender. 
Therefore, there is nothing in the definition originally provided by the 
Canadian Supreme Court that explains retribution in international context.
117
  
In fact, the combination ‘international risk-taking of the offender’ does not 
entirely ‘fit’ within the retributive rationale. Inhibition of risk-taking 
behaviour in potential perpetrators through the fear of punishment is precisely 
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the attribute of the deterrent, not just deserts, philosophy.
118
 In the original 
version, however, the domestic court stressed not the risk-taking per se, but 
rather the intentional risk-taking as an indication of the culpability of the 
offender. If the word ‘intentionally’ is omitted or replaced by another word, 
the description of retribution no longer holds. Moreover, even overlooking 
the misquotation, one should bear in mind that the quote is taken out of the 
context: in the original paragraph, the court was not concerned with providing 
a comprehensive definition of the ‘retributive’ rationale.119 It is unfortunate 
that both Krajišnik appeal judgement and Popović trial judgements copied the 
above definition verbatim,
120
 despite the mistake. 
The Kordić and Čerkez appeals panel also relatively unsuccessfully 
elaborated on the meaning of deterrence. First, the court rightfully pointed out 
that individual deterrence aims at disheartening the offender from 
reoffending. However, it then continued to state that general deterrence 
“refers to the attempt to integrate or to reintegrate those persons who believe 
themselves to be beyond the reach of international criminal law”121, thereby 
conflating the rehabilitative sentencing purposes,
122
 which aims precisely at 
reintegration of the offender, with the concept of general deterrence. The 
subsequent Krajišnik and Popović appeal judgements, despite citing the 
original Kordić and Čerkez judgment, managed to remedy this confusion by 
restating that international penalties “should be adequate to deter the 
convicted person from committing any future violation, it must also have the 
effect of discouraging other potential perpetrators from committing the same 
or similar crimes.”123 
The ECCC and ICC pioneered an important new development in international 
sentencing - an attempt to incorporate victims’ rights, including the rights to 
reparation and compensation, within the international criminal justice 
paradigm.
124
 This attempt corresponds to the restorative justice philosophy of 
punishment. The ICC reinforced the restorative rationale in its recent decision 
in Lubanga setting out the principles on reparation pursuant to Article 75(1) 
of the Rome Statute and ordered the registry to transmit the individual 
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applications to the Victims Trust Fund.
125
 The court held “[t]he Statute and 
the Rules introduce a system of reparations that reflects a growing recognition 
in international criminal law that there is a need to go beyond the notion of 
punitive justice, towards a solution which is more  inclusive, encourages 
participation and recognizes the need to provide effective remedies for 
victims.”126  
The court in Lubanga named a few of the functions of reparations: relieving 
the suffering caused by the offences; affording justice to the victims by 
alleviating the consequences of the wrongful acts; deterring future violations; 
contributing to the effective reintegration of former child soldiers, as well as 
reconciling the offender, the victim and wider community.
127
  The court 
failed, however, to explain the process whereby all of these goals could be 
achieved, especially the scope of the process. The ICC noted that reparations 
should not be limited to ‘direct’ harm or the ‘immediate effects’ of the crimes 
of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15, and that the 
standard of ‘proximate cause’ must be adopted. It failed, however, to provide 
a definition for this standard.
128
  
In contrast with the ICC, the ECCC did not issue a separate decision on 
reparations, preferring to include the relevant section in the judgment, 
immediately after the section on sentencing.
129
 Despite keeping reparations 
and sentencing separate in the trial chamber judgment, the restorative justice 
discourse affected KAING Guek Eav’s final sentence of life imprisonment. 
The Supreme Court Chamber held that the initial sentence of 35 of years of 
imprisonment does not appropriately reflect the gravity of his crimes. The 
underlying rationale for imposing a harsher penalty was the need to cure the 
sufferings of the victims. The Supreme Court Chamber clarified: “[a]lthough 
the punishment of  KAING Guek Eav does not completely cure their 
suffering, the victims’ fair and reasonable expectations for justice deserve to 
be fulfilled. KAING Guek Eav’s crimes were an affront to all of humanity, 
and in particular, to the Cambodian people, inflicting incurable pain.”130 
It follows that since Erdemović, international criminal law has not made 
much progress in elaborating punishment goals. The Lubanga reparation 
decision is one exception. But even this decision lacks clarity with respect to 
                                                             
125
 Prosecutor v. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, 7 August 
2012 (‘Lubanga Reparation Decision’), § 289. 
126
 Ibid, 177. 
127
 Ibid, § 179. 
128
 Ibid, § 249. 
129
 Duch Trial Judgment, section 4.1 et sq. 
130
 Duch Appeal Judgment, §§ 381-383. 
  
 
 
 
216 
the process and the standard of causation. Its main function is to shift the 
burden of reparations onto the shoulders of the Victims Trust Fund.  
When reading the short accounts of punishment goals -explicitly or implicitly 
mentioned in the international judgements- one gets the impression that they 
are directly borrowed from domestic law. There is no accompanying 
assessment of how these goals can be accommodated in an international 
criminal law context. This state of affairs in sentencing is quite distinct from 
the situation that exists in relation to the stage leading to conviction that is 
quite autonomous. The latter defines the modes of liability and the 
substantive crimes with a reference to international treaties and customs; 
domestic law only serves secondary purposes. For example complicity, albeit 
being widely accepted as a form of criminal participation in all domestic legal 
systems, frequently gives way to the new, ‘custom-made’, modes of liability, 
such as the joint criminal enterprise and the co-perpetration, specifically 
designed for the purposes of international criminal law.
131
 
One should be careful, however, with borrowing domestic law punishment 
rationales and transplanting them directly into international criminal law. As 
with any other municipal law concept, it should first be first reduced to the 
level of a general principle and then transposed into international law in a 
way that addresses the reality of the international legal order.
132
 This is 
particularly true when it comes to punishment, if only because sentencing 
objectives designed for the offenders within the domestic penal system may 
not have the same content or produce the same effect in international criminal 
law.
133
  This does not mean, however, that national sentencing goals are 
irrelevant for international law. Quite the opposite, international criminal law 
requires a profound understanding of the domestic philosophy of punishment 
in order to formulate sentencing goals at an international level. 
ii. Sentencing Objectives in Domestic Law 
It seems that international criminal law embraces two main rationales – 
retribution and deterrence. Rehabilitation also surfaces in some judgements, 
although its role is limited. The ICC is pioneering the restorative justice 
philosophy in international criminal law. Below is short account of these 
punishment aims as they are understood in the of context of domestic law. 
Special emphasis is placed on the treatment of accomplices within each 
rationale. 
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The philosophy of retribution finds its support in the work of Immanuel 
Kant.
134
 In 1797, Kant treated the law of retribution (ius talionis) as the only 
suitable sentencing principle of pure and strict justice, free from extraneous 
considerations. In Kantian philosophy, the principle of punishment is a 
categorical imperative.
135
 Those who commit crimes violate the public order 
by treating themselves as exceptions to the law.
136
 They become unworthy 
citizens and need to be punished for the sake of re-establishing the 
equilibrium that they broke. Punishment becomes the instrument of justice, 
and justice is essential for functioning of the society, “for if justice goes, there 
is no longer any value in men's living on the earth.”137  
Kant’s theory embraces the idea of unqualified punishment. He wrote that 
“whatever underserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that 
you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal 
form him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike yourself; if 
you kill him, you kill yourself.” 138  In case of murder, for example, the 
offender must die because “there is no substitute that will satisfy justice”.139 
The modern account of the retributive, or ‘just deserts’, philosophy is less 
categorical; it no longer requires that the suffering of the offender is equal to 
the harm done.
140
 Rather, it calls for the punishments that are individual and 
proportionate to the seriousness of criminal conduct.
141
 
This philosophy implies that punishment for crime must be proportionate to 
its relative seriousness, which is measured by the harm produced by the crime 
and the culpability of the offender.
142
 Retribution is about treating the 
wrongdoer as a moral agent. Punishment conveys blame through the 
deprivation.
143
 Two contemporary proponents of this rationale, Andrew von 
Hirsch and RA Duff both maintain that the main function of the criminal 
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sanction in the retributive sentencing framework is to communicate to the 
offender public disapprobation of his past deeds.
144
  
The gradation of sentences depending on the mode of participation is the best 
fit within this sentencing objective as it is intrinsically linked to offender’s 
level of culpability. The understanding that accomplices - as opposed to 
primary perpetrators - receive a more lenient sentence rests on the assumption 
that accomplice’s culpability is lower than that of the perpetrator.  
In contrast with retribution that is looks back at the past deeds of the offender, 
the deterrent rationale is forward-looking. It aims at reducing crime through 
the fear of punishment.
145
  Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria’s works 
account for this philosophy. Beccaria wrote “the purpose of punishment […] 
is none other than to prevent the criminal from doing fresh harm to fellow 
citizens and to deter others from doing the same.”146 Like the retributivists, 
Beccaria referred to proportionality, putting, however, a different meaning in 
this term. He maintained that proportionality between the crime and 
punishment is observed if the obstacles that deter men from committing a 
crime are more formidable, the more those crimes are contrary to the public 
good and the greater the incentives to commit them.
147
   
Beccaria argued against cruel punishments because, in his view, for the 
punishment to achieve its objective it is only necessary that the harm that it 
inflicts outweighs the benefit that derives from the crime and that the 
punishment is certain.
148
 Beccaria also reasoned in favour of punishing 
accomplices. He drew parallels between those who attempt to commit crimes 
and accomplices to a crime, not all of whom are its direct perpetrators. 
Beccaria’s claim was that the action preceding the commission of a crime 
shows a clear intent to carry it out (be it an attempted crime or an act of 
complicity) and deserves punishment, albeit less severe than what is 
prescribed for the actual execution of the crime. The punishment is justified 
by the need to prevent the execution of the crime and the lesser penalty 
motivates the offender to withdraw from the risk-taking enterprise before its 
commission.
149
 
Jeremy Bentham developed Beccaria’s ideas.150 He argued that in order to 
prevent reoccurrence of the offence it is important to make the offender afraid 
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of offending. This can be achieved by making the pain of punishment 
outweigh the pleasure of offending. Bentham held that excessive penalties are 
justified because they deter a particular offender from re-offending (specific 
deterrence) and instigate fear of offending in all members of the public 
(general deterrence). 
151
 With regard to different ways in which individuals 
get involved in crimes, Bentham noted that there shall be some general 
convergence as to the quantity of punishment intended for similar offenders, 
but individual circumstnaces need to be taken into account.
152
 
In addition to deterrence, the reform and rehabilitation of the offender 
represents another utilitarian sentencing goal in domestic law. As Bentham 
put it, one of the ways to prevent crime is to take away the desire to offend.
153
 
The rehabilitative model focuses on reforming the offender’s character and 
motivation to commit crimes by tackling the root causes of offending. The 
rehabilitative model acknowledges that the majority of offenders come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, and it is the state’s duty to provide programs to 
support them.
154
  The mode of participation of the offender could be 
indicative of his or her proneness to rehabilitation but this largely depends on 
the circumstances of the case.  
Finally, there is the restorative justice paradigm, with the emphasis on 
compensation for the harm suffered. The restorative approach as a 
punishment applies only to the direct or primary victims, while restorative 
justice in a broader sense also affects secondary victims.
155
 In the latter case, 
punishment may be a side effect, but the main goal of the restorative 
approach is restitution and compensation.
156
 This rationale is similar to 
retribution in that it is backward looking, but it shifts the focus from the 
offender to the harm caused by the crime and the ways in which this harm can 
be repaired.
157
 The process whereby amends are made is as important as the 
outcome.
158
 Domestic criminal justice systems face a great challenge in 
combining restoration and retribution in a single punishment. The two 
sentencing aims are not however irreconcilable.
159
  There are at least three 
ways of facilitating restoration through retribution: first, through imposing the 
‘suffering’ on the offender by subjecting him to censure; second, by having 
the offender feel remorse; and, finally, by vesting on the offender an 
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obligation to make reparation to the victim.
160
  If one views restorative justice 
as a punishment goal it is essential that there is a causal link between the 
actions of the offender, and the harm suffered by the victims. 
The mode of participation of the offender, arguably, does not play an 
important role within the restorative paradigm stricto sensu. This is because 
the focus is on the harm done and the relationships broken by the offence, and 
not merely on the offender. However, this philosophy gives complicity a 
broader meaning. Kutz, for example, argued that our current practices of 
accountability (the term he uses to refer to responsibility) are relational and 
positional rather than individualistic and retributivist. He claimed that 
accountability should be understood through the relationship between an 
agent (an individual causing harm) and the respondent (the victim).
161
 The 
individualistic approach to accountability fails to reflect the special nature of 
associative wrongdoing, in particular the culpability of the agent in the 
context of his relationship with the respondent. For Kutz, criminal 
responsibility of accomplices for their confederates’ acts is defensible only if 
viewed in relation to the actions of the respondent and if the individual 
differences in culpability are taken into account.
162
   
iii. Challenges of Adapting the Sentencing Objectives to 
International Law 
Looking at the sparse account of sentencing aims in international judgments, 
one gets the impression that punishment rationales are not properly discussed 
in the context of international criminal law. At times, the judges lean towards 
one specific philosophy, without properly justifying it. For example, Taylor’s 
political leadership placed him in a special category for deterrence purposes: 
the severe penalties in his case highlight the abuse of power and the violation 
of the duty of care by the former head of state, 
163
 thereby sending out a 
powerful message to potential perpetrators. The idea behind such a harsh 
punishment would be that not even the highest-ranking state official enjoys 
impunity for international crimes. However, there is no elaborate discussion 
related to the deterrent rationale in the Taylor judgment. Likewise, despite 
rejecting the importance of rehabilitative function of punishment, the 
Erdemović Trial Chamber considered the young age of the accused, his 
family status and cooperation with the Tribunals as “a series of traits 
characterising a corrigible personality”.” 164  Thus, there is a need in 
international criminal law to develop a more coherent account of sentencing 
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goals. Below, I discuss some aspects pertaining to retribution, deterrence and 
restoration in international context.  
When it comes to transplanting retributive philosophy from domestic to an 
international level, the major stumbling block is the application of its central 
element - the principle of proportionality. It is difficult to make international 
punishment fit mass crimes.
165
 Jens Ohlin developed a theory adapting the 
conventional principle of proportionality to sentencing in international law.
166
  
He noted that the sentences handed down by the ICTY suffer from a conflict 
between two types of proportionality: the offence-gravity proportionality and 
the defendant relative proportionality; the former refers to the traditional 
consideration that the punishment is proportionate to the gravity of the 
offence, while the latter denotes the trend among judges to ensure that less 
culpable defendants are punished less severely than more culpable ones.
167
 
While offence-gravity proportionality is normatively superior, the defendant-
relative proportionality often overtakes judges’ reasoning when they hand 
down unacceptably lenient sentences to ‘reserve space’ for those allegedly 
more responsible.
168
   
As a solution, Ohlin suggested reinforcing the offence-gravity rationale by 
treating punishment in international criminal law as a vindication of the rule 
of law.  He based his theory of international punishment as a vindication of 
the rule of law in the contemporary formulation of Immanuel Kant’s 
categorical imperative, a principle of moral action whereby one should not act 
on a maxim unless one can will that maxim to be a universal law.
169
  When 
someone violates morality, they treat themselves as an exception to universal 
laws and act against morality. The legal system (or international community), 
in such circumstances, is allowed to impose harsh treatment on the offender 
to vindicate the rule of law over criminality.
170
 According to Ohlin, 
international sentences ought to reflect the inherent gravity of the offence in a 
way that even moderate participation in international crimes would yield a 
life sentence equal to that received by the highest offenders.
171
  
Ohlin’s uneasiness with the application of the central consideration of 
retributive sentencing rationale, the principle of proportionality, to 
international sentences is well grounded.  However, the defendant-relative 
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proportionality does not appear to be the main area of concern. Both the 
ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chambers stressed that comparison of one case with 
another is often of limited assistance, and the differences between two 
accused convicted of similar crimes in similar circumstances are often more 
significant than the similarities.
172
 Rather, the problem stems from the 
limitations of international criminal law as such, targeting only a fraction of 
offenders, namely those most responsible for the mass crimes.  
It is conceivable to apply the proportionality principle when punishing those 
few selected for prosecution, but it is impossible at an international level to 
ensure that the punishment is distributed equally among all the offenders for 
their offences. This is in stark contrast with domestic criminal law, which, at 
least at the level of statute, presupposes its universal application. Fletcher 
refers to this requirement that the law punish the guilty, all the guilty, as 
‘positive legality’.173 Therefore, the essential component of the retributive 
theory – retribution in the distribution of punishment – is distorted a priori 
through artificially limiting the pool of potentially accused.  HLA Hart 
highlighted the difference between retribution as a justifying aim and 
retribution in the distribution of punishment, the latter having a value 
independent from the former.
174
 Perhaps, embracing the fact that international 
criminal law does not, a priori, ensure proportionality in distribution of 
punishment could remove some of the concerns related to the dominance of 
the defendant-relative considerations in the judges reasoning. It remains 
equally important to define the gravity of offence in international criminal 
law for the purposes of observing the offence-gravity proportionality, as well 
as to assign weight to other sentencing rationales, such as deterrence, 
rehabilitation and restorative justice. 
As with the retribuitve perspective, deterrence requires further justification 
within the context of international criminal law. There are views that more 
weight should be attributed to deterrence when deciding on the sentences of 
the accused in international trials.
175
 This initiative deserves credit. However, 
some important considerations must be taken into account. First,  there is a 
need to address the main criticism of the deterrence philosophy, namely the 
difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of sanctions designed to prevent 
offending.
176
  To date, there is no solid empirical basis supporting the idea 
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that potential perpetrators are intimidated by the international indictments and 
penalties.
177
   
Secondly, it is important to establish the limits of the applicability of the 
deterrent rationale in international criminal law and the ‘target audience’ for 
the harsh penalties. This is so because, deterrence in domestic law targets 
both the general public (general deterrence) and the particular offender 
(specific deterrence), whereas international criminal law is particularly 
concerned about the former, not the latter.
178
  When it comes to specific 
deterrence, many national criminal law provisions reflect the idea that there is 
a robust connection between the crime and the prior record: offenders with a 
prior record are more likely to re-offend.
179
 Such offenders pose a higher risk 
to society, and thus extra measures should be taken against them. In a purely 
utilitarian account, persistent offenders shall be sentenced based on the 
cumulative model with each new offence increasing the severity of the 
sentence.
180
 Thus, recidivists are one of the main addressees of the deterrent 
sanctions at the domestic level. Escalation of punishment and the 
impossibility of establishing the correlation between harsher penalties and 
desistance is the classical counter-argument against escalating the punishment 
based on consequentialist thinking model.
181
 
From an international criminal law perspective, however, this latter argument 
loses some of its power because the ‘audience’ that it targets is different from 
the ‘audience’ affected by the escalated sanctions in domestic law. 
International criminal law deals with a highly specific category of offenders – 
usually high-level first-time perpetrators responsible for the commission of 
the gravest crimes. The deterrent effect of harsh penalties in relation to these 
offenders is far from clear.
182
 One can, however, presume that the sanctions 
imposed at an international level gain much publicity, at least alerting 
potential perpetrators of the risks associated with offending.  
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Finally, there a large question mark exists regarding the restorative justice 
rationale. International criminal law has gradually recognized victims’ rights, 
including the right to reparation. The ICC and ECCC include restorative 
elements in their discourse. It is crucial, however, to distinguish between 
restoration as a punishment goal and restoration in a broader sense. The 
former requires the causal link between the acts of the accused and the harm 
that he or she caused to the victims. The broader notion of restorative justice 
implies reparations to the wider community. However, if one accepts that 
restoration in a broader sense is one of the purposes of international criminal 
law, it is crucial to define its relationship to the cornerstone legal principles, 
such as that of individual criminal responsibility. Can the latter be 
jeopardized in favour of the former?
183
 
Restoration as a punishment goal is not entirely inconceivable nor is it at odds 
with the traditional retributive approach of international criminal law. There 
are two challenges, however: first, emphasizing the causation - the offender is 
responsible for those wrongs that he/she inflicted upon the victims. By 
expressing remorse, suffering hard treatment (punishment) and reprobation by 
international community, he or she makes amends; second, wider 
harms/grievances need to be addressed outside of the criminal trial, possibly 
through outreach, fact finding and truth and reconciliation commissions. This 
broader restorative justice function of international criminal law, albeit 
extremely important, cannot fit strictly into the punishment of the accused 
and needs to be achieved in a different way. The court's only contribution 
towards this goal should be its adherence to strict legal rules.
184
  
Darryl Robinson explored in-depth the challenges ensuing from adopting 
victim-based reasoning in international criminal law.
 185
 He pointed out the 
fact that the tendency to adopt victim-focused teleological interpretations 
often comes at the expense of the fundamental principles of a liberal criminal 
justice system.
186
 Robinson’s argument is that teleological methods of 
interpretation inherent in human rights law may not always be compatible 
with the principle of legality and other criminal law principles designed to 
protect the rights of the accused.
187
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It appears that a teleological interpretation as such can be reconcilable with 
the liberal aims pursued by international criminal law. When the court 
chooses to apply a provision from an international treaty, the process of 
validation includes interpretation of a treaty in the light of the rules reflected 
by Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
A teleological method of interpretation is compatible with the rules stipulated 
in the VCLT – it simply prioritizes the object and purpose of a treaty over the 
intent of the parties.
188
 The challenge then becomes providing an evolving 
interpretation compatible with the fundamental principles of criminal law. 
One way to do this would be to recognize that human rights law and criminal 
law share the same basic notions - fairness, individual autonomy and legality. 
Consequently, the courts have to strive to apply human rights law in a 
consistent manner without prejudicing the rights of the accused.  
 
Robinson’s concern is, nonetheless, well founded to the extent that the 
interests of the accused are often balanced against the interests of the victims, 
whereas a principled approach is required.
189
 This unqualified balancing act 
leads to results that compromise the ideals of the liberal criminal justice 
system. The reason for this outcome appears to stem from confusion about the 
aspirations of international criminal law and what it is able to achieve through 
the individual sentences meted out to the accused. 
3. Embracing Judicial Sentencing Discretion in 
International Criminal Law 
It has been over ten years since the Appeals Chamber in Furundžija refused 
to accept the existence of an ‘emerging sentencing regime’ in international 
criminal law.
190
 Arguably, there is remarkably little evidence that any 
consensus has been reached on this issue since then. As discussed in the 
previous sections, international judges rely solely on the broad provisions of 
the statutes of international criminal courts and tribunals and the generic case 
law clarifying these provisions.  There are no penalty ranges for the specific 
crimes or the hierarchy of articulated sentencing rationales.
191
  Unfettered 
judicial discretion leads to the certain level of disparity in sentencing in 
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international criminal law.
192
  Disparity occurs when similar cases are dealt 
with differently, and where different cases are treated without reference to 
those differences.
193
 Disparity in sentencing is a form injustice, yet the choice 
of techniques to promote consistency is not an easy matter even at the 
domestic level.
194
   
National legal traditions recognize different techniques for ensuring that 
sentencing complies with the rule of law principles.
195
 The most obvious way 
to reduce disparity is to articulate and prioritize sentencing aims. As Andrew 
Ashworth pointed out “without an explicitly and well-articulated guiding aim, 
consistency is a forlorn hope”. 196  The other technique of promoting 
consistency is establishing sentencing tariffs for particular crimes. In England 
and Wales, for instance, judges are required to follow guidelines that provide 
for a penalty range for each particular crime and a set of the mitigating and 
aggravating factors to move up and down the scale. If judges decide to depart 
from the guidelines, they have to give reasons.
197
 In fact, 
most national jurisdictions follow the principle nulla poena sine lege by 
stipulating sentencing tariffs in the statutes or formal sentencing 
guidelines. The more precise the provisions on penalties, the more the 
national system leans towards order and regularity at the expense of the 
individualized justice. However, the tension between these two values is 
always present in domestic jurisdictions.
198
 
International criminal law prioritizes individualized justice. International 
judges stress the importance of individualized sentences reflecting the totality 
of the criminal conduct of the particular accused.
199
 This is so because there 
are barely any limits on judicial discretion in international sentencing. It 
appears that in the absence of proper guidance at the level of statutes and case 
law, maximum flexibility is granted to international judges at sentencing. 
While the current practice of favouring individualized justice and the totality 
of factors should not be underestimated we should not deny the benefits of 
improving the current system. As discussed in the previous sections of this 
chapter, parts of the judgments dealing with sentencing are often very brief 
and generic, leaving the reader with much uncertainty as to how judges arrive 
at a particular punishment. This deficiency can be remedied by adjusting the 
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sentencing goals to an international level and by providing more elaborate 
reasoning in the sentencing parts of international judgements.
200
 
There are two main reasons why judicial discretion at an international level 
should be defended. First and foremost, there is no established penal regime 
in international criminal law. In the absence of legal traditions, such as those 
that aid domestic criminal judges in their sentencing deliberations, judges at 
an international level face a difficult task of developing the sentencing regime 
at the same time as determining how to transform the culpability of the 
accused into a number of years of imprisonment. This duty requires an extra 
degree of discretion. The final sentence must reflect traditional sentencing 
goals, such as retribution and deterrence, as adjusted to the international 
criminal law context. Thus, the sentence has to send out a strong message of 
reprobation addressed to the potential perpetrators and members of the 
international community without violating the principle of proportionality.  
Secondly, the final punishment needs to embrace the unique considerations 
characteristic of international criminal law. One limitation of international 
criminal law bearing heavily on sentencing is the inevitable jurisdictional 
hurdle ratione personae – it restricts prosecutions to senior leadership figures, 
most responsible for the atrocities. In these circumstances, the pressure to 
convict and render a harsh penalty is very high. This is so because the 
punishment is not distributed equally among all those responsible, but is 
focused on selected few. In these circumstances the judges are tasked with 
recognizing not only the mode or participation of the accused and the 
particular crime for which they stand convicted, but also a number of other 
factors, including the leadership position of the convicted person. 
At this point, it is essential to clarify how ‘complicity’ as a mode of 
participation fits within the discourse relating to the judicial discretion. 
Frequently, domestic law provisions on sentencing levels or aims of 
punishment explain the relative weight (if any) to be attributed to the mode of 
participation of the convicted person.
201
 In international criminal law on the 
other hand, complicity bears a relative weight on sentences. In the absence of 
sentencing scales or articulated punishment aims in international law, the 
pronouncement that aiding and abetting generally warrants lesser sentences 
than that to be imposed for more direct forms of participation is effectively 
unenforceable. Judges have no guidance in identifying the starting point, from 
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which to mitigate the sentence.
202
 This observation, coupled with the need to 
take into account the totality of factors and not just the mode of participation 
of the accused, renders complicity less useful as an indicator of the culpability 
of the accused at the sentencing stage. However, this is not to claim that the 
mode of participation is irrelevant in international criminal justice or should 
have no bearing on the sentence of the convicted person. Quite the opposite, 
the concept of individual criminal responsibility requires the establishment of 
the precise way in which the accused became involved in the alleged crimes. 
The key distinction to be drawn here is between the two stages of a criminal 
trial – the stage leading to conviction and the one of sentencing. HLA Hart 
highlighted the importance of separating these two stages. According to him, 
responsibility has a value quite independent of retributive or denunciatory 
theories of punishment.
203
 At times, the principle of responsibility may be 
sacrificed when the social cost of maintaining it is too high, thus violating the 
principle of proportionality in the distribution of punishment.
204
 This, 
however, cannot affect the principle of proportionality inherent to the 
punishment itself. International criminal law with its limitations ratione 
personae is the best example of how the principle of responsibility may be 
sacrificed due to the practical impossibility of prosecuting all those 
responsible at an international level.  
There is an implicit recognition of the duality of responsibility and 
punishment in international criminal law: the parts of international 
judgements that deal with the factual background, liability modes and the 
definition of crimes are explicit and lengthy, while the sentencing parts are 
often curtailed and appear somewhat detached from the findings leading to 
conviction. At times, questions of the guilt of the accused and their sentences 
are even dealt with in separate hearings.
205
  Therefore, complicity as a mode 
of participation has two independent functions in each of the two stages: first, 
it serves as an instrument of attaching liability to the accused, provided the 
legal requirements for complicity are met; secondly, it becomes one of the 
indicators of the appropriate sentence.  
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Although at times it may be very tempting, these two functions of complicity 
should not be conflated. At the stage of attribution of liability, it is essential to 
adhere to the strict principles of individual criminal responsibility and due 
process. The ‘fair labelling’ is important because this is the only way that the 
bodies applying international criminal law gain legitimacy.
206
 In instances 
when there is insufficient evidence to meet the legal requirements for the 
most commonly used modes of liability – joint criminal enterprise or co-
perpetration, it is advisable to resort to alternatives, such as various forms of 
complicity. This approach ensures that the acts of the accused receive the 
most accurate description in the judgment. Using less stringent criteria for 
attaching liability undermines the cause of international criminal law by 
creating the image of ‘collective punishment’. This in turn negatively affects 
its public perception and has a detrimental impact on victims’ rights, 
depriving them of proper recognition.
207
  
Modes of liability at sentencing serve a different function – they form part of 
the picture in assessing the gravity of the conduct of the convicted person. 
While there is pressure to convict and render a harsh penalty, this should not 
be done at the cost of circumventing the stringent criteria for the attribution of 
liability. It is not an adequate solution to grant a convicted person a more 
lenient sentence due to a lack of evidence as appears to be the case with the 
accused Gbao in RUF. Evidentiary problems need to be addressed at the stage 
of the attribution of responsibility by, for example, using a mode of liability 
that best describes the conduct of the accused, and not at sentencing.  
The question is whether it is more realistic to employ modes of participation 
that accurately reflect the contribution of the accused, and then determine the 
appropriate sentence taking all relevant factors into account. It appears that 
the Trial Chamber in the Taylor and Lubanga cases preferred 
the latter solution. The court in Taylor refused to convict Charles Taylor 
under the joint criminal enterprise doctrine due to insufficient evidence 
regarding his alleged participation in the common plan.
208
 Instead, the judges 
held the accused accountable as an aider and abetter, or someone who 
knowingly contributed to the commission of crimes.
209
 However, despite the 
fact that Taylor ‘merely’ aided and abetted and planned crimes in Sierra 
Leone, his sentence duly recognized other factors such as his overall 
leadership role and the impact of his actions on the conflict. Likewise, the 
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Lubanga Trial Chamber handed down a relatively lenient sentence 
notwithstanding the finding that Lubanga is a direct co-perpetrator. What 
mattered to the court is the combination of the mitigating factors, absence of 
the aggravating factors and a lesser form of intent on part of the convicted 
person. Therefore, the forms of liability of both accused took a backseat when 
it came to imposing the penalty. This approach seems reasonable. 
Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the role of complicity at sentencing. International 
judges have declared on a few occasions that aiding and abetting generally 
warrants a lesser sentence that that rendered for perpetration. The case law 
and the statutory sentencing principles reveal, however, that primary 
perpetration through the joint criminal enterprise or the concept of ‘co-
perpetration’ does not automatically warrant a more severe sentence than that 
rendered for aiding and abetting (or any other forms of complicity), nor does 
it imply a higher degree of culpability. Rather, the mode of participation 
forms part of the discussion of the appropriate punishment, along with a 
number of other factors. 
In contrast with many domestic legal systems that already include a 
sentencing discount for aiding and abetting at the statutory level, complicity 
in international criminal law is fully compatible with lengthy sentences at the 
level of primary perpetration. This is so for the two main reasons. First the 
lack of a coherent sentencing regime in international criminal law. The 
exercise of judicial discretion in international criminal law is only limited by 
a small number of generic formulas stemming from the statutes and case law. 
This guidance establishes some broad principles such as the prohibition of the 
death penalty but is hardly sufficient to attribute any value to the modes of 
participation or to set scales of punishment for each particular crime. On a 
theoretical level, international criminal law does not rank or properly define 
the goals of punishment that could indicate the role of an accomplice for 
sentencing purposes. Therefore, international judges are left with 
the freedom to decide on the appropriate punishment in each case, taking into 
consideration the combination of factors and not the mode of participation 
alone.  
The second reason why complicity is compatible with longer sentences in 
international criminal law is the unique nature of international criminal law: a 
priori limitation of international prosecutions to the senior leadership figures 
reduces the pool of primary perpetrators in the dock and increases the number 
of accomplices and ‘masterminds’ removed from the scene of the crime. In 
this situation, only individualized assessment of circumstances and particular 
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facts of the case allows one to determine whether the culpability of the 
accomplice is less or more than that of the actual perpetrator.  
It is essential to recognize the duality of criminal proceedings. The mode of 
participation serves different purposes at trial and sentencing. At trial, 
complicity or any other form of participation is used for ‘labelling’ the 
conduct of the accused. The goal is to provide the most accurate description 
of individual’s role in the commission of the crime. This is in line with the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility. At the sentencing stage, the 
mode of participation is one out of several indicators for measuring the level 
of culpability of the accused for punishment purposes. Depending on the 
factual circumstances of the case, complicity may or may not indicate the 
lesser involvement of the convicted person. As the case law has shown, the 
mode of participation usually plays a peripheral role in sanctioning due to the 
presence of other factors that account for harsher penalties, such as an 
individual’s leadership role or the grave nature of crimes. 
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VII. Conclusion: the Place of Complicity in 
International Criminal Law 
Introduction 
Previous chapters analysed complicity from different angles. Chapter I 
showed that historically one of the main challenges of international criminal 
law was attributing individual criminal responsibility for collective 
wrongdoings. It became apparent that different mechanisms were employed 
to solve the problem – from ignoring the distinctions between crime 
participants in favour of a fact-based approach to holding the accused 
responsible under the broad umbrella of conspiracy. Under the influence of 
continental lawyers, in particular those coming from France, complicity also 
made its way into international criminal law as one of several means for 
attaching liability to those removed from the scene of the crime.  
 
Chapters II and III focused on contemporary international criminal law and 
the jurisprudence emanating from the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and the 
ECCC. The analysis in these chapters showed that forms of participation 
occupy a distinct place in the statutes and case law of international courts and 
tribunals, all of which recognize different forms of complicity. However, 
there are several problematic areas pertaining to the law on complicity that 
require attention. Among these issues is the frequent ‘mismatch’ between the 
facts of the case and the legal labels attached to them, a failure to distinguish 
between the elements of the substantive offence and the legal requirements of 
liability modes, the introduction of competing concepts for dealing with 
collective criminality that are not firmly grounded in international law, 
shifting standard of causation, and finally the ‘downgrading’ of complicity by 
unduly associating it with a lower degree of blameworthiness. 
Chapter IV explored complicity in domestic law. The study of the liability 
modes covered 31 domestic jurisdictions. It showed that complicity in its 
various forms is rooted in all of the legal systems under consideration. Even 
countries adhering to the unitary model of participation – i.e. not 
distinguishing between different forms of participation at the legislative level 
– recognize in both doctrine and case law the different roles of those involved 
in offending. The boundary between primary perpetration and secondary 
liability shifts from country to country, and within a single system, depending 
on the factual circumstances. However, the functional core of complicity does 
not depend on this shifting border; complicity is a legal construction that 
serves to determine the circumstances in which liability is attributed to those 
who do not physically perpetrate the crime. Because of the wide recognition 
that complicity enjoys in national law, it is fair to assume that it has the status 
  
 
 
 
234 
of a general principle of international law recognized by ‘civilised nations’ 
and therefore constitutes a source of law. 
Chapter V compared complicity in the law of state responsibility and 
international criminal law. The chapter established certain limits of cross-
fertilization between the two fields of law. The difference between the 
objectives and methods of the two fields of law places a limit on the 
transferability of legal notions from one domain to another. However, despite 
this divergence, both disciplines share a number of problems with the 
application of the concept of complicity, such as linking the form of liability 
to the substantive crime or defining the fault requirement.  
Finally, Chapter VI explored the consequences of complicity. It assessed 
critically the statement made by several Chambers that aiding and abetting 
generally warrants a lesser sentence than primary perpetration. This statement 
was dismissed as mechanical on the basis of the analysis of individual cases, 
supplemented by the table on the correlation between the modes of 
participation and sentencing in Appendix IV. The study in this chapter 
revealed that it is the totality of factors that influence the sentence rather than 
the liability mode alone. Moreover, the chapter distinguished the two stages 
of the criminal process – the stage of attribution of responsibility and the 
sentencing stage. It was argued that the principle of fair labelling requires 
describing the conduct of the accused in precise terms; hence complicity 
occupies a prominent role during the first stage. At the same time, forms of 
participation are not dispositive at the second stage, that of sentencing, which 
is characterized by a high degree of judicial discretion. 
The analysis in the previous chapters outlined various aspects of complicity in 
international criminal law – its historical origin,1  roots in domestic law,2 
philosophical underpinnings,
3
 and problems with its application in 
international context.
4
 However, the predominant question of how we deal 
with collective criminality remains. Is complicity an adequate construction to 
describe the conduct of international offenders? Does the context of mass 
atrocities affect the way legal concepts are interpreted and applied by 
international courts and tribunals?
5
 Do we even need to ‘fine-tune’ the forms 
of liability in international criminal law? Osiel posed an important question in 
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2
 Chapter IV. 
3
 Chapter II.2.ii. 
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 Chapters II.2 and III.2. 
5
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this respect: “[D]oes a preoccupation with individual culpability prevent 
proper recognition of the collective origins and nature of mass atrocity?”6 
The answer to these questions lies in the sphere of the objectives of 
international criminal justice. This concluding chapter argues that the main 
and overarching purpose of international criminal law is its symbolic 
significance as the flagship of values shared by humanity. The symbolism 
manifests itself procedurally – international criminal law strives to be an 
exemplary justice mechanism; and substantively – through setting the 
threshold of behaviour that is no longer accepted by the international 
community. This overarching goal allows for the limitations of international 
criminal law – its aspirational character, lack of supranational enforcement 
powers, the dissonance between targeting individual perpetrators and the 
collective nature of offending, and, finally, the distinct and complex 
criminological reality of mass atrocities.  
The need to distinguish among various forms of participation and as a 
consequence, the need for complicity, stems from the procedural aspect of the 
symbolic value of international criminal law. It we accept that international 
trials aspire to set an example of how justice must be administered, then the 
principles of fairness and individual criminal responsibility require us to 
define the precise way in which the accused is connected to the crime. 
International criminal law often targets those most responsible – those 
removed from the scene of the crime, the leaders and the ‘masterminds’. This 
focus of international criminal justice makes secondary forms of liability 
indispensible. 
Part one of this chapter briefly defines the limitations of international criminal 
law – this exercise lays the ground for the second part of the chapter that 
discusses symbolism as an overarching objective of international criminal 
justice. It is argued that conceptualizing international criminal law as 
symbolic serves a dual purpose: firstly, attaining a certain standard of justice 
and defining the type of conduct that humanity rejects is an objective in its 
own right, and, secondly, it allows us to embrace the limitations in respect of 
the plethora of other goals pursued by international criminal law. Finally, the 
third part of the chapter schematically outlines a number of areas in the law 
on complicity requiring attention. 
1. Limitations of International Criminal Law 
As the name suggests, international criminal law combines the features of two 
disciplines - public international law and domestic criminal law. They form 
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the skeleton of international criminal law.
7
 This is not to suggest that other 
disciplines do not have any influence – international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law inform the content of international criminal 
law. They serve as its ‘flesh’. The fundamental principles upon which 
international criminal law operates, however, come from the two founding 
disciplines. For example, the principles of individual criminal responsibility, 
legality and equality of arms, fundamental for international criminal justice, 
all derive from domestic criminal law.
8
 However, reliance on national 
concepts has its limits. At times, the principles emerging at an international 
level conflict with the fundamental principles of domestic criminal law, as in 
the case with selective prosecutions, for instance. There is a strong political 
and international element embedded in international criminal law that cannot 
be ignored. International criminal law tends to fall back on its public 
international law origins in difficult situations. The limitations of 
international criminal law can thus be revealed through the tensions between 
the two different fields of law. 
i. Conservative vs Progressive 
Domestic criminal law is a highly conservative institution aiming to preserve 
the social order and enforce social norms through criminal sanctions.
9
 It 
exemplifies the conflict between individual autonomy and collective 
interests.
10
 In Mill’s philosophy, self-protection is the sole end for which 
mankind is allowed to interfere with the individual liberty of any of their 
number. Consequently, the only purpose for which power can be exercised is 
to prevent harm to others.
11
 The definition of harm depends on the values 
embedded in society. Usually the ruling classes define these values over time; 
and the threat of penal sanctions protects the equilibrium attained in a 
particular society.
 12
 
Durkheim explained the traditionalist nature of penal law by the fact that it 
denotes the feelings collectively shared by the society.
13
 The authority of the 
penal rule is thus a societal custom formed over time.
14
 Domestic criminal 
law has an indispensible regulatory function because by guarding dominant 
values shared by its citizens it may be said to preserve the identity of the 
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state. Punishment in domestic law is administered in a systematic fashion 
because all members of the society are presumed to share the values and 
agree to submit the offender to censure.
15
 Society can be said to ‘outsource’ 
the imposition of penalty to an organized body, which administers this 
process in a consistent way. 
In contrast, international criminal law is a relatively new field of law that 
dates back just a few decades to the establishment of the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.
16
 International criminal law does not limit 
itself to the values shared by the citizens of a particular state, but claims 
universality and adherence to the project of protection of the fundamental 
legal values of humanity as a whole.
17
 It is highly aspirational – many 
customs are not yet embedded in the international community and are still in 
the process of being formed. Despite its great importance for the development 
of humanity, international criminal law, unlike its domestic counterpart, has 
arguably not yet achieved the status of being an indispensible regulatory 
instrument in international affairs as it lacks consistency in the imposition of 
punishment that domestic criminal law offers. International trials are just 
‘samples’ of justice in the situations when political reality and the 
international climate allow for prosecution and conviction.  
ii. Deviance vs Conformity 
Domestic and international offending differ from a behavioural point of view. 
Criminology offers a number of theories explaining why people commit 
traditional crimes. These explanations vary significantly. Some criminologists 
believe that people offend due to being exposed to an unfavourable 
environment; others claim that economic inequality prompts criminality, 
while the third group believes that humans act as rational beings and seize 
any suitable opportunity to offend.
18
  What unites these approaches is that 
criminality is regarded as a form of deviance from the norm. The responses of 
the domestic criminal justice system are consequently geared towards 
ensuring conformity and preventing deviance.
19
  
International criminal law deals with a different type of criminality. It stems 
from obedience rather than from deviance.
20
 Political violence usually 
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changes the context in which humans operate and authority is exercised to 
induce offending rather than desistance. Its responses have therefore to be 
attuned to breaking the patterns of compliance rather than ensuring 
conformity. Mass violence requires structure and organization because its 
continuation depends on human cooperation within the system. The only way 
to induce individuals to be part of the enterprise that commits crimes is to 
instil in their minds that they are simply small cogs with no responsibility.
21
 It 
is almost as if persons submit their individual autonomy, their freedom of 
choice, to a higher authority, and in return they expect to feel absolved of 
responsibility. Hanna Arendt explored this phenomenon by asking how was it 
possible for the individual and collective conscience to disappear, with some 
notable exceptions, in Nazi Germany?
22
 She looked at the example of 
Eichmann – a Nazi bureaucrat whose trial she observed. He did not enter the 
criminal system for sadistic motives but to pursue a career and his conscience 
functioned in the expected way for about four weeks until it began to function 
abnormally.
23
 The reason behind this shift was the effect of a substitution of 
values promoted by the Nazi party. Instead of perceiving themselves as 
murderers, the functionaries felt that they were involved in something 
historic, grandiose, and unique.
24
 The duty to obey orders overshadowed any 
possible conscientious objections.
25
   
Stanley Milgram conducted a number of experiments designed to test 
individuals’ capacity to defy authority when put under pressure to perform 
acts that went against their conscience. The participants were instructed by an 
authoritative figure to gradually administer electric shocks to another 
individual (actor) in cases when the latter gave the wrong answers to the 
predetermined questions. The declared goal of the experiment was to test the 
effects of punishment on learning, but the real aim was to see how far 
individuals could go in inflicting pain on another human being. The results 
were shocking: while people were experiencing severe strain and discomfort 
following the orders from the person in charge, very few participants found 
the strength to resist the authority and stop the experiment. This is despite the 
fact that they perceived their acts as immoral. This outcome led Milgram to 
conclude that values are not the only forces that drive a person in an on-going 
situation – context is equally important. Milgram argued that the level of 
obedience can be altered and defiance can be stimulated when multiple 
authority figures are not in agreement with each other (diffusion of authority) 
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or when an individual is exposed to a group pressure (someone else refuses to 
obey).
26
 
iii. Legitimacy Through Enforcement vs Legitimacy 
Through Fairness 
Domestic criminal law and international criminal law gain their legitimacy in 
a different way. National criminal law is the product of the separation of 
powers: the legislators enact positive law in the form of statutes; courts apply 
the law as a principle and determine whether a technical violation of law 
constitutes a wrongdoing; while the executive branch frames public 
discussion about criminalization or de-criminalization of certain conduct.  
What is extremely important is that domestic law does not need to legitimize 
itself. The state system provides for a basic rule of recognition that allows us 
to determine before a rule is actually made, that it will be valid if it conforms 
to the requirements of the rule of recognition.
27
 If a criminal law provision 
fulfils these requirements it is automatically valid, and citizens are obliged to 
obey. The state machinery ensures compliance through its enforcement 
powers.  
International criminal law functions in an entirely different way. It is a branch 
of public international law that benefits neither from a basic rule providing 
general criteria of validity for its norms nor from an enforcement apparatus 
akin to that of the state. International law is not entirely without ‘teeth’ as it 
envisages coercion, just not in the form of criminal sanctions.
28
 Its persuasive 
force is of political nature. For meaningful executive powers international 
criminal justice must rely on states.
29
 The dialogue with national governments 
is thus essential to maintain the functioning of the discipline as failure to 
perform enforcement functions may lead to the denial of justice, as for 
instance, with the pending ICC arrest warrant against the president of Sudan - 
Omar Al Bashir. How do international courts achieve full cooperation of 
domestic institutions? The key is to be perceived as legitimate. This can be 
accomplished through enhancing the quality of international criminal justice. 
International trials should be a matter of quality not quantity. The legitimizing 
effect of exemplary justice cannot be understated. 
International courts and tribunals are essential mechanisms for bringing to life 
international legal norms through interpreting its sources - treaty, custom and 
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the general principles of law. They validate the law post-factum.
30
 This is in 
contrast with domestic courts that apply the law that is already valid and 
binding. This particularity underscores the importance of the rigorous 
approach of international courts and tribunals in dealing with the sources of 
international law. Shklar drew attention to the propensity of the analytical 
legal mind for thinking of the law as ‘there’ or ‘not there’ at all times and in 
all places when it is rather a question of degrees of legalism in politics of 
complex social orders.
31
 The truth is that international criminal law began in a 
legal vacuum – the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg was created 
when there was no law, no government and no political order.
32
 The principle 
of legality had to be circumvented to some extent as the law was gradually 
created. Consequently, the quality of work of international courts 
predetermines the perceived legitimacy of the outcome. 
iv. Individual vs Collective Aspect 
Liberal domestic criminal law theories are built upon the principle of 
individual autonomy, which respects an individual’s freedom to act as a 
rational being.
33
 Pursuant to this principle, an individual can only be held 
liable for voluntary conduct.
34
 International criminal law recognizes this 
central rule. The challenge lies in reconciling the individual nature of criminal 
responsibility and the group aspect of crimes: how does one attribute 
responsibility for mass atrocities? International criminal law has struggled 
over this problem since its inception. The difficulty arises from the enormity 
of crimes in question, the collective nature of offending that involves many 
individuals at the different levels within the state hierarchy and the strong 
organizational element inherent in international criminality. 
Robert Jackson, the chief prosecutor for the US at Nuremberg, in his opening 
address to the tribunal, summarized the challenges of opening the first trial in 
history for crimes against peace: ‘Never before in legal history has an effort 
been made to bring within the scope of a single litigation the developments of 
a decade, covering a whole continent, and involving a score of nations, 
countless individuals, and innumerable events.’35  This statement underscores 
the difficulty of dealing with enormous crimes through judicial proceedings. 
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2. Symbolism as an Overarching Aim  
In 2004 report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General claimed that 
the objectives pursued by the special criminal tribunals include bringing to 
justice those responsible for serious violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law, putting an end to such violations and preventing their 
recurrence, securing justice and dignity for victims, establishing a record of 
past events, promoting national reconciliation, re-establishing the rule of law 
and contributing to the restoration of peace.
36
 These goals, which were never 
formalized or ranked, have different timeframes but are all equally ambitious: 
some look backwards at ‘establishing a record of past events’; others dwell on 
the present-day concern of ‘bringing to justice those responsible’, while a 
third type of objectives are focused on the future of ‘preventing the 
recurrence of violations’ and ‘promoting national reconciliation, re-
establishing the rule of law and securing peace’.37 
The desire to fulfil all of the stated goals without clearly defining them – the 
desire for an ultimate success in achieving each stated objective - also became 
the weakness of international criminal justice. A unifying principle that limits 
our expectations and curtails the multiple ambitious objectives can make 
international criminal law more coherent. Without such a principle or an 
overarching aim the system is prone to provoking disappointment, 
disapproval or even abuse. The criticism ranges from the ineffectiveness of 
international courts and tribunals to their over-politicization and the 
selectivity of prosecutions.  
It seems that one of the most important, tangible achievements of 
international criminal law is changing the way in which the world community 
perceives political violence.
38
  This is significant progress for a field of law 
that was created relatively recently. International crimes are no longer 
tolerated as the ‘necessary evil’. Rape, for instance, is no longer perceived as 
one of the ‘spoils of war’ but as a crime against humanity deserving of 
condemnation along with other hideous acts. Thus, this thesis nominates 
symbolism as the leading objective of international criminal justice. The term 
‘symbolism’ is meant to refer to the mission of international criminal law in 
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creating a space for shared, immutable values of the international community 
through the administration of exemplary justice. Symbolism seems to be the 
best fit because it denotes the strengths of international criminal justice to 
transcend state borders and serve as a reminder that mass atrocities do not go 
unpunished. At the same time, this objective also stresses the peculiarities of 
international criminal law discussed in the previous section that stem from its 
dualistic nature.  
Perceiving international criminal justice as symbolic helps to manage 
expectations bestowed on the international criminal justice system while 
maintaining a sense of coherence. For example, because of the collective 
nature of mass atrocities as well as a frequent lack of enforcement powers, 
international criminal law is capable of addressing only a limited number of 
situations and reaching only a handful of perpetrators. This is in stark contrast 
with domestic criminal law, which, at least at the statutory level, presupposes 
its universal application.
39
 Viewed through the lens of retribution or 
deterrence (typical domestic sentencing rationales) that require the law to 
punish the law to punish all the guilty and not just a selected few, there is a 
problem with this discrepancy in international criminal law.
40
  
However, if one accepts that the role of international criminal law is 
symbolic, this caveat no longer appears problematic. The very few instances 
when the responsible individuals stand trial in the context of international 
criminal law become representative of a broader consensus amongst the 
international community that rejects political violence as a threat to 
international peace and security. They serve as a symbol of condemnation and 
the mature status of international society. In the criminological reality of mass 
atrocities, in the midst of which individuals tend to abandon their will and 
follow a manipulative higher authority when put under pressure, international 
criminal law has no other choice but to focus primarily on breaking the 
patterns of obedience when violence is about to happen or even eliminate the 
circumstances that would induce violence and manipulation in the first place. 
One way to achieve this is to conceptualize international criminal law as an 
alternative source of authority or an instrument of group pressure – a 
loudspeaker for transmitting universal values with the view of preventing 
criminal obedience.
41
 This is precisely the symbolic function of international 
criminal law.  
The rhetoric of symbolism also emphasizes the limited scope of legal inquiry 
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for the purposes of setting the historical record. Acknowledging that 
international criminal law is symbolic in that it allows for prosecuting only a 
handful of perpetrators releases some pressure from courts to uncover all the 
truth about the conflict. 
The symbolic function also tackles the limitations of the deterrence rationale 
in international criminal law – namely, the lack of a solid empirical basis 
supporting the idea that potential perpetrators are intimidated by the 
international indictments and penalties.
42
 Symbolism allows us to think about 
international criminal law as a showcase of the emerging values of 
international community. Those few judgments that are issued at an 
international level gain a lot of publicity and at least alert potential 
perpetrators of the general risks associated with offending. In addition to that, 
international criminal law triggers ‘pre-deterrence’ in a sense of establishing 
universal moral minima.
43
 Pre-deterrence implies creating the conditions 
under which individuals do not even contemplate taking part in the political 
violence because of certain assumptions instilled in their minds.  
When it comes to the considerations of restorative justice that receive 
increased recognition in international criminal law, the main problem seems 
to be the fact that the rights of the accused are often balanced against the 
rights of the victims.
44
 For example, Judge Odio Benito in her separate and 
dissenting opinion to the Lubanga judgement argued that it is incumbent on 
the ICC to regard the interests of victims, and, as a result, provide 
comprehensive legal definitions that go beyond the circumstances of each 
individual case.
45
 This view seems to extend the powers of the Trial Chamber 
beyond those envisaged in Article 64(2) of the Rome Statute.
46
 Furthermore, 
overexpansive legal definitions are at odds with the rights of the accused, in 
particular the right to be informed about the charges, to have adequate time 
for preparation and to be tried without delay.
47
 The approach that seeks to 
counterpoise the rights of the accused and the victims’ rights entirely 
transforms the focus of a criminal trial.  The question remains whether such 
shift faithfully serves the end goal of bringing justice to the victims. 
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A more coherent approach would be to strive for the quality of individual 
judgments by strict adherence to the principles of liberal criminal justice. The 
rights of the accused have to be respected to the fullest extent possible and 
not sacrificed in favour of other considerations.
48
 This way the perceived 
legitimacy of the tribunals would increase and with it, hopefully, victim 
satisfaction and the potential for reconciliation. If international justice is 
viewed as legitimate, it is easier to use it as a tool of empowering local 
communities to pursue accountability at the national level, through, for 
example, the principle of complementarity promoted by the ICC.
49 Increased 
accountability at the local level should result in a ‘change from within’ – the 
sign of true reconciliation. 
The symbolic function has received some recognition by legal academics. 
Mirjan Damaška referred to this goal of international criminal law as the 
didactic objective. He argued that international criminal courts should place 
more emphasis on persuasion and strengthening a sense of accountability for 
international crime by exposure and stigmatization of these extreme forms of 
inhumanity.
50
 The purpose is to establish moral minima that are universal.
51
 
The socio-pedagogic function of international criminal law in the Damaškian 
sense can be roughly equated with the symbolic function presented in this 
chapter. The new name does however denote an additional element – 
symbolism should also be conceptualized as a tool of coming to terms with 
the limitations of international criminal law.  
Mark Drumbl called this goal ‘expressivism’ and has maintained that an 
expressivist punishes to strengthen faith in the rule of law among the general 
public, as opposed to punishing simply because the perpetrator deserves it or 
because potential perpetrators will be deterred by it.
52
 However, this 
reasoning is very close to retribution, that is treating the wrongdoer as a moral 
agent and in which punishment conveys blame through deprivation.
53
 The 
communicative function is a valid attribute of the retributive rationale.
54
  This 
is somewhat different from the broader symbolic function of international 
criminal law as a flagship of shared values.
55
 The distinctive objective of 
symbolism is delivering a certain message to the community as a whole rather 
than to a certain offender. Harmen Van der Wilt’s view is possibly the closest 
to the one advocated in this chapter - he contends that the role of the 
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expressive theory is to imbue the general public with core values and with 
faith in the rule of law.
56
  
Symbolism receives patchy coverage in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, 
hybrid courts or the ICC. The judgments acknowledge to some degree that 
there is something different about international crimes and the need to punish 
them but this is done more on an intuitive level rather than explicitly 
integrating the emblematic value of international criminal law in the 
reasoning.
57
  The tendency of international judges is to concentrate on the 
punishment rationales as they appear in the domestic context – retribution and 
deterrence, with some attention to victims’ rights and reconciliation.58 The 
following passage from Aleksovski is sometimes cited in support of a limited 
recognition of the symbolic function of international criminal law:
59
  
[…] [A] sentence of the International Tribunal should make plain the 
condemnation of the international community of the behaviour in 
question and show that the international community was not ready to 
tolerate serious violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights.
60
 
This rhetoric is indeed very powerful. However, there is no separation of 
retribution and symbolism in this judgment that speaks in the preceding 
phrase about the fact that retribution is not fulfilling the desire for revenge 
but an expression of the outrage of international community.
 61
 Reference is 
made to the function of retribution as a medium for voicing public 
disapprobation of the deeds of the offender. This is slightly different from 
symbolism because the channel of communication is with the particular 
offender and not the general public. 
The Krstić Appeal judgment recognized to some extent the symbolic function 
of international criminal law by singling out one particular offence, genocide, 
as deserving  “special condemnation and opprobrium”.62 The reasoning is that 
genocide “is a crime against all of humankind, its harm being felt not only by 
the group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity.”63 Similarly, the 
only sentencing judgment of the ICC in the Lubanga case made no direct 
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reference to the function of international criminal law in propagating values 
shared by humanity, but incidentally pointed towards the unacceptable nature 
of crimes against children.
64
 The considerations in Krstić and Lubanga are 
crime-specific but they show how international judgments become the point 
of reference for the behaviour that is not tolerated by the humankind.  
The recent Taylor Appeal judgment came closest to an express recognition of 
the symbolic function of international criminal law. The Appeals Chamber 
upheld Charles Taylor’s conviction and a 50-year sentence for aiding and 
abetting and planning murders, rapes and other acts of violence committed 
during the Sierra Leonean civil war.
65
 As the former president of Liberia, 
Taylor was involved in organizing and funding the attacks on the civilian 
population in the neighbouring country.  The appellate judges held that the 
sentences imposed by the court reflect “the revulsion of mankind, represented 
by the international community, to the crime and the convicted person‘s 
participation in the crime.” 66  Thereby, they recognized that culpable 
involvement of the heads in political violence in another state is no longer 
accepted. Justice in this case serves as a yardstick of the shared global values. 
The reason for the scarcity of the express acknowledgment of the symbolic 
function of international criminal law in the jurisprudence is twofold: firstly, 
there is a thin line between proclaiming the symbolic value of international 
justice and sliding to rhetorical restatements devoid of legal content; 
secondly, this aim is something unique for international criminal law – it is 
hard to find a corresponding objective within the domestic domain. 
Consequently, there is a need to construct this purpose de novo – a task that is 
more challenging than simply borrowing the rationale from the national legal 
system.  
It follows that accepting the symbolic role of international criminal law helps 
in containing expectations and bringing some coherence to the plethora of the 
proclaimed objectives of international criminal law. The question is how does 
one integrate this overarching aim into judicial reasoning? One way to do this 
is to see the symbolic function of international criminal law as a substantive 
and procedural consideration. From the substantive point of view, 
international criminal law plays a crucial role in defining the forms of 
political violence that are not accepted by international community. It shapes 
our perception of the shared values that must be upheld universally.
67
 For 
                                                             
64
 Lubanga Sentencing Decision, §§ 37-44. 
65
  Taylor Appeal Judgment. 
66
 Ibid, at 663. 
67
 The Committee of French jurists participating in setting up the ICTY, suggested that the 
proposed tribunal  “must be universal, because the crimes it is to punish are an affront to the 
conscience of all humanity.” Report of the Committee of French Jurists, § 23 (b).  
  
 
 
 
247 
example, the Rome Statute represents an up-to-date codification of 
international crimes. Arguably, the role of the ICC is not only to provide the 
jurisdictional framework for international prosecutions but also to spread the 
values embedded in the Statute through enhancing national legislation. 
Pursuant to the complementarity principle, the ICC promotes the 
implementation of the Rome Statute into the domestic legislation of the 
countries that are parties to the Statute.
68
  
The symbolic function of international criminal law can also be seen as a 
procedural tool for interpreting the administration of justice. It appears that 
international criminal justice attains legitimacy not only through delivering 
the final outcome – the conviction or acquittal – but also through the way in 
which it reaches this outcome. Justice becomes a matter of outcome and 
process. If we conceive international trials as symbols of exemplary justice, 
then the principles of fairness and due process must inform every step of the 
way.  
The role and place of complicity in international criminal law becomes 
evident if one looks at it through the lens of procedural symbolism. Ashworth 
wrote that fairness demands that offenders are labelled and punished in 
proportion to their wrongdoing.
69
 He stressed that the principle of fair 
labelling requires us to maintain the distinctions “to ensure a proportionate 
response to law-breaking, thereby assisting the law’s educative and 
declaratory function in sustaining and reinforcing social values.”70 This is 
precisely the symbolic function of law discussed above. Ashworth referred to 
the definitions of the substantive offences, but the same consideration applies 
to the modes of responsibility - the notion of fairness insists that we describe 
the conduct and the mental state of the accused in the most precise terms.  
Ohlin argued in favour of the distinction between principals and accessories 
in international criminal law because collapsing this distinction sends the 
wrong message to the world – it inflates the culpability of accessories and 
deflates the culpability of principals.
71
  Perhaps, the main problem with 
attaching the same label to all crime participants is not necessarily ‘evening 
out’ their level of culpability - since this primarily depends on the factual 
circumstances rather than the mode of participation - but the violation of the 
principle of legality.  Labels are important for reinforcing this principle – an 
individual must be fairly warned prior to any demands on his liberty and have 
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a crystal clear idea as to why and how he incurs individual criminal 
responsibility. Another argument for maintaining the distinction is that an 
accurate description of the conduct and mental state of the accused 
contributes to the perceived legitimacy of international courts and tribunals. 
Damaška claimed - in respect of setting the lower limits of superior 
responsibility - that “[o]rdinary people do not lump together intentional 
perpetrators of heinous crimes and those who failed to bring them to 
justice.”72 
Judge Van den Wyngaert invoked the principle of fair labelling when she 
criticized the emerging hierarchy of the participation modes at the ICC – 
principal perpetration being considered the most blameworthy.
73
 This highly 
questionable position reinforces the tendency to make the conduct of political 
and military leaders “fit the mould of principal liability” by using implied 
theories such as the one of ‘control of the crime’.74 Judge Van den Wyngaert 
accurately observed that the drafters of the Rome Statute have not elaborated 
forms of criminal responsibility for this specific category of offenders, and 
characterizing them as principals is problematic from the legal and conceptual 
point of view.
75
 The legal difficulty is precisely the violation of the principle 
of fair labelling – the juridical description of the conduct has to match the 
facts of the case rather than be based on an artificially constructed notion. If 
the leader is removed from the scene of crime, then he may just as easily be 
held complicit in the crimes occurring in the field rather than ‘perpetrating’ 
them. 
3. Improving Current Practices of Attaching Liability for 
Complicity 
The previous section argued in favour of distinguishing between different 
forms of participation in international criminal law. The reason for this is to 
uphold the principle of legality and to send the message of a fair trial to the 
world community. It seems that different forms of complicity – explicitly 
provided in the statutes of international courts and deeply rooted in domestic 
legal systems – are often the most appropriate mechanisms for attaching the 
liability to the offenders removed from the scene of the crime. The remaining 
question is how does one improve the current practices on accomplice 
liability in international criminal law? The following list outlines a number of 
considerations in this regard: 
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1. Legal requirements of complicity – conduct and fault requirements – 
need to be sufficiently clear and linked to the facts of the particular 
case. It is essential to treat these two elements not as two autonomous 
units but as parts of the same whole. 
 
2. Because of its evolving nature, international criminal law is 
characterized by a high degree of judicial discretion – not only at the 
sentencing stage, but also at the stage of the attribution of 
responsibility. However, there must be limits to judicial creativity. It 
is advisable to adopt a more rigorous methodology when it comes to 
processing the sources of international criminal law. Decisions to 
create new forms of liability beyond those expressly provided for in 
the statutes or to introduce new elements to the existing forms call for 
further justification.  
 
3. Complicity is an intricate balancing exercise. It may seem that it casts 
its net too wide by not requiring that the act of the accomplice caused 
the principal to act. The lack of causation loosens the conduct 
requirement. The equilibrium is restored by an enhanced fault 
requirement: the knowledge of the crime and the intent to assist or 
encourage the commission of the principal’s crime. 76  The Rome 
Statute demands that the aider and abettor acts with a purpose of 
facilitating the commission of the crime.
77
 
 
4. The practical implication of the balancing exercise is that the further 
the accomplice is removed from the scene of the crime, the more 
emphasis must be placed on his mental state. From the evidentiary 
point of view, this may imply avoiding a fully inferential analysis 
when it comes to assessing accomplice’s culpability. Knowledge that 
the crime is being committed is an essential element of complicity.
78
 
If the accomplice is found to be close to the scene of the crime, his 
fault may be implied, while his contribution has to be spelled out –
mental state alone is not sufficient to bring about criminal 
responsibility. In contrast, in cases of removed assistance or 
encouragement, knowledge about the crimes and the intent to be 
involved in their commission become dispositive for attaching 
responsibility to the accomplice. This consideration is particularly 
relevant in the context of mass atrocities – the gap between the 
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accomplice and the crime is often very wide, and the only way to 
compensate for the distance is to focus on individual culpability. 
 
5. The requirement that the aid of the accused is specifically directed 
towards the crime is arguably part of the fault - rather than conduct – 
requirement of complicity.
79
 The necessary extent of accessory’s 
knowledge of the principal offence is a complex consideration that 
depends largely on the circumstances of the case.
80
 The test in English 
law would be whether the offence committed was within the 
contemplated range of offences, and if not, then whether it was of the 
same type as any of those offences contemplated.
81
 International 
criminal law has to devise its own approach to the required level of 
specificity of the accused’s knowledge. For example, it may be said 
that the threshold of specificity is met if the accomplice supplies 
material aid to the rebel groups with the knowledge that the rebels are 
involved in a large scale mass violence and the furnished aid will 
almost inevitably be put to criminal use.  
 
6. From the criminological point of view, it seems that the context of 
political violence has a bearing on the culpability of the accused – 
offending often stems from obedience rather than defiance. This 
aspect has to be accounted for when assessing the accomplice’s 
culpability.  Which factors shaped the accomplice’s wrongful 
decisions? What were the courses of action available to the accused? 
 
7. The collective nature of international criminality is also an important 
consideration for the purposes of establishing accomplice liability. 
Factual scenarios of mass atrocities are diverse but are all equally 
complex. They presuppose co-operation of individuals at different 
levels of military and political apparatus. It is essential to establish the 
links between different actors. Culpability in criminal law is 
individual but should be assessed in relation to the acts of the other 
perpetrators.  
 
8. The hierarchy of the modes of participation implicit in the reasoning 
of some ICC, ICTY and ICTR Trial Chambers should be abandoned. 
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The degree of blameworthiness should not hinge on the legal label 
attached to the conduct of the accused but should rather be a reflection 
of the factual circumstances. In the context of political violence, the 
acts of accomplices are often more reprehensible than those of the 
primary perpetrators. Accomplices issuing orders from the safety of 
their desks frequently have more freedom to act in accordance with 
their conscience than the crime participants pulling the trigger of the 
gun. Accomplices also frequently enjoy the benefit of time – an 
opportunity to reflect on the consequences of their conduct – an option 
that is not available to the principals. This too, must be brought to bear 
on the assessment of accomplices’ individual criminal responsibility. 
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The Nuremberg Charter 
Article 6 
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to m Article 1 hereof for the 
trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall 
have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European 
Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed 
any of the following crimes.  
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:  
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging 
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing;  
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to 
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;  
(c)CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.  
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes 
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.  
The Tokyo Charter 
Article 5 
Jurisdiction Over Persons and Offences. The Tribunal shall have the power to try 
and punish Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of 
organizations are charged with offences which include Crimes against Peace. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 
a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, 
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treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war; 
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution 
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, 
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution 
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are 
responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan. 
Control Council Law No. 10 
Article II 
1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: 
(a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of 
aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation 
of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
(b) War Crimes. Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting 
violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill 
treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose, of civilian 
population from occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or 
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, 
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity. 
(a) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited 
to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws 
of the country where perpetrated. 
(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared 
criminal by the International Military Tribunal. 
2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is 
deemed to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he 
was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or 
ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was 
connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of 
any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) 
with reference to paragraph 1 (a) if he held a high political, civil or military 
(including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents 
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or satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any 
such country. 
3. Any persons found guilty of any of the crimes above mentioned may upon 
conviction be punished as shall be determined by the tribunal to be just. Such 
punishment may consist of one or more of the following: 
(a) Death. 
(b) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without hard labor. 
(c) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labour, in lieu thereof. 
(d) Forfeiture of property. 
(e) Restitution of property wrongfully acquired. 
(f) Deprivation of some or all civil rights. 
Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of which is ordered by 
the Tribunal shall be delivered to the Control Council for Germany, which shall 
decide on its disposal. 
4. (a) The official position of any person, whether as Head of State or as a 
responsible official in a Government Department, does not free him from 
responsibility for a crime or entitle him to mitigation of punishment. 
(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of 
a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered 
in mitigation. 
5. In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to, the accused shall not 
be entitled to the benefits of any statute of limitation in respect to the period from 30 
January 1933 to 1 July 1945, nor shall any immunity, pardon or amnesty granted 
under the Nazi regime be admitted as a bar to trial or punishment. 
 
The ICTY Statute 
Article 7: Individual criminal responsibility 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 
5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. 
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if 
he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts 
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or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a 
superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires. 
Article 24 
Penalties 
1. The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In 
determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to 
the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into account such 
factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person. 
3. In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any 
property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, 
to their rightful owners. 
Article 27 
Enforcement of sentences 
Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the International Tribunal 
from a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to 
accept convicted persons. Such imprisonment shall be in accordance with the 
applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of the International 
Tribunal. 
The ICTR Statute 
Article 6: Individual Criminal Responsibility 
1.      A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 
to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. 
2.      The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of state or 
government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 
3.      The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal 
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about 
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
4.      The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a government or 
of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be 
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considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda 
determines that justice so requires. 
Article 23: Penalties 
1.      The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to 
imprisonment.  In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall 
have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of 
Rwanda. 
2.      In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into account such 
factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person. 
3.      In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any 
property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, 
to their rightful owners. 
Article 26: Enforcement of Sentences 
Imprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any of the States on a list of States 
which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept convicted 
persons, as designated by the International Tribunal for Rwanda.  Such 
imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable law of the State concerned, 
subject to the supervision of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. 
The SCSL Statute 
Article 6: Individual criminal responsibility 
 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided 
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 
2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime. 
2.  The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 
3.  The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present 
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of 
criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate 
was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
thereof. 
4.  The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government 
or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment if the Special Court determines that justice 
so requires. 
5.  Individual criminal responsibility for the crimes referred to in article 5 shall 
be determined in accordance with the respective laws of Sierra Leone. 
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Article 19: Penalties 
 
1.  The Trial Chamber shall impose upon a convicted person, other than a 
juvenile offender, imprisonment for a specified number of years. In determining the 
terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall, as appropriate, have recourse to the 
practice regarding prison sentences in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and the national courts of Sierra Leone. 
2.  In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chamber should take into account such 
factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person. 
3.  In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chamber may order the forfeiture of 
the property, proceeds and any assets acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct, 
and their return to their rightful owner or to the State of Sierra Leone. 
Article 22: Enforcement of sentences 
1.  Imprisonment shall be served in Sierra Leone. If circumstances so require, 
imprisonment may also be served in any of the States which have concluded with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia an agreement for the enforcement of sentences, and which 
have indicated to the Registrar of the Special Court their willingness to accept 
convicted persons. The Special Court may conclude similar agreements for the 
enforcement of sentences with other States. 
2.  Conditions of imprisonment, whether in Sierra Leone or in a third State, 
shall be governed by the law of the State of enforcement subject to the supervision of 
the Special Court. The State of enforcement shall be bound by the duration of the 
sentence, subject to article 23 of the present Statute. 
The ECCC Law 
Article 29 
 
Any Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or committed the 
crimes referred to in article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be individually 
responsible for the crime.  
The position or rank of any Suspect shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility or mitigate punishment.  
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law 
were committed by a subordinate does not relieve the superior of personal criminal 
responsibility if the superior had effective command and control or authority and 
control over the subordinate, and the superior knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to 
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators.  
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The fact that a Suspect acted pursuant to an order of the Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea or of a superior shall not relieve the Suspect of individual criminal 
responsibility.  
 
The ICC Statute 
Article 25: Individual criminal responsibility 
1.         The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this 
Statute.  
   
2.         A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.  
   
3.         In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:  
(a)     Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another 
or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible;  
(b)     Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in 
fact occurs or is attempted;  
(c)     For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission;  
(d)     In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:  
(i)     Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; or  
(ii)     Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime;  
(e)     In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others 
to commit genocide;  
(f)     Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur 
because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a 
person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents 
the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this 
Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and 
voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose. 
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4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility 
shall affect the responsibility of States under international law. 
 
Article 28: Responsibility of commanders and other superiors 
            In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court: 
(a)     A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and 
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of 
his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:  
  
(i)     That military commander or person either knew or, owing to 
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces 
were committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii)     That military commander or person failed to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or 
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution.  
(b)     With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her 
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such subordinates, where:  
  
(i)     The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; 
(ii)     The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and 
(iii)     The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
  
Article 78: Determination of the sentence 
1.  In determining the sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime 
and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.  
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2.  In imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the Court shall deduct the time, if 
any, previously spent in detention in accordance with an order of the Court. The 
Court may deduct any time otherwise spent in detention in connection with conduct 
underlying the crime.  
3.  When a person has been convicted of more than one crime, the Court shall 
pronounce a sentence for each crime and a joint sentence specifying the total period 
of imprisonment. This period shall be no less than the highest individual sentence 
pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprisonment or a sentence of life 
imprisonment in conformity with article 77, paragraph 1 (b). 
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Appendix II: Definitions of the Common Terms 
  
 
 
 
293 
 
 
This appendix provides a list of terms associated with complicity and used 
throughout the thesis. The main focus is on domestic law definitions of the terms.
1
  
Accessory (an ‘accessory before the fact’ in common law) are all those who are held 
derivatively liable for another’s committing the offence. This category includes 
instigators as well as aiders-and-abettors. Unlike civil law, the Anglo-American 
common law does not recognize the distinction between different types of 
accessories. Accessories incur secondary liability. 
Accomplice per Fletcher’s definition is any partner in crime – a co-perpetrator or an 
accessory.
 Ashworth uses the term ‘accomplice’ more narrowly, as a synonym for an 
accessory, to contrast the accomplice with the principal. 
Actus Reus (conduct) is an act or omission contrary to a rule imposing specific 
behavior.
2
  
Aider and abettor in German law is “any person who intentionally assists another in 
the intentional commission of an unlawful act” or “a person who assisted in the 
commission of the offence by supplying counsel, directions, information or the 
means for the commission” in Russian law. 
Conduct Requirements of complicity differ depending on the type of complicity 
involved but the common feature is that the law of complicity does not require 
causation. Thus even a small act of assistance may suffice in entailing the liability of 
an accomplice. 
Conspiracy is a distinct offence, consummated upon entering into the agreement to 
commit the offence. Conspiracy also generates a standard for holding each 
conspirator complicitous in the crimes of fellow conspirators but, unlike complicity, 
which is a category of accessorial liability, conspiracy functions as a test of what it 
means to be a co-perpetrator.  
Constituent elements of crimes: it is the general principle of criminal law that a 
person may not be convicted of a crime unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt 
that he has caused a certain event or that responsibility is to be attributed to him for 
the existence of a certain state of affairs (actus reus), and that he had a defined state 
                                                             
1
 Fletcher’s categorization of participants in the crime is widely relied on in providing the 
definitions.
1
 See Fletcher, 1978, at 637 – 649. 
2
 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2
nd
 edn Oxford University Press, 2008, at 53. 
Smith and Hogan suggest that actus reus includes all the elements in the definition of the 
crime except the accused’s mental element. Thus, actus reus is made up generally of conduct 
(which includes acts or omissions) and sometimes its consequences, and also the 
circumstances in which the conduct took place. An example of the ‘circumstances’ would be 
the absence of the consent of the rape victim. Actus reus is sometimes referred to as a 
‘conduct element’ of the crime, but as follows from the definition, actus reus can be broader 
than just a conduct. J.C. Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law, 10th ed., Butterworths 2002, 
at 30. 
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of mind in relation to the causing of the event or the existence of the state of affairs 
(mens rea). 
Co-perpetrator (a ‘principal in the second degree’ in common law) is a person who 
commits the offence jointly with others. The problematic aspect of co-
perpetratorship is that sometimes the conduct of one or more co-perpetrators does 
not satisfy the objective elements of the substantive crime. For example, English law 
allows holding two or more persons as co-principals (co-perpetrators) if each of 
them satisfies some part of the conduct element of a substantive crime, and if each of 
them has the required mental element.
3
 This is when the joint enterprise concept 
comes into play. 
Counsellor (English law) is someone who persuades to principal to commit a crime 
by pointing to the advantages of this course of action. 
Dolus directus (direct intent) means that the accused desires particular consequence 
of his act. 
Dolus directus in the second degree means awareness that the crime will be the 
almost inevitable outcome of the acts or omissions of the accused.
4
 
Dolus eventualis (indirect intent or inadverted recklessness) consists of the 
knowledge of the risk for the effect to occur and the will (at least in the form of the 
acceptance).  
Fault Requirement of complicity has two dimensions: first, the accomplice must 
intend to do whatever acts of assistance or encouragement are done, and must be 
aware of his ability to assist or encourage the principal, and secondly, the accomplice 
must know the circumstances of the offence. The fault requirement serves as a 
‘signpost’ limiting accomplice liability, as the conduct requirement allows for a very 
broad application of the concept. 
Joint criminal enterprise (or a ‘common design’) seems to be recognized to some 
extent by both civil and common law countries. In German law, for example, the 
joint enterprise could be roughly equated with the notion of ‘co-perpetratorship’ in 
some instances.  
Indirect perpetrator – see perpetrator-by-means. 
Instigator in Germany is “any person who intentionally induces another to 
intentionally commit an unlawful act” and “a person who induced another to commit 
a crime through persuasion, bribery, threat or any other means” in Russia. 
Legal requirements of complicity: it is important to distinguish the constituent 
elements of the offence and the constituent elements of the mode of responsibility 
used in conjunction with this offence. In cases when the crime is committed solely 
by the primary perpetrator (the principal), it is not necessary to discuss separately his 
mode of liability because his conduct fully satisfies the actus reus for the defined 
crime and he acted with the requisite mens rea. However, when talking about various 
                                                             
3
 Ashworth, 1995, at 410. 
4
 Schabas, Commentary, at 475. 
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forms of complicity one needs to differentiate the actus reus and mens rea of the 
substantive offence committed by the principal and the way in which the accomplice 
was involved in this act. Consequently, there exists a separate set of requirements for 
the various forms of complicity designed to help the judge or the juror decide 
whether the accomplice’s involvement in a crime entails criminal responsibility or 
not.  
Mens Rea (state of mind) a psychological element required by the legal order for the 
conduct to be blameworthy and consequently punishable.
5
  
Organizer the Russian law recognizes this additional type of accessory as someone 
who “planned the commission of the offence or took charge in the commission of the 
offence.”  
Perpetrator (a ‘principal’ in common law) is someone whose liability can be 
established independently of all other parties. The perpetrator’s liability is direct and 
not derivative of someone else’s conduct. 
Primary perpetrator (a ‘principal in the first degree’ in common law) is an actor who 
“commits the criminal act himself” (as defined by the German Penal Code). In other 
words, he “directly” or “at first hand” commits the criminal act (as defined in the 
Russian Penal Code). Smith and Hogan define the principal as someone whose act is 
the most immediate cause of the actus reus.
6
 
Perpetrator-by-means (an ‘indirect perpetrator’ or a ‘principal in the first degree’ in 
common law) is a principal who commits the offence through another (as per the 
German definition), or “the person who committed the offence by using other 
persons, not subject to criminal responsibility due to their age, insanity or other 
factors” (as per the Russian definition). The American Model Penal Code offers 
another definition: perpetrator-by-means “causes an innocent or irresponsible person 
to engage in the proscribed conduct.” 
Principal – see perpetrator. 
Principal in the first degree – see primary perpetrator; perpetrator-by-means. 
Principal in the second degree – see co-perpetrator. 
Procurer (English law) is someone who brings about an offence, by deceiving 
another so that the other commits an offence. 
                                                             
5
 A. Cassese, 2008, at 53. For the crime to attract criminal liability, actus reus must be 
committed with the requisite state of mind. Smith and Hogan use the term ‘mens rea’ to mean 
the state of mind, intention or recklessness required by the particular crime. They suggest that 
the term ‘negligence’, while being a manifestation of fault in English law in addition to the 
intention and recklessness, falls outside the scope of mens rea, properly understood, for it is 
not a state of mind but rather a failure to comply with a standard conduct. The German 
Criminal Code adopts an even more narrow definition of the requisite state of mind by saying 
that “[u]nless the law expressly provides for criminal liability based on negligence, only 
intentional conduct shall attract criminal liability.” (Article 15 German Penal Code). 
6
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Appendix III: National Legislation on Complicity 
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Table: National Legislation on Complicity: Comparative Study 
*The translation of the terms used in this table may vary due to linguistic peculiarities. 
Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
Albania 1. Organizers - organize and manage 
the activity to commit the criminal 
act. 
2. Executors - carry out direct actions 
to realize the criminal act.  
3. Instigators - instigate the other 
collaborators to commit a criminal 
act.  
4. Helpers - through advice, 
instructions, concrete means, 
abolition of obstacles, promise to 
hide collaborators’ tracks
 
or things 
relevant to the criminal act, help to 
carry it out.  
 
No No Creation and participation 
in a criminal organization, 
terrorist organization, 
armed gang, or structured 
criminal group constitute a 
crime and are punished 
according to the provisions 
of the special part of the 
Penal Code or other special 
criminal provisions. 
 Art. 25-28 
Albanian 
Penal Code 
Argentina 1. Executors 
2. Accomplices without whose help 
the crime would not have been 
executed 
3. Other accomplices involved in the 
execution of the crime 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Mandatory discount 
for other accomplices 
(category 3). 
 
 
 Accomplices are 
punished only for 
what they intended. 
Art. 45-48 
Argentinia
n Penal 
Code 
Austria  
 
 
Persons involved in the execution 
of the crime. 
No Yes 
 
Discretionary 
sentencing discount 
for those participating 
 Every participant is 
punished according to 
the guilt. 
Sections 
12-13; 34 
(1) 6 
Austrian 
Penal Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
in the ancillary 
manner 
 
 
Bangladesh 1. Executors 
2. Abettors 
a. Instigators 
b. Conspirators provided illegal act 
or omission result from the 
conspiracy 
c. Aiders 
No No 
 
 
 Abettors are punished 
for the result. 
 
Abettors are punished 
even in cases where 
the crime is not 
executed. 
 
Abettors are always 
removed from the 
scene of the crime. If 
they are present, they 
are deemed to have 
committed the 
offence. 
Chapter 5 
Penal Code 
of 
Banglades
h 
Bolivia 1. Author – any party without whose 
contribution the crime would not 
have been executed 
2. Instigator 
3. Accomplice – contributes 
intentionally to the crime, which 
would have would have been 
executed even without such help 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Mandatory discount 
for other accomplices 
(category 3). 
 
  Articles 
20-24 and 
39 
Bolivian 
Penal Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1. Perpetrator 
2. Accomplices (joint perpetrators) 
3. Inciter 
4. Accessory (helps in the commission 
of the crime) 
Yes Yes 
 
Discretionary 
mitigation for 
accessories (category 
4). 
 The accomplice shall 
be considered 
criminally responsible 
within the limits set 
by his own intent or 
negligence, and the 
inciter and the 
accessory within the 
limits of their own 
intent.  
 
Articles 
29-32 
Penal Code 
of Bosnia 
and 
Herzegovi
na 
Bulgaria Accomplices in crime: 
1. Actual perpetrator 
2. Abettor - the one who has 
deliberately persuaded somebody 
else to commit the crime 
3. Accessory - the one who has 
deliberately facilitated the 
commitment of the crime through 
advice, explanations, promise to 
provide assistance after the act, 
removal of obstacles, providing 
resources or in any other way.  
Yes Yes 
 
Discretionary 
discount for aiding 
when the degree of 
participation is small. 
 The abettor and the 
accessory shall be 
responsible only for 
what they have 
deliberately abetted or 
helped the perpetrator. 
Articles 
21, 22, 55, 
58 
Bulgarian 
Penal Code 
Canada 1. Actual perpetrator 
2. The one who does or omits to do 
anything for the purpose of aiding 
any person to commit the crime 
3. Abettor 
No No   Articles 
20-24 
Canadian 
Penal Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
4. Persons carrying out the common 
purpose 
5. Counsellor (procures, solicits and 
incites) 
China 1. Principal offender is one who 
organizes and leads a criminal 
group in conducting criminal 
activities or plays a principal role in 
a joint crime 
2. Accomplice is one who plays a 
secondary or supplementary role in 
a joint crime 
3. One who is coerced into 
committing a crime 
4. Instigator 
Yes Yes 
 
Mandatory discount 
for accomplices and 
those coerced into 
committing a crime. 
 
Discretionary 
discount for 
instigators. 
A criminal gang is a more 
or less permanent criminal 
organization composed of 
three or more persons for 
the purpose of jointly 
committing crimes.  
The head, who organizes or 
leads a criminal gang, shall 
bear criminal responsibility 
for all the crimes committed 
by the gang. 
 Articles 
25-28 
Criminal 
Law of the 
People’s 
Republic 
of China 
Cuba 1. Authors (including those who 
execute, organize or use an innocent 
agent to commit crime) 
2. Accomplices (including those who 
encourage others to commit a crime, 
facilitate its commission through 
advice or help its commission in 
other ways). 
Yes Yes 
 
Mandatory discount 
for accomplices. 
  Articles 
18.1 – 19.1 
Cuban 
Penal Code 
England  1. Principals 
2. Whoever aids, abets, counsels or 
procures a principal 
Not mentioned 
in the 
legislation, but 
in the doctrine. 
No Conspiracy occurs in both 
English and American law 
as a distinct offence, 
consummated upon entering 
into the agreement to 
The general part of 
criminal law relies 
heavily on case law.  
1861 
Aiders and 
Abettors 
Act, case 
law 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
commit criminal acts. 
Conspiracy also generates a 
standard for holding each 
conspirator complicitous in 
the crimes of fellow 
conspirators. 
Estonia 1. Principle offender - unaided 
principle offender, the one 
committing crimes through an 
innocent agent and jointly with 
other offenders pursuant to an 
agreement embracing the elements 
of the offence 
2. Accomplice 
a. Abettor - intentionally induces 
another person to commit an 
intentional unlawful act. 
b. Aider - who intentionally 
provides physical, material or 
moral assistance to an 
intentional unlawful act of 
another person. 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Discretionary 
discount for aiders 
(category 2(b)); 
 
Mandatory discount 
for the accomplices 
that lack the specific 
personal 
characteristics, which 
pursuant to law 
constitute 
prerequisites for the 
liability of the 
principal offender. 
 
  Articles 
20-24 
Estonian 
Penal Code 
Finland 1. Accomplices - two or more persons 
have committed an intentional 
offence together 
2. Instigator - intentionally persuades 
another person to commit an 
Yes Yes 
 
Mandatory discount, 
if the perpetrator is 
  Chapter 5 
(515/2003) 
Finnish 
Penal Code 
  
 
 
 
303 
Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
intentional offence 
3. Abettor - before or during the 
commission of an offence, 
intentionally furthers the 
commission by another of an 
intentional act or of its punishable 
attempt, through advice, action or 
otherwise. 
convicted as an 
abettor, or his or her 
complicity in the 
offence is otherwise 
clearly less than that 
of other accomplices. 
 
France 1. Perpetrator - commits the 
criminally prohibited act 
2. Accomplice - 
a. knowingly, by aiding and 
assisting, facilitates its 
preparation or commission, or 
b. by means of a gift, promise, 
threat, order, or an abuse of 
authority or powers, incites the 
commission of an offence or 
gives instructions to commit it. 
 
Yes No Conspiracy is a distinct 
offence defined as a 
criminal association 
established with a view to 
the preparation of the crime, 
marked by one or more 
material actions in 
furtherance of that crime. 
Accomplice is 
punishable as a 
perpetrator. 
Articles 
121-4-121-
7 French 
Penal Code 
Georgia 1. Performer (and co-performer) 
2. Organizer- a person who organized 
the commission of a given crime, or 
who guided its execution, as well as 
a person who created an organized 
criminal group 
3. Abettor- a person who inclined 
another person to the commission of 
a given crime by way of persuasion, 
subornation, threat, or by any other 
Yes No 
 
The creator and/or 
organizer of a criminal 
group is liable in cases 
specified in the special part 
of the Penal Code. 
 
 
Criminal liability of 
participant in the 
crime shall be 
determined by the 
character and degree 
of participation of 
each participant in the 
commission of a 
given crime 
Articles 
27-31 
Georgian 
Penal Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
method 
4. Accomplice-a person who co-
operated in the commission of a 
crime by advice, instructions, 
granting of information, 
instruments, or means for the 
commission, or by elimination of 
the impediments for the commission 
of a crime, etc. 
The commission by a 
person of a crime 
which was not 
covered with the 
intent of other co-
participants shall be 
recognized as an 
excess of a co-
participant. Other 
participants in a given 
crime shall not be 
subject to criminal 
liability for an excess. 
Germany 1. Perpetrator commits the crime 
himself or through another  
2. Co- Perpetrator commits a crime 
jointly with one or more other 
people 
3. Instigator intentionally induces 
another to commit an unlawful act 
4. Accessory intentionally renders aid 
to another in that person's 
intentional commission of an 
unlawful act. 
No Yes 
 
Mandatory discount 
for accessories 
(category 4) 
A person who declares his 
willingness or who accepts 
the offer of another or who 
agrees with another to 
commit or abet the 
commission of a felony 
shall be liable under the 
same terms. 
 Sections 
25-30, 49 
German 
Penal Code 
India 1. Executors 
2. Abettors 
a. Instigators 
b. Conspirators provided illegal 
act or omission result from the 
No No When two or more persons 
agree to do, or cause to be 
done an illegal act, or an act 
which is not illegal by 
Abettors are punished 
for the result. 
 
Abettors are punished 
Articles 
107-120 
Indian 
Penal Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
conspiracy 
c. Aiders 
 
illegal means, such an 
agreement is designated a 
criminal conspiracy. 
even in cases where 
the crime is not 
executed. 
 
Abettors are always 
removed from the 
scene of the crime. If 
they are present, they 
are deemed to have 
committed the 
offence. 
Indonesia 1. Principals 
a. Those who perpetrate, cause 
others to perpetrate, or take a 
direct part in the execution of 
the act 
b. Those who provoke the 
execution of the act by gifts, 
promises, abuse of power, etc. 
2. Accomplices 
a. Those who deliberately aid in 
the commission of the crime 
b. Those who provide 
opportunity, means and 
information for the 
commission of the crime 
Yes Yes 
 
Mandatory discount 
for accomplices. 
 Complicity to commit 
a misdemeanour shall 
not be punished. 
Articles 
55-62 
Indonesian 
Penal Code 
Iraq 1. Principal 
a. who commits an offence by 
himself or with others 
No No A criminal conspiracy is 
considered to be an 
agreement between two or 
Any person who 
participates in the 
commission of an 
§§. 47-59 
Iraqi Penal 
Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
b. who participates in the 
commission of an offence that 
consists of a number of acts, and 
who wilfully carries out one of 
those acts during the 
commission of that offence 
c. who incites another in any way 
to commit an act contributing to 
an offence if that person is not in 
any way criminally liable for the 
offence 
2. Accessory 
a. who incites another to commit 
an offence and that offence is 
committed on the basis of such 
incitement 
b. who conspires with others to 
commit an offence and that 
offence is committed on the 
basis of such conspiracy 
c. who knowingly supplies the 
principal to an offence with a 
weapon, instrument or anything 
else to commit an offence or 
deliberately assists him in any 
other way to carry out those acts 
for which he has received 
assistance. 
 
more people to commit a 
felony or misdemeanour 
such as theft, fraud or 
forgery, whether or not it 
is a specified offence or 
arises out of acts that are 
aided and abetted, even 
though that agreement 
is in the initial planning 
stages or has been in 
existence only for a short 
time. 
 
offence as 
principal or accessory 
is punishable by the 
penalty prescribed for 
that offence unless 
otherwise 
stipulated by law. 
 
An accessory is 
considered to be a 
principal to an offence  
if he is present during 
the commission of 
that offence or any act 
contributing to that 
offence. 
Israel 1. Perpetrator 
a. Perpetrator 
No Yes 
 
  Articles 
29-34 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
b. Joint perpetrator (performing all 
acts jointly, or having some acts 
performed by another person) 
c. Perpetrator using another person 
as an instrument 
2. Instigator - causes another to 
commit an offence by means of 
persuasion, encouragement, 
demand, cajolery 
3. Accessory - if a person does 
anything – before an offence is 
committed or during its commission 
– to make its commission possible, 
to support or protect it, or to prevent 
the perpetrator from being taken or 
the offence or its loot from being 
discovered, or if he contributes in 
any other way to the creation of 
conditions for the commission of 
the offence. 
Mandatory discount 
for accessories 
(category 3). 
Israeli 
Penal Code 
Italy Persons cooperating in crime No No 
 
Penalty is increased 
for those who led 
others to cooperate. 
Agreement to commit a 
crime is not punished if the 
crime is not carried out. 
Conspiracies to commit 
specific offences form an 
exception to the general 
rule. 
Each of the co-
operators is subject to 
penalties prescribed 
for the crime itself. 
 
Penalty can be 
increased or decreased 
(within the sentencing 
range) using the 
provision on 
Articles 
110-118 
Italian 
Penal Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
aggravating and 
mitigating 
circumstances. 
Japan 1. Principals 
2. Accomplices 
a. Co-principals 
b. Inducers 
c. Aiders 
Yes Yes 
 
Mandatory 
sentencing discount 
for aiders (category 
2(c)). 
A person who did not 
actually take part in 
committing a crime, but 
masterminded it and 
conspired with others is 
usually punished as a 
principal because, as held 
by the Supreme Court, he 
uses the acts of the others as 
an instrument to commit a 
crime (Judgement of the 
Supreme Court, 28 May 
1958, Keishu 12-8-1718). 
 Articles 
60-65 
Japanese 
Penal Code 
Kenya 1. Actual perpetrator 
2. A person who does or omits to do 
any act for the purpose of 
enabling or aiding another person 
to commit the offence  
3. A person who aids or abets 
another person in committing the 
offence;  
4. A person who counsels or 
procures any other person to 
commit the offence. 
No No  Each of the 
participants in the 
crime is deemed to 
have committed the 
offence and is guilty 
of that offence. 
Articles 
20-23 
Kenyan 
Penal Code 
Norway Modes of participation are not listed in No No Conspiracy to commit   
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
the general part of the code; rather they 
form a part of the description of specific 
offences in the special part of the code.  
 
Depending on the 
particular offence in 
question, the same 
penalty is fixed for all 
of the participants in 
the crime. 
certain crimes is 
punishable. For example, 
conspiracy to commit a 
homicide. 
Philippines 1. Principals 
a. Those who take a direct part in the 
execution of the act; 
b. Those who directly force or 
induce others to commit it; 
c. Those who cooperate in the 
commission of the offence by 
another act without which it 
would not have been 
accomplished. 
2. Accomplices - persons who, not 
being principals, cooperate in the 
execution of the offence by 
previous or simultaneous acts. 
3. Accessories - knowingly take part 
in the crime subsequent its 
commission by various forms of 
assistance. 
Yes Yes 
 
Sentencing discount 
by one degree for 
accomplices 
(category 2) and two 
degrees for 
accessories (category 
3). 
 
 
 
Conspiracy exists when two 
or more persons come to an 
agreement concerning the 
commission of a felony and 
decide to commit it.  
 
Conspiracy is only 
punishable when the law 
specifically provides for 
this. 
Accessories are only 
punished for grave 
felonies. 
 
Articles 8, 
16-20,52-
59 
Philippines 
Penal Code 
Poland 1. Perpetrators 
a. Actual perpetrator 
b. Joint Perpetrator 
c. The one who ordered the 
commission of the act 
No Yes 
 
Discretionary 
mitigation for aiders 
 Each person co-
operating in the 
perpetration of a 
prohibited act shall be 
Articles 
18-24 
Polish 
Penal Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
d. The one who directed the 
commission of the act 
2. Instigators 
3. Aiders and abettors 
a. The one who with intent that 
another person should commit a 
prohibited act, facilitates by his 
behaviour the commission of the 
act, particularly by providing the 
instrument, means of transport, or 
giving counsel or information 
b. The one who acting against a 
particular legal duty of preventing 
the prohibited act, facilitates its 
commission by another person 
through his omission 
and abetters (category 
3). 
liable within 
the limits of his intent 
or a lack of it, 
irrespective of the 
liability of others co-
operating in the 
perpetration. 
Russia 1. Perpetrator (including joint 
perpetrator and perpetrator using an 
innocent agent) 
2. Organizer who has organized the 
commission of a crime or has 
directed its commission, also a 
person who has created an 
organized group 
3. Instigator who has abetted another 
person in committing a crime by 
persuasion, bribery, threat, or by 
any other method 
4. Aider who has assisted in the 
commission of a crime by advice, 
instructions on committing the 
Yes  
 
(as an 
umbrella term 
for all the 
participants in 
the crime) 
No The creator and/or 
organizer of a criminal 
group is liable in cases 
specified in the special part 
of the Penal Code. 
 
The responsibility of 
accomplices in a 
crime shall be 
determined by the 
character and the 
degree of the actual 
participation of each 
in the commission of 
the crime. 
 
The commission of a 
crime that is not 
covered by the intent 
Articles 
32-36, 67 
Russian 
Penal Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
crime, or the removal of obstacles 
to it, etc. 
of other accomplices 
shall be deemed to be 
an excess of the 
perpetrator. Other 
accomplices to the 
crime shall not be 
subject to criminal 
responsibility for the 
excess of the 
perpetrator.  
 
Switzerland 1. Perpetrator 
2. Those who intentionally 
participate in crime 
a. Ex. aiders 
No Yes 
 
Mandatory discount 
for those who 
intentionally provided 
assistance to the 
perpetrator (category 
2(a)) 
  Articles 
24-27 
Swiss 
Penal Code 
United Arab 
Emirates 
1. Principal 
2. Accomplice 
a. Direct accomplice 
i. Joint perpetrator 
ii. Perpetrator of an act that 
constitutes part of the crime 
iii. Perpetrator through an innocent 
agent 
b. Accomplice to crime by causation 
Yes No  Accomplices are 
punished for the 
result, even if the 
other crime was 
intended. 
 
Whoever takes part in 
a crime in his capacity 
Articles 
44-52 
UAE Penal 
Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
i. Abettor 
ii. Conspirator 
iii. Aider (by providing weapons, 
tools and facilitating the 
commission of the crime by 
other means) 
as a direct or 
causative accomplice 
shall receive the 
penalty for said crime 
unless the law 
provides otherwise. 
 
United 
States 
1. Direct perpetrator who personally 
engages in the proscribed conduct; 
2. Indirect perpetrator who causes 
an innocent or irresponsible person 
to engage in the proscribed conduct; 
3. Accomplice who, with the purpose 
of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of the offence, 
a. solicits such other person to 
commit it; 
b. aids or agrees or attempts to aid 
such other person in planning or 
committing it.  
 
Yes No 
 
Each person’s 
criminal liability 
should reflect his 
individual culpability. 
Conspiracy exists in both 
English and American law 
as a distinct offence, 
consummated upon entering 
into the agreement to 
commit criminal acts. 
Conspiracy also generates a 
standard for holding each 
conspirator complicitous in 
the crimes of fellow 
conspirators. 
American law is 
highly fragmented 
due to the existence of 
both federal and state 
legal systems and 
because not all states 
have adopted the 
modern penal code. 
Section 
2.06 
Model 
Penal Code 
Venezuela 1. Perpetrator 
2. Immediate co-operator 
3. Instigator 
4. Accessories (facilitating the 
commission of the crime, providing 
means and assistance before or after 
the act). 
No Yes 
 
Mandatory discount 
for accessories 
(category 4) provided 
their aid was not 
indispensable for the 
commission of the 
  Articles 
83-84 
Venezuela
n Penal 
Code 
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Country 
 
Participants in Crime Term 
‘Complicity’ 
Mentioned 
Sentencing Discount 
for any mode of 
participation 
Conspiracy Comments Reference 
to 
Legislatio
n 
crime. 
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Table: Correlation Between the Forms of Liability and Sentencing: ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ECCC, ICC  
Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
ICTY 
Aleksovski Zlatko Appeal  24 
March 
2000 
 
Outrages upon personal dignity  Aiding and abetting; 
superior responsibility 
7 
Babić, Milan Appeal 18 July 
2005 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds  Joint criminal enterprise 13  
Bala, Haradin 
 
Appeal 27 
Septem
ber 
2007 
Torture, cruel treatment, murder  Direct perpetration 
(murder and cruel 
treatment); aiding and 
abetting torture 
17 
Brahimaj, Lahi

  Appeal 21 July 
2010 
Cruel treatment and torture  Perpetration 6  
Banović, Predrag, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial 28 
Octobe
r 2003 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds  Joint criminal enterprise 8  
                                                             

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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Beara, Ljubiša Trial 10 June 
2010 
Genocide, extermination, murder, persecutions Joint criminal enterprise Life 
Blagojević, Vidoje Appeal 9 May 
2007 
Murder, persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds 
and inhumane acts, forcible transfer) 
Aiding and abetting 15  
Blaškić, Tihomir  Appeal 29 July 
2004 
Inhumane treatment  Perpetration, ordering, 
planning, aiding and 
abetting 
 
Borovčanin, 
Ljubomir, (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 10 June 
2010 
Extermination, persecutions, forcible transfer and murder Aiding and abetting 17  
Bralo, Miroslav, 
(guilty plea) 
Appeal  2 April 
2007 
Murder; persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
rape; torture; inhumane treatment 
Perpetration 20  
Brđanin, Radoslav  Appea 3 April 
2007 
Persecutions; torture; deportation; inhumane acts (forcible 
transfer), wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or 
devastation not  justified by military necessity; destruction or 
wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, wilful 
killing; torture 
Aiding and abetting; 
instigating 
30  
Čerkez, Mario Appeal 17 
Decem
ber 
Persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds; 
imprisonment; unlawful confinement of civilians  
Co-perpetration; superior 
responsibility 
6  
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
2004 
Češić, Ranko, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial 11 
March 
2004 
Murder, humiliating and degrading treatment  Perpetration 18 
Ćorić, Valentin Trial 29 May 
2013 
Persecutions; cruel treatment; unlawful labour; inhumane 
treatment; wilful killing; unlawful deportation 
Joint criminal enterprise 16  
Delić, Hazim Appeal 8 April 
2003 
Wilful killings, torture, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury, inhuman treatment  
 
Perpetration 18  
Delić, Rasim Trial 15 
Septem
ber 
2008 
Cruel treatment  Superior responsibility 3  
Deronjić, 
Miroslav, (guilty 
plea) 
Appeal 25 July 
2005 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds  Joint criminal enterprise 10  
Đorđević, 
Vlastimir 
Appeal 23 
Februar
y 2011 
Deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder, 
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, murder 
Joint criminal enterprise; 
aiding and abetting 
27  
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Došen, Damir, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial 13 
Novem
ber 
2001 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds Superior responsibility 5  
Erdemović, 
Dražen, (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 5 
March 
1998 
Murder Perpetration 5  
Furundžija, Anto Appeal 21 July 
2000 
Torture, outrages upon personal dignity, including rape Co-perpetration; aiding 
and abetting 
10 
Galić, Stanislav  
 
Appeal 30 
Novem
ber 
2006 
Acts of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread 
terror among the civilian population, as set forth in Article 51 of 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva conventions of 1949; 
murder and other inhumane acts 
Ordering  Life 
Gvero, Milan Trial 10 June 
2010 
Persecutions and forcible transfer Joint criminal enterprise 5  
Hadžihasanović, 
Enver 
Appeal 22 
April 
2008 
Cruel treatment Superior responsibility 3,5 
Jelisić, Goran Appeal 5 July 
2001 
Murder; cruel treatment; plunder; inhumane acts Perpetration (not specified) 40 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Jokić, Dragan 
 
Appeal 9 May 
2007 
Extermination, persecutions on political, racial and religious 
grounds and murder 
Aiding and abetting 9  
Josipović, Drago Appeal 23 
Octobe
r 2001 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; murder; 
inhumane acts  
Perpetration; Co-
perpetration 
12  
Kolundžija, 
Dragan, (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 13 
Novem
ber 
2001 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds Superior responsibility 3  
Kordić, Dario Appeal 17 
Decem
ber 
2004 
Unlawful attack on civilians; unlawful attack on civilian 
objects; wanton destruction not justified by military necessity; 
plunder of public or private property; destruction or wilful 
damage to institutions dedicated to religion or education  
Planning; instigating; 
ordering 
25  
Kos, Milojica  2 
Novem
ber 
2001 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, murder, 
inhumane acts; murder; torture 
Joint criminal enterprise 6 
Kovač, Radomir Appeal 12 June 
2002 
Rape, enslavement Perpetration, aiding and 
abetting 
20 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Krajišnik, 
Momčilo 
Appeal 17 
March 
2009 
Persecution on political, racial or religious grounds; deportation; 
inhumane acts (forced transfer) 
Joint criminal enterprise 20 
Krnojelac, 
Milorad 
Appeal 17 
Septem
ber 
2003 
Torture, murder, persecutions and cruel treatment Joint criminal enterprise; 
superior responsibility  
15 
Krstić, Radislav Appeal 19 
April 
2004 
Genocide, murders, extermination and persecutions Aiding and abetting 35 
Kubura, Amir 
 
Appeal 22 
April 
2008 
Plunder of public or private property Superior responsibility 2 
Kunarac, 
Dragoljub 
Appeal 12 June 
2002 
Torture, rape, enslavement Perpetration, aiding and 
abetting 
28 
Kvočka, Miroslav Appeal 28 
Februar
y 2005 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; murder; 
torture 
Joint criminal enterprise 7 
Landžo, Esad Appeal 8 April 
2003 
Wilful killing, torture, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury  
Perpetration 9  
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Lazarević, 
Vladimir 
Trial 26 
Februar
y 2009 
Deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer)  Aiding and abetting 15 
Lukić, Milan Appeal 4 
Decem
ber 
2012 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; murder; 
inhumane acts; and extermination, murder, and cruel treatment 
Perpetration Life 
Lukić, Sredoje Appeal 4 
Decem
ber 
2012 
Inhumane acts; aiding and abetting persecutions on political, 
racial and religious grounds, murder, cruel treatment 
Perpetration; aiding and 
abetting  
27 
Lukić, Sreten Trial 26 
Februar
y 2009 
Deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder, 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, murder 
Joint criminal enterprise 22 
Martić, Milan Appeal  8 
Octobe
r 2008 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, murder, 
imprisonment, torture, inhumane acts, deportation, inhumane 
acts (forcible transfers), wanton destruction of villages or 
devastation not justified by military necessity, destruction or 
wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to education or 
religion, plunder of public or private property, attacks on 
civilians 
Joint criminal enterprise 35 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Martinović, Vinko Appeal 3 May 
2006 
Inhumane treatment; wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health; wilful killing; unlawful transfer of a 
civilian; unlawful labour; plunder of public or private property; 
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, 
inhumane acts, murder 
Perpetration, ordering, 
aiding and abetting, 
instigation, superior 
responsibility 
18 
Miletić, Radivoje Trial 10 June 
2010 
Murder, persecutions, forcible transfer Joint criminal enterprise 19  
Milošević, 
Dragomir 
 
Appeal 12 
Novem
ber 
2009 
Terror, murder and inhumane acts Ordering, superior 
responsibility 
29 
Mrđa, Darko, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial 31 
March 
2004 
Murder, inhumane acts Perpetration 17 
Mrkšić, Mile Appeal 5 May 
2009 
Murder; torture; cruel treatment Aiding and abetting 20 
Mucić, Zdravko Appeal 8 April 
2003 
Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury, unlawful 
confinement of civilians, wilful killings, torture, inhuman 
treatment  
Superior responsibility 15  
Naletilić, Mladen Appeal 3 May Torture; wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health; unlawful transfer of a civilian; unlawful labour; 
Perpetration, ordering, 
aiding and abetting, 
20 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
2006 wanton destruction not justified by military necessity; plunder 
of public or private property; persecutions on political, racial 
and religious grounds 
instigation, superior 
responsibility 
Nikolić, Dragan, 
(guilty plea) 
Appeal  4 
Februar
y 2005 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, murder, 
sexual violence, torture 
Perpetration 20 
Nikolić, Drago Trial 10 June 
2010 
Genocide, extermination, murder, persecutions Aiding and abetting 
genocide; joint criminal 
enterprise (persecutions) 
35  
Nikolić, Momir, 
(guilty plea) 
 
Appeal 8 
March 
2006 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds Perpetration 20 
Obrenović, 
Dragan, (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 10 
Decem
ber 
2003 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds Superior responsibility 17 
Ojdanić, 
Dragoljub 
Trial 26 
Februar
y 2009 
Deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) Aiding and abetting 15 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Pandurević, Vinko Trial 10 June 
2010 
Murder, persecutions, forcible transfer Aiding and abetting; 
superior responsibility 
13  
Pavković, Nebojša Trial 26 
Februar
y 2009 
Deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder, 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, murder 
Joint criminal enterprise 22 
Petković, Milivoj Trial 29 May 
2013 
Persecutions; cruel treatment; unlawful labour; inhumane 
treatment; wilful killing; unlawful deportation 
Joint criminal enterprise 20  
Plavšić, Biljana, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial 27 
Februar
y 2003 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds Individual criminal 
responsibility 
11 
Popović, Vujadin Trial 10 June 
2010 
Genocide, extermination, murder, persecutions Joint criminal enterprise Life 
Praljak, Slobodan Trial 29 May 
2013 
Persecutions; cruel treatment; unlawful labour; inhumane 
treatment; wilful killing; unlawful deportation 
Joint criminal enterprise 20  
Prcać, Dragoljub Appeal 28 
Februar
y 2005 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; murder; 
torture 
Joint criminal enterprise 5 
Prlić, Jadranko Trial 29 May 
2013 
Persecutions; cruel treatment; unlawful labour; inhumane 
treatment; wilful killing; unlawful deportation 
Joint criminal enterprise 25  
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Pušić, Berislav Trial 29 May 
2013 
Persecutions; cruel treatment; unlawful labour; inhumane 
treatment; wilful killing; unlawful deportation 
Joint criminal enterprise 10  
Radić, Mlađo Appeal 28 
Februar
y 2005 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, murder, 
inhumane acts, torture 
Joint criminal enterprise 20 
Rajić, Ivica, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial  8 May 
2006 
Wilful killing, inhumane treatment (including sexual assault), 
appropriation of property, extensive destruction not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly 
Planning and ordering 12 
Šainović, Nikola Trial 26 
Februar
y 2009 
Deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder, 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, murder 
Joint criminal enterprise 22 
Šantić, Vladimir 
 
Appeal 23 
Octobe
r 2001 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; murder; 
inhumane acts  
Perpetration; co-
perpetration 
18  
Sikirica, Duško, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial 13 
Novem
ber 
2001 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds Superior responsibility; 
perpetration 
15  
Simić, Blagoje Appeal 28 
Novem
ber 
Persecutions; cruel and inhumane treatment including beatings, 
torture, forced labour, and confinement under inhumane 
Aiding and abetting 15 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
 2006 conditions; and deportation and forcible transfer 
Simić, Milan, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial 17 
Octobe
r 2002 
Torture Perpetration 5 
Šljivančanin, 
Veselin 
Appeal 8 
Decem
ber 
2010 
Torture Aiding and abetting 10 
Stakić, Milomir Appeal 22 
March 
2006 
Extermination, murder and persecutions Joint criminal enterprise 40 
Stanišić, Mićo Trial 27 
March 
2013 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, murder 
and torture 
Joint criminal enterprise 22 
Stojić, Bruno Trial 29 May 
2013 
Persecutions; cruel treatment; unlawful labour; inhumane 
treatment; wilful killing; unlawful deportation 
Joint criminal enterprise 20 
Strugar, Pavle Appeal  17 July 
2008 
Attacks on civilians; destruction or wilful damage done to 
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts 
and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science; 
devastation not justified by military necessity; unlawful attacks 
Superior responsibility 7,5 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
on civilian objects. 
Tadić, Duško 
 
Appeal 26 
January 
2000 
 
Wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment and murder Joint criminal enterprise 20  
Tadić, Miroslav, 
(guilty plea) 
Trial 17 
Octobe
r 2003 
Persecutions based upon deportation and forcible transfer Aiding and abetting 8 
Tarčulovski, 
Johan  
Appeal 19 My 
2010 
Murder, wanton destruction, cruel treatment Ordering, planning and 
instigating 
12  
Todorović, 
Stevan, (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 31 July 
2001 
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds Ordering, perpetration, 
superior responsibility 
10 
Tolimir, Zdravko Trial 12 
Decem
ber 
2012 
Genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, extermination, 
murder, persecutions and forcible transfer 
Joint criminal enterprise Life 
Vasiljević, Mitar Appeal 25 
Februar
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds and murder Aiding and abetting 15 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
 y 2004 
Vuković, Zoran Appeal 12 June 
2002 
Torture and rape Perpetration 12 
Zarić, Simo Trial 17 
Octobe
r 2003 
Persecutions based upon cruel and inhumane treatment 
including beatings, torture, and confinement under inhumane 
conditions 
Aiding and abetting 6 
Zelenović, 
Dragan, (guilty 
plea) 
Appeal 31 
Octobe
r 2007 
Torture and rape Co-perpetration 15  
Žigić, Zoran Appeal 28 
Februar
y 2005 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, torture, 
cruel treatment 
Joint criminal enterprise 25 
Župljanin, Stojan Trial 27 
March 
2013 
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, 
extermination, murder and torture 
Joint criminal enterprise 22 
ICTR 
AKAYESU, Jean 
Paul  
Appeal 1 June 
2001 
Genocide, incitement to commit genocide, rape, murder, cruel 
treatment 
Perpetration, instigation, 
ordering and aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
BAGARAGAZA 
Michel (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 17 
Novem
ber 
2009 
Complicity in genocide Individual criminal 
responsibility (substantial 
assistance) 
8 
BAGOSORA, 
Théoneste 
Appeal 14 
Decem
ber 
2011 
Genocide, murder, extermination, rape, persecutions, serious 
violations of Article 3. 
Ordering, superior 
responsibility 
35 
BARAYAGWIZA
, Jean Bosco 
Appeal 28 
Novem
ber 
2007 
Genocide, extermination, persecution Instigation, ordering 32 
BIKINDI, Simon Appeal 18 
March 
2010 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide Perpetration 15 
BISENGIMANA, 
Paul (guilty plea) 
Trial 13 
April 
2006 
Extermination Aiding and abetting 15 
BIZIMUNGU, 
Augustin 
Trial 17 May 
2011 
Genocide, murder, extermination, rape Superior responsibility 30 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
‘GAA’(guilty 
plea) 
Trial 4 
Decem
ber200
7 
Giving false testimony Perpetration 9 months 
GACUMBITSI, 
Sylvestre 
Appeal 7 July 
2006 
Genocide, extermination, murder, and rape Committing, ordering, 
instigating, aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
GATETE Jean 
Baptiste  
Appeal 9 
Octobe
r 2012 
Genocide, extermination, conspiracy to commit genocide Joint criminal enterprise 40 
HATEGEKIMAN
A, Idelphonse 
Appeal 8 
March 
2012 
Genocide, rape, murder Joint criminal enterprise Life 
IMANISHIMWE, 
Samuel  
Appeal 7 July 
2006 
Torture, murder, cruel treatment, imprisonment Ordering, aiding and 
abetting 
12 
KAJELIJELI, 
Juvénal 
Appeal 23 May 
2005 
Genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
extermination 
Ordering, instigating, and 
aiding and abetting 
45 
KALIMANZIRA 
Callixte  
Appeal 20 
Octobe
r 2010 
Genocide Aiding and abetting 25 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
KAMBANDA, 
Jean (guilty plea) 
Trial 19 
Octobe
r 2000 
Genocide Instigation, aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
KAMUHANDA, 
Jean de Dieu 
Appeal 19 
Septem
ber 
2005 
Genocide, extermination Ordering Life 
KANYARUKIGA 
Gaspard 
Appeal 8 May 
2012 
Genocide, extermination Planning 30 
KANYABASHI, 
Joseph 
Trial 24 June 
2011 
Genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
extermination, persecution, violence to life, health and physical 
or mental well-being of persons) 
Superior responsibility  35 
KAREMERA, 
Edouard 
Trial 2 
Februar
y 2012 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide, genocide, 
rape, extermination, and killing and causing violence to health 
and well-being 
Committing, ordering, 
instigating, aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
KARERA 
François 
Appeal 2 
Februar
y 2009 
Genocide, extermination, murder Instigating, committing, 
ordering, aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
KAYISHEMA, 
Clément  
Appeal 1 June 
2001 
Genocide Committing, instigating, 
ordering, aiding and 
Life 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
abetting 
MUHIMANA, 
Mikaeli  
Appeal 21 May 
2007 
Genocide, rape, murder Instigating, committing, 
abetting 
Life 
MUNYAKAZI, 
Yussuf  
Appeal 28 
Septem
ber 
2011 
Genocide, extermination Commission 25 
MUSEMA, Alfred Appeal 16 
Novem
ber 
2001 
Genocide, extermination Ordering, committing Life 
MUVUNYI, 
Tharcisse 
Appeal 1 April 
2011 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide Committing 15 
NAHIMANA, 
Ferdinand 
Appeal 28 
Novem
ber 
2007 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide, persecution Superior responsibility 30 
NCHAMIHIGO, 
Simeon 
Appeal 18 
March 
2010 
Genocide, murder, inhumane acts Ordering, instigating 40 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
NDAHIMANA 
Gregoire 
Trial 30 
Decem
ber 
2011 
Genocide, extermination Aiding and abetting, 
superior responsibility 
15 
NDAYAMBAJE, 
Elie 
Trial 24 June 
2011 
Genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
extermination, persecution, violence to life, health and physical 
or mental well-being of persons) 
Instigating, aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
NDINDABAHIZI
, Emmanuel  
Appeal 16 
January 
2007 
Genocide, extermination Committing, instigating, 
aiding and abetting 
Life 
NDINDILIYIMA
NA, Augustine 
Trial 17 May 
2011 
Genocide, murder, extermination Superior responsibility 11 
NGEZE, Hassan Appeal 28 
Novem
ber 
2007 
Genocide, incitement to commit genocide, extermination Aiding and abetting 35 
NGIRUMPATSE, 
Mathieu  
Trial 2 
Februar
y 2012 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide, genocide, 
rape, extermination, and killing and causing violence to health 
and well-being 
Committing, instigating, 
aiding and abetting 
Life 
NIYITEGEKA, Appeal 9 July Genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, murder, extermination, other 
Ordering Life 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Eliezer 2004 inhumane acts 
NIZEYIMANA, 
Idelphonse 
Trial 19 June 
2012 
Genocide, extermination and murder Joint criminal enterprise, 
ordering 
Life 
NSABIMANA, 
Sylvain 
Trial 24 June 
2011 
Genocide, extermination, persecution, violence to life, health 
and physical or mental well-being of persons) 
Aiding and abetting 25 
NSENGIYUMVA
, Anatole 
Appeal 14 
Decem
ber 
2011 
Genocide, murder, extermination, persecutions, serious 
violations of Article 3. 
Ordering, aiding and 
abetting 
15 
NSHOGOZA 
Léonidas 
Appeal 15 May 
2010 
Contempt of the court Committing 10 months 
NTABAKUZE, 
Aloys 
Appeal 14 
Decem
ber 
2011 
Genocide, murder, extermination, persecutions, serious 
violations of Article 3. 
Superior responsibility Life 
NTAHOBALI, 
Arsène Shalom  
Trial 24 June 
2011 
Genocide, rape, extermination, persecution, violence to life, 
health and physical or mental well-being of persons), outrages 
upon personal dignity 
Committing, ordering, and 
aiding and abetting, 
superior responsibility 
Life 
NTAKIRUTIMA Appeal 13 
Decem
Genocide, extermination Aiding and abetting 10 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
NA, Elizaphan ber 
2004 
NTAKIRUTIMA
NA, Gérard 
Appeal 13 
Decem
ber 
2004 
Genocide, murder, extermination Committing, aiding and 
abetting 
25 
NTAWUKULILY
AYO Dominique 
Appeal 14 
Decem
ber 
2013 
Genocide Aiding and abetting 20 
NTEZIRYAYO, 
Alphonse 
Trial 24 June 
2011 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide Not specified 30 
NYIRAMASUHU
KO, Pauline  
Trial 24 June 
2011 
Genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, rape, extermination, 
persecution, violence to life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons), outrages upon personal dignity 
Ordering, superior 
responsibility 
Life 
NZABIRINDA, 
Joseph (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 23 
Februar
y 2007 
Murder Not specified 7 
NZUWONEMEY
E, François-
Trial 17 May 
2011 
Murder Committing, ordering, 
aiding and abetting 
20 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Xavier  
NZABONIMANA
, Callixte 
Trial 31 May 
2012 
Genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, extermination 
Committing, instigating Life 
RENZAHO 
Tharcisse 
Appeal 1 April 
2011 
Genocide, murder Ordering, aiding abetting, 
superior responsibility 
Life 
RUGAMBARAR
A, Juvénal (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 16 
Novem
ber200
7 
Extermination Superior responsibility 11 
RUGGIU, 
Georges (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 1 June 
2000 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide, persecution Committing 12 
RUKUNDO, 
Emmanuel  
Appeal 20 
Octobe
r 2010 
Genocide, murder, extermination Aiding and abetting 23 
RUTAGANDA, 
George 
Trial 6 
Decem
ber 
1999 
Genocide, extermination, murder Committing, aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
RUTAGANIRA 
Vincent (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 14 May 
2005 
Extermination Aiding and abetting (by 
omission) 
6 
RUZINDANA, 
Obed 
Appeal 1 June 
2001 
 Committing, instigating, 
ordering, aiding and 
abetting 
25 
SAGAHUTU, 
Innocent  
Trial 17 May 
2011 
Murder Committing, ordering, 
aiding and abetting 
20 
SEMANZA, 
Laurent 
Appeal 10 May 
2005 
Genocide, complicity in genocide, extermination, rape, torture Committing, aiding and 
abetting, ordering 
35 
SEROMBA, 
Athanase 
Appeal 12 
March 
2008 
Genocide, extermination Committing, aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
SERUGENDO 
Joseph (guilty 
plea) 
Trial 12 June 
2006 
Genocide and persecution Committing  6 
SERUSHAGO, 
Omar (guilty plea) 
Trial 5 
Februar
y 1999 
Genocide, murder, extermination, torture Not specified 15 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
SETAKO, 
Ephrem 
Appeal 28 
Septem
ber 
2011 
Genocide, extermination, murder Committing, ordering 25 
SIMBA, Aloys Appeal 27 
Septem
ber 
2007 
Genocide, extermination Joint criminal enterprise 25 
SCSL 
Brima, Alex 
Tamba  
Appeal 22 
Februar
y 2008 
Extermination, murders, act of terrorism, outrages upon 
personal dignity, sexual slavery and rape 
Committing, ordering, 
planning, superior 
responsibility 
50 
Gbao, Augustine Appeal 26 
Octobe
r 2009 
Extermination, murder, rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane 
acts; violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being 
of persons; intentionally directing attacks against peacekeepers 
Joint criminal enterprise 20 
Fofana, Moinina Appeal 28 May 
2008 
Murder, violence to life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons, other inhumane acts, pillage 
Aiding and abetting, 
superior responsibility 
15 
Kallon, Morris Appeal 26 
Octobe
r 2009 
Extermination, murder, rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane 
acts; violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being 
of persons; intentionally directing attacks against peacekeepers; 
Joint criminal enterprise 40 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into 
armed forces or groups 
Kamara, Brima 
Bazzy 
Appeal 22 
Februar
y 2008 
Extermination, murders, act of terrorism, outrages upon 
personal dignity, sexual slavery and rape 
Ordering, planning, aiding 
and abetting 
45 
Kanu, Santigie 
Borbor 
Appeal 22 
Februar
y 2008 
Extermination, murders, act of terrorism, outrages upon 
personal dignity, sexual slavery and rape 
Planning, superior 
responsibility 
50 
Kondewa, Allieu Appeal 28 May 
2008 
Murder, violence to life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons, other inhumane acts, pillage, cruel treatment  
Aiding and abetting, 
superior responsibility 
20 
Sesay, Issa Hassan Appeal 26 
Octobe
r 2009 
Extermination, murder, rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane 
acts; violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being 
of persons; intentionally directing attacks against peacekeepers; 
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into 
armed forces or groups 
Joint criminal enterprise 42 
Taylor, Charles Appeal 26 
Septem
ber 
2013 
Murder, rape, enslavement, terrorism, outrages upon personal 
dignity, violence to life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons, in particular cruel treatment, pillage 
Planning, aiding and 
abetting 
50 
ICC 
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Name of the 
Accused 
Level Date Crimes Mode of Participation Sentence 
length/nu
mber of 
years 
Lubanga Dyilo, 
Thomas 
Trial 14 
March 
2012 
Enlistment, conscription and use of children below the age of 15 
to participate actively in hostilities 
Direct co-perpetration 14 
German Katanga Trial 7 
March 
2014 
Murder, attacking a civilian population, destruction of property 
and pillaging. 
 
Contribution to the crime 
committed by a group 
(Article 25(3)(d)(ii)) 
TBD 
ECCC 
KAING Guek Eav 
alias ‘DUCH’ 
Appeal 3 
Februar
y 2012 
Persecution, extermination (encompassing murder), 
enslavement, imprisonment, torture, and other inhumane acts. 
Joint criminal enterprise, 
planning, instigating, 
ordering, aiding and 
abetting 
Life 
 
